When everyone knows that what is in one's own box is not the same thing which is in another's box, and each person calls what is in one's own box a "beetle", why would anyone believe that what someone means by "beetle is the same as what someone else means by beetle? — Metaphysician Undercover

What is in one box is not necessarily different from what is in another; only that nobody can know what is in another's box.

Regardless, if everyone assumes that what is in everyone else's box is different to what is in theirs, then the word "beetle" can only be used to refer to "the contents of a person's box", or to "the thing in the box, whatever it is".

Therefore, it doesn't matter what particular thing is in anyone's box. The particular contents of a particular box is irrelevant to the use of the word. The word can be used only to refer to some unknown thing in the box. As Wittgenstein says "...one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is." The word could still be used in this way even if there were nothing in the box.

Clearly, under the terms of the example no one would think that any two people would mean the same thing with the word "beetle". — Metaphysician Undercover

Surely, "beetle" means "the contents of a person's box".

Otherwise, if nobody knows what anybody else means by "beetle", then how can this word be used in the language at all?

Since "beetle" refers to what's in all those different boxes... — Metaphysician Undercover

The word does refer to what's in all (or any of) those different boxes, but the particular contents of those boxes is irrelevant to the word's use.

...two people would only mean the same thing when using the word, if they were both referring to what's in one particular box. If this is case, then which beetle is being referred to, would have to be indicated in some other way. — Metaphysician Undercover

What "other way" is there? Maybe one person could point at another while saying "beetle", or they could even say "your beetle" to make reference to the contents of that person's particular box. But the word would still only mean "the contents of your box, whatever it is".

Your claim that all first-person points-of-view are exactly the same, by virtue of being first-person points-of-view, is just like saying that all things are exactly the same by virtue of being things. How is that a useful assumption, rather than a misleading assumption, in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to have misread what I wrote. To try to better explain via the law of identity: X = X. Hence, "a first person point of view = a first person point of view". This just as much as "a thing = a thing". I did state and then emphasize that each first person point of view is different in various ways - but that all first person points of view are nevertheless identical strictly in so being first person points of view. To then use your example, all things are identical strictly in their property of being things. A rock is no more nor less a thing than is a bolder - despite the two things mentioned being distinctly different in givens such as their spatial properties. The thingness, or thinghood (don't laugh, these are words one can find in a dictionary), of all things is nevertheless exactly the same, this by virtue of all things being things - rather than for example being actions. Again, just as X = X, so too does a thing = a thing.

Now, thingness is an abstraction we abstract from individual things. In the context of consciousness, or else of awareness, though the words "a first-person point of view" are themselves abstractions, what I'm saying is that we each can reference these words to a personal experience of being which, of itself as experience, is intimately real and non-abstract.

I get the Cartesian skepticism that could unfold (the "what if" and "how do you know with infallible certainty" questions). Still, you experience yourself to be, among other things, a first person point of view, as I myself do. These experiences are as real as experiences get. We are of course uniquely different in innumerable ways as first person points of view. Nevertheless, if you are a first person point of view, and if I am a first person point of view - this among all our other attributes which differentiates us - then (get ready) how would the "first-person-point-of-view-ness(or, -hood)" which we both share be in and of itself in any way different ... as that which we both at base minimally are as aware beings?

Do you for example experience being a first person point of view by physiologically seeing some given from two different points of view at the same time and in the same way?

Again, I do maintain that the beetle you hold of being a first person point of view and the beetle which I hold of likewise being a first person point of view - in so far as strictly this one attribute of being is concerned - can only be qualitatively identical (again, in so far as strictly concerns this one attribute). That we, for example, each see different things that impart upon us different forms as first person points of view does not, of itself, annul the fact that we both minimally are first person points of view as aware beings that cognize things. As a bolder is no more or less a thing than is a pebble, so too are you or I no more or less a first person point of view than the other.

What is in one box is not necessarily different from what is in another; only that nobody can know what is in another's box. — Luke

Of course the two distinct things in two distinct boxes are necessarily different from each other, that's what makes them two distinct things. Are you familiar with the law of identity? I went through this already with Harry. They are necessarily different from one another, as two distinct things. Why would you think they could be the same?

Regardless, if everyone assumes that what is in everyone else's box is different to what is in theirs, then the word "beetle" can only be used to refer to "the contents of a person's box", or to "the thing in the box, whatever it is". — Luke

And why would you think this? It is common practise for different people to use the same word differently in different situations. Strictly speaking we ought not even call these two distinct instances "the same word".

