Communicating doesn't consist of making "the right sounds", it consists of understanding. The fact is that in every different situation there are many different words, or sounds, which could be used for the specific purpose, so there is no such thing as "the right sound".

Don't get me wrong, I'm not ruling out similarity, as playing an essential role. I am just trying to induce the proper distinction between "similar" which implies different, from "same" which implies not different. In this way we won't be inclined to say that similar things are the same, and we'll have some rigorous logical principles to approach the issue.. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you can make any sounds you want, then understanding isn't part of the language game. You just make sounds. If there is a language "game" then there are rules to follow when referring to certain things. When people use language incorrectly, or in the wrong contexts, like talking as if you were Elvis Presley and claiming that you are, and acting like you are, then we typically think those people delusional or insane.

Regarding similarity vs. difference vs. same: If our experiences are so different, then how is it that we can communicate and understand each other? How could we learn to use words the same way and then use them the same way if we are so different? We at least seem to agree that we both experience colors and sounds, but not the same colors and sounds? Why that distinction? How would we know that we both experience colors and what those are and that we are both talking about the same thing when we write the scribble, "colors" on a screen? It would seem to me that we talk about those things in the right contexts, like when colors are in both of our experiences, and we refer to the experience (which refers to the body's interaction with the world) when talking.

Wouldn't the idea that we are both similar beings, as in human-beings, lead one to believe that we have similar experiences, at least more similar than you would with a dog or goat?

We can never know if we see the same colors. It's intuitively plausible, and an argument can be made for it, but it's unnecessary. Generations come and go without knowing whether they use 'green' to refer to the same quale. Or whether anyone ever has the same signified for 'toothache.' — jjAmEs

Why wouldn't we see the same colors if we are members of the same species? It would be surprising for someone to say that we are so different that some humans might have experiences more like bats or beetles. How many varieties of experience of the world are there? Does the type of brain have some influence on how you experience the world? Do different types of brains have different types of experiences? What reason would we have to posit that the same type of being, human-beings, have different experiences? What is the scope of the difference? If we can't realize whether or not we have the same quale, when using "green", how do we know if we even are referring to the same quale when we use, "colors"?

If we can't say that what everyone experiences is different or not, then it can be safely said that we each have or own private language. What one person's quale is when interacting with a particular wavelength of light is their "word", or symbol, for that wavelength. What another experiences is their "word", or symbol for that wavelength. Because we each experience that symbol when interacting with that wavelength of EM energy, we can use symbols that we both can observe (like ink on paper, sounds from the mouth, hand motions, etc.) to translate our private language to a public one. Because we both consistently have a color experience (even though they may not be the same color) when interacting with that wavelength, just as we consistently experience someone saying "green" when we experience that color, we can harness some aspect of the world that we both have access to to communicate our experiences that we don't have access to. So our private world becomes public once we translate our private experience into public symbols.

If you can make any sounds you want, then understanding isn't part of the language game. You just make sounds. If there is a language "game" then there are rules to follow when referring to certain things. — Harry Hindu

I don't dispute that the external "game" is separate from the internal "understanding". What I said is that what is important is the internal part, the understanding, not the external part, the game. The problem is that the rules cannot be attributed to the external part, they are rules of understanding, and they are not necessary. But without some sort of rules for understanding, misunderstanding is likely. The rules cannot be features of the external part, because then there would be no internal rules for understanding the external rules, and misunderstanding would be pervasive.

If our experiences are so different, then how is it that we can communicate and understand each other? — Harry Hindu

I don't see your point. You're eating hamburgers off the BBQ, and I'm hungry, two distinctly different experiences. I grunt, make various noises and gestures until you understand that I'm hungry and you offer me a burger. I have communicated something to you. Where is the need for us to have the same experience? Remember, I don't deny that similar experiences are necessary, so you might have experienced hunger at one time and this experience which was similar to mine, helped you to understand. What I deny is the need for the same experience.

How could we learn to use words the same way and then use them the same way if we are so different? — Harry Hindu

We don't use words the same way, all circumstances are unique and therefore different. We use them in various different ways, with differing degrees and features of similarity, that's why the same word may be interpreted in different ways..

We at least seem to agree that we both experience colors and sounds, but not the same colors and sounds? Why that distinction? — Harry Hindu

The distinction is for the purpose of understanding each other. There is a difference between "same" and "similar". If we are having a discussion, and you use them interchangeably, I am likely to misunderstand you, because of ambiguity or even equivocation. So before we proceed in this discussion, I want to make sure you have a good understanding of how I want you to use these terms. If you can't recognize the difference between similar and same, then we won't get very far in any efforts to understand each other.

How would we know that we both experience colors and what those are and that we are both talking about the same thing when we write the scribble, "colors" on a screen? — Harry Hindu

We are clearly not talking about "the same thing" in this situation, so I don't know why you keep coming back to this, talking as if you think that we are talking about the same thing.

Wouldn't the idea that we are both similar beings, as in human-beings, lead one to believe that we have similar experiences, at least more similar than you would with a dog or goat? — Harry Hindu

Similar, yes, but not the same. Are you starting to catch on yet? Do you think you can refrain from using "same", when you really mean similar, so that I am not confused and misunderstanding what you are trying to say? So for example, when you said "we are both talking about the same thing when we write the scribble 'colors' on the screen", what you really meant is that we are talking about similar ideas we each have, not the same idea. And if you insist that it truly is "the same" idea, in both your mind, and in my mind, at the same time, I would have to disagree with you and ask you how you think the same thing can be in your mind and my mind at the same time. Can we agree that what you meant was "similar"?

