How would rules conjure a concept? It's probably that both rules and concepts are elements of post hoc analysis of language. — frank

The difference between prescriptive rules (how one ought to behave), and descriptive rules (post hoc inductive statements about behaviour) is very important. I understand a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement. However, in educational institutions we are taught to use certain words according to strict rules of application, like my example of "triangle". In this case the rules are prescriptive, and this is what I've argued is constitutive of "concepts".

Both use in practice and formulation of a rule are aspects of concepts. — Ludwig V

I agree that both are aspects of concepts, but I also argue that what you call use of words in practice extends far beyond the use concepts. So "use in practice" is a very large category, and the majority of it does not involve concepts. And, I argue that this is a very important point to understand if we want a proper representation of "use in practice". If we assume that all "use in practice" involves concepts, then we'll end up saying that all communication, even that done by other animals involves concepts. Therefore I think we need some rules as to what exactly "a concept" is, and we need to adhere to those rules in discussions like this.

You could say that there are two different, but related, concepts here, or you could say that there are sufficient similarities between the two to justify calling them one. — Ludwig V

The point is that you cannot call two distinct sets of rules for using a specific word "one concept", without allowing for the possibility of contradiction inhering within that concept. So in your example of distinct uses of "game", things which one person would qualify as "a game" would be disallowed by the other, so you'd end up having contradictory uses of "game" being allowed for by "the same concept". This means that your proposition for "concept" allows for a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Again, there are several varieties of football - different concepts of it if you like, since there are formal books of rules. It isn't a usually a problem. I don't see the point of arguing about it. — Ludwig V

It is a problem for anyone who claims that the different varieties are "the same game", though having different sets of rules. if two different teams want to play the same game, "football" and they each have different sets of rules, that's a very real problem. They have to hammer out their differences and decide on one game to play. They can't each be playing a different game, and insist that it is the same because they both have the same name. Likewise with concepts, if we want to have a logical discussion, we can't each be proceeding with different rules of usage for the same word, and insist that it is the same concept. That's a fallacy known as equivocation.

So, in my view, the use of the word in practice is more important that whether an explicitly formulated rule is being followed. — Ludwig V

For logical procedures following explicitly formulated rules is of primary importance. I agree that use of the word in practice may sometimes serve as a guideline for creation of those rules, especially if common practice already follows from a field of discipline (rule guided). But in many cases, the principle of "use of the word in practice", just serves to deliver equivocation, therefore it must be curbed for philosophy and logical procedures.

I agree that we have the concept of “freedom” and there are rules as to how the word “freedom” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does).

But there are no rules as to why we have the concept “freedom” in the first place (rules as to what the concept is) — RussellA

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".

How could you use the word “freedom” in a sentence if you did not know what freedom meant, did not know the concept of freedom. — RussellA

That's simple, you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts.

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".....................you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In language there is the word “freedom”, and although it is commonly used, I agree that it has no publicly accepted meaning, concept or definition.

As regards copying, person A sees person B say “freedom” and be given a sailing boat. Person A wants a sailing boat and therefore also says “freedom” on the expectation that they are given a sailing boat.

Person A copies person B’s behaviour saying “freedom” because they have the prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A would remain motionless if they had no prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A only speaks because they have a prior concept.

Person A may want the sailing boat in order to sail across the Atlantic, and person B may want the sailing boat in order to sail at the weekends. It could be that every member of the linguistic community has a different meaning or concept of “freedom”.

I agree that “freedom” is a word commonly used in a vast variety of different ways.

The expression “freedom” has a meaning in language because it is associated with observable, empirical behaviour, even if everyone’s meaning or concept of “freedom” is different.

The problem with using your own private language is that there wouldn't be a way to confirm rules. That same issue shows up if you ask yourself what rules you've been following up till now. There's no fact of the matter. — frank

Can you not make up your own rules for own private language, confirm and agree with the other member who uses the private language too?

Yes, it is a point to mull over as you indicated. Will get back for further thoughts on the point, if crops up.

The rule of random determination? Can't randomness be considered as a rule? — Corvus


Not as a rule. — RussellA

There seem many things operating under the rule of random selection or random events. Consider the lottery jackpot numbers drawn from 50 numbers plus 12 lucky star numbers. The winning jackpot numbers consists of 5 numbers and 2 lucky star numbers randomly chosen. No one can predict or say why those numbers came out. But they do.

Another example, consider your own birth. Was there a rule for you having been born as yourself?
Can you explain why you were born as RussellA? Nope. I guess not. It was a pure random event. But there you are.

Many things happen and exist without explanation why. That is the truth of reality. Is it not?

There seem many things operating under the rule of random selection or random events. — Corvus

Chess has rules and society has laws that are consciously made by humans

They say that we are living in a rule-governed universe that operates according to the laws of nature, meaning that there are rules and laws operating independently of humans.

Because humans are a part of the Universe, and our concepts are part of us, it may well be that our concepts are rule-governed operating according to the laws of nature. I don’t know.

