(To say nothing of the most embarrassing graph in modern physics....) — Wayfarer

Yes, it is embarrassing. But this is what I keep telling people who think physics is intellectually difficult: any idiot can do it, you just have to be interested! (And accept 30 timetabled hours a week at college.)

EINSTEIN: I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man. — Wayfarer

What this says is that ideal Pythagorean theorem is a belief, not a fact, that is: the idea itself exists in Einstein's head, not out there somewhere.

Sebastian Rodl, look him up. He’d be of interest to you, I suspect. — Wayfarer

“...Aristotle and Kant are the heros of this book...”. (Rodl, 2012)

What’s not to like, huh?? Thanks.

I can point to quantum mechanics where the law of the excluded middle does not hold (e.g. either the radioactive atom decayed or it did not) — Kenosha Kid

That is more a case of asking whether the present king if France is bald or not. It looks like that must violate the principle of the excluded middle, because there is no present king of France, but technically that just makes the answer “no”; the mistake is in thinking that a “no” answer means “the king has hair”. Similarly, there is no classical state of the particle until observation, so the answer to whether it has decayed or not is “no”; but not in a way that means it is definitely classically undecayed, simply in a way that means it is not classically anything because it’s not in a classical state, it’s in a superposition.

Similarly, there is no classical state of the particle until observation, so the answer to whether it has decayed or not is “no”; but not in a way that means it is definitely classically undecayed, simply in a way that means it is not classically anything because it’s not in a classical state, it’s in a superposition. — Pfhorrest

Limiting the question only to times when systems are in classical states is the same as limiting oneself to the sorts of everyday propositions where the law of the excluded middle applies. We know that outcomes of quantum experiment depend on the fact of superposition, not on some pending classical state. In other words, nature itself does not exclude middles.

But that wasn't really my point, which was that there are some of us quite happy with non-binary answers to propositions. It is unusual, because the experience of dealing with QM is unusual. It is usual to see that the law of the excluded middle holds, because it does so in usual experience.

You missed the whole point of that post. Kings are classical objects. Yet “the present king of France is bald” and “the present king of France is non-bald” are both false. That might superficially seem to violate the law of the excluded middle, but they technically don’t, because there is no present king of France.

Likewise, “the classical state of the particle is decayed” and “the classical state of the particle is non-decayed” are both false for an unobserved particle, but not because the law of the excluded middle has been violated, rather because there is no classical state of the particle, just like there is no present king of France.

In both cases the apparent violation of the LEM is actually due to making reference to a non-existent referent.

You missed the whole point of that post. Kings are classical objects. Yet “the present king of France is bald” and “the present king of France is non-bald” are both false. That might superficially seem to violate the law of the excluded middle, but they technically don’t, because there is no present king of France. — Pfhorrest

No I got the point. I was going to mention that the reason why the proposition must be "No" for the king of France is because he doesn't exist. The atom, in my thought experiment, does exist. But I focused on the meat.

Superposition is not analogous to non-existence. Yes, you can say "the classical state doesn't exist yet/anymore", but a classical state is not necessary to ask meaningful questions. A classical electron must go through the left slit or right slit, a superposed electron must not. Truth is not postponed until a classical state exists: even then, the fact of superposition between emission and collapse is evidenced. Likewise for radioactive decay.

As I said, limiting propositions to classical states, i.e. to ones that may obey the law, is the same thing as observing that the law of the excluded middle does not apply to systems in a quantum superposition. We, even if you do not, are still able make reasonable propositions (has the atom decayed?) and answer (63% yes, 37% no).

But I do think you miss my point. The point is not interpretation of QM. The point is: there exist people for whom non-binary truth values of reasonable propositions are valid. Even if they were wrong and the "real" truth value is binary and unanswerable or assumed false until measurement (your interpretation of QM), the way they think about truth values is non-binary. They are comfortable with it.

Where is that idea? Out there arguing with the law of the excluded middle? Or in the heads of those comfortable with it?

The atom, in my thought experiment, does exist. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, but a classical state of the atom does not.

Superposition is not a logically indeterminate answer to the question of what classical state is true. It’s there being something other than any classical state at all.

