Philosophy is tangled words. — Banno

Philosophy is often difficult to fathom, but that doesn't mean it's 'tangled'.

What could it even mean to ask if the noumenal cup, the cup in itself, is in the cupboard, though? To ask such questions is to push the bounds of coherence. I think the only possible answer to that kind of question would be the advaitic one: 'the cup is both in the cupboard and not in the cupboard, and is neither in the cupboard nor not in the cupboard'. — John

It all goes back to the ruminations of the difference between reality and appearance. If there is no difference, then philosophy is an entirely pointless discipline.

What I don't think is that we can sensibly argue that reality is or is not like this or that, unless we are talking about empirical reality; the shared world of intersubjective experience. This wanting to argue about how things "ultimately" are is a cause of great problems for human beings in senseless clashes of ideologies and religious fundamentalisms. — John

But it's also fundamental to philosophy and science. If there is no ultimate truth - well, that itself then becomes a kind of ultimate truth, namely that of relativism and ultimately nihilism, also, as Nietzsche foresaw.

I indeed do believe there is an ultimate truth but that this is a very difficult idea to articulate or consider. Any kind of moral or philosophical absolute has to be more than simply a scientific hypothesis - I mean, there are some some absolutes in science, perhaps, like the speed of light. But from the perspective of philosophy, which is concerned with existential matters - the nature of existence - such scientific absolutes may not themselves have any ultimate significance.

I think the belief there is an absolute, or that there are moral absolutes, has to be anchored in some manner of religious conviction. That doesn't mean 'blind faith' or clinging to a dogmatic formulation, it is quite feasible to argue for such convictions on a rational basis (something I often try to do, with greater or lesser degrees of success). But, within the Western philosophical tradition, the belief in a philosophical absolute or supreme good, is represented in such ideas as the Good in Plato, or the One, in neo-platonism, much of which was subsequently incorporated into Western theology. And I still think the mainstream of Western philosophy holds such a conviction; its abandonment by scientific materialism, is because materialism is an outgrowth or offshoot of the Western tradition proper.

So, don't agree in the least that the concern for ultimate truths is only the cause of ideological conflict or fundamentalism. It can be, but it doesn't have to be. That's one of the factors that attracts me to Buddhism, in particular - it is able to accomodate a multi-perspectival understanding of reality, whilst at the same time pointing to an ultimate good, namely, Nirvāṇa, the ending of sorrow - and of continual re-birth, to bring the point back to the OP.

Not straight up familiar, but I took the book from the shelf and read the two passages, and I agree with the analysis there.

I think it does depend on perspective what is thought as simple and what composite. The cup might be thought to be composed of "quantum thingies", and we might think of the cup as the complex and the quanta as the simple, or conversely we might think of the complex quantum configuration as the complex and the cup as the simple thing we see, and hold and drink out of..

I don't think the notion of there being an absolute truth is fundamental to science; and I would say it is not fundamental to all philosophy, either. It might be fundamental to some philosophy. What is meant by "absolute truth" though? Do you mean to say that there is an absolute discursive truth? I could not agree with that; I think all discursive truth is relative to context as the Wittgenstein passages Banno referred to shew.

On the other hand I think there are ideas of moral, aesthetic and even intellectual perfection; but they cannot ever be reached; they are rather ideals to move towards in the wise living of better and ever better lives. To me this is the essence of Christianity. It seems to be the only religion to emphasize individual conscience and the disposition of repentance, and the love that grows from these, over precepts and laws.

So, I agree that moral or philosophical "absolutes" cannot be "scientific hypotheses". I think to refer to them as "absolutes' suggests the unforgiving rigidity of a law that must be obeyed; it seems better to conceive of them as perfections that guide our lives in different ways for each individual, rather than as absolutes that are to be rigidly followed, and at great cost to ourselves if we don't.

So, don't agree in the least that the concern for ultimate truths is only the cause of ideological conflict or fundamentalism. — Wayfarer

I don't say that the concern for ultimate truths is the cause of ideological conflict or fundamentalism at all. I say that the misunderstanding of the idea of ultimate truth, thinking that it can be discursively formulated, is the cause. The concern for goodness, beauty and truth is the greatest part of humanity; without that we would be nothing.

It all goes back to the ruminations of the difference between reality and appearance. If there is no difference, then philosophy is an entirely pointless discipline. — Wayfarer

There is certainly a logical distinction between appearance and reality. But you always seem to be the one of the ones arguing that we cannot know anything beyond appearances, which is a bit confusing given what you are saying here, to say the least.

For me one purpose of philosophy is to clarify our ideas about the distinctions between appearance and reality. Why can't we say that we know reality in appearances ('appearances' taken in the very broadest sense)? Understood this way the question becomes: 'How else could we know reality?'.