Because humans are a part of the Universe, and our concepts are part of us, it may well be that our concepts are rule-governed operating according to the laws of nature. I don’t know. — RussellA

Chess has rules and society has laws that are consciously made by humans — RussellA

Not sure about the universe - how large it is and how it began. One thing seems to be clear is that concepts are made by man. Western chess has its rules, but the Chinese chess has it own rules, and Japanese chess called "Go" has its own rules too, which are all different and specific on how they work.

On the concept of freedom, you could write a dissertation on its origin of the word, analysis of the meaning and uses of the concept, if needed.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule. And in some cases, there is no rule for something such as random events and operations, and that is a rule too.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule. — Corvus

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule.
— Corvus

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements. — RussellA

I don’t think that’s right, and the regress you set up is a good way to see why.

If rules were “nothing but social agreements,” then you really would need an extra rule that says “now follow the rules,” and then another, and so on. But in real life we don’t add an continuous stack of meta-rules. We get trained into a practice where “following the rule” is already part of the technique, shown in what counts as going on correctly, what's a correction, what's a mistake. It's not a separate agreement; it’s built into what we do.

Also, agreement isn’t enough. A group can agree on a rule and still misunderstand it, misapply it, or disagree in cases about what counts as following it. That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction.

I’d say it like this, rules aren’t private rails, but they also aren’t social contracts. They’re norms embodied in shared practices, and that’s why the regress stops in “this is how we go on,” not in a further agreement to agree.

As you are probably aware, hinges are central to what some call the "third Wittgenstein". Although you do not make that claim here, I wonder whether hinges are given undue attention and importance.

If hinges are a tool then what is their function beyond being a corrective to radical skepticism? Surely even a philosopher can see that there are many things what we accept without question. But it is questionable whether everything we accept without question is a hinge. What turns on the claims that there’s an external world,” that “Other people exist,” that “I have a body,” and “The world didn’t begin five minutes ago”?

On the other hand the fact that we do not question some things is not in itself a good reason not to question them.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not tell us what does or does not count as a hinge. The only example he gives us is the mathematical proposition (655).

It is not clear whether Wittgenstein intended to restrict the use of the term hinge so as to exclude pre-linguistic practices and activities, but it is questionable whether everything that is not doubted is a hinge. The term hinge is used three times. The first is explicitly about propositions (OC 341). The second refers to investigations and assumptions. (OC 343)

Between these two statements about hinges and connecting them he says:

... it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

( OC 342)

The third, as already mentioned is about mathematical propositions. (655)

It may be that his use of the term 'hinge' does not refer to human forms of life but rather to specific forms of life shaped and informed by science.

I agree that it is sometimes possible to know the cause of a broken window, in that someone may have filmed it, but it is impossible to know the inner cause of someone grimacing. — RussellA

It's difficult to express the point clearly. "the inner cause of someone grimacing" could be taken to refer to the sensation of pain. But the private language argument shows that there's no such thing. So we need to explain that if we are to be quite clear.

For example, the fact that I may not know what “Je veux deux pommes” means does not mean that it is not part of a language. — RussellA

True. But lots of people do know what it means. No-one knows what "slithy" means, because it doesn't mean anything. It is just a noise. Lewis Carroll was having fun writing something that sounded like language but wasn't.

For example, the fact that I may not know what “Je veux deux pommes” means does not mean that it is not part of a language — RussellA

But it is part of a language. So lots of people know what it means.

In the world, there are a total of four things if two things are alongside another two things. — RussellA

Yes but the sign "+" does not refer to that fact. It is, in effect an instruction to do something, so it can't refer to anything.

There are no unicorns, but the word “unicorn” still refers to something. — RussellA

But it does not refer to some thing. Unicorns are mythical creatures, so they do not exist, so "unicorn" cannot refer to them. You could, I suppose say that "unicorn" refers to the myths in which the stories occur, but that is a very different kind of reference from the one you seemed to have in mind.

Betrand Russell distinguished between phrases that refer to non-existent entities and those that refer to actual objects. For instance, "the present King of France" refers to a non-existent entity, while "the present King of England" refers to a specific, existing individual. (Wikipedia) So we can refer to both existent and non-existent things. — RussellA

No, Russell's point, as I understood it that propositions that appear to refer to non-existent entities can be assigned a truth value by interpreting "The present king of France is bald" by analysing it as consisting of two claims - 1) that there is a king of France and 2) that he is bald. A conjunction of two sentences is true iff both conjuncts are true. In this case one of the conjuncts is false, because the reference fails, so the entire sentence is false. No non-existent entities required.

You seem to have a generous soul. Your concept of language is generous. So is your concept of reference.

One of Wittgenstein’s most useful tools is noticing when a word has stepped out of its ordinary work. We're using the word, but it’s no longer doing the job it normally does, and this is when language goes on holiday to Bermuda. — Sam26

Sometimes we stretch meanings or apply them in new ways, but it is not always going on holiday. Sometimes it is putting words to work in new ways. Perhaps I'm being picky, but I think it would be wrong to think that a new use is always, as one might say, the engine idling.

