Given that God knows all things, how can we have libertarian free will? — Walter Pound
Have you never had a free choice in your life?*actually do whatever is in our ability to do. This means, not just having the option to do otherwise but the actual ability to choose that option. — 8livesleft
What might be interesting is how or why, with so much freedom, so many people make so many bad choices. I myself am often good for as many as six before breakfast. — tim wood
And it's a shame to dismiss the Bible. Squeeze what you and I might call (the) nonsense out of it and there is still a good bit of sense left - in my opinion if nothing else it's a book of mostly very astute psychology and good advice, distilled of thousands of years of experience. Perhaps not all agreeable, but scarcely to be dismissed. — tim wood
The God aspect does complicate things. Seeing as by definition all things were created/set in motion by God, obviously... yeah. You have an interest in gambling due to some either biological mental configuration that makes you a risk-taker or you happened to be born in a family who buys lottery tickets often, both that were outside of your control and allegedly the result of God. — Outlander
there is no other path except the one laid out by it — 8livesleft
Free-will only makes sense if the being was not an omni. — 8livesleft
it would appear that it isn't an omni — 8livesleft
a lot like every other god of the time: a reflection of ourselves. — 8livesleft
It, allegedly, creates a world or environment of many paths, it just happens to know what you will end up choosing. — Outlander
Take the atheistic approach of evolution. Millions of years of whatever, blah blah, the circumstances are still same. It's something (in this case not an entity but an event or series of events) that defines all we are able to experience thus do. So, because of evolution we don't have free will?
The two are interchangeable, God and evolution in the sense that something greater than us is responsible for not only why we're here but all we will ever see, hope, and do.
Yes, so again there is just the one path - the one it knew all along that we would choose. — 8livesleft
Evolution only got us to the point of directing our biological needs and abilities. We still have to make decisions based on those needs and abilities. — 8livesleft
Interesting take. But, evolution is not a sentient thing that directs our actions. — 8livesleft
My dude, it's not controlling you or making you choose anything it just knew. — Outlander
If it's a tempest in a teapot, then it seems to me to be a very small teapot, or as you say, an absurdity. That is, no matter how many or how few my alternatives, or whether a God or anyone else knows, I still possess the possibility and capacity for making a relatively free decision. — tim wood
What if the road forks three ways? Are you forced to take the middle path, or the mathematical mean? What if there is no exact middle? Can you toss a coin to choose the forced alternative? Or just go round & round in circles? Not all choices are black & white. :smile:↪Walter Pound
God or no god, given a set of alternatives, you will do or choose one of them. Where's the freedom in that? — tim wood
God is thought to be out of time,
without any special relationship with any specific time. Although human beings have a special relationship with the present, God does not. Boethius uses the metaphor of a circle with a point at its center. The circle represents the succession of temporal moments, while the central point represents the divine point of view of the temporal series. Although the temporal moments have different relationships with each other (e.g., they are more or less distant from each other), the central point is at the same distance from every temporal moment, so that none of them is privileged. Consequently, divine knowledge of the future is not foreknowledge in the genuine sense. God does not know what an agent will do before she acts because God’s relationship with the future is the same as His relationship with the present and the past. God simply sees what the agent does at a certain time, but this knowledge of the agent’s choice does not imply that the agent is not free when she acts. The fact that Ann knows that John chooses to do x at time t does not imply that John is not free when he chooses to do x. In the same way, the fact that God knows that John chooses to do x at time t does not impinge on John’s freedom. In terms of modal logic, we can concede that it is necessary that if one knows that the agent does x, then it is true that the agent does p, i.e., □(Kp → p), but from this, it does not follow that it is necessary that the agent does p, i.e., Kp → □p. The simple fact that it is possible to know contingent propositions is sufficient to deny this assumption.
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