Just like France being a republic isn’t a logically indeterminate answer to the question of whether their king has hair, it’s there being something other than any king at all.

The atom, in my thought experiment, does exist.
— Kenosha Kid

Yes, but a classical state of the atom does not. — Pfhorrest

Yes, but I'm not talking about people who are considering classical states only; I'm not even talking about collapse interpretations of QM. I had in mind more theorists. But even experimentalists after observation can establish facts about superposition.

Superposition is not a logically indeterminate answer to the question of what classical state is true. It’s there being something other than any classical state at all. — Pfhorrest

It's neither, it's a probability amplitude distribution over classical states. When the atom is in a 50/50 admixture, it is not "neither decayed or not decayed" and it's CERTAINLY not "undecayed until classical"*. It is an admixture.

*This would actually make little sense. If the proposition "is the atom decayed" were false until collapse, the would be no quantum entanglement. Cat would never be in a superposition**.

**Not that it would anyway.

I understand what superposition is, thanks. You’re still not getting the point I’m making.

If someone asks about the hair status of the king of France, neither “bald” nor “hairy” is true, but not because the LEM had failed, just because there is no king of France to be either bald or hairy.

If someone asks about the decay status, a classical state, of an unobserved atom, neither “decayed” nor “undecayed” is true, but not because the LEM had failed, just because there is no classical state of an unobserved atom to be “decayed” or “undecayed”.

I’m not at all questioning your description of quantum mechanics, I’m pointing out that the same apparent problem of the LEM violation occurs in entirely non-quantum situations too, and in either case can be explained without throwing out the LEM.

If someone asks about the decay status, a classical state, of an unobserved atom, neither “decayed” nor “undecayed” is true, but not because the LEM had failed, just because there is no classical state of an unobserved atom to be “decayed” or “undecayed”. — Pfhorrest

There is, though.

|atom> = a*|decayed> + b*|not decayed>

They're on the right. :)

I’m pointing out that the same apparent problem of the LEM violation occurs in entirely non-quantum situations too — Pfhorrest

But it isn't the same kind of problem. We can agree on the non-existence of the king of France, and it is his non-existence that makes the question meaningless. There is no extent to which he is bald as he doesn't exist. There is no extent to which he has hair as he doesn't exist. There is an extent to which an atom has decayed or not decayed, right there in the wavefunction. The decayedness or not-decayedness is not an unanswerable question, it just doesn't have a binary answer. Otherwise quantum computing is gonna be screwed.

There is, though.

|atom> = a*|decayed> + b*|not decayed>

They're on the right. :) — Kenosha Kid

That is a superposition, not a classical state.

That is a superposition, not a classical state. — Pfhorrest

I was talking about a superposition, not a classical state. The classical states are on the right.

I said an unobserved particle doesn't have a classical state. It's in a superposition, which you can decompose as you just did into a distribution of possible classical states. But "a classical state" is definitionally not a superposition. If an unobserved particle is in a superposition, it definitionally does not have a classical state of being either decayed or undecayed.

Just like France doesn't have a king.

If it makes the analogy better for you, imagine that instead of having one king, or being a republic, France had a council of many co-kings, who all had hair of different lengths, some of them completely bald. Still "the" king of France does not have a specified hair status, because there is no "the" king of France, even though that's for a different reason (more like a superposition) in this hypothetical than in reality.

No fancy quantum anything needs to be invoked to explain how there is no hair-status of the king of France in such a scenario, yet the LEM is still not violated there. The LEM is not violated by superpositions for the same reason.

But "a classical state" is definitionally not a superposition. — Pfhorrest

It is. a = 1, b = 0. There's nothing inherently special about these values. Everything is in an eigenstate of something (Hohenberg-Kohn theorems).

If it makes the analogy better for you, imagine that instead of having one king, or being a republic, France had a council of many co-kings, who all had hair of different lengths, some of them completely bald. Still "the" king of France does not have a specified hair status, because there is no "the" king of France, even though that's for a different reason (more like a superposition) in this hypothetical than in reality.