But it’s false if you hear “everyday use” as “the average person’s current opinions or sloppy speech is the standard.” Witt isn’t taking a poll. Use includes the practice’s norms, how words are taught, corrected, and applied. Ordinary use includes skilled and technical language games too, medicine, law, mathematics, because those are also ordinary human practices with standards. — Sam26

There are different registers of language, appropriate to specific kinds of occasion. Informal usage is one thing, formal usage somewhat different. One register for the law courts, another for a late night in the pub, and so on. Yet it is true that our approach in philosophy does assume a common understanding of correctness in language which might not always be appropriate. This was more or less taken for granted until somewhere in the 'sixties. Less so now. It could be very difficult, but seems to work well enough on the whole.

I understand a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not unjustified. The only enforcement pressure for the "rules" of language is not being understood or being misunderstood. But that is seriously undermined by our ability to understand what people mean to say even if they say it in a way that breaks the rules.

If we assume that all "use in practice" involves concepts, then we'll end up saying that all communication, even that done by other animals involves concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see why we should not allow that animals have concepts. It would be hard to understand them if we did not.

Therefore I think we need some rules as to what exactly "a concept" is, and we need to adhere to those rules in discussions like this. — Metaphysician Undercover

The trouble is that you and I can recommend, but we have absolutely no power to enforce anything.

if two different teams want to play the same game, "football" and they each have different sets of rules, that's a very real problem. They have to hammer out their differences and decide on one game to play. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. But they can decide to play either game, or play one the first week, the other the second and so on. It's only a problem if they try to play both games at the same time.

As you are probably aware, hinges are central to what some call the "third Wittgenstein". Although you do not make that claim here, I wonder whether hinges are given undue attention and importance.

If hinges are a tool then what is their function beyond being a corrective to radical skepticism? Surely even a philosopher can see that there are many things what we accept without question. But it is questionable whether everything we accept without question is a hinge. What turns on the claims that there’s an external world,” that “Other people exist,” that “I have a body,” and “The world didn’t begin five minutes ago”?

On the other hand the fact that we do not question some things is not in itself a good reason not to question them.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not tell us what does or does not count as a hinge. The only example he gives us is the mathematical proposition (655).

It is not clear whether Wittgenstein intended to restrict the use of the term hinge so as to exclude pre-linguistic practices and activities, but it is questionable whether everything that is not doubted is a hinge. The term hinge is used three times. The first is explicitly about propositions (OC 341). The second refers to investigations and assumptions. (OC 343)

Between these two statements about hinges and connecting them he says:

... it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
( OC 342)

The third, as already mentioned is about mathematical propositions. (655)

It may be that his use of the term 'hinge' does not refer to human forms of life but rather to specific forms of life shaped and informed by science. — Fooloso4

I think this seriously understates what hinges are doing in OC, and it also makes two points that don’t hold up.

First, hinges aren’t just a “corrective to radical skepticism.” They’re Witt’s way of describing the grammar of doubt and inquiry. Doubt is not a free-floating attitude you can apply to anything. For doubt to be intelligible, some things have to stand fast, not because we’ve proved them, but because they are part of what makes checking, testing, and correction possible. That’s a conceptual point about how doubt, evidence, and investigation function, not a special attack against skeptics.

Second, “not questioning isn’t a good reason not to question” misses the target. Hinges aren’t defended by “we happen not to doubt them.” The point is that certain doubts don’t amount to a hill of beans, they don’t connect to any practice of checking. If you say, “Maybe I don’t have a body” or “Maybe the world began five minutes ago,” what would count as testing that? What would count as evidence either way? If there’s no answer, then the doubt isn’t courageous, it’s idle, it pulls the word doubt out of any meaningful role.

Third, you ask “what turns on” claims like “there is an external world” or “other people exist.” The answer is everything ordinary. Testimony, memory, perception, measurement, correction, surprise, learning. The whole business of “we checked,” “we found out,” “we were mistaken,” “the instrument was misreading,” already presupposes a stable background in which those activities make sense. That’s what “turns on” them.

Fourth, the “Witt doesn’t tell us what counts as a hinge” complaint sets the wrong expectation. Different propositions can function as hinges in different contexts, and many hinges are not even voiced as propositions most of the time. That’s why he talks of propositions, assumptions, and the “logic of our investigations.” He’s mapping a function, not compiling some list.

Finally, the idea that hinges might be restricted to science is too narrow. He says “it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations,” yes, but the point generalizes about inquiry of almost any kind, viz., it depends on what stands fast. Science is just an especially clear case because it makes “testing” and “error” explicit. The underlying structure is part of our broader form of life, not something created by science. Moreover, any belief system that can function as a system of assessment, correction, and inference will have something that stands fast for it. You can’t evaluate, test, or justify everything at once, because justification and testing always operate against a background. So, every workable system has hinge certainties / bedrock certainties of some kind.