If we can't say that what everyone experiences is different or not, then it can be safely said that we each have or own private language. — Harry Hindu

I think that inference only makes sense if one clings to consciousness-grounded paradigm that is exploded by the beetle-in-the-box example. The whole habit of trying to ground everything in consciousness deserves rethinking when it comes to language. As I see it, there are certain biases or prejudices that are so automatic that we don't even notice them and find the questioning of them absurd at first. I suggest that it makes as much sense to ground the subject/consciousness in language as it does to ground language in the subject/consciousness. The whole philosophical discourse of consciousness occurs within public sign-systems. The subject is an effect of language, not as a body, of course, but as a concept, as one more sign that only makes sense in a system of signs.

If you haven't seen this, you might find it interesting.

http://www.colby.edu/music/nuss/mu254/articles/Culler.pdf

If there is a language "game" then there are rules to follow when referring to certain things. When people use language incorrectly, or in the wrong contexts, like talking as if you were Elvis Presley and claiming that you are, and acting like you are, then we typically think those people delusional or insane. — Harry Hindu

Exactly. I just say that 'thinking they are insane' is pretty much just having certain chains of signs in our internal monologue. Or we say it out loud and lock people up for their own safety. To me the big idea is that we are radically conventional/cultural/social animals. If we notice that thinking is largely just chains of signs that we only sometimes speak out loud, then we can start to get some distance from the assumption of some ideal thought content that only uses words as a vehicle. I think we focus too much on ideally constative utterances when it's more about speech acts as a kind of activity for manipulating the environment, sometimes by coordinating work or enforcing norms.

We say that we know what we mean when we can find other chains of signs that do pretty much the same job. But I suggest that it's more about an assured knowhow than a grasp of language-independent essences.

To be frank, I relate our disagreement to theism/atheism disagreements. IMV certain philosophers have made strong cases against traditional metaphysical assumptions/paradigms. But we're not rigorously logical beings, and even a certain notion of rigorous logic depends on a demolished picture of language.

I do think certain vague insights can come into half-focus. One such insight is that we never know exactly what we mean. We emit various chains of signs and use them to gesture toward some never-to-shared-interior that is supposed to ground everything. Of course we have a vague sense of what 'soul' or 'consciousness' means, but excellent thinkers have long ago pointed out the limits of what functions like a dogmatic quasi-theological concept.

What would strengthen your case from my point of view is some chain of signs that demonstrates to me that you've actually absorbed the critics I have in mind. I have the sense that you are more or less shutting out ahead of time what could change your mind.


http://www.colby.edu/music/nuss/mu254/articles/Culler.pdf

I suggest that it makes as much sense to ground the subject/consciousness in language as it does to ground language in the subject/consciousness. The whole philosophical discourse of consciousness occurs within public sign-systems. The subject is an effect of language, not as a body, of course, but as a concept, as one more sign that only makes sense in a system of signs. — jjAmEs

Though not new to me, I find this to be an interesting take.

I'd like to know if you'd affirm the same of the term awareness. More specifically, in your view, is it a valid position to affirm that the English linguistic percept of "awareness" is in itself what manifests the occurrence of awareness - such that the term does not reference anything that can occur in the term's absence?

If yes, this would naturally entail that language-less beings are devoid of sentience due to their lacking of awareness - to include not only lesser animals but young toddlers as well - for none such hold a linguistically framed concept of "awareness".

BTW, I in part ask because a) the concept of "awareness" can of course only be linguistically conveyed and because, b) given the wide array of possible denotations that can be applied to the term "consciousness" - while it is conceivable given some such denotations that awareness can occur sans consciousness (e.g., an ant can be so claimed to be devoid of a consciousness while yet aware of stimuli) - denoting consciousness as something that can occur in the absence of awareness makes the term "consciousness" utterly nonsensical. And our own awareness - via which we perceive just as much as we cognize intuitions and introspections - seems to me to be the pivotal "beetle".

So, to sum: in your view, is it a valid possibility that awareness cannot occur in the absence of language?

Though not new to me, I find this to be an interesting take. — javra

I like this idea too, and I find it taking different forms throughout the history of philosophy.

More specifically, in your view, is it a valid position to affirm that the English linguistic percept of "awareness" is in itself what manifests the occurrence of awareness - such that the term does not reference anything that can occur in the term's absence?

If yes, this would naturally entail that language-less beings are devoid of sentience due to their lacking of awareness - to include not only lesser animals but young toddlers as well - for none such hold a linguistically framed concept of "awareness". — javra

Personally I wouldn't claim so definite and radical. I don't deny some kind of beetle in the box. Or the kind of experience that tempts us to ground everything in the subject instead of the social software.The Turing test seems to fit in here. Is my textstream on this site generated by a neural network? Is yours? When I pet my cat, I 'know' that she has some kind of inner life. But what do I mean when I say that I know this? What do I mean exactly by awareness that isn't linguistic? Even if I believe in it, which I do more or less, I'm never quite sure what I believe in. All I can do is churn out more signs. About which I can also only churn out more signs. The ghost of exact meaning is supposed by some to haunt all of this sign shuttling. I relate to the ghost of inexact meaning, the what-it-is-like of 'grasping' (hand metaphor) a concept. So for me it's not about a denial of consciousness outside language.