Therefore, it doesn't matter what particular thing is in anyone's box. The particular contents of a particular box is irrelevant to the use of the word. The word can be used only to refer to some unknown thing in the box. As Wittgenstein says "...one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is." The word could still be used in this way even if there were nothing in the box. — Luke

I agree with the first part here, "the particular contents of the particular box is irrelevant". That is why the relation between a word and a thing is somewhat arbitrary. However, the second part does not follow logically, and that is what misled jAmEs. We cannot cancel out the thing in the box, unless we are prepared to classify language use as deception.

When a person speaks about the thing in the box, it is implied that there is a thing in the box which is spoken about. The fact that the thing in the box could be anything does not mean that the thing in the box could be nothing. If there is nothing in the box the person is practising deception. One cannot proceed logically from the premise of "I've got something in the box which could be anything", through the premise of "the precise nature of the thing is not indicated by the name it has", to the conclusion "therefore I might have nothing in the box". That is not a logical conclusion.

So the situation here is that if there is nothing in someone's box, then that person is deceiving others when referring to the beetle in the box. Wittgenstein has indicated that this is a possibility, a person could imply "I have something in the box", by referring to the beetle in the box, when there is nothing in the box. Therefore it is possible that language could be used for deception. He supports this principle further, in practise, with that deceptive argument, proceeding from the premise that everyone has something in the box, to the conclusion that there might be nothing in the box. That's a fallacy. The success of that argument, in misleading people like jAmEs, is evidence of what Wittgenstein is arguing, that language might be used for deception.

Surely, "beetle" means "the contents of a person's box". — Luke

No it does not, "beetle" is the name of the thing in the box. The example states that everyone has a box with something in it, called a beetle. This statement of yours just creates the ambiguity which is required to veil the deception. "Contents of a person's box" might be construed as nothing. But that is not what is stated. So your statement appears to be like a person's statement who is defending oneself after having been caught in a lie. You are saying, it's not really a lie if you understand my words this way instead of that way, so I didn't really tell a lie if you interpret like this. But what is really at issue here is the intent to deceive, and this you cannot remove by introducing such ambiguity. Ambiguity is used to hide the intent to deceive, it does not remove it.

Otherwise, if nobody knows what anybody else means by "beetle", then how can this word be used in the language at all? — Luke

I don't see any criticism here, everyone knows what everyone means by "beetle", it's the name of the thing in a person's box. The only issue is that when we're talking we can't just refer to it as "the beetle", because we need to distinguish "your beetle" from "my beetle" from "his beetle", and "her beetle" etc.. This is no different from talking about a part of the body like a right hand. We all have one, but we can't just refer to our own as "the right hand", because there are as many right hands (almost) as there are people. In no way does this indicate that nobody could know what anyone means by "right hand".

The word does refer to what's in all (or any of) those different boxes, but the particular contents of those boxes is irrelevant to the word's use. — Luke

This statement is deceptive as well. Creating this illusion is what allows for Wittgenstein's deception to proceed. I have a box, with a thing in it called a beetle. You likewise. I know that I call my thing "beetle", and you know that you call your thing "beetle". The example does not indicate why any of us is inclined to call the thing in the box by that specific name. We cannot assume coincidence in this matter, therefore we can look for some convention, or rule being followed, if you have this box, with something in it, call that thing a beetle.

Under the foregoing framework for the example, assuming a convention, or rule, the contents of the box is irrelevant. However, that framework is inappropriate, and not an adequate description of language use, nor is it applicable to real life. It's not a real example. There is no rule, or convention, which stipulates when you have a feeling within your body (beetle in the box), you must call it "pain". There are all sorts of different feelings within your body, therefore all sorts of different things within your box. So Wittgenstein's example obscures this fact, the multitude of things in the box, hiding the need to be able to distinguish one thing from another, within one's own box, with the premise that there is only one thing in the box, thereby establishing the groundwork for the deception. Recognizing this fact brings the deception into focus.

What "other way" is there? Maybe one person could point at another while saying "beetle", or they could even say "your beetle" to make reference to the contents of that person's particular box. But the word would still only mean "the contents of your box, whatever it is". — Luke

There are countless different ways to indicate whose box , pointing as you said, "Luke's box", "the person's box who is walking through the door", etc..

