I was trying to make you understand what measurement means. — Corvus

All I can say, is that what "measurement" means to you is nothing like what it means to me. And since what you said looks nonsensical to me, I can tell you with a high degree of confidence, that you will never be able to make me understand what measurement means

Why can’t two things occupy the same field without occupying the same space?

If the sun’s light is a field projected from itself, how can it occupy the same field as that which receives it? — Mww

I don't think you quite understand what I meant. What I was talking about is distinct fields in the same place. So the earth has an electromagnetic field which shares the same space as the sun's electro magnetic field. And, the proton and electron, for example, consist of fields which overlap. Therefore the proton and the electron share the same space, but are spoken of, as distinct things.

"Space and time are the pure forms of intution"―not dogmatic.
"Space and time are nothing but the pure forms of intution"―dogmatic. — Janus

You're talking nonsense just like Corvus is. I see no substantial difference between the two phrases. Why does one appear dogmatic, and the other not dogmatic to you? Are you that sensitive to the qualification of "nothing but"?

For the purpose of logical procedure, when a word such as "space" or "time", is defined in a specific way, then we must accept that the meaning for that word is "nothing but" the prescribed definition. To allow that the word might have a meaning other than the prescribed definition is to invite equivocation, which is a fallacy. You might call this "being dogmatic", but it's really just the process of maintaining validity in logic. If you prefer to throw validity out the window, and equivocate by providing a definition other than the one prescribed, because you feel that logical process is too dogmatic, that is your prerogative. We can all be illogical if we want to.

You're talking nonsense just like Corvus is. I see no substantial difference between the two phrases. Why does one appear dogmatic, and the other not dogmatic to you? Are you that sensitive to the qualification of "nothing but"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The first statement says that space and time are relevant to or operative in some domain, which doesn't rule out that they are also relevant to or operative in other domains. The second says they are relevant to and operative in only one domain. If you cannot see the difference in meaning between the two statements then I don't know what else to say.

What I was talking about is distinct fields in the same place. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I’m ok with that. Earth’s magnetic field and gravitational field are in the same space. But the particles associated with those fields are not in each other’s spaces. Neutrinos pass through the gravitational field without bothering anything, right? Jets pass through the magnetic field, and while some of the particles of the jet’s composition may be affected, for all intents and purposes, the jet isn’t, despite the reality that it’s 1 x 10 -32nd of an inch shorter than it was when it was on the ground.

But I see your point. It was Feynman in a CalTech lecture, who said fields could be considered things, insofar as they do occupy space. But you know ol’ Richard….he’s somewhat cryptic, if not facetious.

The first statement says that space and time are relevant to or operative in some domain, which doesn't rule out that they are also relevant to or operative in other domains. The second says they are relevant to and operative in only one domain. If you cannot see the difference in meaning between the two statements then I don't know what else to say. — Janus

Janus, both statements say what space and time "are". "Space and time" is the subject and the statements are definitive as to what space and time are. The subject is not "some domain" which "space and time are relevant to or operative in". What's the point in intentionally switching the subject in your interpretation of one as compared to the other?

That would be a very unusual interpretation of Kant, to say that when he states that space and time are a priori intuitions, he is talking about a domain of a priori intuitions, within which space and time play a role. And, although space and time each play a role within this domain, they are also active in some other domains. Your proposal that space and time cross over from one "domain" to another, is nothing but a category mistake.

Earth’s magnetic field and gravitational field are in the same space. But the particles associated with those fields are not in each other’s spaces. — Mww

Now the issue I pointed to is that we generally restrict the boundaries of "the object" according to visual information, and that's why we conclude that two objects cannot be in the same space. We cannot see two distinct objects at the very same place. In reality, if we include the parts of the object which we cannot see, numerous objects exist at the same place and at the same time. So for example, the gravity of the moon exists in the same space as the gravity of the earth. And, we really ought to include the object's gravity as part of the object. If we did that, then we'd have to admit that the moon exists in space that the earth also exists in, at the same time.

Furthermore, when distinct identifiable physical objects exist in the same place, like a solution of water and salt, we tend to see the two visually as one object. Then one might be inclined to rationalize how they are really just one object, instead of admitting that two things exist in the same space. So, this idea that two things cannot exist in the same space at the same time, is really just an example of how we are mislead by overconfidence in our sense of vision, toward the unreasonable acceptance of a faulty principle.

But I see your point. It was Feynman in a CalTech lecture, who said fields could be considered things, insofar as they do occupy space. But you know ol’ Richard….he’s somewhat cryptic, if not facetious. — Mww

Feynman was actually very good at explaining complicated physics. I read one paper where he explained how the electricity in a copper wire, which common language says travels as electrons within the wire, actually travels through the field around the wire. This is how an induction motor works.

He didn’t believe it; he stated for the record that nothing can be known of noumena as a logical deduction in accordance with a theory he himself constructed. I’d rather think he trusted in the logical construction of the theory, rather than only believed in its conclusions. — Mww

Yes, if we can make valid statements only about the transcendental a-priori and the empirical world, then, yes, the 'noumenon' is unknowable. But that's the problem, IMO.
Since Kant doesn't say that the empirical world is a mere projection of the transcendental subject, I believe his 'system' implies that it arises from the 'interaction' between the subject and the 'noumenon'.

