there is no such thing as a property of language less conscious experience that we've called "redness" — creativesoul

Agreed. Quality of redness is not a property; it is the condition of the property of red. We experience the property, we merely think the relative condition of it.

I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"...
— Luke

And something tells me you never will...
— creativesoul

Perhaps, but not for lack of trying. I have asked for clarification. — Luke

Have you read all I've had to say on this topic in this thread? That may make a difference. Click on my avatar, then on my comments. I've been participating almost exclusively here lately. I assumed you had been following, but were ignoring it all. Perhaps that assumption was mistaken? I'm not interested in being asked for clarity of the clarity of the clarity, but it seems as though that is what's been going on with you. Nothing personal. No intent on insulting you.

What's the difference between redness and red?

Knowing that red things have that in common requires isolating and focusing upon the fact that the same frequencies are emitted/reflected by different things.
— creativesoul

No it doesn't, as had already been pointed out. Our concept of redness precedes our knowledge of the wave nature of light and cannot depend on such knowledge. — Kenosha Kid

We're not getting anywhere with gratuitous assertions or non sequiturs. You've a habit of rewording what I say into something different, and then criticizing your reconstruction. I'm not saying that one need to have knowledge that color is determined - in part - by reflected/emitted light, I'm saying that one needs to be able to focus upon the fact that different things reflect/emit the same light(that things are the same color) in order to gather like colored things for the sake of doing so.

One could gather like colored things as a means to an end that is not for the sake of gathering like colored things. For food reward, as an example. You're claiming that that gathering ability requires a concept of redness. I'm saying that it only requires the ability to see and gather like colored things and hold some expectation of food upon doing so, and that seeing and gathering red things does not equate to having a conception of redness.

Note the common etymology. — Olivier5

Look at "red" and "redness" while you're at it...

I'm not saying that one need to have knowledge that color is determined - in part - by reflected/emitted light, I'm saying that one needs to be able to focus upon the fact that different things reflect/emit the same light(that things are the same color) in order to gather like colored things for the sake of doing so. — creativesoul

I understood that, and I'm saying this is NOT relevant. If red things appeared red because God willed it, we would still have phenomena with the property of redness. The how simply doesn't enter into phenomena because it is not something we are conscious of, that we perceive. All we get is constantly refreshed, temporal mish-mash of impressions. This ball is red for whatever reason. This cup is red for whatever reason. This language-less animal can learn to connect these things by the key property they share, however it does it.

You're claiming that that gathering ability requires a concept of redness. I'm saying that it only requires the ability to see and gather like colored things and hold some expectation of food upon doing so, and that seeing and gathering red things does not equate to having a conception of redness. — creativesoul

Well, I said "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" to be precise. What you have described is an animal that can not only compare two objects of the same colour, but can compare that colour to a colour is associates with 'get foodness'. This 'get foodness' may well be identically the "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" I spoke of (seems likely). That is all it needs.

So association of color equals conception of color?

What's the difference between redness and red? — creativesoul

At a basic, grammatical level, the latter is the adjective, while the former is the noun derived from the adjective. Redness is therefore the state or quality of being red, for an object. The "redness of her skin", "the redness of the sky at sunset".

But on a more philosophical plane, you were trying to make a fine distinction between the pre-theoretical perception of something "red" and our theories about the perception of "redness" (what you call meta-cognition). I suppose the idea is that the concept of "redness" reifies a mere colour (or set of colours) into a thing, but only you can tell what the connection was, if you still remember.

So association of color equals conception of color? — creativesoul

Refering back to myself:

What you have described is an animal that can not only compare two objects of the same colour, but can compare that colour to a colour is associates with 'get foodness'. This 'get foodness' may well be identically the "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" I spoke of (seems likely). — Kenosha Kid

So that last sentence proposes that the association could be identity in that instance, allowing for the possibility that, for said crow, there's nothing to redness but 'get foodness'. I wasn't making a general observation.

A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M

However, if that perspective is is coloring in the world, adding sound, taste, smell and various feels, then we're still left with something that needs to be explained, because the rest of the world isn't colored in, doesn't have feels and tastes and what not. It's only that way to a perceiver. So somehow the perceiver adds those sensations to their interaction with the world. The hard problem remains in some form until there is some way to account for these sensations.

Maybe the concept of qualia is problematic, but the term itself was derived from an inability to account for consciousness, which is made up of those sensations, plus proprioception, feelings and any other internal sensations. All Dennett has done in Quininq Qulia is highlight some issues with the traditional definition of qualia, while leaving the core of the hard problem.