And no, the word does not mean "the contents of your box", it refers to the thing in your box. Furthermore, when you put the example into context, the demonstration which Wittgenstein is making, you'll see that "contents of a person's box" makes no sense. As I explained there are really many different things within that box, and Wittgenstein has distinctly said that the word refers to something in the box. So the whole example falls apart, as a person needs a way to distinguish one thing from another within one's own box. The whole idea that there is only one thing in the box is faulty. Then the example will be seen for what it is, an exercise in deception.

To try to better explain via the law of identity: X = X. Hence, "a first person point of view = a first person point of view". — javra

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Therefore, one person's point of view is the same as that person's point of view. Another person's point of view is not the same. I have to say that you are employing a misunderstanding of the law of identity. This law is actually meant to prevent procedures like yours. We ought not say that one red thing is the same as another red thing, just because they are both red, so we employ the law of identity to prevent people from creating a logical argument which employs this idea as a premise. Trying to use the law of identity to support this procedure just demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of identity.

Nevertheless, if you are a first person point of view, and if I am a first person point of view - this among all our other attributes which differentiates us - then (get ready) how would the "first-person-point-of-view-ness(or, -hood)" which we both share be in and of itself in any way different ... as that which we both at base minimally are as aware beings? — javra

It's just like the beetle in the box. We call it a "first-person-point-of-view", no matter who has it, but this does not necessitate that there is any specific thing about it which is the same. We are just calling different things by the same name, just like two different people might be called "John".

The thingness, or thinghood (don't laugh, these are words one can find in a dictionary), of all things is nevertheless exactly the same, this by virtue of all things being things - rather than for example being actions. — javra

I am not laughing, but this is exactly what Wittgenstein would laugh at, the idea that there is such a thing as "thingness". That's why he set up those deceptive arguments, like the beetle in the box, to lead (mislead perhaps) people away from this idea. The problem is that his arguments which appear to be intended to lead people away from this idea, are really deceptions, such that the people who are led away from this idea have been deceived. If we read deeper into what Wittgenstein is saying, we'll see that he is really trying to demonstrate what this "ness" or "hood" really consists of.

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Therefore, one person's point of view is the same as that person's point of view. — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking a different route, if I’m understanding you correctly: Since no singular first person point of view remains the same over time - e.g., the you of five seconds past is not identical to the you of the present - there thereby can be no personal identity through time. Is this correct?

I should add that I don't consider the first person point of view to be a thing, i.e.a homunculus.

The fact that the thing in the box could be anything does not mean that the thing in the box could be nothing. If there is nothing in the box the person is practising deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Simply by using the word 'beetle' one is "practising deception"? Are deaf people practising deception when they talk about sounds, and blind people when they talk about colours?

Wittgenstein has indicated that this is a possibility, a person could imply "I have something in the box", by referring to the beetle in the box, when there is nothing in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only implication here is your own stubborn assumption that the use of the word must depend on what is inside the box.

Therefore it is possible that language could be used for deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it's possible. Did you think it was not possible?

I agree with the first part here, "the particular contents of the particular box is irrelevant". — Metaphysician Undercover

Great! Then it is also irrelevant (to the use of the word) whether a particular box contains something or not.

Is someone "practising deception" if they talk about unicorns or Santa Claus (since these don't really refer to anything)?

The example does not indicate why any of us is inclined to call the thing in the box by that specific name. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably for the same reasons that any of us uses any given language at all.

It's not a real example. There is no rule, or convention, which stipulates when you have a feeling within your body (beetle in the box), you must call it "pain". There are all sorts of different feelings within your body, therefore all sorts of different things within your box. So Wittgenstein's example obscures this fact, the multitude of things in the box, hiding the need to be able to distinguish one thing from another, within one's own box, with the premise that there is only one thing in the box, thereby establishing the groundwork for the deception. Recognizing this fact brings the deception into focus. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's discuss Wittgenstein's actual example, though, instead of importing into it all of these extraneous details and assumptions.

The whole idea that there is only one thing in the box is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are we discussing Wittgenstein's example here, or some other scenario that is only in your mind?

Taking a different route, if I’m understanding you correctly: Since no singular first person point of view remains the same over time - e.g., the you of five seconds past is not identical to the you of the present - there thereby can be no personal identity through time. Is this correct? — javra

No, that's not what I had in mine. You, as a thing just like any other thing, have small changes which occur to you over time, so your point of view changes, nevertheless you are still the same thing, and it is still your point of view. So the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, allows that a thing which is changing as time passes, might continue to be the same thing, because the thing never ceases to be the same as itself despite the fact that it is changing over time.