Kant would then say that we shouldn't say anything about the noumenon. However, I can't see how his system doesn't say that: the noumenon is in part the 'basis' for the arising of the empirical world. But this is already saying that something about the noumenon, which would then contradict Kant's view that nothing can be known about it.

Also it is hard to me to think how could the noumenon be 'structureless/inintelligible' if it is the basis for the arising of the empirical world. If not, the 'order' we see in the empirical world would only be due to the subject. But this would actually mean that the subject the facto is the 'creator' of the empirical world and this is absurd given the apparent contingency of the subject (it is interesting that 'non-dualist' thinkers, who shared with Kant the view that the 'subject' has an active role in organizing experience, believed that in some way the individual subject is also 'ultimately unreal'...).

Notice that I do agree with Kant that the 'empirical world' arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject. However, I believe Kant overreaches in saying that we can't know absolutely nothing about the noumenon.

All I can say, is that what "measurement" means to you is nothing like what it means to me. And since what you said looks nonsensical to me, I can tell you with a high degree of confidence, that you will never be able to make me understand what measurement means — Metaphysician Undercover

It is such a simple explanation to understand for anyone. But you seem to be determined refusing to see it. Why is it so difficult to see it? Why do you bring in such a bizarre ideas of "measurement" (property of property?) of time into the discussion?

Why is it so difficult to see it? — Corvus

You said, an instrument reads the numeric value of an object. There is a few fundamental errors with this statement, which render it incoherent.. Here's some:

1. The person using the instrument reads the number from the instrument.
2. The instrument does not read anything from the object.
3. As I already explained, it is not "the value" of the object itself which is determined by the measurement, but the value of a specific measurement parameter, which we might call a property of the object.
4, The number must be determined relative to a scale. Usually the instrument does this, places the number within a scale. The designated scale, is the property of the property. So in the phrase "5 metres of length", the property of the object is "length", and the property of that property is 5 metres.

For example, if a tape measure is the instrument, one might put it beside an object, according to the criteria of the parameter, width, height, etc. (3). Then the person reads the number from the instrument (1). The instrument does not read anything (2). And, the person must interpret the number relative to a scale, imperial system, metric system, whatever (4). The tape measure might say on it "inches", "centimeters", or something like that.

These same principles apply to the measurement of time:
1. The person measuring reads a number from the clock.
2.The clock does not read anything from the object (time) itself.
3. It is not time itself (the object) which is measured, but a specific parameter which is commonly called "duration".
4. The number read, (4:02 for example) must be determined relative to a scale, atomic scale, solar scale, or something like that.

Is the in itself purely imaginary or is it real? — Janus

Hmmm…..the in-itself is purely conceptual, as a mere notion of the understanding, thus not real, so of the two choices, and in conjunction with conceptions being merely representations, I’m forced to go with imaginary. But every conception is representation of a thought, so while to conceive/imagine/think is always mind-dependent, we can further imagine such mind-dependent in-itself conceptions as representing a real mind-independent thing, by qualifying the conditions the conception is supposed to satisfy. This is what he meant by the thought of something being not at all contradictory.
—————-

Would you say the refusal to infer from experience the nature of the in itself (while acknowledging that it cannot be certainly known) is motivated by the practical reason of making room for faith? — Janus

While the gist of what you’re asking here comes from the CPR B intro, your altogether different application of it isn’t really wrong. It actually does take some faith to accept some transcendental idea born from pure speculative reason, the experience of which is quite impossible. The impossibility of knowledge does make room for faith, but making room for faith doesn’t make faith necessary.

Refusal to infer from experience is really loaded. Inferences from experience belong to judgement, a fully operational logical faculty that only does inferences. Inferences for experience in general is transcendental and belongs to reason. Dunno how refusal to infer is possible. A faculty the job of which is inference can’t not infer.

Anyway…fun to think about.

Feynman was actually very good at explaining complicated physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he was. For those liking their physics complicated.

You’re taking things into a realm I don’t care anything about. It’s highly unlikely I’ll be doing the SOL anytime soon, and there’s really no good reason for getting two candles into the same holder.

I’m ok with things the way I’ve thought of them, and I don’t deny what you’ve said. I just like my way better.

I believe his 'system' implies that it arises from the 'interaction' between the subject and the 'noumenon' — boundless

It being the world; the world arises from. Ok, it doesn’t, that notwithstanding, how would it work in order to be the case?

I can't see how his system doesn't say that: the noumenon is in part the 'basis' for the arising of the empirical world. — boundless

His doesn’t say, and his system doesn’t allow, that the noumenon is in part the basis for the arising of the empirical world.

Granting the empirical world is the totality of all possible real things, it is absurd to suppose a single human logical construct is responsible for the existence of it. And even if the empirical world is merely a concept, in that we as humans could never experience such a thing as the totality of all possible real things….what has noumena to do with any of that?

Also it is hard to me to think how could the noumenon be 'structureless/inintelligible' if it is the basis for the arising of the empirical world. — boundless

Which just says it’s not hard to think the opposite if it isn’t. Which makes more sense? It depends on what one thinks a noumenon to be, doesn’t it? What do you think it is, other than structureless/inintelligible, and if that, why is it that way and not some other?