And yes, perceivers are part of the same world, not walled off from it, but still the question needs to be answered: from whence comes the colors, sounds, etc?

A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M

To echo @Marchesk’s post, if we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have?

if that perspective is is coloring in the world, adding sound, taste, smell and various feels, then we're still left with something that needs to be explained — Marchesk

But what are we supposed to be adding color to? A little paint-by-number picture in our minds? Even if we did such a thing, how would we see it? The "mind's eye" is a metaphor, not an organ.

Maybe it's no help, but I would rather start by saying that we see a world of colored things because that's how we see, and other animals must see quite differently because they have very different organs of sight. Since color is admittedly relational, what can it mean to say that the world lacks color until we daub it on? Is the intent just to say that other animals, or people with atypical eyes our brains, see differently? Color is neither out there nor not out there; color is an aspect of how you see or it isn't.

I find this slightly puzzling to think about, but I don't care, because I know that my brain always only presents objects to my awareness colored, and there's no way for me to see around my own corner. This simply is what seeing is for me. For me to have an experience of seeing-things-colored, I'd have to have something to compare it to, and I can't. That's why it makes sense to me to deny that I'm experiencing color sensations or whatever -- I don't see how I could do that, but I do know that I can see and when I do there's always color.

I don't doubt I've once again phrased some of this poorly; it is genuinely awkward to talk about, but I'm not convinced there's philosophical hay to make of that awkwardness.

I don't doubt I've once again phrased some of this poorly; it is genuinely awkward to talk about, but I'm not convinced there's philosophical hay to make of that awkwardness. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem is how is there a conscious experience at all? We have detectors that can discriminate light and sound, yet they're not conscious. When we examine our brains, no consciousness is found there. It's not like some neural pattern is colored red.

f we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have? — Luke

You can't turn around and look at it. That's the main issue here: that the observing mind is never the object - which is why Dennett et al want to eliminate it altogether - but then, nothing can be said to exist without the perspective provided by the observing mind.

That is the sense in which consciousness 'underlies' - not that it's 'out there' as some mysterious substance or an attribute of matter (per panpsychism) - but that the act of knowing is grounded in the observing mind, which itself is never an object. Once that is understood a lot of things fall into place. (See this.)

The problem is how is there a conscious experience at all? — Marchesk

By simply asking the question you answer it. What are we even talking about? Do you know? What are the arguments, what are yours? I understand it's how not if (or is it?). Neurons, man. It's just happening. It's exact nature should not be pinpointed. Otherwise we'll inevitably have Terminator: Rise of the Machines. Makes sense don't you know?

nothing can be said to exist without the perspective provided by the observing mind. — Wayfarer

Does that include the existence of the observing mind itself?

You can't turn around and look at it. That's the main issue here: that the observing mind is never the object — Wayfarer

Yes, it’s a conundrum.

the act of knowing is grounded in the observing mind, which itself is never an object. — Wayfarer

Focusing on “knowing” misses the point, I feel. I agree it’s not “out there”, but “having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists.

You appear to suggest that we define physical existence in terms of what “the observing mind” observes , or in terms of objects, and simply ignoring any problems posed by having minds or being subjects.

You appear to suggest that we define physical existence in terms of what “the observing mind” observes, or in terms of objects, and simply ignoring any problems posed by having minds or being subjects. — Luke

Not ignoring it, but acknowledging that the inscrutable nature of the observing mind is a limit. Dennett wants to ignore it, or rather, wants to explain it away, to carry on as if it is something that isn't real, but meanwhile, everything he thinks, says or writes is grounded in it.

Wittgenstein said, did he not, that 'in order to set a limit to thinking, you would have to think on both sides of the limit'? But sensing, being aware of, the limit, is not the same as saying you know what it is. If you say 'I know what it is', then you've already fallen back into the subject-object mode of analysis.

“having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists. — Luke

What is the terminus of explanation in respect of such a question? What is the 'it' which is the subject of the question 'does it exist?' 'It' is that which every question presupposes, as without 'it' there is nobody to ask the question.

This approach requires a certain kind of diffidence, so to speak - an awareness of the limitations of thought.

Your answer is suggestive of some mysterious 'other' form of existence; which we can never know. What use is it if we can never know it, though? I'd rather think there is something wrong with the question 'what is consciousness"; that it is some kind of bamboozlement caused by reifying language. Which is not to say the intimation of a mysterious existence doesn't have poetic worth, just that it's not much use for this kind of philosophical investigation; it has nothing to tell us.