I should add that I don't consider the first person point of view to be a thing, i.e.a homunculus. — javra

It was you who was talking about a first-person-point-of view as if it were a thing, which could be identified with other first-person-points-of view. If the first-person-point-of-view is not a thing which can be talked about, then what is it that you are referring to with this phrase?

Simply by using the word 'beetle' one is "practising deception"? — Luke

If you are saying "I have a thing in my box which I am calling a beetle", when you have nothing in your box, wouldn't you agree with me that this is deception?

Great! Then it is also irrelevant (to the use of the word) whether a particular box contains something or not. — Luke

Did you not read what I wrote? Or do you have some sort of mental block which prevents you from understanding simple logic? The description is of something in the box. What it is, which in the box, is irrelevant to that description. It is simply stated that there is something in the box. How can you think that this means that it is also irrelevant whether or not there is even something in the box? It is described as something in the box, so whether or not there is something in the box is what makes the description true or false. How can you claim that whether or not there is something in the box is irrelevant, just because it is stipulated that what it is which is in the box is irrelevant. That is a completely illogical conclusion.

Is someone "practising deception" if they talk about unicorns or Santa Claus (since these don't really refer to anything)? — Luke

Often yes, when they talk about fictional characters as if they are not fictional, they are practising deception. When parents tell their children about Santa Clause they are very clearly practising deception. Also, if one writes a book of fiction and presents it as if it were a factual book, this is deception. However, if it is explicit, or implicit, that the fictional character is a fictional character, there is no deception. In the case of the "beetle" in the box, when there is nothing in the box, it is clearly deception, because the person talks as if there is something in the box, referring to it as a beetle, while knowing that there is not anything in the box.

Are we discussing Wittgenstein's example here, or some other scenario that is only in your mind? — Luke

Yes, this is Wittgenstein's example. Look where it is presented by jAmEs:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. — Wittgenstein

What is being exemplified is "pain". But people feel many things other than just pain. Therefore there must be more than one thing in the box in the analogy. People feel pleasure, pain, all sorts of emotions, and sensations. So the analogy of "beetle in the box" is completely inapplicable in the first place, because there must be all sorts of different things in the box, beetles, ants, caterpillars, butterflies, etc., just like there are all sorts of feelings other than pain within the person. So the issue is how do we know how to give which name to which thing in the box, and this is not even broached by Wiitgenstein, who is presenting the analogy as one thing in the box. The analogy is very clearly an exercise in, or demonstration of deception, at numerous different levels. It's almost as if Wittgenstein looked for as many ways as possible to deceive people within one simple example, just to demonstrate the reality of deception. Can you not see, that what "the beetle in the box" is demonstrating is deception?

I got a notification.

Hip hip hooray!

The description is of something in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover

See PI 290-291 regarding your use of "description" here.

Did you not read what I wrote? Or do you have some sort of mental block which prevents you from understanding simple logic? The description is of something in the box. What it is, which in the box, is irrelevant to that description. It is simply stated that there is something in the box. How can you think that this means that it is also irrelevant whether or not there is even something in the box? It is described as something in the box, so whether or not there is something in the box is what makes the description true or false. How can you claim that whether or not there is something in the box is irrelevant, just because it is stipulated that what it is which is in the box is irrelevant. That is a completely illogical conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are talking about the use of the word 'beetle'. As you have agreed, the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word. That is, the use of the word does not rely on the contents of the box. Why should it be any different if the box was empty? The word could still be used in exactly the same way even if the box was empty, despite your tirades about deception.

"That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." (PI 293)

People feel pleasure, pain, all sorts of emotions, and sensations. So the analogy of "beetle in the box" is completely inapplicable in the first place, because there must be all sorts of different things in the box, beetles, ants, caterpillars, butterflies, etc., just like there are all sorts of feelings other than pain within the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ever heard of a thought experiment?

So the issue is how do we know how to give which name to which thing in the box, and this is not even broached by Wiitgenstein, who is presenting the analogy as one thing in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover

You think this is the issue?

How do you know any words (and their uses)? Did you invent them?

As you have agreed, the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word. — Luke

There you go, changing the terms again to "contents". Didn't I point out this mistake to you already? I didn't agree that the contents of the box are irrelevant, nor did Wittgenstein imply such, in the analogy. Something is in the box, and that is very relevant. It is the premise of the analogy. How could it not be relevant? The exact nature of the thing in the box is not relevant, and that is what I agreed to. What is in the box could be anything.

