So no, the chess analogy isn’t claiming rational discourse is literally a game. It’s forcing a distinction you keep trying to blur, viz. that clarifying the conditions of intelligibility isn't the same thing as arguing for a claim within those conditions or parameters. You can have meta-level norms without turning bedrock conditions into ordinary premises. And pretending otherwise is exactly how the issue of global doubt and endless “improvement” talk becomes performative rather than really answerable. — Sam26

While I can't speak for @J, I can say that it hasn't been my intention to collapse everything into one level. I take it that the distinction between levels has been explicitly granted, and that we're now disputing whether the meta-level is inside or outside of rational normativity as such. For me, it's not about arguing for system-closure, or for some Archimedean stand-point outside of inquiry. It's about acknowledging that reason can come to understand the conditions of its own operation, and that to do so is itself a rational achievement.

For me, it's not about arguing for system-closure, or for some Archimedean stand-point outside of inquiry. It's about acknowledging that reason can come to understand the conditions of its own operation, and that to do so is itself a rational achievement. — Esse Quam Videri

I suspect that what’s at stake here is, at least in relation to Wittgenstein, is to what extent we treat understanding and reason in terms of adequation and conformity vs creation, enaction and becoming.

Thanks for all of the replies. I'm trying to think of another subject for a thread. My philosophical focus tends to be very narrow, but hopefully I'll think of something that's interesting.

I suspect that what’s at stake here is, at least in relation to Wittgenstein, is to what extent we treat understanding and reason in terms of adequation and conformity vs creation, enaction and becoming. — Joshs

Yes, I agree it’s probably the underlying axis. For my part I would tend to side more with . I wouldn't want to deny creation, enaction, or becoming, but my worry is that if we say “normativity is creatively re-established in each use,” we risk collapsing into “norms are whatever we now make them,” which would seem to undercut the possibility of error and the authority of correction.