It is through the direct connection of the light reflecting off other objects that we can see the object. — NOS4A2

Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception.

None of this implies sense-data or other mental objects either. — NOS4A2

I'm not saying it does. Again, these are two distinct claims:

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

Your brand of "direct" realism agrees with (1) even if it doesn't agree with (2). I am simply pointing out that direct realism as almost everyone else understands it doesn't agree with (1).

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena — Michael

Good point @NOS4A2 add that clarification to my recent reply. It is extremely succinct, thank you Michael.

As I have explained previously, qualia do not meet the criteria required to play the role of the object of perception. This doesn’t mean they don’t exist; it means they are features of perceptual acts rather than entities that can ground correctness, error, or public objecthood. Treating them as objects simply relocates the problem rather than solving it. — Esse Quam Videri

I'll rephrase the two claims:

1. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are distal objects and their properties
2. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are qualia/sense data

Naive realism claims that (1) is true, minimal indirect realism claims that (1) is false, and the sense datum theory claims that (2) is true.

My concern is not to deny that there are multiple senses in play, but to argue that any adequate theory of perception ought to explain normativity, error, and objecthood, and that refusal to address those issues looks less like a theory of perception and more like quietism or eliminativism. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't think it's necessarily quietism or eliminativism; rather it's only trying to answer a simpler question, and that is: what are the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience?

You're just telling me how scientists say we see things. That's not in dispute. — Hanover

And the way scientists say we see things is the way indirect realists say we see things, in contrast to naive realists who say that distal objects and their properties are literal constituents of first-person phenomenal experience.

The metaphysical question deals with the fundamental ontological composition of the entity. — Hanover

That metaphysical question is a question for materialists, idealists, and dualists — not for indirect realists. Indirect realism is concerned with the nature of perception, not with the nature of apples.

I think its possible your description of hte Sun there lands us in the same position: If that, to you, is 'direct awareness' I don't understand the claim. It is not "the object" in any sense - it is light ferried across one AU, bringing with it information about the Sun. We call this 'seeing the sun' because its easier and better for "getting on with it". — AmadeusD

I'm not clear what "it" refers to in "it is not 'the object' in any sense". These examples scramble our intuitions - our common sense. The problem is that there is a slippery slope here. Under normal circumstances, we have no hesitation about saying that we see the computer screen on which we are typing. And yet, there is a time lag between light leaving the screen and it arriving at our eyes. But when we find cases where the time lag is longer, we don't quite know what to say. Nothing wrong with that.
Let's add in the phenomenon of nova stars, which are stars that explode in a brilliant flash, easily seen on earth, even though the phenomenon is light years away. So far that the star has usually disappeared by the time we see it.
So, what is it that we see - the computer screen, the sun, the exploding star? If I allow that we don't see the star, I'll need to admit we don't see the sun and we don't see the computer screen. I prefer to work the other way. I insist that we see the computer screen, the sun and the exploding star. I accept it's a choice, but that's the point. There's no right way to go here.
I don't think that we normally see light, except as reflected or emitted from things - and even then, what we see is the objects from which the light is reflected or emitted. So I was most uncomfortable when I needed to describe what travels from the sun to the earth. Information?, an image? I don't know the right term. But I need to be clear that I see the sun, just as I see the computer screen on which I am writing. Light is the medium that enables me to see, not something that I see in its own right.

Right. I've been considering exactly this is recent days - ..... I am sorry if this isn't directly on point, but it seems clear to me "error" comes in different kinds, and the one I mean (related to the latter example) cannot be adjudicated by further looking at the object: It can change from red to grey as I see fit, in some sense. I am not bound by the object to see it as a certain colour in that case. — AmadeusD

There's a lot in here. I agree that there are many different sources of error. I would hate to have to create a taxonomy. However, there is one key point here and that is the concept of interpretation. Many errors are errors of interpretation and so do not require positing any kind of intermediary object. That's what is left out of this debate.

We don't argue about whether "watching the game" on recording is direct awareness of the game, or the recording (well, it seems to me we dont?). I don't quite see a difference here. — AmadeusD

I'm not sure about that. I agree most people will happily say that they are watching the game under all those conditions. But I think most people will differentiate between watching the game live and watching a recording. They will likely not talk of "direct" or "indirect", but still...