But you always seem to be the one of the ones arguing that we cannot know anything beyond appearances, which is a bit confusing given what you are saying here, to say the least. — John

That's because there needs to be some distinction between the scientific and (for want of a better word) the spiritual. I don't say we can't know anything beyond appearances, but that the knowledge we have of what is 'beyond appearance' is of a different kind to 'empirical knowledge'.

I saw Dawkins' latest book the other day which he says is about being a 'passionate rationalist'. In fact, he's not a rationalist at all, in the philosophical sense. The origins of philosophical rationalism were the Parmenides, Pythagoras and Plato, and the like. That is very much the tradition of which Spinoza was heir.

Dawkins, et al, are nothing whatever like that. Their idea of rationalism comprises scientific facts, the kinds of things that are demonstrable in empirical terms. So they're actually not rationalists, but 'tangibalists' - the only kinds of truths they're interested in is the kind you can see through a microscope or a telescope.

But there is no end of things that can be discovered by such means. Furthermore such discoveries may have many pragmatic benefits (although also perils, like the discovery of atomic weapons). But they're not able to reveal the kinds of truths that I think you're referring to here:

I don't say that the concern for ultimate truths is the cause of ideological conflict or fundamentalism at all. I say that the misunderstanding of the idea of ultimate truth, thinking that it can be discursively formulated, is the cause. The concern for goodness, beauty and truth is the greatest part of humanity; without that we would be nothing. — John

So, how many folks do you think are conscientiously occupied with 'goodness truth and beauty'? And where in the school curriculum are such ideas taught nowadays? These form a part of all classical cultures, and they're seriously undermined and eroded by scientific materialism and global capitalist culture.

'How else could we know reality?'. — John

The major point is that, since Galileo's time - the advent of modernity - we conceive of the nature of reality as something separate from us, something which is 'objectively the case', which is what the 'scientific worldview' purportedly guides us towards. But that is rooted in an existential condition which we're now so deeply embedded in, we're not aware of it. Waking up to that requires a different mode of being in the world. (That is the subject of Paul Tyson's book, Defragmenting Modernity, which is on my current titles list. It's also the subject of Owen Barfield's Saving the Appearances).

It would take a long time to find the post, but earlier in this topic, someone asked what it is that carries through to the next life in reincarnation.

Obviously, without continuity of experience, there'd be no reincarnation.

Additionally, all suggestions about reincarnation include the suggestion that some basic, deep attributes, inclinations, attitudes remain.

Yes, some suggest that detailed memories of specific events in a past life can be remembered. Fewer people agree with that suggestion.

This post isn't intended to express advocacy of a position. ...just to clarify what reincarnation would entail, as regards what carries through to the next life.

By the way, how would your basic and deep attributes, tendencies and inclinations affect your next life, in the reincarnation-mode that I've suggested?

Well, for one thing:

Whatever such deep, basic tendencies and inclinations you have, they could be heriditary. Therefore, aren't there more life-experience possibility-stories--or might there not be a better-matched one--in which you inherited those deep, basic attributes?

That could remain so, even if your ingrained attributes are, in this life, the result of habitual behavior instead of heredity.

As I mentioned, it's said that:

What you are is what you get.

If you're like that, that could imply that your parents, and maybe even the society at large, is like that.

And, if such a new life-experience possibility-story is favored, by your deep and basic attributes, then
they influence the world that you'll be born into.

You might say that your next parentage would be particularly, directly affected. But isn't the character and quality of your parents particularly important, as an environmental factor in your chances in life?

(I could testify to that :) )

I'm not saying that that's the only way that your vasanas influence your next life. I only meant to name one possible effect.

Michael Ossipoff

These form a part of all classical cultures, and they're seriously undermined and eroded by scientific materialism and global capitalist culture. — Wayfarer

I don't disagree with this, but I see materialism not as being a result of science as such, but as being a result of philosophical empiricism and rationalism, and, really, pragmatism, as well. Spinoza's, Kant's, Hegel's and Peirce's ideas all lead inexorably to atheism if followed to their logical conclusions, even if their author's did not intend this. Hume's ideas do also, but he probably would have applauded that. Feeling ourselves as alienated from nature we have become focused on personal advantage and stimulation; in other words we have become consumers. Of course, science has helped to accelerate technology, enabling our consumerism to become novel, exciting and thus terribly beguiling.