If you are making noumena your own, which you’re perfectly entitled to do, the burden then falls on you to say what any relation of which it is a part is, and how that relation is possible.

Proceed?
—————-

Notice that I do agree with Kant that the 'empirical world' arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject. — boundless

Only if the empirical world is a general conception representing all possible real things does it arise from the cognitive faculties of the subject. For any particular thing in the collection of all possible things, given to the senses in perception and by which experience is possible, that thing does not arise from the cognitive faculties of the subject, but, insofar as it is given, arises from Nature herself.

So you might not be agreeing with what you think you are.

1. The person using the instrument reads the number from the instrument.
2. The instrument does not read anything from the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you could think of some measuring instrument, you will change your mind I am sure. Think of the speed detection machine for detecting cars driving over the speed limit on the road.

The machine monitors the road via the camera vision, and reads the speed of every passing cars. When it detects cars driving over the set speed limit in the machine, it will take photo of the car's number plate, and sends it to the traffic control authorities, from which they will issue a fine and warning letter with the offense points to the speeding driver.

If you think only humans can read, but machines and instruments cannot, then your reasoning seems in fault.

3. As I already explained, it is not "the value" of the object itself which is determined by the measurement, but the value of a specific measurement parameter, which we might call a property of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, I feel that you seem to be trying to complicate the issue unnecessarily for some strange reason. This is a simple issue. Time doesn't have physical existence itself. It is measurement of perceived duration. Human mind perceives duration, but it lacks accuracy of the readings to be any use for science or even daily routine in the society, hence they must rely on the accurate time reading instruments. That is, right you guessed it I hope, clocks and watches.

Hmmm…..the in-itself is purely conceptual, as a mere notion of the understanding, thus not real, so of the two choices, and in conjunction with conceptions being merely representations, I’m forced to go with imaginary. But every conception is representation of a thought, so while to conceive/imagine/think is always mind-dependent, we can further imagine such mind-dependent in-itself conceptions as representing a real mind-independent thing, by qualifying the conditions the conception is supposed to satisfy. This is what he meant by the thought of something being not at all contradictory. — Mww

I'll try another way of looking at this and see if it makes sense to you. I am going to kind of repeat what I already said. So, you say "the in itself is purely conceptual"―I'm going to modify that in line with the "use/ mention" distinction. Accordingly we would then have "'the in itself' is purely conceptual". So, the idea 'the in itself' is undoubtedly purely conceptual. What does the idea refer to? Well, it refers to the in itself of course.

So, I posed the question as to whether the in itself is imaginary or real. You say you are forced to go with imaginary, but then you go on to say that we (you) can further imagine that the mind-dependent conception of the in itself could represent a real mind-independent thing, by qualifying the conditions the conception is supposed to satisfy. This would seem to mean, to me at least, that we can equally think of the in itself as imaginary or real, while acknowledging that we cannot be at all certain whether it is imaginary or real, and if real, just what it is.

So, then I would say the inference to the best explanation, given that the in itself is thought to give rise to the for-us, and since the for-us is real, would be that the in itself is real, but can be real for us only to the extent of what our senses reveal of it, and as to the rest it can only be imagined, and is hence in that regard, for us ideal.

I agree with the rest of what you say in that post, I'm just not sure whether you will agree with the above.

Hmmm…..the in-itself is purely conceptual, as a mere notion of the understanding, thus not real, so of the two choices, and in conjunction with conceptions being merely representations, I’m forced to go with imaginary. But every conception is representation of a thought, so while to conceive/imagine/think is always mind-dependent, we can further imagine such mind-dependent in-itself conceptions as representing a real mind-independent thing, by qualifying the conditions the conception is supposed to satisfy. This is what he meant by the thought of something being not at all contradictory. — Mww

So, does this mean that the mind itself is mind independent? For example, everything that is thought, is mind dependent. But the thinker, being the mind itself is mind independent.

If you could think of some measuring instrument, you will change your mind I am sure. — Corvus

I gave you a couple of examples of measuring instruments, in my examples. I used a tape measure, keeping things nice and simple so as to avoid unnecessary complications. And in the case of measuring time I used a clock. What more are you asking for?

Think of the speed detection machine for detecting cars driving over the speed limit on the road.

The machine monitors the road via the camera vision, and reads the speed of every passing cars. When it detects cars driving over the set speed limit in the machine, it will take photo of the car's number plate, and sends it to the traffic control authorities, from which they will issue a fine and warning letter with the offense points to the speeding driver. — Corvus

I wouldn't use a "speed detection machine" as an example, because I really don't know exactly how it works. I do however know that it works by radar, not "camera vision". So you are just continuing to demonstrate how wrong you are.

Time doesn't have physical existence itself. It is measurement of perceived duration. — Corvus

Then what does "duration" as the thing measured, refer to, if not a length of time? And if it does refer to a length of time, how can there be a "length" of something which has no physical existence?

A note to clarify my view of what is meant by the 'in itself': it designates whatever has *not* entered 'the machinery and the manufactury of the brain' (to quote Schopenhauer.) Put another way: an object considered from no perspective.