No fancy quantum anything needs to be invoked to explain how there is no hair-status of the king of France in such a scenario, yet the LEM is still not violated there. The LEM is not violated by superpositions for the same reason. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I can see you're fond of the analogy, however, as I said:

There is no extent to which he is bald as he doesn't exist. There is no extent to which he has hair as he doesn't exist. There is an extent to which an atom has decayed or not decayed, right there in the wavefunction. The decayedness or not-decayedness is not an unanswerable question, it just doesn't have a binary answer. — Kenosha Kid

In addendum, one man being bald is not orthogonal to another man having hair.

Nope, not buyin’ that. Reason is the ground of everything mental in a rational agent with respect to what is or may be, including the exposition and subjective validity of consciousness.

Consciousness = experience + emotion. Consciousness is the state of my being conscious, the unity of that of which I am conscious. I am not conscious of my reason, but only the manifestations that represent it. — Mww

How can reason be the ground if you re not conscious of your reason, but only the manifestations that represent it? Surely the ground then is that which you are not conscious of - the subconscious?

My understanding is:
Consciousness = thought + emotion
Experience = thought + emotion

Consciousness is equivalent to experience. I assume this is what you meant.
If they are equivalent, then we can swap them out.
If I did this to your last sentence, it would read:

I do not experience my reason, but only the manifestations that represent it

A slight shift in perspective - curious isnt it? Especially when we add emotion to the equation.

Consciousness is a state of (entangled, integrated, and unified) information. Consciousness is personally constructed from information - each individual consciousness is unique and subjective as it is personally constructed, but they all share this characteristic of integrated information.

The input is information, and the output is integrated information. please consider.

( the unity of that of which I am conscious ). - What can this be in mind other then unified information + emotion?

I don't think we're invaded by a parasite called "mind". We're not in Alien. We're not doing science fiction.

But you wrote this in your previous reply;

There's a lot we don't know about the universe in general that we know we don't know. Much more than we even suspect.

So were we to consider these things we don't know, we would be writing science fiction then?

You can't banish the "alien", because you don't like it. Theology a respectable branch of philosophy would'nt like it if you were to banish the soul, which is hosted by the brain.

What there is is an exact relationship between the mind, which is the manifestation of certain verbal and gestural actions, and the brain. Remove one, and the other ends.

Likewise a puppet on a string, or a philosophical zombie. Cut the strings and the puppet doesn't move ergo the puppet must be dead. Unplug the TV and the rendition of Bach's toccata and fugue in d minor ceases to be broadcast. Could, I wonder, the TV have broadcast it absent the signal it hosts?

There's no indication of a mental parasite.

There is in the puppet and the TV and perhaps if there weren't one in us we would be philosophical zombies.

And if a word has no directly or indirectly observable reference, a word has no meaning.

Does my TV understand the meaning conveyed by Bach's toccata and fugue?

Within this spectrum it seems logical to me to distinguish physical and mental, and there are many other such cases. — Wayfarer

But getting back to limestone, or inorganic stuff generally - what it doesn’t convey, or embody, is information. I mean, unless you’re really eccentric, rocks don’t think - actually the thing I don’t like about ‘panpsychism’ is that it seems to suggest they actually do. — Wayfarer

Life seems to embody a symbolic code, to embody information on a fundamental level. DNA, which has been mentioned here, is the obvious example. — Wayfarer

And many of the exponents of biosemiotics recognise that the laws that govern signs, exist independently of those that govern physical objects, even if in some sense they’re dependent on them. — Wayfarer

Semiotics points to another form of dualism namely, matter form (hylomorphic) dualism. — Wayfarer

The problem you've got, though, is that (for example) Pythagoras' theorem would be true (to quote Einstein) 'whether anyone discovered it or not' — Wayfarer

We seem to agree on the rejection of the consciousness of the universe and material things.

But you're trying to replace it with the concept of information. I don't agree. There's a big difference between the concept of "bioinformation" and human information, between the information a rock produces and the information the front page of the Washington Post produces. Even in the information produced by a tweet from President Trump, which is the closest thing I know to a rock. The concept of semantics only works in the natural world by analogy. The genetic code is not a symbolic language like human language. There are many differences. For example, human language uses symbols that need a human mind to interpret them. A human symbol is polysemic in itself. A human language has pragmatic means. No natural code is capable of asking a question. There is a controversy among biologists about whether the concept of genetic "code" and information theory is a useful model or an inconvenient one. In either case, there is nothing in the genetic code that involves consciousness, intentionality and abstraction.