BTW, I in part ask because a) the concept of "awareness" can of course only be linguistically conveyed and because, b) given the wide array of possible denotations that can be applied to the term "consciousness" - while it is conceivable given some such denotations that awareness can occur sans consciousness (e.g., an ant can be so claimed to be devoid of a consciousness while yet aware of stimuli) - denoting consciousness as something that can occur in the absence of awareness makes the term "consciousness" utterly nonsensical. And our own awareness - via which we perceive just as much as we cognize intuitions and introspections - seems to me to be the pivotal "beetle".

So, to sum: in your view, is it a valid possibility that awareness cannot occur in the absence of language? — javra

You make some good points. 'My' position is like a clump of hair in the drain. It's a bundle of stolen and vague insights. 'Consciousness' is a sign that we employ with a mostly tacit know-how. To be sure, we can do our best to find some approximation of context-independent meaning for it. Or we can try yet again for the perfect technical /metaphysical jargon that starts with everyday blurry meanings and is sharpened into effectiveness.

Are we articulating -- necessarily imperfectly and incompletely -- a mostly blind know-how when we do so? We never lose the ability to make rough sense of someone using the word 'incorrectly' or against our careful theoretical judgments. To me any sign/concept is part of an 'organic' system of conventions that we can never dominate or make completely explicit. I can't prove that metaphysically. If I'm right, I can never prove I'm right. The whole vision of metaphysical certainty is built on a certain vision of how meaning and language work. Perhaps this is why Wittgenstein wrote PI in such a strange style.

I agree that certain attempts at fixing the meaning of 'consciousness' lead to absurdities or nonsense. But to me this is a local effect generated from fragile local semi-fixed and semi-exact meanings. The sign is alive and well and valuable in our language, no matter its slipperiness or the slipperiness of all signs for that within us that would catch them in an iron glove.

I hope my answer is somehow helpful or at least not boring.

This suggests that your interpretation of W is a bad reading. — jjAmEs

Oh, yes. Meta's misguided reading has been pointed out before.

I hope my answer is somehow helpful or at least not boring. — jjAmEs

Definitely not boring, and certainty insightful. I agree that meaning is not static, fixed, but instead fluid and alive (allegorically speaking). It's also a given to me that language is inter-subjective, rather than what I'd term intra-subjective (as would be one's private awareness of a flashing insight, for example) - and, hence, that linguistic meaning is largely social and historical. Myself, I however am also of the general opinion that most concepts - or, at least, those which are most important - do however reference concrete existents, for lack of better terms, this in reference to what's going on within (again, as I term it, in reference to each of our own intra-subjective reality). That said, I by no means deny the complexity to our semantics, which you've eloquently expressed.

Thank you for the candid reply.

Myself, I however am also of the general opinion that most concepts - or, at least, those which are most important - do however reference concrete existents, for lack of better terms, this in reference to what's going on within (again, as I term it, in reference to each of our own intra-subjective reality). — javra

I hear you, and I guess I think something like that too. I emphasize the other stuff because that's what's counter-intuitive, what surprised me in my favorite thinkers.

It's also a given to me that language is inter-subjective, rather than what I'd term intra-subjective (as would be one's private awareness of a flashing insight, for example) - and, hence, that linguistic meaning is largely social and historical. — javra

Right. We agree. It's not about a denial of intra-subjective meaning (the beetle) but only about making vivid how radically social -historical -conventional language is. Culler's little book on Saussure really impressed me. And Limited Inc by Derrida (and Sarl/Searle, really) is quite a journey, quite a combat. The role of the subject / consciousness /intention is just huge in philosophy, something like a 'theological' center. I gotta link to this, in case you're interested: http://lab404.com/misc/ltdinc.pdf

Thank you for the candid reply. — javra

My pleasure, and thanks for yours.

Oh, yes. Meta's misguided reading has been pointed out before. — Banno

In a way it's not surprising. Wittgenstein hurts. Or rather his insights are threatening to those invested in a certain game and self-image. I suspect that these days that I'm biased in the other direction (expressing vague insights informally and suspicious of the idea of The Method that will churn out The Exact and Final Truth.)

I gotta link to this, in case you're interested: http://lab404.com/misc/ltdinc.pdf — jjAmEs

I'll check it out. Seems like a worthwhile read.

Have to ask, have you ever experienced concepts that are not communicable via the language(s) you speak?

Yea, I know, the beetle.