You might be thinking of an object in the absence of any perspective, but even thinking of it requires either imagining it or naming it, both of which are mental operations.

This is why I have said previously that the ‘unobserved object’ neither exists nor does not exist — not because it is unreal, but because either claim already presupposes a standpoint from which it can be meaningfully predicated. To say 'it exists' is to predicate something of it when it literally 'hasn't entered your mind'. To say 'it doesn't exist' likewise already situates the object as something, the existence of which can be negated. So the 'in itself' is neither - in fact, not even a 'ding'! Just the 'in itself'.

(Again, the noumenon and the ding an sich are different in Kant's philosophy but they are often conflated, even by him.

Noumenon means literally 'object of nous' (Greek term for 'intellect'). In Platonist philosophy, the noumenon is the intelligible form of a particular. Kant rejects the Platonist view, and treats the noumenon primarily as a limiting concept — the idea of an object considered apart from sensible intuition — not as something we can positively know. And it’s worth remembering that Kant’s early inaugural dissertation already engages directly with the Platonic sensible/intelligible distinction.

The 'ding an sich' is not the same concept although as noted often treated as if it were. The ‘thing in itself’ designates whatever a thing may be independently of the conditions under which it appears to us. It is not an intelligible object we could know or describe, but precisely what cannot be brought under any standpoint or predicates at all.)

In relation to time, then: whatever we think exists, or might exist, is already implicitly located in time and space. Even the theoretical abstractions of modern physics (like virtual particles) are temporally, if ephemerally, existent. As Kant points out, in order to conceive of anything as a thing, it must be located in time and space which provide the structural conditions that underlie all empirical existence - the 'framework of empirical cognition', you might say. But because these ‘pure intuitions’ are so deeply embedded in our consciousness, we fail to recognise that the mind itself is their source. We think we are looking at them, when in fact we are looking through them, at the objects disclosed within them.

I gave you a couple of examples of measuring instruments, in my examples. I used a tape measure, keeping things nice and simple so as to avoid unnecessary complications. And in the case of measuring time I used a clock. What more are you asking for? — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not asking for anything. I am just stating that any act of reading measurements is involved with some sort of measuring tools. You cannot read size, weight or time with no instruments or measuring tools. The measuring instruments or tools become the part of reading measurements. You cannot separate them.

I wouldn't use a "speed detection machine" as an example, because I really don't know exactly how it works. I do however know that it works by radar, not "camera vision". So you are just continuing to demonstrate how wrong you are. — Metaphysician Undercover

A speed detecting machine is a good example for this case, because it integrates many different technical modules for measuring, reading and also decision making and processing in the device.

To take photos of the speeding cars, it uses camera vision, not the radars. Radars are used for mostly flying objects in the sky and aeronautical or military applications, not for the speed traffic detection.

Why and how does your ignorance on the technology proves that I am wrong?

Then what does "duration" as the thing measured, refer to, if not a length of time? And if it does refer to a length of time, how can there be a "length" of something which has no physical existence? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a good question. Measurement of time is always on change. That is, the changes of movement of objects. It is not physical length. It is measurement of the duration on the start and end of movement the measured objects.

Think of the measurement for a day. It is the duration of the earth rotating once to the starting measurement geographical point. It takes 24 hours. Think of the length of a year. It is the set point where the earth rotates around the sun fully, and returns to the set point, which the duration of the movement is 365 days.

Think of your age. If you are X years old now, it must have counted from the day and year you were born until this day. For this measurement, you don't need any instruments, because it doesn't require the strict accuracy of the reading / counting. However, strictly speaking, we could say that your brain is the instrument for the reading.

Noumenon means literally 'object of nous' (Greek term for 'intellect'). In Platonist philosophy, the noumenon is the intelligible form of a particular. Kant rejects the Platonist view, and treats the noumenon primarily as a limiting concept — the idea of an object considered apart from sensible intuition — not as something we can positively know. And it’s worth remembering that Kant’s early inaugural dissertation already engages directly with the Platonic sensible/intelligible distinction. — Wayfarer

I think the main difference between Plato and Kant, is that Kant denies the human intellect direct access to the noumenon as intelligible object. He describes all of our understanding of any supposed noumenon as derived through the medium of sensation, and those a priori intuitions of space and time.

Plato, on the other hand thought that the human intellect might have direct, unmediated access to the intelligible objects, to apprehend and understand them directly as noumena. This is elucidated by the cave allegory, where the philosopher is able to get beyond the realm of sensations, and grasp with the mind's eye the intelligible objects directly. At this point, instead of the medium of sensation imposed by Kant, Plato proposed "the good" as that which illuminates intelligible objects, so that the philosopher may apprehend them directly.

Notice the difference, instead of sensation and the a priori intuitions coming between the intellect and the noumenon, Plato has the intelligible objects being illuminated by the good, so that the intellect may grasp them directly. This is the highest part of the divided line analogy.

I am not asking for anything. I am just stating that any act of reading measurements is involved with some sort of measuring tools. You cannot read size, weight or time with no instruments or measuring tools. The measuring instruments or tools become the part of reading measurements. You cannot separate them. — Corvus

Actually, measurement in its basic form, is simply comparison. So no "instrument" is required for basic measurements. If Jim is short, and Tom is judged as taller, that is a form of measurement. The tools, standard scales, and instruments, just allow for more precision and complexity, for what is fundamentally just comparison.