The apple doesn't exist during the second ten seconds and so cannot be a constituent of the experience, and so the conclusion is false. Therefore, one of the premises is false. Given that I agree with P1a, my conclusion is that P2a is false. — Michael

So the experience of an apple in the first ten seconds was not an experience of an apple. H'm.

Okay, so I'll step back and explain because I really don't mean to be obscure or confusing.

I say, "I see an apple." There are two questions that can be asked: (1) what is the apple, and (2) what does it mean to say "I see an apple." The problem arises when these two questions get conflated. They get conflated when someone says "Apple means having an experience of an apple." That ties meaning either to (a) the apple itself or (b) the experience you have of the apple. Considering you cannot tell me (a) what the apple itself is without referring to some sort of perceptual state (i.e. it is round, weighs 3 ounces, is red, etc.), and (b) you cannot open your mind and show me your perception, telling me the "apple" is (a) or (b) offers me nothing. You'll also note that (a) and (b) are metaphysical questions, not physical questions. As in, I want to know what the apple itself is if that's what you're using to tie it to meaning.

What I have is use and a community of users of the word apple, and from that we speak of apples. Meaning is use, not meaning is the thing or the experience. How do we use the term "apple"? Through
correction (“no, that’s not an apple”), mistake, teaching, rule-following. That's what I mean by "apple."

This does not deny (1) that there are real apples in the world, (2) that you don't have an experience of an apple, (3) that photons and neurons don't act certain ways. It doesn't speak of that at all. My discussion is about grammar, meaning how words are used, not metaphysics or private sensations.

When you say "I saw an apple" if you start to delve into what is the apple "really" and what part of your sensation was the apple and what wasn't, or if there even was an apple "out there," you've lost your way. You're talking in unanswerable and incohrent circles.

As in, tell me what the apple looks like without telling me how things look because subjective qualities aren't part of the apple. That makes no sense. So, what do I see? I see an apple, but I mean "apple" like we use the term "apple," not by assigning it meaning from metaphysics.

So, you're an indirect realist, then tell me which part of the apple you see if part of the apple really. If none, for fear of being labeled an direct realist as to that part of the apple, then why posit the apple "out there" at all. What explanatory power does it have to say it is the stuff that causes stuff when we can't know anything about the stuff.

So the experience of an apple in the first ten seconds was not an experience of an apple. H'm. — Ludwig V

That's not what I said. I'll start again from the top.

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. — Martin 2004

The important points to take from this are:

P1. If I have direct perception of an object then that object is a constituent of the experience
P2. If an object is a constituent of the experience then that object exists

I then continue this with the following:

Let's assume that I live in a world in which the air is thick and light has mass and travels at a slow 1m/s. An apple is placed 10m in front of me at 10:00:00. It is disintegrated at 10:00:20. Given the speed of the light and the distance of the apple I see an apple for 20 seconds between 10:00:10 and 10:00:30.

P3. If the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds then it is a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
P4. The apple does not exist during the second 10 seconds
C1. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C2. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
C3. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds
P5. If I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 1m/s then I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 299,792,458m/s
C4. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 299,792,458m/s

The experience during the first 10 seconds (and the second 10 seconds) is still the experience of an apple; it just isn't the direct perception of an apple.

Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception.

Sure, but it isn’t indirect perception of the mind-independent world. So you agree with direct perception of the mind-independent world, which is contrary to indirect realism.

Your brand of "direct" realism agrees with (1) even if it doesn't agree with (2). I am simply pointing out that direct realism as almost everyone else understands it doesn't agree with (1), and so you theory straddles the line between traditional direct realism and the sense datum theory.

But I haven’t used the concept of sense-datum at all, so nothing is straddled.

Sure, but it isn’t indirect perception of the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

It's indirect visual perception of apples and trees and everything other than light, which is a very significant asterisk to your "direct visual perception of a mind-independent world".

But I haven’t used the concept of sense-datum at all, so nothing is straddled. — NOS4A2

It straddles the line because traditional direct realism rejects (1) and (2), you accept (1) and reject (2), and the sense datum theory accepts (1) and (2). I would even say that if you accept (1) then you are an indirect realist with respect to seeing apples even if you're not a sense datum theorist with respect to seeing apples.