Since I'm Romanian-American, as example, in Romanian there is no translation of "awareness" - as there is, for example, of "cat" ("pisica"). There is "conștință" - which stands for both consciousness and conscience - as well as "cognizență", which is fluidly translated into "cognizance" - but there's no term for "awareness". This example, of course, is easier than expressing Romanian words for which there is no English translation. It's because of such multilingual experiences - along with sentiments and for me at times concepts which I find are not communicable via the languages I know (other than via generalities that miss the mark, e.g. "an aesthetic experience") - that I take the following view:

Allegorically, words as signs are akin to boxes into which we package our intended semantics so as to have our meaning delivered to some other who then opens the box, so to speak, in order to grasp - as best they can - what we wanted to be understood by them. These boxes are intersubjectively manifested, with a long history to them, and so goad that which we can and cannot convey - both to others as well as to ourselves. In the case of the latter, a language's words limits the forms which our linguistically conveyed thoughts can take. Hence, language shapes thoughts by imposing itself upon which concepts are possible to convey. Yet, at the same time, it is due to the very existence of "beetles" which it references that language has any import for us. Rather than it being a unidirectional causal process - either envisioned from without (language) toward within (subjects) or vice versa - I strongly believe the relation between language and subject to be bidirectional. New words come into use via individual subjects' intentions (culturally speaking, this being a bottom-up influence upon language). Once these words become mainstream, they then shape that which can be conveyed and the very thoughts of those who convey information (language's top-down influence upon subjects). These are my general musings on the subject, here given for disclosure.

At any rate, we all have our unique experiences. Again, was curious if you've ever experienced concepts that were not communicable via language.

Now that I think of it, to me many art forms are just this: the attempted communication of experiences, sometimes conceptual, that are not communicable via language.

Have to ask, have you ever experienced concepts that are not communicable via the language(s) you speak? — javra

I relate to the experience of looking for the right words or deciding that a previous phrase wasn't quite right. 'How can I know what I think till I see what I write?'

A related side-issue is feeling misunderstood or not. If I share an idea, I hope for some different chain of signs from the listener that will convince me that the communication was successful. (You can see that I am enmeshed in the usual thinking in terms of consciousness and the transmission of private content, so the 'opposed' view is more of supplement than a replacement.)

Since I'm Romanian-American, as example, in Romanian there is no translation of "awareness" - as there is, for example, of "cat" ("pisica"). There is "conștință" - which stands for both consciousness and conscience - as well as "cognizență", which is fluidly translated into "cognizance" - but there's no term for "awareness". — javra

Saussure/Culler mention examples like this. Not only is the signifier arbitrary, but so is the signified. Different languages have different ways of breaking up or articulating reality. I find that fascinating.

These are my general musings on the subject, here given for disclosure. — javra

I like your musings. Some kind of bidirectional process makes sense. After all, we do have individual nervous systems. We experience something we call 'meaning.' I envy your perspective in which the problem of translation is concrete and not abstract.

Now that I think of it, to me many art forms are just this: the attempted communication of experiences, sometimes conceptual, that are not communicable via language. — javra

I think this intuitive view gets something right. But I'd like to add the notion of the artist discovering experiences by experimenting with the medium. I've worked in various media (music and visual art, for example) and personally I did not in general know where I was going or wanted to say. Instead I experienced a 'reactive' critical faculty that was or was not satisfied as I tried this or that, starting perhaps with vague general ideas. If all went well, I'd end up with shapes or sounds that felt good. These days I get my artistic fix from what I'm doing right now. I don't know what I'm going to write until I write it. Sometimes I'm delighted with a phrase. In retrospect it usually fits in with the clump I mentioned earlier. Another nice theme is the continuity of personality, the semi-fiction of a unifying self or signature. I never know exactly who I am. I drag a history behind me from which I project a vague project.

In my understanding of art, a good artist often (but maybe not always) can see his/her own work as if it were the work of a stranger. And this art always exists against and depends for its effect upon a background of other artworks and conventions.

For me the artist would share with others in the experience of the art afterward. But he or she would never know for sure that the experience/beetle was the same. Certain gestures and chains of signs would make the artist feel appreciated or misunderstood.


*Here's an excellent summary of the other link, presented with less potentially frustrating impishness : http://www.colby.edu/music/nuss/mu254/articles/Culler.pdf

To me it's 17 pages of gold.

Different languages have different ways of breaking up or articulating reality. I find that fascinating. — jjAmEs

Yes, me as well. Though I yet maintain that there is some underlying reality that is signified. In a way it reminds me of a ruby metaphor: the same gem gets expressed, and conceptualized, via one of its many faces. Though each conceptualization, as abstraction, picks up a different impression of the underlying reality, the underlying reality as a whole still is. Maybe I'm over-generalizing here, but I find this for example holds in relation to what can be termed "awareness".

But I'd like to add the notion of the artist discovering experiences by experimenting with the medium. I've worked in various media (music and visual art, for example) and personally I did not in general know where I was going or wanted to say. Instead I experienced a 'reactive' critical faculty that was or was not satisfied as I tried this or that, starting perhaps with vague general ideas. If all went well, I'd end up with shapes or sounds that felt good. — jjAmEs

:grin: Yup, I can relate. Sometimes, I'd dabble random dots on a blank paper and then proceed to connect them till something interesting would appear. Then I'd refine this general appearance into a finalized product that "felt good". I think that's the extreme I've gone in that direction. Music too, placing bits of sound that worked individually into a streamlined whole. Still, I've also often had a general image, or feeling, that I wanted to make tangible - not a picture perfect imagination, but a clear awareness of the impact I wanted the subject matter to convey. Then, of course, as the work progressed, aesthetic decisions changed what I initially conceived into a somewhat altered final product.

