It is through the direct connection of the light reflecting off other objects that we can see the object. — NOS4A2

Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception.

None of this implies sense-data or other mental objects either. — NOS4A2

I'm not saying it does. Again, these are two distinct claims:

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

Your brand of "direct" realism agrees with (1) even if it doesn't agree with (2). I am simply pointing out that direct realism as almost everyone else understands it doesn't agree with (1).

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena — Michael

Good point @NOS4A2 add that clarification to my recent reply. It is extremely succinct, thank you Michael.

As I have explained previously, qualia do not meet the criteria required to play the role of the object of perception. This doesn’t mean they don’t exist; it means they are features of perceptual acts rather than entities that can ground correctness, error, or public objecthood. Treating them as objects simply relocates the problem rather than solving it. — Esse Quam Videri

I'll rephrase the two claims:

1. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are distal objects and their properties
2. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are qualia/sense data

Naive realism claims that (1) is true, minimal indirect realism claims that (1) is false, and the sense datum theory claims that (2) is true.

My concern is not to deny that there are multiple senses in play, but to argue that any adequate theory of perception ought to explain normativity, error, and objecthood, and that refusal to address those issues looks less like a theory of perception and more like quietism or eliminativism. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't think it's necessarily quietism or eliminativism; rather it's only trying to answer a simpler question, and that is: what are the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience?

You're just telling me how scientists say we see things. That's not in dispute. — Hanover

And the way scientists say we see things is the way indirect realists say we see things, in contrast to naive realists who say that distal objects and their properties are literal constituents of first-person phenomenal experience.

The metaphysical question deals with the fundamental ontological composition of the entity. — Hanover

That metaphysical question is a question for materialists, idealists, and dualists — not for indirect realists. Indirect realism is concerned with the nature of perception, not with the nature of apples.

I think its possible your description of hte Sun there lands us in the same position: If that, to you, is 'direct awareness' I don't understand the claim. It is not "the object" in any sense - it is light ferried across one AU, bringing with it information about the Sun. We call this 'seeing the sun' because its easier and better for "getting on with it". — AmadeusD

I'm not clear what "it" refers to in "it is not 'the object' in any sense". These examples scramble our intuitions - our common sense. The problem is that there is a slippery slope here. Under normal circumstances, we have no hesitation about saying that we see the computer screen on which we are typing. And yet, there is a time lag between light leaving the screen and it arriving at our eyes. But when we find cases where the time lag is longer, we don't quite know what to say. Nothing wrong with that.
Let's add in the phenomenon of nova stars, which are stars that explode in a brilliant flash, easily seen on earth, even though the phenomenon is light years away. So far that the star has usually disappeared by the time we see it.
So, what is it that we see - the computer screen, the sun, the exploding star? If I allow that we don't see the star, I'll need to admit we don't see the sun and we don't see the computer screen. I prefer to work the other way. I insist that we see the computer screen, the sun and the exploding star. I accept it's a choice, but that's the point. There's no right way to go here.
I don't think that we normally see light, except as reflected or emitted from things - and even then, what we see is the objects from which the light is reflected or emitted. So I was most uncomfortable when I needed to describe what travels from the sun to the earth. Information?, an image? I don't know the right term. But I need to be clear that I see the sun, just as I see the computer screen on which I am writing. Light is the medium that enables me to see, not something that I see in its own right.

Right. I've been considering exactly this is recent days - ..... I am sorry if this isn't directly on point, but it seems clear to me "error" comes in different kinds, and the one I mean (related to the latter example) cannot be adjudicated by further looking at the object: It can change from red to grey as I see fit, in some sense. I am not bound by the object to see it as a certain colour in that case. — AmadeusD

There's a lot in here. I agree that there are many different sources of error. I would hate to have to create a taxonomy. However, there is one key point here and that is the concept of interpretation. Many errors are errors of interpretation and so do not require positing any kind of intermediary object. That's what is left out of this debate.

We don't argue about whether "watching the game" on recording is direct awareness of the game, or the recording (well, it seems to me we dont?). I don't quite see a difference here. — AmadeusD

I'm not sure about that. I agree most people will happily say that they are watching the game under all those conditions. But I think most people will differentiate between watching the game live and watching a recording. They will likely not talk of "direct" or "indirect", but still...

The apple doesn't exist during the second ten seconds and so cannot be a constituent of the experience, and so the conclusion is false. Therefore, one of the premises is false. Given that I agree with P1a, my conclusion is that P2a is false. — Michael

So the experience of an apple in the first ten seconds was not an experience of an apple. H'm.