Again, hinges aren’t “everything we accept without question,” and they aren’t a mere anti-skeptic patch. They show the background conditions that make doubt, evidence, and investigation intelligible.

But it’s false if you hear “everyday use” as “the average person’s current opinions or sloppy speech is the standard.” Witt isn’t taking a poll. Use includes the practice’s norms, how words are taught, corrected, and applied. Ordinary use includes skilled and technical language games too, medicine, law, mathematics, because those are also ordinary human practices with standards.
— Sam26
There are different registers of language, appropriate to specific kinds of occasion. Informal usage is one thing, formal usage somewhat different. One register for the law courts, another for a late night in the pub, and so on. Yet it is true that our approach in philosophy does assume a common understanding of correctness in language which might not always be appropriate. This was more or less taken for granted until somewhere in the 'sixties. Less so now. It could be very difficult, but seems to work well enough on the whole. — Ludwig V

I agree with most of that. Different registers, legal, technical, pub talk, all have their own standards, and Witt’s “use” point fits that well. There isn’t one absolute or global yardstick of correctness that floats above all contexts, correctness is internal to the specific language game and the context.

Where I’d adjust what you say is the following: philosophy doesn’t assume a single standard of correctness across all registers. Wit’s method is often to stop philosophers from importing the standards of one register into another, like treating everyday “know” as if it must behave like courtroom proof or treating psychological talk as if it's like physics. A lot of philosophical confusion comes from exactly that cross-register mix up.

Witt’s point isn’t “anything goes.” Even informal talk has standards, you can misuse words, you can be corrected, you can be asked “what do you mean?” The standards are just local, practical, and often implicit, which is why philosophy needs careful overviews rather than a theory of “correctness in general.”

Person A copies person B’s behaviour saying “freedom” because they have the prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A would remain motionless if they had no prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A only speaks because they have a prior concept. — RussellA

This is not true. Have you never watched a child learn to speak? It is not true that a person "only speaks because they have a prior concept". Your example is not even making sense to me.

The expression “freedom” has a meaning in language because it is associated with observable, empirical behaviour, even if everyone’s meaning or concept of “freedom” is different. — RussellA

So you are saying that there are as many concepts of "freedom" as there are people who use that word? Wouldn't this amount to us each having one's own private language? And isn't this exactly the type of conclusion which Wittgenstein is trying to avoid? There is no beetle in the box, no concept of freedom in the mind. That's what the beetle analogy is meant to show, this is a faulty way of looking at things.

That is not unjustified. The only enforcement pressure for the "rules" of language is not being understood or being misunderstood. But that is seriously undermined by our ability to understand what people mean to say even if they say it in a way that breaks the rules. — Ludwig V

That's right, that's why I said "a dictionary definition as principally a post hoc inductive statement". It's just a generalization making an inductive statement about how the word is commonly used. It is a descriptive rule rather than prescriptive. There is no "enforcement pressure", not even an implied ought.

I don't see why we should not allow that animals have concepts. It would be hard to understand them if we did not. — Ludwig V

You are not making sense any more Ludwig. Why does understanding something require that the thing which is understood has concepts? We can understand through behavioural patterns. The sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening on a very regular basis, and this allow us to understand the solar system. Would you say that we couldn't understand the solar system if it doesn't have concepts?

That's right. But they can decide to play either game, or play one the first week, the other the second and so on. It's only a problem if they try to play both games at the same time. — Ludwig V

Yes, that's the point, it would be two distinct concepts of "football", not one concept. And if we tried to insist that there is one concept of football we'd have to acknowledge internal contradiction within the concept.

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However, in educational institutions we are taught to use certain words according to strict rules of application, like my example of "triangle". In this case the rules are prescriptive, and this is what I've argued is constitutive of "concepts". — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you arguing that without prescriptive rules for word usage, the concept wouldn't exist? What about the smaller concepts that make up a triangle, like 3 and polygon. Do those also reduce to prescriptive rules?

Tool 14: Aspect Seeing, “Now I see it as…”

Aspect seeing is Witt’s tool for showing that a picture can be seen as different descriptions/things, it's a shift in how we’re seeing what’s there. Think of the duck rabbit or seeing the same drawing now as a cube facing one way, then another. Nothing in the lines changes, but what you see changes.

It matters philosophically because it exposes a common temptation. We often think there must be one forced description, one correct “what's really there,” and that competing descriptions must be competing hypotheses. Aspect seeing demonstrates that in many cases the argument is not about hidden facts, but about how we are seeing the thing, what concept/s we are bringing to the picture, or what role the picture plays. Our psychology (especially ego, we don't want to lose the argument) often plays a role in the way we picture things.

This is where Wittgenstein makes the connection between seeing and understanding. “Now I see it” can mean “Now I get it.” You were staring at the same words, the same proof, the same remark, but you couldn’t find your way. Then an intermediate link clicks into place and you suddenly see the connections. That shift is not a private mental thing, it shows itself in how we go on, explain, apply, correct, and anticipate objections.