For me the artist would share with others in the experience of the art afterward. But he or she would never know for sure that the experience/beetle was the same. — jjAmEs

Seems as though this goes without saying. Agreed. Then there's the case to be made of the artwork holding the artist as its principle audience. One knows, senses, when it came out at its best. The pleasure then is intrinsic, rather than being obtained from other's reaction.

Hmm, notice this is changing the thread's topic a bit - possibly a bit too much. But its good to relate about these things.

Though I yet maintain that there is some underlying reality that is signified. In a way it reminds me of a ruby metaphor: the same gem gets expressed, and conceptualized, via one of its many faces. — javra

To me that's a totally plausible and intuitive hypothesis or reported experience. I guess I lean toward the identification of thought and language. Since translation is common, that makes the idea of some language-intuitive content quite appealing and natural. How does one see that a translation is correct? That some bridge has been formed between different convention systems ? One defends a translation with a chain of signs.

What's interesting is that we can all more or less believe in the beetle (the ruby itself) while only ever being able to trade signs and gestures. The whole speech/writing thing in Derrida really shines on this forum. I have the impression (I believe) that you are a human being. You pass the Turing test. I 'know' that you have a 'soul.' I hope that I seem to have a soul and experience feelings and signifieds.

But technology is moving in the Blade Runner direction. If deciding whether textstreams were written by genuine minds or algorithms ever becomes difficult, that's going to mess with us. I haven't studied NLP closely, but I have studied deep learning generally. It's all statistics really. I don't know if the tech will ever get quite that good, but our crazy species may have thousands of years ahead of it, despite its recklessness. In 4013, we may convert an entire planet into a computer. We might agree that it's the best conversationalist ever without being sure that is has thoughts or feelings. (To be clear, I 'know' that we human beings have thoughts and feelings, without knowing exactly what I mean by saying that I know it.)

I offer this not to be contrary but only to keep things interesting by defending an opposing view. It's not for me about destroying the concept of consciousness but instead in recontextualizing it. The idea is (as I understand it) that we have certain conventions that give concepts identity. We have a repeatable or iterable code that can function in our absence. Others can stumble on our post here in 3 years and make of it what they will. Or maybe we'll return one day and not remember exactly what we meant. And we can always be quoted (perhaps by ourselves) in a new context, and the meaning of all the signs will drift or shift. I think we agree here, since we both accept that language is historical, etc.

Still, I've also often had a general image, or feeling, that I wanted to make tangible - not a picture perfect imagination, but a clear awareness of the impact I wanted the subject matter to convey. — javra

I can relate to that too. As a musician I slowly focused in on a certain emotion and style as the identity of the band. I guess this is more of the bidirectional theme.

Seems as though this goes without saying. Agreed. Then there's the case to be made of the artwork holding the artist as its principle audience. One knows, senses, when it came out at its best. The pleasure then is intrinsic, rather than being obtained from other's reaction.

Hmm, notice this is changing the thread's topic a bit - possibly a bit too much. But its good to relate about these things. — javra

That's a good point. In a way it's the artist's job to be the ideal audience. The ideal situation is that the artist has a more refined sensibility than the audience proper and that the artwork (difficult at first) extends the sensibilities and taste of its consumers. Vonnegut wrote that it takes seeing 1000 paintings to know a good painting from a bad one. I think I know what he meant (see his ruby).

In some ways, maybe the artist takes pleasure in the artwork already from the perspective of an ideal audience. To me this is like Feuerbach's idea that the species thinks through language and not primarily the individual. Despite being a once rebellious youth, I've come around to understand objectivity as the ideal of subjectivity. Even in my rebellion I was striving toward some 'iterable' and implicitly universal ideal. To me the notions of the true and good are loaded with some intuition of an ideal community, perhaps only virtual and to come. Even irony is tangled up with this. But it's also wandering off topic.

It is good to share this stuff. Feel free to link to any art you have online. I'll check it out.

Though I yet maintain that there is some underlying reality that is signified. In a way it reminds me of a ruby metaphor: the same gem gets expressed, and conceptualized, via one of its many faces. — javra

You make me feel so Jung :grin:

when i say that an object is spatially extended, I mean that it has volume, and when i say that an object is not spatially extended, I mean that it does not have volume. According to my understanding, volume is contingent upon perception; meaning that there is no independently existing spatial reality — TheGreatArcanum

You do not have to account for extention if the act of perception occurs at the object itself; that is to say that perception operates from the periphery to the centre. However, you do have to account for how unextended representation becomes extended when perception occurs from the centre and is projected outwards. Infact you have to account for how all the attributes that were stripped from the object and made ideal, map back onto the object. Does this make 'sense' ?

One such insight is that we never know exactly what we mean. — jjAmEs

Tell that to this person:

Meta's misguided reading has been pointed out before. — Banno

If "we never know exactly what we mean", how could there be such a thing as a "misguided reading"? "Misguided" would be an arbitrary determination. And you jAmEs, have already made the same accusation, so now you contradict yourself.

What would strengthen your case from my point of view is some chain of signs that demonstrates to me that you've actually absorbed the critics I have in mind. I have the sense that you are more or less shutting out ahead of time what could change your mind. — jjAmEs

When a person makes claims, and supports them by an appeal to authority, instead of backing up the claims with explanations and principles, I conclude that the person is incapable of supporting those claims. That's the category I place you, because that's all you've done, made one obviously untenable assertion after the other without providing any support.