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

So you agree with direct perception of the mind-independent world, which is contrary to indirect realism. — NOS4A2

I didn't say I agree with you.

This argument that "we see tennis, even if on TV; therefore direct realism is true" is ridiculous. — Michael

Quite so. And it's not what was argued. The indirect realist makes the ridiculous claim that even when you are at the Rod Laver Arena, you do not see the tennis, but an image of the tennis. That we do not have "direct" perception of the tennis when watching it on the screen, or in the front row.

I'm not clear what "it" refers to in "it is not 'the object' in any sense". — Ludwig V

I am sorry if it was unclear - even on re-reading I can't see ambiguity.
The "it" is the image the said light provides you with. It isn't the object, one AU away from Earth, as it is. It is highly mediated, and actually isn't an object, but an experience (on my view, obviously).

Under normal circumstances, we have no hesitation about saying that we see the computer screen on which we are typing. And yet, there is a time lag between light leaving the screen and it arriving at our eyes. — Ludwig V

Yes. I have been over this several times now: idealization. I am unsure how much more lifting I can do on this exact matter.

But when we find cases where the time lag is longer, we don't quite know what to say. — Ludwig V

As far as I can tell, they behave exactly the same way - but the proximity gives less room for discussing any kind of 'error' in DR terms, whereas accepting that the light has gone through x space and time can leave open, prima facie, reason to think maybe something has gotten in that process and altered what's received (speculatively. That's not even in the IR position per se). I think the intuition most people feel is that the distance is merely a niggle on the farside of their metaphysical grapevine, but is slightly closer(i.e a more perceptible niggle) for the Sun example vs a computer screen a foot away. That is, unless one is discussing these things lol.

So far that the star has usually disappeared by the time we see it. — Ludwig V

Yeah, nice. That's largely the crux of why the initial account doesn't work for me. Hopefully there's some common ground to come.. .

I prefer to work the other way. — Ludwig V

Yes, and in practical terms, that's fine. There are many things we idealize in this way. The concept of "perfection" is an example. Its incoherent really, but we use it to describe many things without noting that we're not really calling x perfect. I don't think there's appreciable difference between that and our examples other than psychology.

There's no right way to go here. — Ludwig V

I'm unsure this is hte correct conclusion, but i massively appreciate your clarifications. I understand where we're askance, I think.
For me, we can simply alter the language (this is the semantic part!!) to actually reflect what happens. I've previously suggested these terms I think, even to you (I am not mentally reviewing htem for consistency right now, so feel free)

To look at: cast one's eyes toward an object (this doesn't require that we know what we're doing)
To see: To have a first-person phenomenal experience of that object (i guess.. whatever object).

I actually use these, most of the time because they far better capture what I'm trying to say at various times. I've responded to some objections to this thus:

"I have my objections, but the position, i take it, is that the mediation is not manipulative or deceptive so gives a 'direct' indication of that object one has cast their eyes too.

I don't quite have an issue with this other than calling it direct."

So, I think you have actually in a previous thread hit on something that speaks to me quite loudly. You said something like: indirect and direct at not apt for a discussion of perception.

I now take that to boil down to the "choice" issue above, meaning it does boil down to semantics. I see the attraction, but I still maintain metaphysics is trying to violate physics there and so its extremely uncomfortable and misleading to me. When I take the DR position to heart, I cannot make sense of what we empirically know about perception.

Many errors are errors of interpretation and so do not require positing any kind of intermediary object. That's what is left out of this debate. — Ludwig V

I don't quite know what you mean here - interpretation meaning the psychological reaction to the (let's call it, for my benefit) image presented in the mind? Or interpretation being what your eyes/brain does with the light? I can understand the former and not the latter just so clarifying. On thebasis it's the former, I think it's left out becuase its like saying a blindfold has much to do with perceptual directness. It's not the same question. Yes, we can misinterpret things we see, but whether this is the apparatus "malfunctioning" in a DRist way, or whether that's evidence of the mediation required to support an IR position seems jury's out to me. So, I can get on with that. Not the latter, though, as that would directly contravene the concept of DR as I understand.