Aspect seeing is also a therapy tool. When a philosophical debate is stuck, Wittgenstein tries to get you to see it by shifting your aspect. Not to win by force, but to loosen the grip of a picture that has made one way of talking feel compulsory. The aim is not relativism, but flexibility, learning when a description is doing real work and when it’s just holding us captive. You can see it going on in this thread, people have a difficult time shifting their frame of reference. They get stuck into a way of seeing reality. This is true of all of us; we all do it.

I see it even when I play chess.

But in real life we don’t add an continuous stack of meta-rules. We get trained into a practice where “following the rule” is already part of the technique, shown in what counts as going on correctly, what's a correction, what's a mistake. It's not a separate agreement; it’s built into what we do......................That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction………….They’re norms embodied in shared practices — Sam26

This makes sense within a Form of Life, but the philosophical problem is how do we choose between different Forms of Life.

Within a Form of Life
For a language game to have meaning it must have rules. As you say, “That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction”. Following the rule is part of our training within a Form of Life and are norms within shared practices. Meaning is use within this Form of Life (PI 43).

Wittgenstein raises the rule following paradox in PI 201, where no course of action could be determined by a rule as every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule, but dismisses it. He dismisses it because this is what it means to be a Form of Life. He writes in PI 219 "when I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey it blindly" and in PI 198 “I have a custom”. Within the Form of Life we have been trained, customs underpin meaning and we are embedded in a community of language users.

Kripke in his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language gives his own example of the rule following paradox. Does the symbol “+” mean we follow the rule of addition or the rule of quaddition. For example, both may give the same result for numbers under 1,000 but may give different examples for numbers over 1,000 (@AtticPhilosophy, Wittgenstein and the Rule Following Paradox)

It makes sense that within a Form of Life there are in effect hinge rules that establish the framework of the language Game, such as “god exists”, which as hinge propositions are exempt from doubt.

Hinge propositions
Within a Language Game within a Form of Life, some propositions are exempt from doubt. They are not beliefs, not objects of knowledge, not subject to evaluation, not open to rational evaluation. They are ungrounded presuppositions, immune to enquiry, absent of evidence, objective certainties, not truth-apt and to reject them would be to reject all our knowledge. They are part of the framework of the Language Game, not part of the content of the Language Game, pre-rational certainties. Moore’s mistake was to say “I know there is a hand” rather than “there is a hand” (IEP, Wittgenstein: Epistemology)

The role of philosophy
Kripke was criticised because his is a philosophical solution, whereas Wittgenstein sets philosophy aside. Wittgenstein makes sense as to meaning within a Language Game within its own Form of Life, but avoids the philosophical problem of how do we know which Form of Life we should choose. Should we be part of the Form of Life that “god exists” or part of the Form of Life that “god does not exists”, should we be part of the Form of Life that “Direct Realism” describes reality or “Indirect Realism” describes reality and should we be part of the Form of Life that “democracy is the best form of government” or “an autocracy is the best for of government”.

As you say “That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction”. This is true within a particular Form of Life having its own Language Game, but the philosophical question, which Wittgenstein avoids, is why should we choose one set of hinge rules over a different set of hinge rules. Why should we choose the hinge rule that “god exists” rather than the hinge rule that “god does not exist”, for example.

There is no "enforcement pressure", not even an implied ought. — Metaphysician Undercover

Any enforcement pressure comes from other people, and our reaction to what they say and do. I also apply pressure to other people. Like jostling in a queue.

Yes, that's the point, it would be two distinct concepts of "football", not one concept. And if we tried to insist that there is one concept of football we'd have to acknowledge internal contradiction within the concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's not really anything to argue about here. Of course, there are two different games (concepts). I practice, though, we have chosen to recognize a common element or at least a common origin for these games. That why we call them "Rugby football", "Australian rules", "American", "Association". All of them derive, as I understand the history, from a common (entirely informal) ancestor.

You are not making sense any more Ludwig. Why does understanding something require that the thing which is understood has concepts? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. I didn't mean to imply that we need to understand the sun in terms of its own concepts. I shouldn't generalize about animals here, because they are very different. But some animals are sufficiently like us that we need to apply some of the concepts to them as we apply to each other. That's all. I have a feeling however, that you would draw the line in a different place from me. We would, I think, agree that bacteria fall outside the scope of this and, most likely, that plants do as well (though some people do contest that). Perhaps most fish. Whales and dolphins?? You get the picture, I'm sure.