The word could still be used in exactly the same way even if the box was empty, despite your tirades about deception. — Luke

No! Obviously this is false! if you are talking to me about the thing in your box, when there is nothing in your box, and you know that there is nothing in your box, then you are practising deception. That's clear and succinct. If you fail to acknowledge this, then so be it. Most people who deceive will continue to deny that they were deceiving long after being caught in the deception. So this is not a completely unusual response from you, to claim that there is no deception where there clearly is deception.

There you go, changing the terms again to "contents" — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't change any terms. You said: "I agree with the first part here, "the particular contents of the particular box is irrelevant"."

The word could still be used in exactly the same way even if the box was empty, despite your tirades about deception.
— Luke

No! Obviously this is false! if you are talking to me about the thing in your box, when there is nothing in your box, and you know that there is nothing in your box, then you are practising deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't make any claims here about practising or not practising deception. I said that the word could still be used in the same way even if the box was empty. Your response does not address this at all. Your position seems to be that the box's contents are irrelevant to the use of the word if there is something in the box but relevant to the use of the word if there is nothing in the box.

I said that the word could still be used in the same way even if the box was empty. — Luke

As I said, it can't be used in the same way, without deception. Talking about the thing in your box, when there is nothing in your box, is deception, and that fact cannot be avoided.

Deception is irrelevant to this discussion.

It's very relevant.

If you allow for the possibility of deception in the use of language, do you see that "everyone's box has something in it" , and "the box might be empty", are contradictory, and therefore deceptive?

Do you see your own contradiction in the position that it is irrelevant to the use of the word when there is something in the box but relevant to the use of the word when there is nothing in the box?

Whether or not there is something in the box is always relevant under the premise of the analogy, because what you would call "the same use" would be deception when there is nothing in the box, and therefore it would not really be the same, the use would be to deceive.

Where's my contradiction?

Whether or not there is something in the box is always relevant under the premise of the analogy, because what you would call "the same use" would be deception when there is nothing in the box, and therefore it would not really be the same, the use would be to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover

You never answered my earlier question: Is it deceptive for a deaf person to talk about sounds and for a blind person to talk about colours? What's the deception?

Is it deceptive for a deaf person to talk about sounds and for a blind person to talk about colours? What's the deception? — Luke

If the deaf person is not hearing sounds, recognizes and understands this, and yet is talking about hearing sounds, that is deception, just like when the person with no beetle in the box, recognizes and understands that there is nothing in the box, yet is talking about the beetle in the box, that is deception.

If the deaf person is not hearing sounds, recognizes and understands this, and yet is talking about hearing sounds, that is deception — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said that they claim to be hearing sounds, only that they can talk about sounds. It does not affect their use of the word "sounds".

Perhaps I didn't make myself clear. When the deaf person is not hearing sounds yet is referring to the sounds which he or she is hearing, that is deception, like when the person without a beetle in the box is referring to the beetle in the box.

Do you understand that as deception?

Again, I did not mention that the deaf person is "referring to sounds which he or she is hearing". All I am talking about, and all I have been talking about throughout, is the simple use of the word. Is it deceptive for a deaf person to use the word "sounds"?

If the "use" of the word is to refer to something which is not there, as if it were there, when the person knows that it is not there, then the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive.

A person can say "I hear sounds", whether or not the person actually hears sounds. The "use" is dependent on whether the person actually hears sounds or not, because if sounds are not actually heard the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive.

You, as a thing just like any other thing, have small changes which occur to you over time, so your point of view changes, nevertheless you are still the same thing, and it is still your point of view. So the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, allows that a thing which is changing as time passes, might continue to be the same thing, because the thing never ceases to be the same as itself despite the fact that it is changing over time. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are very likely interpreting the term “thing” in different ways. “I am a thing” to me doesn’t register.

As for the main gist of the quote:

A rock as a thing is in perpetual change and this change eventually results in sediments. Though the same physical components are present, the rock is not the same thing as the sediments which inevitably result. There will be a time over this course of slow transformation - in which the rock turns to sediments - when the given rock ceases to be the same given rock, instead being a different rock. Sortie’s paradox here applies (imo, as it applies to the identity of all spatiotemporal givens). Before this time is arrived at, its sameness over time is not a result of the same unchanging total package of constituent parts - which never remains the same - but only of the same holistic form which is maintained despite all the changes that unfold. Nothing spatiotemporal ever remains in a static state of being - and so identity through time is not a property applicable to the organization of the parts but only to the holistic form which the parts bring about. Hence, one cannot step twice into the same river in terms of constituent components - yet it remains the same river in terms of its holistic form via which it is recognized over time to be the same river. Such is my view.