But I think most people will differentiate between watching the game live and watching a recording. They will likely not talk of "direct" or "indirect", but still... — Ludwig V

Ok, good and I think I agree, but I doubt people will do this unless asked about it. At any rate, yes, good - I am simply extending this to all time-lag (using your early time) type experiences. The Sun is a good once because while its "immediate" in the sense of it not being recorded, it is eight minutes ago when you get it (the image, the Sun, the light, whatever you'd like to call it). The recording is data while results in light traveling to your eyes with x,y,z properties and presents you with the game which was played, let's say for fun, eight minutes ago. Same for the Sun.

Okay, so I'll step back and explain because I really don't mean to be obscure or confusing. — Hanover

I'm not taking you that way - but very appreciate any elucidations! Onward..

The problem arises when these two questions get conflated. — Hanover

Yes, I think probably for disparate reasons, I agree!

"Apple means having an experience of an apple." That ties meaning either to (a) the apple itself or (b) the experience you have of the apple. Considering you cannot tell me (a) what the apple itself is without referring to some sort of perceptual state (i.e. it is round, weighs 3 ounces, is red, etc.), and (b) you cannot open your mind and show me your perception, telling me the "apple" is (a) or (b) offers me nothing. You'll also note that (a) and (b) are metaphysical questions, not physical questions. As in, I want to know what the apple itself is if that's what you're using to tie it to meaning. — Hanover

This is confused ( to me), and possibly misleading(your a's and b's dont align so it's hard to respond directly). The phrase would not be "Apple is..." (again, to me. If you're referring to some third party arguing something I wouldn't, i prefer to not take that up).
The phrase would be "Seeing an Apple is...". That leaves an ability to describe that experience in terms of shape, weight, colour and all the rest without trouble and call that "the apple" meaning "the apple I see" or "the apple in my experience". But it leaves out the commitment that the Apple is either nowhere, or included in the experience. Now, I can see an objectin being that this intimates all of our experiences of what we want to call the same apple, are in fact, not hte same apple. I bite this bullet. They are caused by the same apple. I see no issue but discomfort/trying to idealize this into every-day language which I have no issue with either. But it is idealizing this concept (again, and always, in my view).

I agree, saying anything about "the apple" is meaningless if you mean to say anything about the actual object, out there in the world (other than what it causes in your perception - you could say "to the best of my knowledge, it causes *insert apt description based on experience*). We, in my view, do not have a word for it - just the concept - ding-en-sich.

I think can, and just did tell you (a.) I just don't think you want what I'm offering and you've given your reasons. My response is that the experience of *i know not what* is "the apple" I want to talk about. I don't talk about the other possible 'object', because I have no access to it. This seems totally coherent to me. You want to give a name to the cause, which I don't try to do and lean toward it not being reasonable to attempt. I tihnk we're at cross purposes in this moment.

Meaning is use, not meaning is the thing or the experience. — Hanover

Well, it has to be something - otherwise words would not have any meaning whatsoever - it's either tied to something we're describing in our experience, or outside our experience (logically - otherwise its describing nothing). I chose the former for many reasons. Use has no utility unless we know what we're doing. Which is, i content, describing our experience and for ease, or maybe just efficiency, we don't bother mentioning that its an experience of something. Which is wild, because we do use that phrase constantly to describe "my experience of going to the DMV" or whatever.

I find no discomfort it this epistemic gap. I am content to be motivated, moved and lead by what appears in my experience and not feel any need to look beyond it for that which, I contend, caused it. It's extremely interesting to me, and in places like TRP I will do so - but day-to-day and in general use, I wouldn't. I would say "I see an apple". It should be sufficiently clear that the semantics do nothing for the disagreement I'm seeing other than to clarify what each of us is trying to say. Your "the Apple" is not the same as mine, in this thread. But whether IR or DR, in general use they amount to the same thing but the commitment is silent (i.e you will say the same thing, and it will be meaningful, whether you take IR or DR on board). I think that does what the Searle types want to do right back to them and solves the problem with words. THe problem was the claim that the problem is with the words. Hahahaha.

When you say "I saw an apple" if you start to delve into what is the apple "really" and what part of your sensation was the apple and what wasn't, or if there even was an apple "out there," you've lost your way. You're talking in unanswerable and incohrent circles. — Hanover

If you say so. I think its pretty interesting to talk of these things - but one would not do this if they wanted the apple from the other side of the table. The above should speak to how this can be on either conception. I, personally, will, in passing, consider those things when I speak.