Every natural code, so to speak, exists only when there is a human mind to decipher it. In nature there are processes. These processes are read as causal or descriptive laws in a coded language. And these laws do not exist outside the human mind and without a specific human language, be it an ordinary language or a science. Even the Pythagorean theorem (a2+b2=c2) is not an object outside of science. The fact is that Pythagoras' theorem only exists in Euclidean mathematics.

What I am saying does not justify a metaphysical dualism. I'm advocating an epistemological dualism. When we describe the laws of nature we use a language. When we describe the mind we use another language. It is the same that we use a scientific language to speak of macroscopic entities (Newtonian physics) and another one for microscopic entities (quantum mechanics). But the referred objects are the same: be rocks or brains. But they are different languages that serve to speak of different levels of a common reality, which we can call matter. In the case of the human being, all his behavior refers to the nervous system. That's the material substrate that is referred with different languages.

What this says is that ideal Pythagorean theorem is a belief, not a fact, that is: the idea itself exists in Einstein's head, not out there somewhere. — Kenosha Kid

Indeed. Note that Einstein, who knows very well that Pythagoras' theorem does not work in non-Euclidean mathematics, introduces the clause "approximately". That opens the door to anything. If you don't like my principles, I have others.

It is the same clause that appears in any form of current realism. It is stated that human ideas (scientific or otherwise) coincide with reality but "approximately".
I am also a realist, but I believe that a univocal idea (law) - reality relationship cannot be established. It can simply be said that science as a whole must have some real correlation that is difficult to establish on a case-by-case basis.

So were we to consider these things we don't know, we would be writing science fiction then?

You can't banish the "alien", because you don't like it. Theology a respectable branch of philosophy would'nt like it if you were to banish the soul, which is hosted by the brain. — Punshhh

Theology does not seem to me to be a respectable branch of philosophy. I think Kant put it in its place, that is, outside of all rationality.

The realization that there is something we don't know ends here. Any attempt to give it a name and to elaborate a whole theory about it is pure fiction. Fiction is fine when we use it for entertainment. But it becomes a hoax when we put the label of truth

Does my TV understand the meaning conveyed by Bach's toccata and fugue? — Punshhh

Music has a merely emotional or aesthetic meaning. It is not knowledge.

Fiction is fine when we use it for entertainment. But it becomes a hoax when we put the label of truth

Truth is a high barrier. If we confine ourselves to what we have established is true and what can logically be deduced about our bodies, then we are nowhere near understanding the origins of consciousness, or mind and our philosophy gets smaller by the day.

our philosophy gets smaller by the day. — Punshhh

Your are not gonna make it great by telling bedtime stories.

Cartesian dualism and its effects on modern thought is big underlying issue. Cartesian philosophy lays out a kind of model of reality - a ‘model’ somewhat in the sense of an ‘economic model’ - in which matter is only extended and completely mindless, and mind is only intellectual and completely incorporeal, yet somehow mysteriously interacting. That’s the model against which the concept of ‘mind’ as a mysterious entity or substance or thing is presented as an ethereal ‘substance’ which somehow controls purely mechanical model, as depicted in Descartes’ famous canard:



Which shows the purportedly mechanical nature of creatures, mysteriously animated by what was to become called ‘the ghost in the machine’. (Gotta love that arrow.)

(This, incidentally, is what also became of God in the modernist picture, but I thought it better to stick with a duck.)

The advantage of the mechanist approach is that it lends itself ideally to solving mechanical and engineering problems. That’s why scientific materialism maybe just is ‘the discipline of engineers applied to the problems of philosophy’.

The materialist approach is generally to frame a problem in terms of some set or system which can be understood in terms of its simpler parts and the principles which govern its interactions - as engineers do. And in that it’s been fabulously successful, let’s not question that. If the world had been run by starry-eyed philosophers, we wouldn't be having this conversation, because the technology behind this forum wouldn’t have been invented by the types of genius engineers who came up with ideas like TCP/IP (like Vint Cerf.)