Are you arguing that without prescriptive rules for word usage, the concept wouldn't exist? What about the smaller concepts that make up a triangle, like 3 and polygon. Do those also reduce to prescriptive rules? — frank

It seems to me that you are making a case for the fundamental and inescapable importance of ordinary life. It seems to echo Ryle's distinction between technical and untechnical concepts. (That's a good thing, BTW)

Where I’d adjust what you say is the following: philosophy doesn’t assume a single standard of correctness across all registers. Wit’s method is often to stop philosophers from importing the standards of one register into another, like treating everyday “know” as if it must behave like courtroom proof or treating psychological talk as if it's like physics. A lot of philosophical confusion comes from exactly that cross-register mix up. — Sam26

I'm glad we agree on so much. My concern is that Wittgenstein, (and those who write about him) seem very often to think that "going on holiday" or "cross-register confusion" are easy to identify and categorize - and file in the appropriate place. So, I find myself thinking here that sometimes cross-register mixes are appropriate and need to be worked through, not dismissed. (See, for example, my post above about animals.)

Have you never watched a child learn to speak? It is not true that a person "only speaks because they have a prior concept". — Metaphysician Undercover

A child hears their parent say “toy” and sees them pick up a toy. Already the child has a concept of “toy”, because they have heard "toy" and seen a toy.
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And isn't this exactly the type of conclusion which Wittgenstein is trying to avoid? There is no beetle in the box, no concept of freedom in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein is not saying that there is no beetle in the box. He is saying that because no one can see into anyone else’s box, each person’s beetle could be different.

Despite this, people can still use “beetle” in conversation.

The beetle could be pain. Wittgenstein is not saying that people don’t have inner feelings

A public language allows communication about inner feelings, not directly, in that no one can know another’s pain, but indirectly, on the assumption that inner feelings are linked to outward behaviour. For example, grimacing, which is empirically observable, thereby enabling public conversations about “ pain”.

The meaning of the word “pain” in a public language is directly determined by empirically observable outward behaviour, and only indirectly by an assumed inner feeling.

On the one hand it is true that meaning in language is directly determined by public and observable objective criteria, but on the other hand, there is the assumption within language that outward behaviour has been caused by inner feelings.

It is therefore true that a public language cannot be based on inner feelings alone.

"the inner cause of someone grimacing" could be taken to refer to the sensation of pain. But the private language argument shows that there's no such thing. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein never said that we had no inner feelings.

PI 257 What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)?
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Yes but the sign "+" does not refer to that fact. It is, in effect an instruction to do something, so it can't refer to anything. — Ludwig V

If I hear someone say “it is hot today”, I know it refers to it being hot today. There is no instruction for me to do anything.

If I hear someone say “2+2=4”, I know it refers to two objects being alongside another two objects. There is no instruction for me to do anything.
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Unicorns are mythical creatures, so they do not exist, so "unicorn" cannot refer to them — Ludwig V

“Unicorn” refers to a mythical creature.
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No, Russell's point, as I understood it that propositions that appear to refer to non-existent entities can be assigned a truth value by interpreting "The present king of France is bald" by analysing it as consisting of two claims - 1) that there is a king of France and 2) that he is bald. A conjunction of two sentences is true iff both conjuncts are true. In this case one of the conjuncts is false, because the reference fails, so the entire sentence is false. No non-existent entities required. — Ludwig V

Russell’s definite descriptions allow us to refer to and discuss non-existent entities because we can reduce expressions, such as “the present king of France is bald”, into constituent truth-apt propositions.

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements. — RussellA

I am not sure if rules are being made on everything. Some are made, but some are inherent.
And not every rules are social agreements. There are private rules between individuals.
From my understanding, rules of concepts are the meanings. How you use concepts in sentences are the grammatical rules.

All concepts comes with its own meanings, and meanings imply the logic and rules how they should be used.

If you say "Pass me over the cup." in the restaurant, they will know what you mean and a cup will be brought to you, which is the use of the concept of cup in social settings and rules.

But if you say "Pass me over the frog.", then they will not know what you mean, even if you meant the cup. But your wife will know what you mean, because you two have the private agreement that frog means cup.

Therefore the rules of concepts can be social, private and also inherent.

But if you say "Pass me over the frog.", then they will not know what you mean, even if you meant the cup. But your wife will know what you mean, because you two have the private agreement that frog means cup. — Corvus

Yes, the meaning of a word depends on its context. In a zoo, “frog” means “a short-bodied, tailless amphibian vertebrates”, but with one’s wife it could mean “cup”.

And there are rules how a word should be used in a sentence, in that “over pass frog me the” would not be correct English

And there are rules how a word should be used in a sentence, in that “over pass frog me the” would not be correct English — RussellA

Japanese and Korean language say in the order of "Frog to me pass over." They have different order of saying words in sentences, i.e. the different rules.

Japanese and Korean language say in the order of "Frog to me pass over." They have different order of saying words in sentences, i.e. the different rules. — Corvus

Yes, each language game needs its own rules

Correct. They usually don't use "the" in sentences either. They will say "the frog", only when asked "which frog?".