How do we use the term "apple"? Through
correction (“no, that’s not an apple”), mistake, teaching, rule-following. That's what I mean by "apple. — Hanover

Yep, and that's fine (although wholly incomplete, nothing turns on what's missing imo). It does not mean our use faithfully represents what's going on in the world or that could suggest it does beyond intuition. It rarely, if ever, does in practice. I do not know why this is so uncomfortable as a concept, when use dictates this type of idealization with plenty of words we routinely use. I guess I understand it, but don't know why. I get no discomfort from the concept that I can never access the world as-it-is. Why would i? It doesn't come up for me(joke, to be clear).

What explanatory power does it have to say it is the stuff that causes stuff when we can't know anything about the stuff. — Hanover

What does this have to do with truth? DR has no explanatory power to me. None. It explains how people get away with ignoring the empirical in service of a metaphysical commitment. If IR is the case, DRist will be saying exactly the same things. Their theory does nothing but reduce what there is to explain - without explanation. Which is why i would simply return to what I have just now gone back and bolded.

The indirect realist makes the ridiculous claim that even when you are at the Rod Laver Arena, you do not see the tennis — Banno

That is a fair charge, but the problem I see is you've said nothing that makes this ridiculous or what makes it ridiculous, other than that you're incredulous - which is fine and understandable as it violates intuition. But yeah, you do not see "the tennis" tout court, no. I don't think that's coherent, its just practical. As such, I think you are playing hide the ball with the term "the tennis" treated at length above under "the Apple". The semantics need work, but are not the problem.

It's indirect visual perception of apples and trees and everything other than light, which is a very significant asterisk to your "direct visual perception of a mind-independent world".

Not in my view. It just means that there are other things between us and the apple. We perceive those too, and in fact much of what exists in our periphery to some degree or another.

What I cannot perceive is an image of an apple, a sense-datum of light, or a representation of my own periphery. I don’t believe you can either.

It straddles the line because traditional direct realism rejects (1) and (2), you accept (1) and reject (2), and the sense datum theory accepts (1) and (2). I would even say that if you accept (1) then you are an indirect realist with respect to seeing apples even if you're not a sense datum theorist with respect to seeing apples.

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

We have direct visual perception of much of our periphery, which sometimes includes apples. I can get so direct about it that I can consume the apple. This is possible because I’m not an eye in Cartesian space and apples are not floating about in a void one minute and ultra-slowy light in the next. All i’ve straddled were the absurdities of these scenarios. It is still the case that I believe we have direct perception of the mind-independent world. I also still deny that we have direct visual perception of mental phenomena.

The experience during the first 10 seconds (and the second 10 seconds) is still the experience of an apple; it just isn't the direct perception of an apple. — Michael

I still have a few questions, I'm afraid.

1. You seem to leave open the question whether the experience during the first ten seonds is an indirect perception of an apple. It looks as if you are relcutant to say that. Why not?

2. If P4 is false, and the apple continues to exist for the entire 30 seconds of the experiment, does the experiment not become a case of direct perception?

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena — Michael

Don't you need to say that we have direct visual perception of one's own mental phenomena?

1. You seem to leave open the question whether the experience during the first ten seonds is an indirect perception of an apple. — Ludwig V

I don't leave it open? C3 literally says "I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds".

2. If P4 is false, and the apple continues to exist for the entire 30 seconds of the experiment, does the experiment not become a case of direct perception? — Ludwig V

No, because as per C3 I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds, even though the apple exists during the first 10 seconds.

Don't you need to say that we have direct visual perception of one's own mental phenomena? — Ludwig V

For the purpose of this argument I'm only interested in proving that (1) is true. It's entirely possible that (2) is false, e.g. if we only have direct visual perception of light.

We have direct visual perception of much of our periphery, which sometimes includes apples. — NOS4A2

Except you have been arguing that the following proposition is true:

1. I have direct perception of X if and only if my sense organs are in direct physical contact with X

Given that my visual sense organs (i.e. my eyes) are not in direct physical contact with apples it therefore follows that I do not have direct visual perception of apples.

So now you're contradicting yourself. If we have direct visual perception of apples then (1) is false and you need to provide a better explanation of what it means to have direct visual perception of apples.

