That we have the illusion is not itself an illusion. — Janus

That's a great way of putting it. (And we see again how binaries like illusion/reality can rapidly become so equivocal as to be unhelpful. "Are illusions real?" "Well, yes and no . . . stipulate how you want to use the terms!")

I doubt whether a complete account of the world we encounter is possible — Janus

I kind of do too, but it feels important to hold it up as a desideratum. Even unreachable goals can be motivating, and express something aspirational about the overall human project of knowledge.

life is being, but it is not merely being in the sense of sheer mere existence. — Janus

"Life is meaningless" is surely a mood everyone has felt at some time. How can we fall into such a mood? (other than reading Sartre's Nausea :smile: ). Usually by noticing, often with horror, that the values we hold, and organize our lives around, cannot be discovered in the world in the same way we discover what Heidegger called (in Manheim's translation) "essents" -- rocks and birds and math problems and everything else that has being but not being-there-for-us (Dasein, more or less). But as you say, living as a human is more than that, or at least so some of us believe.

I kind of do too, but it feels important to hold it up as a desideratum. Even unreachable goals can be motivating, and express something aspirational about the overall human project of knowledge. — J

Totally agree. I'm with Peirce on the idea of metaphysical and scientific truth as something asymptotically approached by the community of enquirers.

"Life is meaningless" is surely a mood everyone has felt at some time. How can we fall into such a mood? (other than reading Sartre's Nausea :smile: ). Usually by noticing, often with horror, that the values we hold, and organize our lives around, cannot be discovered in the world in the same way we discover what Heidegger called (in Manheim's translation) "essents" -- rocks and birds and math problems and everything else that has being but not being-there-for-us (Dasein, more or less). But as you say, living as a human is more than that, or at least so some of us believe. — J

Right, Heidegger captures that mood nicely in his idea of Vorhandenheit translated as 'present-at-hand" in its contrast with Zuhandenheit, translated as 'ready-to-hand. When we are dealing seamlessly with the world the ready to hand becomes transparent, and the meaning of things is found in their use as "affordances". The hammer and nails "disappear" when we are in that 'flow' state, and it's when something goes wrong and we suddenly become aware of the hammer as just a brute object, a bare existent, without meaning other than to be analyzed into its components, that we fall into a state of "rootlessness" (my word, not Heidegger's) wherein things become meaningless objects.

As a musician you would be aware of that meaningful flow state. Meaning is found in feeling, if we attempt analyze it, it disappears. For me, to live fully is to live a life of intense feeling, with the intellectual concerns informed by, not separate to, that life. I tried reading Nausea once—I wasn't able to get far with it. On the other hand I love Camus' works, which are explicitly about finding the deepest meaning without the need for transcendence.

I tried reading Nausea once—I wasn't able to get far with it. — Janus

It isn't very good, as a work of art. But it does capture that "draining life of meaning" feeling.

For me, to live fully is to live a life of intense feeling, with the intellectual concerns informed by, not separate to, that life. — Janus

It's a problem for philosophers, isn't it? We tend to overdevelop the intellect, maybe especially in the moral sphere. You can read volumes and volumes about ethics and never find a discussion of what compassion is, and why it's central to our lives.

According to phenomenology, consciousness is no thing or property that may exist or not exist. “Consciousness” is the misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence. What makes this remark obvious for phenomenologists and almost incomprehensible for physicalists, is that phenomenologists are settled in the first-person standpoint, whereas physicalist researchers explore everything from a third-person standpoint. From a first-person standpoint, anything that exists (thing or property) is given as a phenomenal content of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness de facto comes before any ascription of existence. — Michel Bitbol

@Relativist @Apustimelogist - interested in your reactions to this. (It's in a paper I'm writing an article about, 'The Roles Ascribed to Consciousness in Quantum Physics'). I think it goes to the heart of the disagreements or should I say the incommensurability of our respective viewpoints.

I agree that consciousness is neither a thing nor a property: it is a process.

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence."

"phenomenologists are settled in the first-person standpoint, whereas physicalist researchers explore everything from a third-person standpoint. "
Sure. But the 1st person standpoint is not analyzable. It just treats 1st person-ness as a primitive.

"From a first-person standpoint, anything that exists (thing or property) is given as a phenomenal content of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness de facto comes before any ascription of existence."
OK, but does this lead anywhere? Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? (by deduction, induction, or abduction)

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence." — Relativist

Bitbol says it's 'misleading' precisely because it is reifying to designate 'consciousness' as an object of any kind, even an 'objective process'. To 'reify' is to 'make into a thing', when consicousness is not a thing or an object of any kind.

He's saying, before we can say anything about 'what exists', we must first be conscious. Or, put another way, consciousness is that in which and for which the experienced world arises. It is the pre-condition for any knowledge whatever.