There is a point to rationalism; which is that only rational knowledge can be shared discursively and intersubjectively corroborated, either in terms of deductive logic or empirical observation and inductive inference. The problem with rationailsm is the idea that "The rational is the real" (Hegel). Rationality cannot get a purchase on the Real except insofar as it is given to empirical observation. The Real may only be evoked by poetry, music, the visual arts and religion and mysticism. But these domains do not produce content which can really be the subject of propositional argumentation; which is most of what philosophy consists in these days. I see philosophy as being more of an art than a science; with its 'scientific' dimension being confined to the logical clarification of ideas and ensuring the logical consistency of conclusions with premises, and so on. Even if we are going to talk about God we must do so without contradicting ourselves, except in the advaitic and catuskotic kinds of exercises of plurivalent logic.

Waking up to that requires a different mode of being in the world. (That is the subject of Paul Tyson's book, Defragmenting Modernity, which is on my current titles list. It's also the subject of Owen Barfield's Saving the Appearances). — Wayfarer

I agree that a mode of being in the world other than the dualistic, dialectical mode of subject/object is needed. In fact we are always already in a non-dual mode of being, and it is only our analyses, that both presume and demand that reality must conform to thought, that hoodwink us into thinking of ourselves as being separate from nature.

I read Barfield's book a few years ago, and I thought it was pretty good,

You might find this article interesting: https://aeon.co/essays/the-logic-of-buddhist-philosophy-goes-beyond-simple-truth

.

Can you think of any way of testing the holographic model? — John

Some recent research:

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/01/170130083231.htm

"A UK, Canadian and Italian study has provided what researchers believe is the first observational evidence that our universe could be a vast and complex hologram. Theoretical physicists and astrophysicists, investigating irregularities in the cosmic microwave background (the 'afterglow' of the Big Bang), have found there is substantial evidence supporting a holographic explanation of the universe -- in fact, as much as there is for the traditional explanation of these irregularities using the theory of cosmic inflation."

I think you're generally correct that the doctrine of reincarnation does have a problem with the continuity of the self. However, one can imagine a situation where one could live out many lives without this problem arising. I've thought about this in connection with NDEs, because many claim that we do live out many lives, not only in this reality but in other realities. It may be quite possible that the core self is what we return to, and that we can enter into a particular body to live out a particular life. Once we die, then we simply return to the core self, and our memories return, like waking from a dream. Some people who have had an NDE say this is exactly what happens to us.

may be quite possible that the core self is what we return to, and that we can enter into a particular body to live out a particular life. Once we die, then we simply return to the core self, and our memories return, like awakening from a dream. — Sam26

The core self would be memory which can be simply the fabric of the mind/holographic nature of life. Yes, it would be exactly like a dream.

Should we describe ourselves as "rejoining" the core self, or as adding a new self to it?

Whatever the self is, there is no 'it', as it's never the object of perception. I think this was the basis of the Buddha's rejection of Ātman - it was posited as an unchanging essence, something which was eternally the same. What, he said, is eternally the same? Show me anything in the field of perception, sensation, mentation, which is unchanging! Of course, there's no such thing. (Challenger slinks away, defeated.)

But as Buddhism developed, it became obvious that the problem of 'agent and action' could not be so easily solved. Hence the development of the notion of the unconscious in Buddhism, which B Allan Wallace would no doubt be expert in.

Think of it as akin to waking up. Thus, as moving from one state of consciousness to another. While in a dream, it's still you, but just in a lower state of awareness. The main point is that there is continuity of the self. If there is no continuity of memory or experience, then it wouldn't be you, and that I think is what is wrong with the doctrine of reincarnation - it loses this continuity. What I have learned by studying NDEs is that the continuity is maintained.

It's not exactly like a dream, but much of it is analogous. I believe all of reality is a product of a mind or minds.

Yes, I agree. The difference between what we know if as awakening from a dream and awakening as a birth is the type of memory that is preserved, though some people do claim to have physical memories of past lives. It is an interesting metaphysical question for those who are c exploring this idea.

What are v people? Many people who have had an NDE report remembering past lives, or have reported about other beings who have lived many lives. I believe it's possible as long as there is a continuity of the self. This has also been confirmed by people who have take DMT.

Ya, much of philosophy is based on language confusions. I agree Banno. In fact, at least half of the threads in this forum are simply linguistic confusions.

This is not a subject that I've explored. There is strong cultural pressure not to talk or believe in such things. There is also some economic incentives at times to proclaim such things. It's a difficult subject to explore unless one has personal experiences. Synchronicity is something I have experienced many times.

I think the testimonial evidence is overwhelming. You're right though, it can be a difficult subject to talk about.

If one abandons the idea of time as a mind-independent substance, then what could "continuity of the self" mean from the perspective of Presentism?

Must the first-person perspective be moving, or just everything it observes?

From a strictly empirical perspective, "reincarnation", or perhaps rather "immortality", seems to be nothing more than the assumption of perpetually observed change.