The indirect realist makes the ridiculous claim that even when you are at the Rod Laver Arena, you do not see the tennis, but an image of the tennis. — Banno

No, the claim is that we do not directly see the tennis. We still indirectly see the tennis, much like when watching it on TV.

And it's not ridiculous.

The "it" is the image the said light provides you with. It isn't the object, one AU away from Earth, as it is. It is highly mediated, and actually isn't an object, but an experience (on my view, obviously). — AmadeusD

I suppose I have to call it an image. In one way, that's what we see if/when it gets into our eyes. In another way, of course, it is nothing of the sort - I see the sun. The language seems quite happy to accommodate both IR and DR without hesitation.

Yes. I have been over this several times now: idealization. I am unsure how much more lifting I can do on this exact matter. — AmadeusD

The recording cannot be your wife's voice. It can be a recording of it. But that's unweildy, so we idealize to get through conversations more efficiently. — AmadeusD

That is p.21 of this thread - dated Jan 14/15. I think this is what you were referring to. I take the point. The difficulty is that listening to the recording is like listening to your wife, but there are important differences as well. It would be foolish to equate the two.
But doesn't it follow that we should not equate the light streaming from the sun with a recording either?

I think the intuition most people feel is that the distance is merely a niggle on the farside of their metaphysical grapevine, but is slightly closer(i.e a more perceptible niggle) for the Sun example vs a computer screen a foot away. That is, unless one is discussing these things lol. — AmadeusD

Yes. It seems odd that people actually deal with this problem without seeming to feel that it is at all difficult. The light arriving on earth shows us the sun as of eight minutes ago. So what? That still seems to simplest solution to me.

So, I think you have actually in a previous thread hit on something that speaks to me quite loudly. You said something like: indirect and direct at not apt for a discussion of perception. — AmadeusD

I expect I did. But trying to shift the framework of a discussion that's already in progress is not a popular move. "Direct" and "indirect" need to be defined in each context that they are used. In this context they are never defined in a proper way that makes sense. But they could be. But that would give sense to both DR and IR. But IR wants to claim the whole territory. (I'm less sure about DR on that front.)

I now take that to boil down to the "choice" issue above, meaning it does boil down to semantics. I see the attraction, but I still maintain metaphysics is trying to violate physics there and so its extremely uncomfortable and misleading to me. When I take the DR position to heart, I cannot make sense of what we empirically know about perception. — AmadeusD

Yes. It seems to me that a good summary is that everybody seems to be agreed what the story is. What they disagree about is how to tell it. I keep wanting to ask why it matters so much whether you tell the story this way or that way. People seem very sure that it does matter, but I don't really understand why.

Yes, we can misinterpret things we see, but whether this is the apparatus "malfunctioning" in a DRist way, or whether that's evidence of the mediation required to support an IR position seems jury's out to me. So, I can get on with that. Not the latter, though, as that would directly contravene the concept of DR as I understand. — AmadeusD

Well, one way to get at my point is to think about the claim that it look as if the sun is going round the earth, even though in fact the earth is going round the sun. But if you think about, our visual experience of the phenomena is perfectly compatible with both stories. It all depends on your presuppositions. In one case, the presupposition is that the earth is stationary, in the other, the presupposition is that the sun is stationary.
Mistakes and disagreements are very often not the result of seeing different objects, but of seeing the same objects differently.
Compare puzzle pictures.
It's not a sovereign cure for all our ills. But it would help, I think, if it were more widely recognized.

The Sun is a good once because while its "immediate" in the sense of it not being recorded, it is eight minutes ago when you get it (the image, the Sun, the light, whatever you'd like to call it). The recording is data while results in light traveling to your eyes with x,y,z properties and presents you with the game which was played, let's say for fun, eight minutes ago. Same for the Sun. — AmadeusD

Our expectations, unsurprisingly, are based on common sense experiences that do not include a noticeable delay. So we are flummoxed when we encounter this new and un-thought-of phenomenon.
Yet we cope well with the delay in sound. No-one doubts that we hear the starting gun even though we only hear it some time after the race has started.

I have been arguing that we have direct perception of the mind-independent world, of which apples and light are constituents. You cannot evade this fact, nor can you support your own beliefs at the same time. You have not put forward a single argument in defense of your thesis, and have consistently avoided any and all questions regarding it.