Are you arguing that without prescriptive rules for word usage, the concept wouldn't exist? What about the smaller concepts that make up a triangle, like 3 and polygon. Do those also reduce to prescriptive rules? — frank

Yes, I believe that concepts like 3 and polygon exist as individuals following prescriptive rules, doing what they ought to do. It is discipline. Plato described our apprehension of concepts as dependent on "the good". "The good" according to Plato in The Republic, is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, in a way analogous with how the sun makes visible objects visible. So the urge to do what is good is what drives us to obey the prescriptive rules, and obeyance provides for the existence of intelligible objects (concepts).

A child hears their parent say “toy” and sees them pick up a toy. Already the child has a concept of “toy”, because they have heard "toy" and seen a toy. — RussellA

i don't agree, and I think that this proposal is untenable.

He is saying that because no one can see into anyone else’s box, each person’s beetle could be different. — RussellA

That's right, and as such the beetles are insufficient as analogous of "a concept". Each person's concept of "beetle" would be private and unique, so there would be no such thing as "the concept of beetle", only a multitude of distinct concepts.

The meaning of the word “pain” in a public language is directly determined by empirically observable outward behaviour, and only indirectly by an assumed inner feeling. — RussellA

You argue two inconsistent, or even opposing things. First, you argue that if a person simply observes the use of a word, they must have an inner concept of that word. Now, you ague that the meaning of the word is dependent on the person' use of the word. The latter denies the possibility of the former. The person could not have a concept for the word, prior to demonstrating "empirically observable outward behaviour" of such, unless you are saying that the person could have a concept of the word without the word having any meaning for the person.

If I hear someone say “2+2=4”, I know it refers to two objects being alongside another two objects. There is no instruction for me to do anything. — RussellA

So what is going on when the waiter adds up the bill (whether by pushing buttons on a machinie or the old-fashioned way)?

“Unicorn” refers to a mythical creature. — RussellA

So is it false to say that unicorns don't exist?

Russell’s definite descriptions allow us to refer to and discuss non-existent entities because we can reduce expressions, such as “the present king of France is bald”, into constituent truth-apt propositions. — RussellA

That's right. He shows how to talk about non-existent entities without referring to them.

Wittgenstein never said that we had no inner feelings.
PI 257 What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)? — RussellA

No, indeed, he did not. Much depends, however, on what you say next - I mean, how you conceive of inner feelings. One way of expressing this is to ask whether the outward signs of pain are connected to the inner feelings on the basis of an empirical inference - that is, whether there are two events here, one outer and visible, and one inner and invisible to anyone except the patient. If you say yes, I shall ask how you connect the outward signs to the inner feelings if you have no access to them.

You’re raising a bunch of issues, and they get tangled because “form of life,” “hinge,” and “worldview” are being treated as if they’re the same kind of thing. They're not.

Forms of life and “choosing between them.”
Witt’s “form of life” is usually the shared human backdrop of practices that makes language, rule following, correction, and inquiry possible. It’s not typically “theism versus atheism,” “direct versus indirect realism,” or “democracy versus autocracy.” Those are competing doctrines, theories, and political commitments inside a more basic form of life where we already count, measure, infer, correct, argue, and so on. The “philosophical problem of choosing between forms of life” is not the problem. We do make choices, shift commitments, and so on, but we’re rarely choosing between forms of life from some meta or neutral standpoint.

PI 201, PI 219, and “obeying blindly.”
Witt’s reply to the rule following question/anxiety isn’t “custom makes it fine, end of story,” and it isn’t “we vote on correctness.” The point is that interpretation isn't the whole story, because interpretations also need a way of being applied. At some point you master of a technique, you go on without consulting a further interpretation. That’s the sense of “blind.” It doesn’t mean “irrational” and it doesn’t mean “infallible.” You can still be wrong, but the very notion of being wrong only makes sense within a practice where there are correct or incorrect standards.

Kripke’s quaddition.
Kripke’s is helpful as a stress test, but it gets its force by removing the training and the settled mathematical practice that fixes what “+” is in our lives. In actual arithmetic, “+” is not fixed by a private mental episode, and not by agreement either. It’s fixed by a teachable technique with correction, proofs, applications, and convergence across our practices. Quaddition is bit of a trick, but it’s not a real candidate inside a practice unless you explicitly introduce a new rule and add a practice around it.

Hinges are not “whatever we don’t question.”
I agree not everything we accept without question is a hinge. A hinge is a role, not a list. It’s what stands fast so that inquiry, doubt, checking, and error detection can get traction. That’s why I also don’t like descriptions that make hinges “not truth apt” across the board. They can be true or false in principle, but while they function as hinges, they aren’t generally what we put on trial, because they are part of what makes the testing possible.

This is where my terminology matters. When I say hinge certainty, or bedrock certainties, I do not mean epistemic certainty, and I definitely don’t mean absolute certainty. I’m marking a functional role, what stands fast in our practices.

Moore.
Yes, Moore’s mistake is largely grammatical. The oddness is not primarily the content “Here is a hand,” but how he uses “I know” in a place where the language game of giving reasons, checking, and defeating doubts has no grouding.