Think of it as akin to waking up. Thus, as moving from one state of consciousness to another. While in a dream, it's still you, but just in a lower state of awareness. The main point is that there is continuity of the self. If there is no continuity of memory or experience, then it wouldn't be you, and that I think is what is wrong with the doctrine of reincarnation - it loses this continuity. What I have learned by studying NDEs is that the continuity is maintained. — Sam26

I agree that continuity is the critical factor here. If we stipulate that consciousness, and all different states of consciousness are properties of an individual, a self, and separate "self" from "soul", then we can assign continuity to the soul, and allow that the soul continues while the "self", being associated with the thing, the body has a beginning and ending. So, in your example of sleeping, the continuity of a particular "state of consciousness" is broken by the person going into another state of consciousness. But all different states of consciousness are properties of that individual self which maintains continuities through those different states. Now, if we allow that the soul maintains continuity, and that the self is a property of the soul like consciousness is a property of the self, we look at the individual living beings, the selves, as analogous to the particular states of consciousness, which are broken and discontinuous, while the soul provides a continuous existence.

The issue appears to be that people want to think of reincarnation as separating an individual's consciousness from that individual's self, allowing the consciousness to pass from one self to another. But consciousness is inherently dependent on the existence of the self. So to allow for reincarnation we have to go beyond the existence of the self, to the soul itself, and establish the continuity of the soul, which is something other than the self.

From a strictly empirical perspective, "reincarnation", or perhaps rather "immortality", seems to be nothing more than the assumption of perpetually observed change. — sime

Observation can move to nothing (as it does while asleep and not dreaming), but as long as memory is preserved memory can be once again be reawakened. This happens every day of our lives. In birth/death/birth cycles one can say that inherited characteristics, innate skills, inborn traits are preserved memories that are reawakened. Memory is the essence of who we are but there is movement and creative intelligence (Bergson,'s Elan Vital) that gives it life. It is possible to think of both as being persistent, evolving through duration (real time).

Observation can move to nothing (as it does while asleep and not dreaming) — Rich

Are states of "unconsciousness" hypotheses about the past, or are states of unconsciousness empirical observations concerning the present, and hence a contradiction?

Let's first discard the irrelevant case: If one is able to remember vague details of being asleep upon waking, then presumably one wouldn't want to assert being unconscious in a qualitative sense. Instead, one might speak of recalling a diminished state of consciousness, which is only to speak of recalling a diminished state of attention as evidenced by (or perhaps, defined by) a presently vague recollection of having slept.

Only if one cannot recall anything about being asleep upon waking, might one say that they were truly and qualitatively "unconscious" then. But how does one differentiate an assertion of being unconscious in the past, from being in a present state of amnesia?

The temporal realist will want to insist that they were truly unconscious in the past, perhaps by saying "I recall being unconscious". But the temporal anti-realist will then respond "how do you 'know' you were unconscious in the past? To which the realist can only respond "because i presently experience having no recollection" - which is really only to assert that their current experiences do not involve memories of sleeping.

The temporal realist will want to insist that they were truly unconscious in the past, perhaps by saying "I recall being unconscious". But the temporal anti-realist will then respond "how do you 'know' you were unconscious in the past? To which the realist can only respond "because i presently experience having no recollection" - which is really only to assert that their current experiences do not involve memories of sleeping. — sime

I agree with your analysis. I can only respond by saying that I had a few experiences in my life when I fell into a non-memory state (unconscious) only to wake up into a memory state. This particular type of reawakening deserves much deeper philosophical exploration.

Whatever the self is, there is no 'it', as it's never the object of perception. — Wayfarer

Being the object of perception is not grounds for individuation. Individuation is something we do, not something we see.

Further, if self is always in a state of flux, the an unchanging self is oxymoronic.

So there remain issues with the coherence of that approach.

If there is no continuity of memory or experience, then it wouldn't be you, and that I think is what is wrong with the doctrine of reincarnation - it loses this continuity. — Sam26

Indeed, that is the issue.

So there remain issues with the coherence of that approach. — Banno

The human being is already a harmonised unity of millions of sub-processes as it is. That is the issue of the 'subjective unity of perception'. What it is that enables the unity and simplicity of the self, amongst the torrent of sensory information that it is absorbing, and never-ceasing change, growth and death of the metabolism, is, some would aver, 'the soul'. (Buddhists, however, would not concur.)

I have long rejected reincarnation on the grounds that it uses a confused notion of the self. It is unclear how Banno could be the very same person who was previously Napoleon... — Banno

Banno is the reincarnation of Napoleon in the sense that both of those individuals share the same subject of experience. Do you have a problem with this definition? You may believe that they are both not the same "person" because you have a particular idea of what a "person" should be, but that just means that reincarnation doesn't involve a persistence of personhood.

Do you have a problem with this definition? — Mr Bee

I've no idea what it might mean.