Furthermore, certainly not all scientists are philosophically materialist. However scientific materialism is unarguably a leading if not the dominant current of philosophical thought in modern global economic culture. It is simply assumed by the secular consensus, and I’m sure is the tacit if not explicit view of most of the long-term posters here.

But let’s note, again, that in this case, that of the nature of the mind, we are what we seek to know. This is the sense in which the problems of philosophy are radically different from scientific problems generally. In those, you have a hypothesis or prediction (left hand side) and outcome or observation (right hand side) and you refer to the latter to refine and inform the former. It’s a very powerful methodology but it doesn’t apply to every subject matter. But I think the conventional attitude is that it is so powerful and so pervasive, that questions that can’t be fit into that framework are regarded as unintelligible. (‘Where’s the data??’)

Critiquing or bringing that mindset to awareness is a serious and difficult philosophical undertaking, requiring adopting a different stance. It’s difficult, because it demands self-awareness, insofar as we’re naturally inclined to embody the kind of attitude that is the subject of the criticism. This kind of approach is found in phenomenology, in existentialism and also non-dualist philosophies that originated in Asian cultures and have begun to percolate through Western culture. All of these require consideration of the human condition (as for example via Heidegger’s dasein) and not just as an attempt to resolve every problem by fitting it into the Procrustean bed of Darwinian materialism, where reason is dictated by the exigencies of survival (‘the success of the phenotype’). They require a different stance or standpoint which can’t be boiled down to the propositions and hypotheses of instrumental reason.

Nevertheless, the Western philosophical toolbox has within it just the kinds of tools that are suitable for this undertaking. It’s just that they’re buried under feet of silt, and nobody knows how to use them any more.

Major dude, man. Being a philosopher, he’ll be famous in about a century.

Indeed. Note that Einstein, who knows very well that Pythagoras' theorem does not work in non-Euclidean mathematics, introduces the clause "approximately". That opens the door to anything. If you don't like my principles, I have others. — David Mo

:up: So there may be a sanity clause?!?

It is stated that human ideas (scientific or otherwise) coincide with reality but "approximately". — David Mo

That's putting it strongly. Whether scientific ideas correlate to reality is tested. The idea can be wrong, there's no obvious difference in terms of their ideas. But well-tested ideas, yes, are thought to describe something about reality to some (presumably higher than previous) level of approximation.

But let’s note, again, that in this case, that of the nature of the mind, we are what we seek to know. This is the sense in which the problems of philosophy are radically different from scientific problems generally. In those, you have a hypothesis or prediction (left hand side) and outcome or observation (right hand side) and you refer to the latter to refine and inform the former. It’s a very powerful methodology but it doesn’t apply to every subject matter. — Wayfarer

This isn't any different than the usual dualist argument, insofar as it defines mind to be not amenable to scientific method and then claims therefore that therefore science cannot answer questions about it. The end result is that we'll be using the same word to describe two different things, only one of which exists, and you're stuck with the problem of whittling down your definition of mind to exclude anything science can illuminate, i.e. a mind of the gaps.

This kind of approach is found in phenomenology, in existentialism and also non-dualist philosophies that originated in Asian cultures and have begun to percolate through Western culture. All of these require consideration of the human condition (as for example via Heidegger’s dasein) and not just as an attempt to resolve every problem by fitting it into the Procrustean bed of Darwinian materialism, where reason is dictated by the exigencies of survival (‘the success of the phenotype’). — Wayfarer

First, modern physics is already phenomenological. There is a gap between how things are modelled and how those models can be found to to correlate to those things. This is true classically although was not always fully appreciated. But these days it's mundane. There was a conference some years ago which tried to agree answers to a set of questions. One of the questions was: What is a photon? The agreed answer was: A click in a photon detector.