What use is it if we can never know it, though? I — Janus

As a general rule, knowing you don't know something is preferable to thinking you know something you don't. It's also preferable to endless blather about the redness of apples. :-)

I'd say this is more an example of knowing that there is something wrong with the question, than knowing we don't know something (that could be known if only we did). I do agree with you about the redness of apples; once we have gotten clear on the different meanings of 'red' there would seem to be little else worth saying about it!

Your answer is suggestive of some mysterious 'other' form of existence; which we can never know. — Janus

Technically, if there is some other form of 'existence', which we, understandably if not narrowly assign the life we live as what encompasses and consists of it, it wouldn't be 'never'. Just not now.

Yes, but if we cannot know it as an object, as @Wayfarer avers, then we cannot ever know it in the sense that we know the objects we can talk about.

The problem is how is there a conscious experience at all? We have detectors that can discriminate light and sound, yet they're not conscious. When we examine our brains, no consciousness is found there. It's not like some neural pattern is colored red. — Marchesk

Surely you didn't expect my eyes to be conscious, or my brain for that matter; I'm the one who's conscious, at least much of the time. What is it you're not seeing that you expected to? Do none of my parts look like they're part of a sometimes conscious creature? Why not? What do they look like?

Yes, but if we cannot know it as an object, as Wayfarer avers, then we cannot ever know it in the sense that we know the objects we can talk about. — Janus

Do we really know the objects we do talk about? Sure, basic things like Laws of Motion, chemical reactions (at least, what substances do what when introduced to others), other forms of easily observable reality (which have been found out to be wrong constantly ie. geocentricism), but just look at the animal kingdom. Or less advanced forms of our own like babies. The peek-a-boo game. If you cover your hands in front of your face, to the baby, you completely disappeared off the face of the Earth. We live in a world of infinite possibility. Those who doubt it are clearly stuck in their ways and blinded by their own ingrained beliefs. It's just how the mind works. Anything that challenges your ingrained beliefs ie. your sense of identity/who you are or one's understanding of reality is instantly ridiculed/laughed off. Cognitive dissonance 101.

Do we really know the objects we do talk about? — Outlander

All I meant to say is that objects can be measured, weighed, chemically analysed and we can talk about their shapes, colours, textures, parts, functions or lack of function, etc., etc. So per that view to know an object is is to be able describe its form, constitution and general characteristics. @Wayfarer says we can never do these kinds of thing with consciousness, because it can never be an object for us.

So we can never, according to him, know what consciousness is, what form of existence (if any) it has. My answer then is that if this is so, the question as to whether consciousness exists, and if so what kind of existence it enjoys, is a misguided question.

So we can never, according to him, know what consciousness is, what form of existence (if any) it has. — Janus

You can study the processes of consciousness scientifically through cognitive science, psychology and other disciplines. You can arrive at an understanding through introspection or through philosophical analysis (as Kant did, and phenomenology attempts to do). But the functional issues of consciousness that are the subject of the objective disciplines are what Chalmers categorises as the 'easy problems' (not that they're very easy!) The hard problem that has to be 'faced up to' is precisely what Chalmers describes as 'what it is like to be'...which I interpret as an awkward description of what is designated by the noun 'being'.

There is a genuine and deep philosophical issue at stake. It has to do with the whole question of the relationship between subjects and the domain of objects (and therefore objective science). Basically, eliminative materialism treats subjects as objects, it denies that there is a subjective reality apart from that can be described in principle by the objective sciences. Dennett spells this out, this is not a 'straw man' criticism; he proposes 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science.'(Consciousness Explained, p72.)

This is what I am saying (and Dennett's other critics, many of whom unlike myself are first-rate philosophers and scholars) is fallacious. You simply cannot arrive at an understanding of the first-person nature of experience (or 'being') by scientific means at all. You only ever know what 'being' is, because you yourself are 'a being'. But don't ask for a description or explanation of what 'being' is, because it's far to nebulous and polysemic a word to admit of a simple definition.

My theory is, eliminative materialism is actually frightened of the ambiguous and slippery nature of the notion of 'being', and so they're attempting to deny it - even though such denials are, according to one of Dennett's many critics, so preposterous as to verge on the deranged.

Wittgenstein said, did he not, that 'in order to set a limit to thinking, you would have to think on both sides of the limit'? But sensing, being aware of, the limit, is not the same as saying you know what it is. If you say 'I know what it is', then you've already fallen back into the subject-object mode of analysis. — Wayfarer

It's an interesting take that the Tractatus may be viewed as an attack on Cartesian dualism or subject/object dualism - not that I think you meant to imply it was, nor that I think that it is - but still, it's interesting to consider.