After the quoted passage, he goes on:

from a third-person standpoint, nothing else than objects of perception and handling is to be taken seriously. Now, the behavioral or neurobiological correlates of consciousness are possible objects of perception and handling. They can be said to exist (if a subject is alive and awake) or not to exist (in other cases). Then, from this standpoint, saying that the neural correlate of consciousness (often taken as its “neural basis”) may exist or not exist, amounts to saying that consciousness itself may exist or not exist in the same sense.

So, here he's saying, that from the customary, 'third-person' perspective of naturalism and natural science, only 'objects of perception' are philosophically significant - what is objectively the case. So from this viewpoint, consciousness can be said to exist (or not exist) insofar as it can be described as correlate or product of such objectively-existing processes (the 'neural basis').

Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? — Relativist

Basically, you're asking 'so what?' Which is what thought you'd say. But this kind of point is, basically, the division between Continental and English-speaking philosophy, in a nutshell. Phenomenology and the existentialism that grew out of it, are not concerned with scientific objectivism, but with lived existence and meaning, as providing the context within which the objective sciences need to be interpreted.

(I've recently had a Medium essay published in Philosophy Today, which you can access here, if you're interested. It's a brief intro to this philosopher, Michel Bitbol. )

If it's a process, then it isn't some "misleading name we give to the precondition for any ascription of existence or inexistence."
— Relativist

Bitbol says it's 'misleading' precisely because it is reifying to designate 'consciousness' as an object of any kind, even an 'objective process'. To 'reify' is to 'make into a thing', when consicousness is not a thing or an object of any kind. — Wayfarer

The quote you asked me to respond to did not mention process. He alleged consciousness isn't "comprehensible". My position is that it IS comprehensible in terms it being a process. A process is not an existent. "Runs" are processes, not things.

He's saying, before we can say anything about 'what exists', we must first be conscious. Or, put another way, consciousness is that in which and for which the experienced world arises. It is the pre-condition for any knowledge whatever. — Wayfarer

This seems trivially true. Only conscious beings "say" anything; What you mean by "the experienced world" is more precisely: conscious experience of the world; so again: trivially true (consciousness is needed to have conscious experiences).

saying that the neural correlate of consciousness (often taken as its “neural basis”) may exist or not exist, amounts to saying that consciousness itself may exist or not exist in the same sense.

"Exist" is the wrong word for process. "Occur" or "take place" are more precise. Neural processes take place, and may very well account for consciousness. IMO, the only real difficulty is accounting for feelings. Given feelings, consciousness entails processes guided by feelings, and producing feelings.

Phenomenology and the existentialism that grew out of it, are not concerned with scientific objectivism, but with lived existence and meaning, as providing the context within which the objective sciences need to be interpreted. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly fine to concern oneself with "lived existence and meaning", but it doesn't falsify a "3rd person" approach.

This seems trivially true — Relativist

Not when consciousness is treated as an object (per Materialist Theory of Mind) :brow:

It’s not about falsifying the third person perspective, but pointing out its implicit limitations.

This seems trivially true
— Relativist

Not when consciousness is treated as an object (per Materialist Theory of Mind) :brow: — Wayfarer

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing.

It’s not about falsifying the third person perspective, but pointing out its implicit limitations — Wayfarer

I brought up the limitation of the 1st person perspective, by asking you:

Other than the fact of one's own existence, what else can one infer? (by deduction, induction, or abduction) — Relativist

I don't see how you can even satisfy yourself that solipsism is false. On the other hand, analysis from a third person perspective has been fruitful.

We can learn more about the nature of consciousness (including accounting for first-person-ness) from this third-person approach than we can by pure, first-person introspection.

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing. — Relativist

That is exactly what this does. and when I posted it, you agreed with it.

if you cannot tell the semantic difference between an illusion and reality when discussing them, I don't think the problem is the terms. They are almost always unambiguous. — AmadeusD

Yes, almost always. But philosophy is one context in which they are not. Consider the context of the discussion you quoted: We're trying to decide whether an illusion -- a mirage, say -- ought to be counted as part of "reality," understood as the totality of all that happens to us. In one sense, no, of course not, because the mirage appears to be one thing -- an object in the world -- when in fact it is something utterly different -- a brain glitch. But in another sense, we can't leave it out of the account of our experience of the world. It has to be explained, just as much as any other item of experience. So there is justification for applying this word "real" to all genuine events, regardless of whether they are what they seem to be.

And this is why I'm so down on terms like "real" -- you have to take precious time spelling out in which sense you're using them.

Materialist theory of mind does not entail reifying the process of consciousness- considering it a thing.
— Relativist

That is exactly what this does. and when I posted it, you agreed with it. — Wayfarer

You are misrepresenting what I said. Here it is:

I agree that consciousness is neither a thing nor a property: it is a process. — Relativist

I have consistently said that processes are not things (objects). That's why I agreed consciousness is not a thing

Physicalism entails that mental activity (including consciousness) is produced by physical things.

Reminder: I do not insist that every aspect of the natural world is discoverable through science. It may very well be that there are aspects of mental activity that are partly grounded in components of world that are otherwise undiscoverable. This is worst case, but it is more plausible than non-physical alternatives.