You’re raising a bunch of issues, and they get tangled because “form of life,” “hinge,” and “worldview” are being treated as if they’re the same kind of thing. They're not. — Sam26

I agree that a hinge is not the same kind of thing as a form of life, but the hinge is crucial to there being a form of life in the first place.
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Witt’s “form of life” is usually the shared human backdrop of practices that makes language, rule following, correction, and inquiry possible. It’s not typically “theism versus atheism,” “direct versus indirect realism,” or “democracy versus autocracy.” — Sam26

Are theism and atheism different forms of life in Wittgenstein’s terms?

I would say that they are. Wittgenstein's "form of life" refers to the shared cultural practices, activities, and ways of living that provide the context for language and meaning (Wikipedia), and theism and atheism have many practices, activities and ways of living that are not shared.

One’s language is closely linked to one’s form of life, and the more diverse one’s language the more diverse one’s form of life. The theist and atheist certainly have different language games.

PI 19 And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
PI 23 Here the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life
PI 241 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.

I am not saying the situation is black and white, In that there are degrees of difference. For example the form of life of a theist is different to the form of life of an atheist, but not as different as the form of life of a human and the form of life of a lion.

However, that the language game of a theist is different to the language game of an atheist, then so must be their form of life.
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We do make choices, shift commitments, and so on, but we’re rarely choosing between forms of life from some meta or neutral standpoint. — Sam26

This is the point I am making. The Wittgensteinian man in the street rarely chooses between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint, but this is the role of the philosopher. The philosopher should be trying to choose between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint

It is the role of the philosopher, sidetracked by Wittgenstein, to stand outside our language games, forms of life, hinge propositions and rules accepted by custom in order to attempt to understand the bigger picture.

It is the role of the philosopher to break the atheist out of their atheistic language game and the theist out of their theistic language game to arrive at a better understanding of the reality of the world.

Witt’s reply to the rule following question/anxiety isn’t “custom makes it fine, end of story,” and it isn’t “we vote on correctness.” The point is that interpretation isn't the whole story, because interpretations also need a way of being applied. At some point you master of a technique, you go on without consulting a further interpretation. — Sam26

In PI 201 talks about the rule-making paradox, and as you say, grasping a rule is not an interpretation and it is not custom that makes a rule. However, it is more fundamental than mastering a technique.

As with the hinge proposition, the rule is part of the framework of the form of life, within which is the language game. Customs, interpretations and techniques are part of the content of the framework, and as such have no control over the rules to which they are subject to.

Grasping a rule is living within a framework that is exempt from doubt, not an object of knowledge, not open to rational evaluation and an objective certainty.

One should not say “I know how to use the language game”, but should say “I use the language game”.

I don't think we're makiing progress, which is usually what happens in Witt threads. At a certain point, we just keep saying the same thing over and over again. This is one of the reasons I don't always respond to people. It turns into an endless debate. So, the point of my threads is to get the information out and let the chips fall where they may.

I've been working on a better definition of philosophy, and I thought I'd post it here just as an aside.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems, whether religious, political, scientific, ethical, etc., using a broad range of tools that extend beyond formal logic including sensory experience, language, testimony, and other sources of knowledge. It is not limited to any single discipline or institution but permeates every domain of serious inquiry, because any domain concerned with truth necessarily engages in a philosophical activity. Even very granular philosophical work on specific concepts like causation, knowledge, or identity operates within this broader framework of belief assessment, deriving its significance from its implications for how we understand reality. Philosophy is therefore not a specialized academic enterprise and more a fundamental dimension of thought itself, one that cannot be escaped, since even the attempt to dismiss or define it is itself a philosophical act. What distinguishes philosophy is not a narrow method but an orientation, viz., the continuous, reflective commitment to analyzing what we believe, how we come to believe it, and whether those beliefs are justified, wherever that inquiry takes us.

First, hinges aren’t just a “corrective to radical skepticism.” — Sam26

Of course. A part of something is not the whole of it. The question I asked is:

... what is their function beyond being a corrective to radical skepticism? — Fooloso4

Part of the difficulty we are having is that, as you say:

I’m also extending some of his insights into my own thinking on epistemology — Sam26

I have no issue with that. It is a common practice, but the first question raised in my post is about:

... whether hinges are given undue attention and importance. — Fooloso4

You say:

I do aim to be faithful where it matters ... — Sam26

Whether it matters depends on one's goals. If your goal is extend concept of hinges beyond Wittgenstein use then it matters less that you means something different than him then if the goal is to understand what he means by hinges. The attempt to extend an insight can be at odds with determining what that insight might be.