“God exists” as a hinge.
This is where I disagree. “God exists” can be treated as nonnegotiable within a religious community, but that doesn’t automatically make it a hinge in Witt’s sense. For most ordinary language games, “God exists” is not part of the scaffolding that makes checking and correction possible. It’s a metaphysical or doctrinal commitment that people argue about, even within the community. So, I’d classify it closer to a worldview commitment, often backed by subjective certainty (conviction), sometimes defended as knowledge, but not typically functioning as hinge certainty in the same way as “there are physical objects,” “other people exist,” or “this is how counting works” does.

Does Witt “avoid” the real question?
I don’t think so. He rejects a picture of the question that assumes there must be a neutral standpoint from which we justify our framework. Where hinges really diverge, reasons eventually bottom out, not because nothing matters, but because argument needs shared bedrock or foundational support. What remains is how we actually handle error, correction, and inquiry, including persuasion and reorientation. That’s not a dodge, it’s a diagnosis of the limits of “proof” when the background itself is what’s in dispute. This is true even in mathematics.

and others.

I want to speak to something that keeps happening in this thread, because it's a good example of the very confusion Witt's tools are meant to address.

Several responses keep making the same argument but in different forms. For e.g., without inner feelings there'd be no language games, therefore language games exist because of inner feelings, therefore when we say "I feel xyz" the meaning of that is my inner feeling of xyz.
The first part is okay, but the conclusion doesn't follow.

Without oxygen there'd be no fires. From that statement it doesn't follow that "fire" means oxygen, or that oxygen is what gives meaning to fire talk. Oxygen is a condition for fires existing. It isn't what makes our fire concepts work. When a firefighter says, "the fire is spreading to the second floor," the meaning of that is fixed by the role it plays, what counts as checking it, etc. Oxygen is presupposed, but it's not doing the semantic work.

It's the same with inner life and meaning. Without any inner life we wouldn't have our language games, whcih is a point about the conditions under which language exists. It's not a point about what gives particular expressions their meaning. Those are two different questions, and confusing them is what forces me to keep making the same clarification.

This isn't just a technicality. If meaning were fixed by private inner objects, you'd need a way to pin the right word to the right inner item privately, with no public check, which is crucial. Wittgenstein shows that this move destroys the thing it's supposed to explain. You can't distinguish "I'm using the word correctly" from "it just seems right to me," because there's no independent standard. That's the private language argument in miniature, and it's not a denial that you have feelings. It's showing that feelings alone can't do the work required.

What drives the misreading is the assumption that meaning must work by a word pointing at some thing, and if outer objects are ruled out, then an inner object is all we're left with. That assumption is exactly what Wittgenstein is trying to dislodge. Meaning doesn't need a hidden referent, inner or outer. It needs a practice, i.e., training, use, correction, context, the possibility of getting it right or wrong in ways others can recognize (no one has access to your inner processes, so there's no way to standardize them). That's not behaviorism, because it doesn't reduce meaning to bodily movement. And it's not mentalism, because it doesn't put meaning in a private theater. It's a third option, and the difficulty people keep having is the difficulty of seeing that this third option is even there.

When I say "inner states don't fix meaning," I'm not saying they don't exist or don't matter. I'm saying they can't play the specific role that keeps being assigned to them, the role of a private foundation that makes meaning possible by itself, apart from any shared practice. Once that's understood, most of the objections in this thread disappear, because they all depend on pushing Witt back into a choice between behaviorism and mentalism, which is something he refused.

That's right, and as such the beetles are insufficient as analogous of "a concept". Each person's concept of "beetle" would be private and unique, so there would be no such thing as "the concept of beetle", only a multitude of distinct concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, my concept of “beetle” must be different to yours because we have lived different lives in different countries and have had different experiences.

There is no one dictionary definition of “beetle”, only a multitude of distinct concepts.
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First, you argue that if a person simply observes the use of a word, they must have an inner concept of that word. Now, you ague that the meaning of the word is dependent on the person' use of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is the stage of learning the meaning of a word and the stage of knowing a word.

In the learning stage, a child can play with a toy without knowing its name. They gain a concept of the object when they play with the object, ie, use the object. The child then hears their parent say “toy” when the parent picks up the toy. The child can learn to associate the name “toy” with the object toy and their concept of toy.

Subsequent to the learning stage, a person knows the concept of toy and knows its name “toy”, and as when a child are able to use the toy.

A person can have an inner concept of an object prior to knowing the name of the object.

So what is going on when the waiter adds up the bill (whether by pushing buttons on a machinie or the old-fashioned way)? — Ludwig V

Yes, that is when someone says “add 2+2”. That is different to someone saying "2+2=4".
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So is it false to say that unicorns don't exist? — Ludwig V

Unicorns exist in fiction.
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He shows how to talk about non-existent entities without referring to them. — Ludwig V

It is impossible to talk about something without referring to it.
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I shall ask how you connect the outward signs to the inner feelings if you have no access to them. — Ludwig V

By inference. If when I feel pain I grimace, when I see someone else grimace I infer that they also are feeling pain.