To take photos of the speeding cars, it uses camera vision, not the radars. Radars are used for mostly flying objects in the sky and aeronautical or military applications, not for the speed traffic detection.

Why and how does your ignorance on the technology proves that I am wrong? — Corvus

We're talking about measurement, not taking pictures of the measured thing. The radar instrument, with the integrated computer analysis is what measures the speed. The camera does not, it takes a picture of the speeding car, to be sent to the owner. That's why it's called "photo radar", the radar machine measures, and the photo machine pictures what was measured.

This is a good question. Measurement of time is always on change. That is, the changes of movement of objects. It is not physical length. It is measurement of the duration on the start and end of movement the measured objects.

Think of the measurement for a day. It is the duration of the earth rotating once to the starting measurement geographical point. It takes 24 hours. Think of the length of a year. It is the set point where the earth rotates around the sun fully, and returns to the set point, which the duration of the movement is 365 days.

Think of your age. If you are X years old now, it must have counted from the day and year you were born until this day. For this measurement, you don't need any instruments, because it doesn't require the strict accuracy of the reading / counting. However, strictly speaking, we could say that your brain is the instrument for the reading. — Corvus

Giving examples of different lengths of duration doesn't tell me what you think duration is. Your claim was that there is "no physical existence" of that which is measured, "perceived duration". So I asked you, if duration is measured, and it has no physical existence, then what is it? It must be something real, if we can measure it.

The question is easily answered. Duration is the passing of time, which happens at the present. The passing of time is not a physical thing, it is nonphysical, immaterial. So duration is the measured extension of a very real immaterial, nonphysical thing, which we know as "time".

Notice that I do agree with Kant that the 'empirical world' arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject.
— boundless

Only if the empirical world is a general conception representing all possible real things does it arise from the cognitive faculties of the subject. For any particular thing in the collection of all possible things, given to the senses in perception and by which experience is possible, that thing does not arise from the cognitive faculties of the subject, but, insofar as it is given, arises from Nature herself — Mww

From a Kantian perspective, this rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what Kant means by arising from the cognitive faculties of the subject. It treats Kant’s claim as if it were about where individual empirical items come from, rather than about the conditions under which anything can count as an empirical object at all.

Kant’s thesis is not that particular empirical objects are fabricated by the mind, nor that the empirical world exists only as a general conception. Rather, his claim is transcendental: the form of objectivity, being an object of possible experience, is contributed by the subject’s cognitive faculties. Space and time are forms of sensibility; the categories are rules of synthesis. Without these, there would be no “collection of possible things” and no “particular thing” that could be said to be given as a thing. Your distinction between a general conception that arises from the subject and particular things that “arise from Nature herself” reintroduces the naïve realism Kant is trying to overcome.

From Kant’s standpoint, the phrase “given to the senses” already presupposes the subject’s contribution. Sensibility is not a passive window onto a ready-made Nature; it is structured receptivity. What is given is given in space and time, and these are not features of Nature as it exists in itself but forms of intuition. Likewise, for something to count as a particular thing rather than a mere manifold of sensation, it must be synthesized under the categories. So even at the level of particular empirical objects, their objecthood does not “arise from Nature herself” in isolation from the subject.

This also misconstrues Kant’s use of “empirical realism.” Kant is an empirical realist because he insists that objects of experience are not illusions or mere ideas; they are objectively valid for all subjects with the same cognitive faculties. But this realism is inseparable from transcendental idealism. To say that a particular empirical object is “given by Nature herself” as opposed to arising from cognitive faculties suggests a standpoint outside the conditions of possible experience, a standpoint Kant denies us. Nature, for Kant, is not a thing in itself that hands over ready-made objects; it is the lawful unity of appearances constituted through the categories.

To say that the empirical world “arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject” is correct if it is understood transcendentally rather than causally. The subject does not produce empirical objects, but it provides the necessary conditions under which anything can appear as an object in a unified world.

Kant is not dividing labor between the subject (general concepts) and Nature (particular things). Instead, he is saying that Nature itself is Nature as appearance, which exists only in relation to the subject’s forms of intuition and categories. To invoke “Nature herself” as the source of particular empirical things is to speak as if we had access to Nature as it is in itself. From Kant’s point of view, that is precisely the illusion his critical philosophy is meant to dispel.

….see if it makes sense to you. (…) the idea 'the in itself' is undoubtedly purely conceptual. What does the idea refer to? Well, it refers to the in itself of course. — Janus

If the “in-itself” is to be considered as an idea, it can only be so as an act of reason, for understanding, the source of empirical conceptions, does not concern itself with mere ideas. Insofar as ideas do originate in reason, they are transcendental conceptions, rather than empirical or aesthetic.

The thing about transcendental ideas is they do not have objects belonging to them, which is indicated by the “in-itself” being a general conception, having no particular reference. So, yes, the “in-itself” idea can only refer to itself, but from which occurs a problem for the other cognitive faculties, for a reference to itself contains no relations, hence would be worthless as a principle. Without a relation of conceptions there is no cognition, so while the transcendental conception is valid as such, it is without meaning.

