Is there still an experience associated with the pencil and paper calculation? Does the computation imagine the colors, sounds and smells of being outside? The sensation of freedom? — Marchesk

How is the algorithm realised? i.e. turned into physical form? It requires an intepreter - otherwise it is just marks on paper. What device does that? Is there such a device?

Is there an objective account of life? Can a "pencil and paper" be alive? — tom

Is a sufficiently sophisticated simulation of a living organism alive? At that point it might be a matter of how we wish to use words, although it could have ethical and legal ramifications at some point, if it's simulated human life.

If you watch or read any science fiction, you're probably come across advanced virtual worlds where characters in those worlds experience their digital reality like we do the physical world. In the book, "Permutation City", set in the 2050s when brain scans are detailed enough, digital human copies live in virtual worlds.

We can ask a Chalmers type question about all such scenarios. Are our digital copies p-zombies, or does it make sense to suppose they see color, hear sounds, etc? I don't think saying it's just a matter of how we wish to use words helps here.

Consider that you were given the option of uploading your mind to a virtual world where you don't have the same physical limitations, such as growing old. But the process is destructive to your physical self. Do you do it in anticipation of experiencing the joys of digital life? Or do you suspect that your digital self is just a bunch of 1s and 0s that won't experience anything at all?

If you think that your digital self can have experiences, then why not a pencil and paper version? What difference does the substrate matter? By the 2050s, it could be a quantum computer server farm instead of silicon and electricity.

How is the algorithm realised? i.e. turned into physical form? It requires an intepreter - otherwise it is just marks on paper — Wayfarer

What is an algorithm computed by a processor? It's just shuffling around 1s and 0s, right? Or to be more precise, it's just moving electricity around.

If we wanted, we could have a billion robot arms righting the writing to paper. Naturally, these would be of Chinese manufacture.

The fact that the computer has a drastically more complex design does not make it anything more than a tool. — Cavacava

I agree, and that was Jaron Lanier's point to the functionalists who think that the mind can be computed, which is why he came up with a bizarre scenario of using a meteor shower instead of a billion Chinese to implement a digital simulation of a person. For functionalists, the substrate is immaterial, as long as it provides the functionality.

What is an algorithm computed by a processor? It's just shuffling around 1s and 0s, right? Or to be more precise, it's just moving electricity around. — Marchesk

Right. Which is why a computer is essentially a highly powerful, miniturised abacus. It's a box of switches, which outputs electrical signals. But I see no grounds to suppose such a device or its components is a subject of experience or 'has experiences'.

That is why I don't accept the claims of AI or trans-humanism. They make the fundamental mistake of equating computer operations with experience. So:

Is a sufficiently sophisticated simulation of a living organism alive? — Marchesk

No. Humans might attribute such a simulation with life or agency, but that is a projection on their part.

The problem with this whole subject is that 'mind' is an implicit factor in human intelligence. The mind does considerably more than compute.

Computers [can] outstrip any philosopher or mathematician in marching mechanically through a programmed set of logical maneuvers, but this was only because philosophers and mathematicians — and the smallest child — were too smart for their intelligence to be invested in such maneuvers. The same goes for a dog. “It is much easier,” observed AI pioneer Terry Winograd, “to write a program to carry out abstruse formal operations than to capture the common sense of a dog.”

A dog knows, through its own sort of common sense, that it cannot leap over a house in order to reach its master. It presumably knows this as the directly given meaning of houses and leaps — a meaning it experiences all the way down into its muscles and bones. As for you and me, we know, perhaps without ever having thought about it, that a person cannot be in two places at once. We know (to extract a few examples from the literature of cognitive science) that there is no football stadium on the train to Seattle, that giraffes do not wear hats and underwear, and that a book can aid us in propping up a slide projector but a sirloin steak probably isn’t appropriate.

We could, of course, record any of these facts in a computer. The impossibility arises when we consider how to record and make accessible the entire, unsurveyable, and ill-defined body of common sense. We know all these things, not because our “random access memory” contains separate, atomic propositions bearing witness to every commonsensical fact (their number would be infinite), and not because we have ever stopped to deduce the truth from a few more general propositions (an adequate collection of such propositions isn’t possible even in principle). Our knowledge does not present itself in discrete, logically well-behaved chunks, nor is it contained within a neat deductive system. — Steve Talbott

Logic, DNA and Poetry.