If a given’s constituents are never identical across time, but only its holistic form can so remain, then the notion of identity can only apply to holistic forms. Coming round to the previous topic, again, what I’ve been trying to express is that the holistic form of a first-person point of view is the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different first person points of view - despite the constituents of awareness pertaining to each being drastically different, thereby being a part of what makes each numerically different first person point of view unique.

Via analogy only: the holistic form which makes some given be a rock is of itself the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different rocks - despite the constituents of each individual rock being drastically different. This rock is not that rock for a multitude of reasons, their unique spatial location included, but both clear cut cases of rocks will equally be a rock.

Maybe you no longer subscribe to realism when it comes to universals? I thought you did. Or maybe we hold drastically different understandings of these as well.

All the same, I’m not here trying to convince you but am instead justifying my stance, which you took issue with. And I don't find the metaphysics of identity to be an easy topic.

It was you who was talking about a first-person-point-of view as if it were a thing, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the slightest. This is what you’ve projected upon what I said, via your own means of interpretation.

If the first-person-point-of-view is not a thing which can be talked about, then what is it that you are referring to with this phrase? — Metaphysician Undercover

A process, maybe? All the same, as I see it, what a first person point of view is ontologically - a thing, a process, both, or neither - does not need to be in any way known by us for one to hold a rather strong certainty that such nevertheless is, at the very least in the here and now.

If the "use" of the word is to refer to something which is not there, as if it were there, when the person knows that it is not there, then the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive.

A person can say "I hear sounds", whether or not the person actually hears sounds. The "use" is dependent on whether the person actually hears sounds or not, because if sounds are not actually heard the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word could be used in this way, to deceive, but it need not be. However, it has been your claim that the word can only be used in this way if the sense is lacking; that any use of the word must be a deception.

If a given’s constituents are never identical across time, but only its holistic form can so remain, then the notion of identity can only apply to holistic forms. — javra

OK, just so you know where I'm coming from, I do not accept the idea of a "holistic form". I think this is an imaginary thing, and that any designation "such is the holistic form of the thing" would be arbitrary, or at least be based on principles which would have a large degree of arbitrariness.

’ve been trying to express is that the holistic form of a first-person point of view is the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different first person points of view - despite the constituents of awareness pertaining to each being drastically different, thereby being a part of what makes each numerically different first person point of view unique. — javra

Therefore I take this determination of "qualitatively identical" as arbitrary. I'll refer to my original example, you might as well say that all things are qualitatively identical, despite having drastic differences between them and being numerically different, on account of them all being things. What is the point in saying things like these are "identical"?

Maybe you no longer subscribe to realism when it comes to universals? I thought you did. Or maybe we hold drastically different understandings of these as well. — javra

I don't think I was ever much of a realist in this sense of the word.

All the same, I’m not here trying to convince you but am instead justifying my stance, which you took issue with. And I don't find the metaphysics of identity to be an easy topic. — javra

Identity is definitely not an easy topic, but you seem to have a much better understanding of it than many. I'm glad you took the time to explain your concept of "holistic form", and although I am sure that I do not adequately understand it, it doesn't appear to be appealing to me. How can the holistic form of a thing stay the same when the thing is changing. What kind of "form" is that?

There will be a time over this course of slow transformation - in which the rock turns to sediments - when the given rock ceases to be the same given rock, instead being a different rock. — javra

Here's something to consider. If you look at the rock as matter, then even after it turns to sediments, the matter is still the same matter. So in a way there is something of the rock, its matter, which will always remain the same, even after the rock is gone.

Before this time is arrived at, its sameness over time is not a result of the same unchanging total package of constituent parts - which never remains the same — javra

But the constituent parts, the matter, stays the same regardless of whether they exist as the rock, or something else. So we have something which remains the same through time, the matter. And, since the form of the object is continually changing, if we gave identity to the form of the thing, it would be a new thing at every moment. Instead, if we give identity to the matter of the thing, we can always identify that same matter, as time passes, regardless of what form it is in.

A process, maybe? All the same, as I see it, what a first person point of view is ontologically - a thing, a process, both, or neither - does not need to be in any way known by us for one to hold a rather strong certainty that such nevertheless is, at the very least in the here and now. — javra

I think I can agree with this.