It is a problem for the other cognitive faculties, because reason, in accordance with the theory from which it receives its warrant, is the faculty of principles for the express use of the understanding as rules for its own functionality regarding empirical conditions. It should be quite clear understanding can cognize nothing empirical at all from the mere idea “in-itself”, and, upon any use of the general idea, assumes the liberty of conceiving the “thing-in-itself”, or, the “object-in-itself”**, which just is to subsume another conception under the general, or, relate one to the other.
** “…I can think whatever I please, so long as I do not contradict myself…”

Now there becomes that with which understanding can form a judgement, in that “thing” and/or “object” have already been empirically thought and their own possible empirical relations already determined, re: being related to this or that matter/form intuition, called…..waaaiiiittt for iitttttt….phenomenon!!!!!!, and it is therefrom this synthesis that the new cognition, the “thing-in-itself” receives its cognitive validity, a.k.a., its definition, as that “thing” which does not meet the requirements of its original synthesis. Or, simply put, the cognition of that which is not ever to be phenomenon because that thing does not meet the criteria sensibility requires.

Often overlooked but very pertinent: for any conception its negation is given automatically, from which follows for any thing given to us there must necessarily be that very same thing not given to us. Now, that thing not given to us in perception may be determinable from its non-existence on the one hand, or, on the other may be determinable merely from the possibility that it hasn’t yet been given, in which case it cannot be non-existent. It is from these mutually-canceling inferences that existence cannot be a condition of the conceptual “thing-in-itself”, and, if existence cannot be a condition for negation it can be at least a non-contradictory condition for affirmation, in which case, it is not wrong to say “things-in-themselves” exist, the absence of its appearance to perception notwithstanding.

Nothing illogical in the principle: that thing perceived must exist but that thing not perceived does not necessarily not exist. Kant does in fact hint strongly in Bxxviii, “….if the critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a twofold meaning, namely as appearance or as thing in itself…”, that the thing-in-itself really is as much an existent as the appearance provided by it really must be.

Hopefully there’s something you find useful in there. It is all only my interpretive opinion, after all.

I think that this point I am making addresses both of your posts, so I'll write a single response.

From what I have understood so far, the 'transcendental idealist' (and I believe this applies also to similar positions generally regarded as forms of 'phenomenology') position seems to assert the following things:

(1) the form of the 'empirical world' is due to the cognitive activities of the 'transcendental subject'. So, for instance, 'time' is a feature of the empirical world, not of a 'world independent from the (transcendental) subject'. So, the 'transcendental idealist' argues, it is not possible to talk about 'time' without reference to the 'transcendental subject'.
(2) the content, however, of the 'empirical world' is not 'due' to the 'transcendental subject'. So, the 'transcendental subject' isn't a 'creator' of the 'empirical world'. However, due to (1), it is not possible to know "how the world is without reference to a transcendental subject, who/which provides the form of the empirical world".

The issues I see here, however, are these:

(A) Apparently, the 'transcendental idealist' takes the 'transcendental subject' as being an individual sentient (or rational*) being. So, it is not possible to know "how the world is without taking a perspective of a given sentient (or rational) being". However it seems clear that each individual sentient/rational being is contigent. If the existence of each sentient/rational being is contingent, it seems to me that there should be an explanation of how they come into existence. However, if there is an explanation, it seems to me that this implies that "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" is intelligible and, in principle, it can make sense to talk about it.

(B) Assuming that the 'transcendent subject' is a particular 'sentient/rational being', however, it is clear that whatever "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" in its interaction (?) with any 'sentient/rational' being gives the content to the latter to form the 'empirical world'. This strongly suggests that the 'content' has already an order before being 'formed' by the subject. Therefore, "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" has an intelligibility.

There is a clear tension here. On the one hand, the transcendental idealist wants to deny that "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" has any intelligibility and is completely unknowable even in principle. On the other hand, however, these two points above suggest the contrary.

So, if one wants to go beyond the 'tension', the possible solutions I see here are (note that there are many precedents IMO in Indian traditions):

(1) Re-define the 'transcendental subject'. Perhaps, it is an Individual Mind, which isn't contingent, that transcends all particular 'sentient beings'. In other words, there is only one subject and each sentient being is a 'mode/manifestio/part' etc of this Subject or even that the multiplicity of the subjects is ultimately illusory. This points towards a pantheist view or even an acosmist view (i.e. multiplicity is illusory, there is only the 'Divine Mind'). This is similar to Spinoza's God, Advaita Vedanta etc.
(2) The 'subject-object' distinction is ultimately illusory. So, ultimately, one can't speak of a 'transcendental subject', it is only a provisional reality. This is more like Buddhist nondualism.
(3) There are a multiplicity of non-contingent Minds. Again, there is an Indian precedent IIRC: the Samkya school.
(4) The "world without reference to any sentient/rational being" is indeed intelligible (at least in principle), i.e. we get a form of realism**.

Personally, I don't view the 'Kantian view' and Kantian-like views as a stable unity. The above two issues (A) and (B) above IMO imply that we go beyond them.

