The deeper question is: in what sense would time exist absent any awareness of it? The difficulty is that as soon as you begin to think about that question, you are already bringing time into awareness, or rather, bringing your mind to bear on the question. So time is always already part of the consideration. — Wayfarer

OK, fair enough on that. But it doesn't say anything about why and how time is intuition, and nothing about the nature of time itself. Remember time is not a new topic. It has been one of the hot topic since ancient Greek era. We could like to try to figure out what the nature of time could be in more understandable and realistic manner from our own material world we live in.

Idealist's account of time would be meaningless and groundless, if it just says that time is something unknowable, and hard to understand, but it makes our perception possible and is a precondition of perception. Anything can appear in our intuition, and time is intuition. It does not really say much about the nature of time itself.

We still have to search, explore and aim to demonstrate in more concrete manner where in our material world time might be existing hidden in the form of different level or type of existence.

….the statement that Time is intuition, said by Kant. — Corvus

“… In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori cognition, namely space and time…” (A22/B36)

I did say they were intuitions, when I should have said they were the pure forms of intuitions, and of sensibility in general.

“…. We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, (…). What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, (…). We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition….” (A42/B60)

All intuition is representation of appearance, space and time are not representations of any appearances, therefore not any intuition. Kant would not have said time is intuition, or time is an intuition.

“…. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any thing at all?…”

What they are, covers 15 A paginations and 16 B.
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If time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited internally, can that be extended to mean time can be intuited internally and space can be intuited externally? In which case, space and time can indeed be intuitions, even if Kant didn’t actually say they were?

But if space and time, in and of themselves alone, are said to represent conceptions the transcendental expositions of which are idealities, must it then be possible to intuit idealities in the same regard as appearances? No, for to cognize transcendentally is to reason, from which follows in the cognition of a ideal representation, we in effect represent to ourselves purely a priori nothing more than the ground of a principle, in this case for the use of sensibility in general insofar as by it the representation of appearances in intuition, re: phenomena, becomes possible.

Which is why everybody hates speculative metaphysics: in most cases, the greater the explanation the less the comprehension.

But if space and time, in and of themselves alone, are said to represent conceptions the transcendental expositions of which are idealities, must it then be possible to intuit idealities in the same regard as appearances? No, for to cognize transcendentally is to reason, from which follows in the cognition of a ideal representation, we in effect represent to ourselves purely a priori nothing more than the ground of a principle, in this case for the use of sensibility in general insofar as by it the representation of appearances in intuition, re: phenomena, becomes possible. — Mww

:up: Yes, agreed.

Capital ‘S’ Self. Which is the entire aim of the path. There’s nothing really corresponding with that in Western culture save as a kind of import from Indian sources. Which is not to imply disrespect but mindfulness of context.

Yes, very much the undifferentiated self, but seen, or known from a personal perspective.
As for a Western equivalent, it seems like it was lost in the mists of time. Maybe never was here, I don’t know.

I think learning to accept and live with the elusive nature of the self/subject/'I' is a fundamental life lesson.
— Wayfarer

That's a bit pf a tantalising idea. Are there 2 or 3 aspects of this particularly you can dot point? — Tom Storm

E.g. reflecting on which things are you or yours. We do this casually every day. For example, when you eat food, when it's inside of your digestive system, you call it yours (and call it your body when the particles in the food become parts of your bones, muscles, etc.), and then you disown it by excreting it. Your car is yours, and you feel bound to it (legally, emotionally), it's a type of extension of yourself, but once it breaks down beyond repair, your disown it. Looking at old photos of yourself, you can also characteristically distance yourself from "the person you were back then".

Another passage from the Transcendental Aesthetic:

We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves, would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. — General Remarks on the Transcendental Aesthetic

Notes:

•“Aesthetic” in contemporary usage usually refers to beauty or artistic appreciation. In Kant, it simply means what pertains to sensibility or sense-perception (from aisthēsis), as distinct from logic. Aesthetic concerns how things are given to us in experience; logic concerns how we think about what is given.

• Note here the centrality of the subject (nowadays often referred to as “the observer”). This passage makes very explicit the constitutive role of the subject in the form of experience — arguably one of the most radical passages in the Critique.

• “Objects in themselves” are said to be entirely unknown to us. This is not to say that they cease to exist, but that whatever kind of existence they may have independently of our mode of cognition is inaccessible to us.

• Finally, note the qualification “every human being.” Kant allows for the possibility that other kinds of beings might have different forms of cognition, and elsewhere he speculates about what a divine intellect might be like. But does give a hint of the breadth of his considerations (elaborated at greater length in some of his other works).