The word could be used in this way, to deceive, but it need not be. However, it has been your claim that the word can only be used in this way if the sense is lacking; that any use of the word must be a deception. — Luke

What is really the case is that when you have named the thing in your box "beetle", and there is nothing in your box, the word is necessarily used to deceive. The deception pervades all usage because you are implying that there is something in the box that you have named "beetle" when you know there is not. Until you make it known to others that there really is nothing in your box which is called "beetle", i.e. that the beetle is a fiction (in which case you are not using "beetle" to refer to the thing in your box anymore), all the usage of that term will be instances of deception.

The deception is inherent within the dictates of the analogy. The name refers to the thing in the box. The person knows what's in one's box. Those two are premised. We can add the further premise, that to refer to the thing in the box when you know that there is nothing in the box, is deception. Therefore to use the word when you know that there is nothing in the box is deception.

On the other hand, when there really is something in the box, one might still use the word for deception as well.

What is really the case is that when you have named the thing in your box "beetle", and there is nothing in your box, the word is necessarily used to deceive. The deception pervades all usage because you are implying that there is something in the box that you have named "beetle" when you know there is not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein doesn't say that you name it. He says that the word has a use in these people's language. Anyone can learn the language, of course, and learn to use the word "beetle" accordingly.

Until you make it known to others that there really is nothing in your box which is called "beetle", i.e. that the beetle is a fiction (in which case you are not using "beetle" to refer to the thing in your box anymore), all the usage of that term will be instances of deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless they make it known that they are deaf, a deaf person is practising deception with any and all usage of the word "sounds"? Do you realise how absurd this is?

On the other hand, when there really is something in the box, one might still use the word for deception as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you back-pedalling on your former agreement that the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word?

What is irrelevant to the question of whether the use of the word depends on the contents of the box is your trivial concern regarding a particular use of the word in order to deceive. The same word or statement could be used in the same way, with the same meaning, in either an honest or a dishonest fashion. It makes no difference to the use/meaning of the word or statement.

I always presumed that Wittgenstein's example of the beetle and the box was just to show that it is a necessary condition for "pain" to have a meaning that it refers to something inner, but that "inner" here cannot mean private and undisplayable to others. I.e. it is necessary for "beetle" to have a meaning that people have things inside their boxes, but ii. they must be able to show others what is in the box. It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, nobody to have the slightest reason for thinking that anyone else's box was not empty, and yet "beetle" still have a use in the language. But what use? It just becomes exactly synonymous with "box" in that case. On the other hand in order to communicate effectively, the meaning of "beetle" must also be shareable, and by hypothesis we cannot share what is private and undisplayable. Is that a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein?

Wittgenstein doesn't say that you name it. He says that the word has a use in these people's language. Anyone can learn the language, of course, and learn to use the word "beetle" accordingly. — Luke

That's irrelevant, I'm not talking about "anyone", I'm talking specifically about the person whose box is empty. That person would be practising deception, according to the contradiction in the terms of the analogy.

Unless they make it known that they are deaf, a deaf person is practising deception with any and all usage of the word "sounds"? Do you realise how absurd this is? — Luke

I'm not talking about a deaf person either, that's an irrelevant distraction you've created.

Are you back-pedalling on your former agreement that the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word? — Luke

Since you misunderstood what I agreed to, or more precisely misrepresented it for a straw man, then I must "back-pedal" to ensure that you understand what I meant.

What is irrelevant to the question of whether the use of the word depends on the contents of the box is your trivial concern regarding a particular use of the word in order to deceive. The same word or statement could be used in the same way, with the same meaning, in either an honest or a dishonest fashion. It makes no difference to the use/meaning of the word or statement. — Luke

So being honest, and being dishonest are "the same" to you? One person makes a truthful honest statement, and another person states the same words in deception, and these two people are using those words in the same way? Tell me another one.

I always presumed that Wittgenstein's example of the beetle and the box was just to show that it is a necessary condition for "pain" to have a meaning that it refers to something inner, but that "inner" here cannot mean private and undisplayable to others. I.e. it is necessary for "beetle" to have a meaning that people have things inside their boxes, but ii. they must be able to show others what is in the box. It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, — jkg20

This would make sense, and showing each other what's in the box would avoid the possibility of someone referring to the thing within the empty box, which is the deception I referred to, but this is not a condition of the analogy. In the analogy what is in the box is meant to be private, that's why it's described as in the box, and only the holder of the box can see inside. And that described privacy is why the possibility of deception looms. Further, deception is then necessitated when Wittgenstein introduces the contradiction "the box might be empty".