For doubt to be intelligible, some things have to stand fast — Sam26

It goes even further than that. For anything to be intelligible some things have to stand fast. This is an ancient problem that goes back at least to Parmenides and Heraclitus. It is both an epistemological and ontological problem. Wittgenstein touches on this at OC 96-97, even using Heraclitus' metaphor of the river. The concept of flux is a hinge belonging to our system of scientific investigations.

Third, you ask “what turns on” claims like “there is an external world” or “other people exist.” The answer is everything ordinary. — Sam26

There is nothing ordinary about these claims. In what situation might this claim be made? Someone who seriously doubts them or thinks there is need to make them is in need of psychological therapy not philosophical therapy.

Fourth, the “Witt doesn’t tell us what counts as a hinge” complaint sets the wrong expectation. — Sam26

It is not about Wittgenstein giving a list of hinges, but about claims that are made by others about Wittgenstein and hinges. To what extent are they faithful to the concept as used by him? In order to consider this we must piece together the few things he says.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Hinges are not simply things you don't doubt, they are things that are exempt from doubt. There are many things we do not doubt that are not exempt from doubt. The fact that we do not doubt them does not mean that they are indubitable.

This is followed by:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

His concern is not the plurality of things said and done that some commentators claim are hinges. Hinges are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations.

Followed by:

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

While it is true that we can't investigate everything, it is not as if one assumption is as good as another. Science does not simply rest content with assumptions. It tests them and alters them when necessary. In some cases the change is minor adjustment to the system propositions, but in some other cases we are forced to make changes to our fundamental orientation as was the case with the Copernican revolution. Hinges had to be replaced with new ones.

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable-it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

This is pretty straight forward, but he follows it by saying:

656. And one can not say that of the proposition that I am called L. W. Nor of the proposition that such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized.-The proposition "I am called . . ." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it.

Both the propositions of mathematics and the proposition that "I am called" or 'such and such people have calculated a problem correctly' are said to be incontrovertible but but unlike the propositions of mathematics they are not explicitly identified as hinges. What is the distinguishing difference? The proposition "I am called '' and the claim that people calculate correctly may be incontrovertible but they do not belong to our system of scientific investigations. Nothing related to our investigations hangs or turns them.

“Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all! … Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say ‘Now I know how to go on’?” (PI 154)

He is not denying that there are mental processes (like some people think in this thread), images, feelings, neural activity, whatever you like. He concedes the ordinary point that there are processes “characteristic of understanding.” But then he adds the grammatical correction: in that sense, understanding is not itself a mental process. That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly.

So, I suspect Witt would say, cognitive science is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on. What it can't do, by its own methods, is answer what's grammatical, namely, what makes a move count as following the rule rather than merely seeming to. What it means to count as is not an extra inner process waiting to be found, it is part of our public grammar.

That's why I resist the phrasing “simply accept mental processes as given,” especially if it mean, “leave the topic untouched and let science do the work.” Wittgenstein’s move is not to abandon the mental, it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects. He untangles the knot so we stop demanding the wrong explanation, and then both philosophy and science can do their work without talking past each other. — Sam26

I’d go along with this, as long as we’re careful not to treat as a division of labor the fact that cognitive science “is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on,” while philosophy handles what “makes a move count as following the rule.” Grammar isn’t a kind of normative layer sitting atop empirical psychology, with philosophy policing the boundary. We dont want to say science studies causes, philosophy studies norms, because we are not dealing with a stable dichotomy but attempting to dissolve that kind of thinking.

“Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all! … Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say ‘Now I know how to go on’?” (PI 154)

He is not denying that there are mental processes (like some people think in this thread), images, feelings, neural activity, whatever you like. He concedes the ordinary point that there are processes “characteristic of understanding.” But then he adds the grammatical correction: in that sense, understanding is not itself a mental process. That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly.

So, I suspect Witt would say, cognitive science is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on. What it can't do, by its own methods, is answer what's grammatical, namely, what makes a move count as following the rule rather than merely seeming to. What it means to count as is not an extra inner process waiting to be found, it is part of our public grammar.

That's why I resist the phrasing “simply accept mental processes as given,” especially if it mean, “leave the topic untouched and let science do the work.” Wittgenstein’s move is not to abandon the mental, it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects. He untangles the knot so we stop demanding the wrong explanation, and then both philosophy and science can do their work without talking past each other.
— Sam26

I’d go along with this, as long as we’re careful not to treat as a division of labor the fact that cognitive science “is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on,” while philosophy handles what “makes a move count as following the rule.” Grammar isn’t a kind of normative layer sitting atop empirical psychology, with philosophy policing the boundary. We dont want to say science studies causes, philosophy studies norms, because we are not dealing with a stable dichotomy but attempting to dissolve that kind of thinking. — Joshs

I'm not sure what you need to be "worried" about. I've been consistent that the point isn't to establish separate jurisdictions. When I say cognitive science is entitled to investigate causal and psychological accompaniments, I'm not parceling out a territory, I'm saying Wittgenstein's grammatical work doesn't shut down our empirical inquiry. That's not a division of labor; it's just not making the mistake of thinking one kind of investigation negates the other.