However, I'm not really interested in the limit, nor in thinking both sides of it (at least, I'm not seeing it that way). My immediate interest, resulting from @Andrew M's post, is the nature of existence of our perspectives. I don't claim to know, or to be able to say, what that is. If we follow Andrew in acknlowledging that "a human being has a perspective of the world", then it is hard not to fall into the subject-object mode of analysis. And I don't see that/why we should necessarily be avoiding it, anyway.

“having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists.
— Luke

What is the terminus of explanation in respect of such a question? — Wayfarer

What sort of explanation would satisfy me? Possibly one that explains the nature of existence of our perspectives, or one that would help to dissolve the apparent dualism without denying the existence/reality of either side of the issue. In short, something that helps to explain why our perspectives are different in nature from everything else in existence. I suspect it may be something to do with the definition of "existence".

What is the 'it' which is the subject of the question 'does it exist?' — Wayfarer

The perspective that each human being has, as I said in the statement you quoted.

'It' is that which every question presupposes, as without 'it' there is nobody to ask the question. — Wayfarer

That doesn't really help (me) to explain the nature of existence of our perspectives, or to dissolve the apparent dualism without denying the reality of either side of the issue.

A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M

To echo Marchesk’s post, if we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have? — Luke

Aha. Interesting point. I would like to comment on your remark ‘Substantial’ (physical) existence’.

A point I often make is that the philosophical meaning of ‘substance’ (and ‘substantial’) is very different to the common sense meaning of the word. The common sense meaning is ‘a particular kind of matter with uniform properties’. The philosophical meaning of ‘substance’ is different to that; it was derived from the Latin term ‘substantia’ which was used to translate Aristotle’s ‘ouisia’. (I will acknowledge at the outset that I’m not a scholar of Greek or Aristotle, however, I think this distinction is one that even an amateur can grasp.)

Aristotle’s notion of ‘ouisia’ is much more ‘a kind or mode of being’ than what we would think of as ‘substance’. That is why, for example, in discussions of Aristotle’s metaphysics, we often read of ‘man’ or ‘horse’ as being exemplars of ‘substances’. In the modern sense of that word, it makes no sense to say that. There is no substance called ‘human’ or ‘horse’ in the modern sense of that word. And this mistranslation or equivocation lurks at the back of many philosophical discussions.

But we have retained the sense of ‘substance’ as ‘that which really exists’, or ‘that in which attributes inhere’. And generally speaking, we regard that ‘substance’ as being material substance, something which exists whether we conceive of it or not, something independent of my saying so or believing so. That sense of ‘what is real’ as being ‘something which exists independently of my thinking about it’ is practically the definition of realism.

That is the sense in which I think you’re using the word ‘substantial’.

And generally speaking, we regard that ‘substance’ as being material substance, something which exists whether we conceive of it or not, something independent of my saying so or believing so. That sense of ‘what is real’ as being ‘something which exists independently of my thinking about it’ is practically the definition of realism.

That is the sense in which I think you’re using the word ‘substantial’. — Wayfarer

Thanks, @Wayfarer. I was responding to Andrew's use of 'substantial', and was thinking in terms of Descartes' res extensa: extended thing(s), given Andrew's reference to res cogitans. So, yes, I was thinking of substantial existence as physical existence or mind-independent existence.

So association of color equals conception of color?
— creativesoul

Refering back to myself:

What you have described is an animal that can not only compare two objects of the same colour, but can compare that colour to a colour is associates with 'get foodness'. This 'get foodness' may well be identically the "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" I spoke of (seems likely).
— Kenosha Kid

So that last sentence proposes that the association could be identity in that instance, allowing for the possibility that, for said crow, there's nothing to redness but 'get foodness'. I wasn't making a general observation. — Kenosha Kid

We're close.

What's a conception of color if not thinking about color? If crows have conceptions of color, and we have conceptions of color, there must be some commonality between the two in order for both to be called by the same name "conceptions"... the same is true of conscious experience of red/redness, thought, belief, understanding, apprehension, etc...

What does all conscious experience of red consist in/of such that it is by virtue of having that constituency that makes it count as conscious experience of red. You're positing some crow equivalent of concept of redness.

What does that consist of? Associations between red and food is a good start(for the trained crow), it seems to me. I do not get the 'get foodness' thing though...