I have been arguing that we have direct perception of the mind-independent world, of which apples and light are constituents. — NOS4A2

And your argument rested on the following premise:

1. I have direct perception of X if and only if my sense organs are in direct physical contact with X

If (1) is true then we only have direct visual perception of light. Therefore, if (1) is true then either a) we do not have visual perception of apples or b) we only have indirect visual perception of apples.

You now seem to be committing the illicit minor fallacy, arguing that:

P1. I have direct visual perception of light
P2. Light is part of the mind-independent world
C1. Therefore, I have direct visual perception of part of the mind-independent world
P3. Apples are part of the mind-independent world
C2. Therefore, I have direct visual perception of apples

C2 both doesn't follow and contradicts (1). Your argument fails.

What you are directed at is phenomenal experience unfolding in time. The rhythm, pitch, and structure are features of the phenomena, not a distal object. There are numerous candidates for distal object: speakers, player, band/creator, cd/lp/mp3 file. All of these are components of our causal understanding of the phenomena, but none of them somehow supersede the phenomena. — hypericin

I completely agree that when we turn our attention to the phenomenal quality of the experience, the distal-object-qua-causal-source is bracketed to the background. But I don’t think this eliminates the object-directedness of experience as such, of which more below.

Not necessarily. I can imagine the sound of chiming, without imagining any specific distal object (wind chime, door bell, phone, mp3 clip) realizing it. I can imagine the phenomenal experience of redness, and I "see" red in my minds eye, not attached to any object at all. — hypericin

I likewise agree that when we imagine a chiming sound or a patch of redness, these can be imagined as “unattached” to any distal object in the environment.

What does this mean, "arise from experience itself". When I hear a chime, I might wonder, what is making the noise. But by no means is this wonderment somehow embedded within the phenomenal experience of chiming itself. It is something extra: given this experience, this chiming, I am led to wonder, "what made it"? — hypericin

Agreed. The explicit question “what is it?” is not embedded in phenomenal character itself, but is a further moment in the overall structure of perception.

But what positive arguments do you have that the phenomenal is derivative? — hypericin

First, I want to make it clear that I’m not claiming that phenomenal experience is derivative in the sense of being unreal, reflectively constructed, or temporally distinct from the act of perception. I fully acknowledge that phenomenal qualities are features of first-order perceptual episodes. What I deny is only that they are first-order with regard to their epistemic or intentional role.

In my view, perception is an intrinsically normative and intentional act. It is characterized by a “directedness” or “aboutness” that purports to present its object as thus-and-so, in a way that is answerable to correction. Perception is something that can be mistaken, revised, and confirmed or disconfirmed, so any theory that purports to explain perception must not render these characteristics unintelligible.

By contrast, phenomenal qualities as such (redness-as-seen, chiming-as-heard, pungency-as-smelled) are not themselves propositional or truth-apt. They do not purport, on their own, to settle what is the case. Whereas perceptual objects exhibit conditions of identity, persistence, and modality that are necessary to underwrite error and correction, phenomenal qualities, taken in abstraction, do not. So to treat phenomenal character as the intermediary object of direct perception is, I would argue, a category mistake.

This doesn’t mean that phenomenal qualities cannot be explicitly thematized within consciousness. We can turn our attention to them specifically, and even make claims about them. When we say “the redness of that apple is very intense,” we are making a claim about the redness itself, but doing this doesn’t alter the adjectival role that redness played in the original perceptual episode.

Similarly, when we imagine a red-patch in abstraction from any particular distal object, the redness-as-such is not the object of imagination. Rather, the redness is presented as-of something—in this case, a bounded phenomenal field (a “patch”) with minimal criteria of identity and persistence. It is the patch-of-red that is the intentional object, not the pure phenomenal quality of redness in isolation.

So phenomenal qualities cannot function as objects standing between subject and world because they do not exhibit the characteristics required to play that epistemic role. Phenomenal qualities are the manner in which an object—actual, imagined, abstract, or indeterminate—is given. Shifts in attention, aesthetic focus, or meditative bracketing only modify the intentional object; but they do not abolish the "object-directedness" of intentionality or invert the priority of the object within intentionality itself.