I clearly demonstrated the fault in your claim, in my last reply to you, and you simply ignored it. So I conclude that you are incapable of supporting your position, and simply appeal to authorities whom you most likely misinterpret as well.

I don't dispute that the external "game" is separate from the internal "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't trying to make a distinction between an "external" game and "internal" understanding. It seems to me that if there is no "internal" understanding, there is no "external" game. It requires at least two people to understand the rules for there to be an external game, and there requires external parts for there to be an understanding about - different pieces have different rules.

We are clearly not talking about "the same thing" in this situation, so I don't know why you keep coming back to this, talking as if you think that we are talking about the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, experiences and thoughts are about things. If you and I have a visual experience of a hamburger, are our experiences not about the same thing? If they are about the same thing, or causally related to the same thing, then how is it that our experiences of it aren't the same, or at least similar? If they aren't about the same thing, then we would just be talking past each other or living in different realities.

I think that inference only makes sense if one clings to consciousness-grounded paradigm that is exploded by the beetle-in-the-box example. The whole habit of trying to ground everything in consciousness deserves rethinking when it comes to language. As I see it, there are certain biases or prejudices that are so automatic that we don't even notice them and find the questioning of them absurd at first. I suggest that it makes as much sense to ground the subject/consciousness in language as it does to ground language in the subject/consciousness. The whole philosophical discourse of consciousness occurs within public sign-systems. The subject is an effect of language, not as a body, of course, but as a concept, as one more sign that only makes sense in a system of signs. — jjAmEs

That isn't what I was trying to do. Language is just visual scribbles and sounds, like mostly everything else in consciousness - that is about things that aren't the scribbles and sounds. If we can adopt various sounds and scribbles in our experience to mean certain things, then how is it that we can't just use the visuals and sounds that we already experience prior to learning any language to be about some other experience? We don't need language to have a narrative. We simply need categories, which are basically the same thing as concepts. Animals can establish causal relationships (explanations) without having any language. A deer passing through the forest scents the ground and detects a certain odor. A sequence of ideas is generated in the mind of the deer. Nothing in the deer's experience can produce that odor but a wolf; therefore the scientific inference is drawn that wolves have passed that way. But it is a part of the deer's scientific knowledge, based on previous experience, individual and racial; that wolves are dangerous beasts, and so, combining direct observation in the present with the application of a general principle based on past experience, the deer reaches the very logical conclusion that it may wisely turn about and run in another direction. All this implies, essentially, a comprehension and use of scientific principles; and, strange as it seems to speak of a deer as possessing scientific knowledge, yet there is really no absurdity in the statement. The deer does possess scientific knowledge; knowledge differing in degree only, not in kind, from the knowledge of a Newton. Nor is the animal, within the range of its intelligence, less logical, less scientific in the application of that knowledge, than is the human. The animal that could not make accurate scientific observations of its surroundings, and deduce accurate scientific conclusions from them, would soon pay the penalty of its lack of logic.

Pre-linguistic children establish object permanence - converting from solipsism to realism - all prior to language-use. At this point in our lives - when we are very young we understand the concept of existing information that is missing from our minds - that information exists even when it isn't in our minds, and that information is called "private" by English speakers. So the words only refer to existing experiences that aren't words. We can establish patters without words. Words simply communicate the pattern that we already have established.

I wasn't trying to make a distinction between an "external" game and "internal" understanding. — Harry Hindu

Actually, I think it was jAmEs who made that distinction, which I agreed to. The problem was, that jAmEs wanted to exclude the role of the internal understanding, as unnecessary.

Since, by assumption, the private inside is inaccessible, it 'obviously' can play no role in grounding a 'meaning' that must be public and external to be a code, a language that one can learn and participate in. — jjAmEs

This led to a contradiction in the reading of Wittgenstein. The premise of the example is that everyone has something in the box, but Wittgenstein later says "the box might even be empty". Clearly we have a contradiction here. "Everyone has something in the box", and "the box might be empty", are incompatible.

I propose that the contradiction is introduced intentionally by Wittgenstein, to mislead people like jAMeS, and perhaps Banno, who do not have a solid education in philosophy, being trained to identify such misleading examples. The faulty example, (presented with explicit contradiction), leads these undisciplined minds toward the conclusion that the internal "private" plays no role.

It seems to me that if there is no "internal" understanding, there is no "external" game. It requires at least two people to understand the rules for there to be an external game, and there requires external parts for there to be an understanding about - different pieces have different rules. — Harry Hindu

Ok, so you did not fall into Wittgenstein's trap, like jAmEs did.

MU, experiences and thoughts are about things. If you and I have a visual experience of a hamburger, are our experiences not about the same thing? If they are about the same thing, or causally related to the same thing, then how is it that our experiences of it aren't the same, or at least similar? If they aren't about the same thing, then we would just be talking past each other or living in different realities. — Harry Hindu

This doesn't make any sense. You want to conclude that if our thoughts are about the same thing, then the thoughts themselves are the same. To think about something is to create a relationship with that thing. It's illogical, that I, being a thing, would have the same relationship as you, being a second thing, to a third thing. In order for you and I to have the same relationship with another thing, we'd have to both be the same thing. You and I would be one thing. Therefore we should conclude that yours and my experiences of that third thing are not the same.