We could, of course, record any of these facts in a computer. The impossibility arises when we consider how to record and make accessible the entire, unsurveyable, and ill-defined body of common sense. We know all these things, not because our “random access memory” contains separate, atomic propositions bearing witness to every commonsensical fact (their number would be infinite), and not because we have ever stopped to deduce the truth from a few more general propositions (an adequate collection of such propositions isn’t possible even in principle). Our knowledge does not present itself in discrete, logically well-behaved chunks, nor is it contained within a neat deductive system. — Wayfarer

Exactly! But there has been an attempt to do that. The project is called Cyc. It's an attempt to codify human common sense, providing a program with the knowledge needed to reason like a human being. The philosophy behind the project is summarized as, "Intelligence is 3 million rules". So, a bunch of propositions linked together in appropriate ways, permitting the right sort of inferences.

I first read about this in the 90s, and it was immediately apparent to me that this is not what human intelligence is. But, Marvin Minsky, a founder of Artificial Intelligence, has stated recently that it has been the only real attempt in AI research to create common sense in a machine, which Minsky sees as fundamental to creating human level, or general purpose AI.

But I'm really suspicious of the actual motivation behind these efforts. I really do think they're an unconscious attempt to 'play God' by, in effect, creating a being. But then, the convenient dodge for such folks is that they generally don't believe in God, or in the unconscious, so you can't ever get them to agree that this is what they're doing. (Although there was a quote from Craig Venter that was mentioned on the Forum: when asked if he was 'playing God', he said 'not playing'.)

A tempting answer is to say that the visual cortex of the brain generates color. But when the brain is examined, there is no color to be found there, of course. So where is that color experience taking place? — Marchesk

The brain doesn't generate color, it experiences color (or rather, your entire organism experiences color, since the brain does not function in isolation from the rest of the organism). It would be senseless to examine the brain looking for the experience of color - what would you expect to find? When you want to drive somewhere, do you just sit and stare at your car, expecting the driving to happen by and by?

But this is veering away from the OP and towards a well-worn debate about qualia. The OP was addressed to those who already accept that consciousness can be realized in a computer, and more broadly, in any system that possesses the same structure and undergoes the same processes as those that are supposedly responsible for producing consciousness in the brain. You didn't have many takers. Instead, some flatly stated that only "meat," so to speak, can be conscious. Or conversely, that "inanimate" things or "tools" cannot. But what are the reasons for such declarations? Or are they made by way of stipulating the very definition of consciousness? Something that Russell described (in a different context) as having "all the advantages of theft over honest toil?"

But let me ask in my turn: can any amount of "honest toil" yield objective criteria for having consciousness? I think the answer is "no". If you think that consciousness can only be realized in "meat," then that is so, by definition. But on the flip side, this doesn't resolve any interesting philosophical questions, this only resolves the meaning of the word "consciousness" in your preferred usage.

It may be fun to do some further thought experiments though. What if a few neurons in your brain were seamlessly replaced by a microcomputer (or a small Chinese city doing calculations with pencil and paper, if you like)? Would you still be conscious? Would you still be you? Well, you see where this is going...

My take is that there is no objectively right or wrong answer. And no way to justify any answer given.

I agree, and that was Jaron Lanier's point to the functionalists who think that the mind can be computed, which is why he came up with a bizarre scenario of using a meteor shower instead of a billion Chinese to implement a digital simulation of a person. For functionalists, the substrate is immaterial, as long as it provides the functionality. — Marchesk

Is a meteor shower computationally universal?

Is a meteor shower computationally universal? — tom

Lanier's argument was that any physical system is, if you squint at it just right. Meaning, we interpret (and build) our computing devices to be manipulating symbols because that's useful to us. But a computer doesn't really operate on 1s and 0s (or high/low or on/off). That's just an interpretation. The real functionality is driven by physics, not computer science or boolean algebra. As such, aliens might think our computers were heaters (they produce heat).