*Kant's own model seems to suggest that the transcendental subject must be a rational being IMO. Others might disagree.
**Some proponents of this view posit, for instance, a Divine Mind as the foundation of this intelligibility (so really, even if one rejects the solution (1), one can still IMO embrace a form of theism, pantheism, panentheism etc - so this topic has clearly nothing to do with the existence of the Divine). However, intelligibility alone doesn't by itself require that Divine Mind.

Edited for clarity

Sensibility is not a passive window onto a ready-made Nature… — Joshs

Never said it was; perception, on the other hand, is. Sensibility, the faculty of receptivity of representations, cannot be as physiological as the sensory apparatuses.

What is given is given in space and time…. — Joshs

What is given is conditioned by space and time.

….the phrase “given to the senses” already presupposes the subject’s contribution. — Joshs

Presupposes the subject’s participation, given to the senses merely the occassion for it.

….empirical object is “given by Nature herself” as opposed to arising from cognitive faculties…. — Joshs

The object is given by, the representation of it arises from.

the empirical world “arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject” is correct if it is understood transcendentally rather than causally. — Joshs

That’s the implication of what I said, yes. I just didn’t get that technical. It remains the case that anything considered in general, as the empirical world must be, is transcendental.

Kant is an empirical realist because he insists that objects of experience are not illusions or mere ideas — Joshs

Objects of experience are representations, which are possible illusions whereas ideas are not. He says he is an empirical realist, not for that, but because real objects are really given to sensibility and not arising from it, as some established idealist doctrines maintained.

To invoke “Nature herself” as the source of particular empirical things is to speak as if we had access to Nature as it is in itself. — Joshs

Not necessarily. It is just as logical to say Nature is the source of particular empirical things insofar as they are given to us as necessary and sufficient causality of our sensations, in which case it is not contradictory to say we have access to Nature herself, but not as it is in itself.

….the illusion his critical philosophy is meant to dispel. — Joshs

…resides in pure reason alone, hence the name, or, in understanding only insofar as that which reason provides for its use, is itself illusory. Case in point…to attribute to the empirical world in general that which relates only to particular instances of it.
————-

Or…..I’ve got it all wrong and led many a folk astray. (Sigh)

I think @Joshs previous comment (above your reply to me) holds, I hope that what I've been arguing so far conforms with it.

the 'transcendental idealist' takes the 'transcendental subject' as being an individual sentient (or rational*) being. — boundless

Here, you are treating the transcendental subject as if it were an entity that could itself be viewed from an external standpoint and compared with a “world without it.” But the whole point of the transcendental analysis is that there is no such standpoint. The subject here is not a being in the world, but the condition under which anything can appear as world. So asking how the world would be “without reference to it,” or how it “comes into existence,” already presupposes what the analysis rules out.

the transcendental idealist wants to deny that "the world without reference to any sentient/rational being" has any intelligibility and is completely unknowable even in principle. — boundless

And what world would that be? Presumably, the earth prior to the evolution of h.sapiens . But then, you're conflating the empirical and transcendental again. Notice that even to name or consider 'the world without any sentient/rational being' already introduces the very perspective that you are at the same time presuming is absent.

I totally get that this is not an easy thing to internalise, because we are so habituated to treating time, space, and objectivity as simply “out there.” Seeing them instead as conditions of intelligibility rather than as objects of description requires a genuine shift in perspective, a kind of gestalt shift.

I think the main difference between Plato and Kant, is that Kant denies the human intellect direct access to the noumenon as intelligible object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agree with the contrast you’re drawing: Plato allows a form of direct intellectual apprehension of intelligible reality, whereas Kant denies that human cognition has any such unmediated access apart from sensible intuition structured by space and time.

But I will call out the language of “intelligible objects.” I think this is where a deep metaphysical confusion enters. Expressions like “objects of thought” or “intelligible objects” (pace Augustine) quietly import the grammar of perception into a domain where it no longer belongs. They encourage us to imagine that understanding is a kind of inner seeing of a special type of thing. I'm of the firm view that the expression 'object' in 'intelligible object' is metaphorical. (And then, the denial that there are such 'objects' is the mother of all nominalism. But that is for another thread.)

But to 'grasp a form' is not to encounter an object at all. It is an intellectual act — a way of discerning meaning, structure, or necessity — not the perception of something standing over against a subject. Once we start reifying intelligibility into “things,” we generate exactly the kind of pseudo-problems that Kant was trying to dissolve.

Thanks, I can make sense of what you say there. I'm radically open to entertaining different perspectives, and I'm not wedded to any of them, or even really to being overly concerned whether they are correct or not. It's more a case that some resonate and others not so much. We're just a bunch of ignorant monkeys, after all...or at least that's one perspective.

Kant's own model….. — boundless

Since when is, or could ever be, a paradigm shifting speculative metaphysics a model? If there’s never been anything like it, what is it supposed to be a model of? Why can’t it just be a theory, like the guy who wrote it said it was?

The transcendental subject, being nothing but the consciousness of every thought, A346/B404, cannot be subject or predicate in a composed logical proposition.

I don’t do Buddhism.

‘Nuff said.

I can make sense of what you say there. — Janus

Cool. Making sense for somebody, isn’t attempting to make him believe…

….some resonate and others not so much… — Janus

…just like that.

Making sense for somebody, isn’t the attempt to make him believe… — Mww

…just like that. — Mww

Exactly. Imagine if there were no plurality of views.