Second, this forwards the fallacy that any proponent of one scientific theory believes they can explain everything with that theory. Darwinism explains inheritable biological characteristics with respect to environment. There will be some biological characteristics, that distinguish ourselves from other species, that give capacity for either a mind or an illusion of a mind. If there is an inheritable drive for mind, that too will have a Darwinistic explanation. But it cannot answer questions about what an individual or group will do with those capacities. For instance, if it transpires that language creates mind, the biological bases are valid evolutionary theoretical questions, however the functioning of mind is not, nor does anyone pretend it does without prejudice.

You make it sound like appeal to data was just an arbitrary add-on in materialist methodology, like its a choice as trivial as what colour hat to wear.

The appeal to sensorially derived data is simply to garner some source of valid authority for mutual agreement.

As Peter Van Inwagen said of most philosophy, it is ultimately boils down to claims about the way the world is. If God exists, then that's the way the world is. If 'exist' is not a material existence but some other kind, then that too is some way the world is. If there is no one way the world is, then that too is still some way the world is... And so on.

If I come up with some entirely personal idea about the way the world is, like a belief in aliens, it makes no difference to anyone how I arrived at or justify that idea, but if I want to say to some others that they are wrong, I need to appeal to some authority external to (or mutual to) us both. Otherwise we just disagree about that instead. Sensorially derived data has proven to be the most useful mutual authority, it's the one with the widest base of agreement. We all have a very broad trust that the things we see, hear and feel are mutually seen, heard and felt. Blind people are missing something, it's not that sighted people are making stuff up.

There's no doubt in my mind (nor, I think in most serious materialist) that what we see, hear and feel is not unencumbered, not a pure reflection of the way the world is. Its value is not in the accuracy of the reflection, its in the mutuality of the experience.

No alternative method of investigation can replicate that. Talk of the spiritual leaves many completely cold - it's not even close to being a mutual experience. Rationality is just the same (one person's 'rational' argument is another's nonsense) there's no mutual experience of what is 'rational'.

We can come close if we culturally invest heavily in set rules (like basic maths, or language) where there's a mutuality born out of the fact that we all know the rules, but this doesn't tell us anything about the way the world is, it just tells us what the rules are.

So when we want to know something about the way the world is, as a social endeavour, we look to some method arbitrated by widely shared mutual experience. That's materialism, nothing else even comes close.

I left this forum forever.

Second, this forwards the fallacy that any proponent of one scientific theory believes they can explain everything with that theory — Kenosha Kid

I have no argument with those who admit science can’t explain everything.

You make it sound like appeal to data was just an arbitrary add-on in materialist methodology, like its a choice as trivial as what colour hat to wear. — Isaac

Not my intent. Simply to make the rhetorical point that it’s the only kind of question a lot of people will think is meaningful.

So when we want to know something about the way the world is, as a social endeavour, we look to some method arbitrated by widely shared mutual experience. — Isaac

Sure, again, no argument, but not the point. There are some things that can only be understood for and by oneself.

//ps// further to that, I believe liberal democratic capitalism and scientific methodology provide the best overall framework for arbitrating those ends. I’m not arguing against it but I regard the question as something that is beyond it’s purview by definition.//

it’s the only kind of question a lot of people will think is meaningful. — Wayfarer

That's because for a lot of people, a meaningful question (in a social environment) is one which has an answer in a social environment, and as I've just explained above nothing even get close to sensory data when it comes to mutual social experience of references that can be used to arbitrate disputes.

So, a question is meaningless (to many) if there's no meaningful answer. An answer (for many) is not meaningful as such if it is indistinguishable from a non-answer (or wrong answer).

Consider 1+1=?. The answer 2 is only meaningful if 3 is not also an answer (or 4, or 5 etc). So we have to have some socially mutual means of arbitrating possible answers in order to make the question meaningful.

There's simply no socially mutual means of arbitration anywhere near as useful as sensory data, so questions posed which are not answered using a method which is arbitrated by sensory data is going to be meaningless to many people. Their not wrong about that, they have a perfectly legitimate set of reasons.

As I said, it's not the only socially mutual means of arbitration. There's really widely accepted rules too, like maths, the rules of chess, even basic moves in logic are quite widely experienced in the same way. But beyond that there's nothing to arbitrate between possible answers, so the questions become meaningless.