If we wanted to, we could interpret other physical systems to be doing computations. But you have to read the paper to see how he goes about setting up the meteor shower computer thought experiment, and see whether you agree with him.

His fundamental point is that computation is cultural (physical systems don't actually manipulate symbols), not ontological, but that consciousness is ontological, and the role it plays is to select how we experience reality, out of the many ways it could be experienced (given what we know about physics). As such, conscious beings determine what computation is, not the other way around.

The brain doesn't generate color, it experiences color (or rather, your entire organism experiences color, since the brain does not function in isolation from the rest of the organism). It would be senseless to examine the brain looking for the experience of color - what would you expect to find? When you want to drive somewhere, do you just sit and stare at your car, expecting the driving to happen by and by? — SophistiCat

And so some physical systems have experiences, like my brain/body, and others don't, like my car (which could be smart and drive itself these days) or the rock I kicked.

That's why it remains problematic for physicalism.

And so some physical systems have experiences, like my brain/body, and others don't, like my car (which could be smart and drive itself these days) or the rock I kicked.

That's why it remains problematic for physicalism. — Marchesk

Where is the problem? Some systems are cars and others are not. Is that a problem too?

Where is the problem? Some systems are cars and others are not. Is that a problem too? — SophistiCat

Physicalism can't explain why some physical systems have experience and others don't. You might ask so what, but physicalism is supposed to present a comprehensive ontology. It can't leave anything out and be true.

I think there's an issue here with our own access to the brain that is (allegedly) causing our conscious experience. I'd liken it to something like an arrow that cannot shoot at itself, or an eye that cannot see it's own gaze.

It's like this. (Allegedly) there is a brain which is causing this conscious experience I am having. But in order to study this brain I only have at my own disposal my sensory experiences (and my thoughts). The trouble here is that those things are themselves already a conscious experience caused by a brain. So lets say somehow I examine my brain (imagine I cut my skull open and start cutting into it or something). The problem here is that what I'm examining is entirely a conscious experience. It's a visual experience of a brain, a touch experience, my thoughts, etc. But these are all themselves conscious experiences which are ALREADY being generated by a brain.

So there's an access issue here. I cannot examine my brain without using conscious experience generated by that brain. But the conscious experience generated by that brain, is NOT, the brain which is causing the conscious experience - it is what that brain is doing.

It's like I cannot step outside of my own gaze, in order to examine the eye.

So I think there is an issue of access here, in that we really cannot get at what it really is that's (allegedly - this is all just a theory that there is a brain generating our conscious experience) causing our conscious experience. We are trapped within conscious experience, and cannot step outside of that in order to examine the cause.

Physicalism can't explain why some physical systems have experience and others don't. You might ask so what, but physicalism is supposed to present a comprehensive ontology. It can't leave anything out and be true. — Marchesk

Which metaphysical view explains subjectivity? Actually, which other metaphysical view offers an explanation for anything?

According to physicalism, subjectivity must be a software feature.

Which metaphysical view explains subjectivity? Actually, which other metaphysical view offers an explanation for anything? — tom

There's always idealism, where it's mind that matters, and not the other way around. Then there's dualism, panpsychism, and neutral monism.

They have their strengths and weaknesses. Idealism doesn't have a mind/body problem, but it sure seems like we experience a material world.

Does any of them give an account of what exists, how it behaves and why?

Physicalism can't explain why some physical systems have experience and others don't. — Marchesk

Physicalism also can't explain why some physical systems are cars and others are not. Take any summation of Physicalism as a philosophical doctrine, and more likely than not, you won't see "cars" mentioned at all. Isn't that just as bad?

You might ask so what, but physicalism is supposed to present a comprehensive ontology. It can't leave anything out and be true. — Marchesk

There's your problem. While there isn't anything like a received view of what "physicalism" stands for, I've never seen it claimed that physicalism is a theory of everything, capable of answering any question that you can think of. Physicalism posits answers to certain specific questions, and that's it.

Anyway, what question are you actually asking above? What sort of answer would you accept?