To say that the empirical world “arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject” is correct if it is understood transcendentally rather than causally. The subject does not produce empirical objects, but it provides the necessary conditions under which anything can appear as an object in a unified world.

Kant is not dividing labor between the subject (general concepts) and Nature (particular things). Instead, he is saying that Nature itself is Nature as appearance, which exists only in relation to the subject’s forms of intuition and categories. To invoke “Nature herself” as the source of particular empirical things is to speak as if we had access to Nature as it is in itself. From Kant’s point of view, that is precisely the illusion his critical philosophy is meant to dispel. — Joshs

You have requested a distinction between a "transcendental" understanding, and a "causal" understanding. Can you explain this difference better, for me? "Nature herself" you say, is not the source of empirical things. So nature is not causal in this respect. And, you describe "the conditions" for empirical appearance, as the a priori intuitions. What could be the cause of those empirical appearances then? As empirical appearances they ought to be understandable, and this implies that we ought to be able to speak of causation. If the human mind itself is not taken to be the cause, then they end up as causeless eternal objects, like Platonic objects.

So, yes, the “in-itself” idea can only refer to itself, but from which occurs a problem for the other cognitive faculties, for a reference to itself contains no relations, hence would be worthless as a principle. — Mww

The relation between a thing and itself is what Aristotle called "identity". The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. (Philosophers have argued that it is worthless as a principle.) But it is relevant to the thread because it is known as a temporal relation, constituting the temporal extension of a thing. The thing at one moment is allowed to continue being the same thing at the next moment, as it was, even though accidental properties are changing. So identity, the relation which a thing has to itself, is the defining feature of primary substance.

But I will call out the language of “intelligible objects.” I think this is where a deep metaphysical confusion enters. Expressions like “objects of thought” or “intelligible objects” (pace Augustine) quietly import the grammar of perception into a domain where it no longer belongs. They encourage us to imagine that understanding is a kind of inner seeing of a special type of thing. I'm of the firm view that the expression 'object' in 'intelligible object' is metaphorical. (And then, the denial that there are such 'objects' is the mother of all nominalism. But that is for another thread.)

But to 'grasp a form' is not to encounter an object at all. It is an intellectual act — a way of discerning meaning, structure, or necessity — not the perception of something standing over against a subject. Once we start reifying intelligibility into “things,” we generate exactly the kind of pseudo-problems that Kant was trying to dissolve. — Wayfarer

I agree, there is something incorrect about the language of "intelligible objects". But this is the language which comes from Plato, derived from the Pythagoreans who believed that the cosmos was composed of mathematical objects. This perspective is maintained today by mathematicians who employ the concept of "mathematical objects" as essential to set theory. A philosopher may apprehend the fact that mathematical objects are not objects at all, and claim that this must be a metaphorical use. But make no mistake, the principles of modern mathematics state that they are objects, and require that they are objects, for their logical proofs. So in application "intelligible objects" is not a metaphor, but something stipulated by axiom.

Notice in Plato's divided line, those who use the so-called intelligible objects, mathematicians, and physicists for example, have a knowledge at a lower level than the philosophers who seek to understand the true nature of these so-called intelligible objects. I believe that Aristotle made the first definitive step in separating the intelligible "forms", from the conception of "objects". This he did with the law of identity, which applies to material objects, but not to the intelligible. Intelligibility is fundamentally based in similarity (which is a type of difference) rather than the sameness stipulated by the law of identity. So in a sense, it is the sameness (remaining the same as time passes), that we assign to the material object which makes it identifiable as "an object". This is to have temporal extension, to persist as the same thing. But this also makes it unintelligible, because intelligibility is based in similarity which is a sort of difference. Consequently the material object as "the same as itself" is distinguished from the intelligible, which at each instance of occurrence is similar but recognizably different.

Actually, measurement in its basic form, is simply comparison. So no "instrument" is required for basic measurements. If Jim is short, and Tom is judged as taller, that is a form of measurement. The tools, standard scales, and instruments, just allow for more precision and complexity, for what is fundamentally just comparison. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't agree. Measurement is not comparison. Measurement is finding the numeric value of the measured objects or movements.

We're talking about measurement, not taking pictures of the measured thing. The radar instrument, with the integrated computer analysis is what measures the speed. The camera does not, it takes a picture of the speeding car, to be sent to the owner. That's why it's called "photo radar", the radar machine measures, and the photo machine pictures what was measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not true. Radar is not involved in the machine. There is no such a thing called photo radar.

So I asked you, if duration is measured, and it has no physical existence, then what is it? It must be something real, if we can measure it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have explained this to you already. Please read my previous reply on this point.

So, yes, the “in-itself” idea can only refer to itself….
— Mww

The relation between a thing and itself is what Aristotle called "identity". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I know, but the thing’s identity as itself, the first law of rational thought, is not what the transcendental idea “in-itself” is about.

But it is relevant to the thread because it is known as a temporal relation, constituting the temporal extension of a thing — Metaphysician Undercover

It is relevant to the title of the thread, but not for temporal extension, but for the permanence, or maybe persistence, of an idea. But there’s no change in the “in-itself”, so any measure in units of time, are impossible.