The other option you propose is that the experiences of you and I are similar. That they are similar would need to be demonstrated. I think we demonstrate the similarities, along with the differences, through communication.

This led to a contradiction in the reading of Wittgenstein. The premise of the example is that everyone has something in the box, but Wittgenstein later says "the box might even be empty". Clearly we have a contradiction here. "Everyone has something in the box", and "the box might be empty", are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein begins with the supposition that everyone has "a box with something in it which we call a 'beetle'". Nobody can ever look into anyone else's box and everyone says they know what a beetle is only by looking at their own beetle. In that case, it's possible for each person to have something different in their box, or for what's in the box to be constantly changing.

Wittgenstein then asks:

"But what if these people's word "beetle" had a use nonetheless?"

THEN it would not be the name of a thing. THEN the thing in the box doesn't belong to the language-game at all. THEN the box might even be (or may as well be) empty.

Whatever is in the box, or in everyone's box, would be irrelevant if the word "beetle" had an established use in the language game. How do I know that what you mean by "beetle" is the same as what I mean by "beetle"? Because that's the assumption here: that the word "beetle" has a conventional use nonetheless. If each person can only know what's in their own box and not what's in anyone else's, and yet we can all still somehow use and understand the meaning of the word "beetle", then the putative thing in each person's box is irrelevant and "cancels out, whatever it is".

Here's the point. Just because the word is not used as the name for the thing in the box, this does not leave the thing in the box as playing no role, as jAmEs concludes. That's the way we use words, they indicate a type of thing, yet we also use them to refer to particulars. The word has a dual use. Wittgenstein is trying to exclude one of these. But that exclusion is not justified.

So the conclusion, that the thing in the box has no role in the language game is not valid, because it does not account for that role, in which the person uses the word to refer to the thing in their own box, or to the thing in someone else's box. Furthermore, that the person's box might be empty, amounts to deception if the person refers to what's in one's own box when there is nothing there. And, as I've already explained, that the box might be empty is deception on the part of Wittgenstein, because the example stipulates that there is something in the box, so he contradicts himself here, in the effort to mislead you into thinking that the exclusion described above is justified.

This doesn't make any sense. You want to conclude that if our thoughts are about the same thing, then the thoughts themselves are the same. To think about something is to create a relationship with that thing. It's illogical, that I, being a thing, would have the same relationship as you, being a second thing, to a third thing. In order for you and I to have the same relationship with another thing, we'd have to both be the same thing. You and I would be one thing. Therefore we should conclude that yours and my experiences of that third thing are not the same.

The other option you propose is that the experiences of you and I are similar. That they are similar would need to be demonstrated. I think we demonstrate the similarities, along with the differences, through communication. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it mean to say that our what our thoughts are about are the same, but the thoughts themselves aren't? If you only know about something by your thoughts, and they are different than mine then how do we know that we are thinking about the same thing?

You say that we can demonstrate the similarities and differences through communication. What would you be communicating - your thoughts or the thing your thoughts are about? If you can only talk about your thoughts - which you say are different, then we would be communicating different things, and never anything similar.

Say you and I are standing on opposite ends of a table looking at an apple on the table. Your view is one side of the apple and my view is the opposite side of the apple. But within my view is you, looking at the apple. It is a fundamental, pre-linguistic understanding that human beings have is that other humans have a view from their location is space. Even chimps seem to have this understanding as they understand that blocking someone's eyes is blocking their view. We don't need to communicate with each other to understand that we are both looking at the same thing.

I offer this not to be contrary but only to keep things interesting by defending an opposing view. It's not for me about destroying the concept of consciousness but instead in recontextualizing it. The idea is (as I understand it) that we have certain conventions that give concepts identity. — jjAmEs

I’ll expand my views on this a little in reference to consciousness. As I was previously implying, consciousness as an abstract conceptual noun has no meaning in the absence of awareness. Although “awareness” and “cognizance” can hold different spectrums of meaning, “to be aware” and “to cognize” do not - this at least when applied to the first-person point of view (rather than a total mind): to be aware of X is to cognize X and vice versa. Here we have multiple abstract conceptual nouns that convey somewhat different concepts that, nevertheless, reference the same exact beetle that is in everybody’s box. Though we’re all uniquely informed as first-person points-of-view by information at large, this being in part what makes us all uniquely different, we all nevertheless hold an identical beetle in that we are all endowed with (else are) a first-person point of view. Granting that an ant is a sentient being and not an automaton, so too does an ant hold the same beetle in its box: that of having, else being, a first-person point-of-view. For emphasis, all first-person points-of-view will be different in form - again, partly due to the differing information they are informed by, also by biological predispositions that are genetically inherited, etc.; nevertheless, all first-person points of view will be the same, by which I mean qualitatively identical, in their one property of so being first-person points-of-view – differently worded, in being a first-person nexus of awareness.

Here, to me, the occurrence of first-person points-of-view is a concrete, albeit intangible, reality – in the sense that our so being is directly experienced by us, rather than being something which we abstract from direct experiences. And to say that I as a first-person point-of-view “am conscious of”, “am aware of”, or “am cognizant of” makes not the slightest difference in what I am intending to be understood by the given signs. But once we enter into the world of abstracted nouns, things change. As abstracted nouns, consciousness, awareness, and cognizance – though their meanings overlap – can each convey different meanings. And, to the extent that these terms can translate into other languages, these meanings are culturally relative, rather than universal.