Yeah, one wonders how it is that people found out that they had brains in the first place. Or hearts. That's a real puzzler :-}

But what color is the sky when nobody's looking? — Marchesk

Supposing it would be blue if you were to look (it might not be, of course--it could be sunset, it could be a gray, cloudy day, etc.), then it's also blue when no one is looking, from the reference point that's the same as where your eyes would be located, and with respect to the range of electromagnetic radiation that comprises visible colors for humans.

That doesn't require a human looking at it. It's just that properties are always as they are relatively, including relative to reference points.

According to physicalism, subjectivity must be a software feature. — tom

I don't think physicalism entails functionalism or the computational theory of mind, although they're compatible.

Right, it definitely doesn't entail functionalism.

I don't think physicalism entails functionalism or the computational theory of mind, although they're compatible. — jamalrob

What else could it be?

Physicalism posits answers to certain specific questions, and that's it. — SophistiCat

Physicalism is an updated version of materialism, not the science of physics. It just says that everything is made up of whatever physics posits. Cars being made up of physical parts isn't an issue for materialists. But experience is problematic.

I didn't make this stuff up.

Anyway, what question are you actually asking above? — SophistiCat

How experience is made up of physical stuff. Saying that meat experiences color, while cars don't because meat, isn't an answer.

What sort of answer would you accept? — SophistiCat

An answer that would make the puzzlement go away, where we could see that experience is physical stuff, probably because we were tricked by a cognitive illusion about what experience is, or something.

Physicalism is an updated version of materialism, not the science of physics. It just says that everything is made up of whatever physics posits. Cars being made up of physical parts isn't an issue for materialists. But experience is problematic. — Marchesk

Physicalism isn't necessarily framed in mereological terms (I personally dislike this approach).

How experience is made up of physical stuff. Saying that meat experiences color, while cars don't because meat, isn't an answer. — Marchesk

Asking "how experience is made up of physical stuff" sounds as absurd as asking how the operation of a car is made up of physical stuff. Maybe you mean something by it, but if so, you need to explain.

You could say that brains are made up of physical stuff - an awkward statement, and not very informative. But it would be a better analogy here. But brains are not consciousness, brains are conscious [of stuff] - see the difference? It's not what the brains are made out of, it's what they do.

An answer that would make the puzzlement go away — Marchesk

I am afraid I still don't understand the reason behind the puzzlement. I mean, consciousness is a wondrous thing and it certainly has plenty to be puzzled about, but let me remind you again that physicalism isn't supposed to be an oracle that will answer all of your questions.

Why is experience problematic to physicalism? — SophistiCat

Because nobody so far has come up with a way to show how experience is constituted by physical parts or processes. Neuroscience falls into that category, since it's positing neurons, neurotransmitters, etc, all of which are made up of physical parts.

To put it another way, the concepts of experience don't fit into the concepts employed by biology, neuroscience, chemistry, physics. It's really an issue of whether an objective account of the world can explain subjectivity. So it applies to computationalism as well.

Max Tegmark's mathematical world has the exact same problem. If the only real properties are mathematical ones, then how can some mathematical systems have experience, since experience isn't a mathematical property or concept?

If experience is actually mathematical, then someone needs to demonstrate how that's so.

I mean, consciousness is a wondrous thing and it certainly has plenty to be puzzled about, but let me remind you again that physicalism isn't supposed to be an oracle that will answer all of your questions. — SophistiCat

No, but it's an ontological commitment to physical systems. So if anything can't be explained in terms of some physical system, process, or parts, then the ontology is in question.

It's possible for physicalism to be false. Maybe it's ontological commitments are incomplete. Experience isn't the only challenge.

But brains are not consciousness, brains are conscious [of stuff] - see the difference? It's not what the brains are made out of, it's what they do. — SophistiCat

Sure, so it's not what a car is made of, it's what it does.

Physical processes are part of the ontological commitment to everything being physical. Brains not in action aren't experiencing anything.

So does this help explain experience, saying that brains in action are conscious of something, but hurricanes, meteor showers or smart cars in action are not?

I am afraid I still don't understand the reason behind the puzzlement. — SophistiCat

Why would any physical system or process be accompanied with experience? Why is my active brain/body having experiences?

You can replace physical above with functional, computational, mathematical, or objective, depending on one's ontological commitments or preferred explanations.