Okay, so I'll step back and explain because I really don't mean to be obscure or confusing.

I say, "I see an apple." There are two questions that can be asked: (1) what is the apple, and (2) what does it mean to say "I see an apple." The problem arises when these two questions get conflated. They get conflated when someone says "Apple means having an experience of an apple." That ties meaning either to (a) the apple itself or (b) the experience you have of the apple. Considering you cannot tell me (a) what the apple itself is without referring to some sort of perceptual state (i.e. it is round, weighs 3 ounces, is red, etc.), and (b) you cannot open your mind and show me your perception, telling me the "apple" is (a) or (b) offers me nothing. You'll also note that (a) and (b) are metaphysical questions, not physical questions. As in, I want to know what the apple itself is if that's what you're using to tie it to meaning.

What I have is use and a community of users of the word apple, and from that we speak of apples. Meaning is use, not meaning is the thing or the experience. How do we use the term "apple"? Through
correction (“no, that’s not an apple”), mistake, teaching, rule-following. That's what I mean by "apple."

This does not deny (1) that there are real apples in the world, (2) that you don't have an experience of an apple, (3) that photons and neurons don't act certain ways. It doesn't speak of that at all. My discussion is about grammar, meaning how words are used, not metaphysics or private sensations.

When you say "I saw an apple" if you start to delve into what is the apple "really" and what part of your sensation was the apple and what wasn't, or if there even was an apple "out there," you've lost your way. You're talking in unanswerable and incohrent circles.

As in, tell me what the apple looks like without telling me how things look because subjective qualities aren't part of the apple. That makes no sense. So, what do I see? I see an apple, but I mean "apple" like we use the term "apple," not by assigning it meaning from metaphysics.

So, you're an indirect realist, then tell me which part of the apple you see if part of the apple really. If none, for fear of being labeled an direct realist as to that part of the apple, then why posit the apple "out there" at all. What explanatory power does it have to say it is the stuff that causes stuff when we can't know anything about the stuff.

So the experience of an apple in the first ten seconds was not an experience of an apple. H'm. — Ludwig V

That's not what I said. I'll start again from the top.

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. — Martin 2004

The important points to take from this are:

P1. If I have direct perception of an object then that object is a constituent of the experience
P2. If an object is a constituent of the experience then that object exists

I then continue this with the following:

Let's assume that I live in a world in which the air is thick and light has mass and travels at a slow 1m/s. An apple is placed 10m in front of me at 10:00:00. It is disintegrated at 10:00:20. Given the speed of the light and the distance of the apple I see an apple for 20 seconds between 10:00:10 and 10:00:30.

P3. If the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds then it is a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
P4. The apple does not exist during the second 10 seconds
C1. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C2. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
C3. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds
P5. If I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 1m/s then I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 299,792,458m/s
C4. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds when the light travels at 299,792,458m/s

The experience during the first 10 seconds (and the second 10 seconds) is still the experience of an apple; it just isn't the direct perception of an apple.

Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception.

Sure, but it isn’t indirect perception of the mind-independent world. So you agree with direct perception of the mind-independent world, which is contrary to indirect realism.

Your brand of "direct" realism agrees with (1) even if it doesn't agree with (2). I am simply pointing out that direct realism as almost everyone else understands it doesn't agree with (1), and so you theory straddles the line between traditional direct realism and the sense datum theory.

But I haven’t used the concept of sense-datum at all, so nothing is straddled.

Sure, but it isn’t indirect perception of the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

It's indirect visual perception of apples and trees and everything other than light, which is a very significant asterisk to your "direct visual perception of a mind-independent world".

But I haven’t used the concept of sense-datum at all, so nothing is straddled. — NOS4A2

It straddles the line because traditional direct realism rejects (1) and (2), you accept (1) and reject (2), and the sense datum theory accepts (1) and (2). I would even say that if you accept (1) then you are an indirect realist with respect to seeing apples even if you're not a sense datum theorist with respect to seeing apples.

1. We do not have direct visual perception of apples, only indirect visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena

So you agree with direct perception of the mind-independent world, which is contrary to indirect realism. — NOS4A2

I didn't say I agree with you.

This argument that "we see tennis, even if on TV; therefore direct realism is true" is ridiculous. — Michael

Quite so. And it's not what was argued. The indirect realist makes the ridiculous claim that even when you are at the Rod Laver Arena, you do not see the tennis, but an image of the tennis. That we do not have direct perception of the tennis when watching it on the screen, or in the front row.