Notwithstanding, all these abstracted nouns are generalized from that which is directly experienced, and, in this sense, concrete: the first person point of view which is conscious of / aware of / cognizant of. And this concrete experience of what is will itself be of a proverbial beetle.

So our abstractions, our concepts, do float about, so to speak, in a linguistic webbing of our own intersubjective making. Our linguistic conventions do give the concepts we entertain their identity. Yet, as is the case with consciousness, these abstract nouns are yet abstracted by us from an underlying non-abstract reality that is. Rather than it being abstract nouns all the way down.

Not saying this to object to your perspectives, but in attempts to better find a suitable middle ground.

Feel free to link to any art you have online. I'll check it out. — jjAmEs

Oh, man. This made me blush. Didn’t mean to imply that I’ve either been prolific or good at the artistic stuff I’ve engaged in - though it’s always been a pleasurable challenge for me. As it is, I haven’t yet posted most anything of my arts on line. Certainly nice to have been asked, though. Ditto, btw. If you have anything online, it would be nice to check it out.

You make me feel so Jung :grin: — Wayfarer

Ha! It’s good to be Jung at heart. :razz: (Well, in some ways at least, given that we are referencing Carl Jung).

What does it mean to say that our what our thoughts are about are the same, but the thoughts themselves aren't? If you only know about something by your thoughts, and they are different than mine then how do we know that we are thinking about the same thing? — Harry Hindu

The same way we know anything, with less than absolute certainty.

What would you be communicating - your thoughts or the thing your thoughts are about? — Harry Hindu

Strictly speaking, what I pass to you in communication is words. And the words might be used to reference my thoughts, or the things my thoughts are about, depending on the situation, but generally a combination of both.

We don't need to communicate with each other to understand that we are both looking at the same thing. — Harry Hindu

Yes we do, because there are many things in a person's field of vision, and without some form of communication I can only assume that your interest is the same as mine. Most likely it is not, and we are not looking at the same thing, so it would not be a very reliable assumption.

I’ll expand my views on this a little in reference to consciousness. As I was previously implying, consciousness as an abstract conceptual noun has no meaning in the absence of awareness. Although “awareness” and “cognizance” can hold different spectrums of meaning, “to be aware” and “to cognize” do not - this at least when applied to the first-person point of view (rather than a total mind): to be aware of X is to cognize X and vice versa. Here we have multiple abstract conceptual nouns that convey somewhat different concepts that, nevertheless, reference the same exact beetle that is in everybody’s box. Though we’re all uniquely informed as first-person points-of-view by information at large, this being in part what makes us all uniquely different, we all nevertheless hold an identical beetle in that we are all endowed with (else are) a first-person point of view. Granting that an ant is a sentient being and not an automaton, so too does an ant hold the same beetle in its box: that of having, else being, a first-person point-of-view. For emphasis, all first-person points-of-view will be different in form - again, partly due to the differing information they are informed by, also by biological predispositions that are genetically inherited, etc.; nevertheless, all first-person points of view will be the same, by which I mean qualitatively identical, in their one property of so being first-person points-of-view – differently worded, in being a first-person nexus of awareness. — javra

Your claim that all first-person points-of-view are exactly the same, by virtue of being first-person points-of-view, is just like saying that all things are exactly the same by virtue of being things. How is that a useful assumption, rather than a misleading assumption, in this context?

That's the way we use words, they indicate a type of thing, yet we also use them to refer to particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not necessarily the way we use words. Unless you have a supporting argument that it is? But I can think of a few words that are used in neither of these ways.

So the conclusion, that the thing in the box has no role in the language game is not valid, because it does not account for that role, in which the person uses the word to refer to the thing in their own box, or to the thing in someone else's box. — Metaphysician Undercover

Everyone says they know what a beetle is only by looking at their own beetle. So how does a person know that what they mean by "beetle" is the same as what anyone else means by it? How can the word be used in this way?

That's not necessarily the way we use words. — Luke

That's right, there is no necessity to the way that we use words, it is done by free will choice. But I did describe a couple of ways that people do use words, so it is not irrelevant.

So how does a person know that what they mean by "beetle" is the same as what anyone else means by it? — Luke

When everyone knows that what is in one's own box is not the same thing which is in another's box, and each person calls what is in one's own box a "beetle", why would anyone believe that what someone means by "beetle is the same as what someone else means by beetle?

Your assumption here doesn't make any sense. Clearly, under the terms of the example no one would think that any two people would mean the same thing with the word "beetle".

How can the word be used in this way? — Luke

A word is seldom used in this way, to mean exactly the same thing as what someone else means, and that's what I spent time explaining to Harry. Since "beetle" refers to what's in all those different boxes, two people would only mean the same thing when using the word, if they were both referring to what's in one particular box. If this is case, then which beetle is being referred to, would have to be indicated in some other way.

So you can see that when a word is used in this way, which you suggested, to mean the same thing as someone else means, this must be in some way indicated, that the meaning in this instance of use is meant to be the same as another instance. Two common ways of indicating this are by providing a reference, and the use of a definition.