If the concern is that someone might read me as reinstating a dichotomy, fine, but that's a misreading. The statement "I'm worried that..." has a way of suggesting the other person hasn't thought something through, when in fact the very point being "worried" about is one I've already addressed. It's a rhetorical move that positions the other person as needing correction before they've actually made the error being attributed to them.

But look, I don't want to get hung up on tone. The substantive point stands, Wittgenstein dissolves the knot, he doesn't leave us with two tidy halves. I've said that. If we agree on that, then we agree.

I've been working on a better definition of philosophy, and I thought I'd post it here just as an aside. — Sam26

I like that.

:up:

I don't think we're makiing progress.................So, the point of my threads is to get the information out and let the chips fall where they may. — Sam26

I am doing the same. I believe the points that I am making are correct, even if no one else agrees. But what else can one do? At the very least I am improving my own understanding. If someone accepts my arguments, then that is a bonus.

As long as you are making progress and I am making progress, perhaps that is sufficient, even though our progress is different, even though our language games are different.
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EDIT - I have deleted the rest of the post as it did not add much.

I want to speak to something that keeps happening in this thread, because it's a good example of the very confusion Witt's tools are meant to address. — Sam26

A useful post

I will give my solution to meaning in language, and try to show it answers all of your questions.

My solution to meaning in language

As in PI 258, I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of my sensation of sadness. Therefore, every time I have the sensation of sadness, which causes me to cry, I record my crying in my calendar by writing the sign “S”.

The sign “S” cannot point to the private sensation of sadness, which is hidden, but can point to the public behaviour of crying, which is not hidden.

There is no criteria for correctness between the sign "S" and the private sensation of sadness, but there is a criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and public behaviour of crying.

The sign “S” is an ostensive definition that points at the public behaviour of crying, not the private sensation of sadness.

I know that if I feel sadness then I cry, so when I see someone else cry I can infer that they too also feel sadness. I can never know that someone else feels sadness, but I can infer that they do from their behaviour.

For example, if you saw a cat with all the behaviours of being in pain, would you walk on past saying “I don’t know that this cat is in pain” or would you say “I infer that the cat is in pain from its behaviour” and take the cat to the vets?

Therefore, the sign “S” refers to and means the behaviour of crying, from which it can be inferred that the person is experiencing sadness.

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Several responses keep making the same argument but in different forms.......................… without inner feelings there'd be no language games………………..Without oxygen there'd be no fires. From that statement it doesn't follow that "fire" means oxygen — Sam26

Without the sensation of sadness there would be no sign “S”.

You are correct that the sign “S” does not mean the sensation of sadness. The sign “S” means the behaviour of crying, from which the sensation of sadness is inferred.
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If meaning were fixed by private inner objects, you'd need a way to pin the right word to the right inner item privately, with no public check, which is crucial. — Sam26

You are right that there is no criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and the private inner sensation. The criteria of correctness is between the sign “S” and the public behaviour of crying.
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What drives the misreading is the assumption that meaning must work by a word pointing at some thing, and if outer objects are ruled out, then an inner object is all we're left with. — Sam26

Meaning must work by pointing at something, and it is not the case that outer objects are ruled out, as it is the outer object of crying that is being pointed at.
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Meaning doesn't need a hidden referent, inner or outer. It needs a practice, i.e., training, use, correction, context, the possibility of getting it right or wrong in ways others can recognize — Sam26

You are correct that language would not work if the referents of the words were hidden. Language works because the referent of behaviour is not hidden.

Even when the meaning of a word is the referent of behaviour, you are correct that this still needs practice, training, use, correction, context and right or wrong.

It is true that the behaviour of crying may have different causes, such as sadness of losing a family pet or watching a particularly funny comedian, and this is where other factors such as context are needed. Is the person crying looking at an empty dog kennel or looking at someone on a stage.
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When I say "inner states don't fix meaning," I'm not saying they don't exist or don't matter. I'm saying they can't play the specific role that keeps being assigned to them, the role of a private foundation that makes meaning possible by itself, apart from any shared practice. — Sam26

Wittgenstein agreed in PI 304 that there are inner feelings

You are correct that inner feelings cannot make meaning in language possible by itself, because it is the behaviour caused by inner feelings that makes meaning in language possible.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

:up:

This does not sound very Wittgensteinian, who accepted hinge propositions rather than assess them.