But I'm not sure about your use of "undisplayable". In relation to the analogy, if people wanted to display what's inside, they could open the box and show it to others, making the thing displayable. How would that work with "pain"? The display of pain is itself the person's action, which includes spoken words. How could we exclude the possibility of deception if the person cannot open oneself up, to show the thing itself, the "pain"? The sports player might be faking pain to get the opponent penalized, how could that person open oneself up to show that the pain is real? If an individual wants to ensure to another, that deception is not the case, and display one's own pain to convince others of one's honesty, how is that possible?

Because deception is possible, and it is impossible for us to convince others beyond the shadow of a doubt that we are not deceiving them concerning what's inside, your assumption that we "must be able to show others what is in the box" is not only inconsistent with Wittgenstein's example, but also inconsistent with lived experience.

It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, — jkg20

It appears to make sense that everyone's box might be empty, and that's why the others in this thread fall for this deceptive suggestion. Logically though, it makes no sense at all, because it directly contradicts the opening premise, that everyone has a box with something in it. That premise excludes the possibility of any box being empty. Furthermore, the premise indicates that "beetle" refers to what's in one's box, so if the box is empty the person practises deception when using that word. Therefore, it makes sense that everyone's box might be empty in the same way that deception makes sense (it is a real aspect of language use), and it makes sense in the same way that contradiction makes sense (it is a real aspect of Wittgenstein's analogy).

I think we might be largely agreed on how to interpret Wittgenstein, and we are certainly in line that the groundwork laid out for the example to make sense requires there to be something inside all the boxes. I agree that we can show each other our pain through our words and actions, and I believe that is what Wittgenstein himself believed, and as I read Wittgenstien he allows that to be a manifestation of what is inner, although of course what is inner in this sense is definitely not private. The example of the beetle in the box is supposed to show the logical incompatibility of three things, as I see it anyway: i. there is something inside each persons box; ii nobody can show any body else what is inside their box iii the meaning of beetle is determined fully and only by whatever is in the box. You can have i and iii, but have to drop ii. You can have i and ii but cannot have iii. As for deception, in the case of the beetle and the box it only makes sense by somebody coming along and pretending that they even have their box: it might look like their box, but things that look like boxes are not always boxes, and if it were genuinely their box, it would have something inside it.

Quick addendum: re. the football player faking pain: I take Wittgenstein as promoting the idea that fake pain behaviour is not pain behaviour, even if it looks like it.

As for deception, in the case of the beetle and the box it only makes sense by somebody coming along and pretending that they even have their box: it might look like their box, but things that look like boxes are not always boxes, and if it were genuinely their box, it would have something inside it. — jkg20

What I've been addressing as deception, Is the supposed conclusion Wittgenstein makes, that the box might even be empty. This possibility comes about through your ii, "nobody can show anybody else what is inside their box", in conjunction with Wittgenstein's suggestion that the people have a use for the word "beetle", which is other than to name the thing in the box.

Notice that this suggestion of another use, is inconsistent with the premise that "beetle" is the name for the thing in the box. In effect, what Wittgenstein has done is offered a second definition for "beetle". Only if we accept this second definition of "beetle" (the other use that people have for the word), which is inconsistent with the first definition (the word refers to the thing in the box), can we proceed to the conclusion that the box might be empty. However, this conclusion contradicts the premise that everyone has something in their box. We can see that the conclusion, which contradicts the premise, is only provided for by introducing a second definition of "beetle". In other word's it's derived from equivocation.

So, the two definitions of "beetle" are completely distinct. At the beginning of the analogy it refers to the thing in the box. At the end of the analogy, it is simply indicated that "beetle" has another use. This other use, whatever it might be, is completely unrelated to, and irrelevant to the thing in the box. The "beetle in the box" is completely and absolutely unrelated to the other use for "beetle. Anyone who assumes that there is some relation here does so by equivocation. So if we apply this back to "pain", then this other use for the word "pain" would be completely unrelated to anything any person felt. But that extreme separation is sort of nonsensical.

iii the meaning of beetle is determined fully and only by whatever is in the box. — jkg20

Let me address this (iii) now. Wittgenstein has offered two distinct scenarios. One,(iii), that the meaning of "beetle" is determined solely by what's in the box ("beetle" refers necessarily to what's in the box), and the other, that there's a meaning for "beetle" which is completely distinct from what's in the box. We can see these two as the two limiting extremes for usage of the word. In reality, all instances of usage fall somewhere in between. So we can dismiss (iii) as inconsistent with reality.

This leads me to (ii), the idea that no one can show another what is inside their box. I think you and I both agree that communication is the act which shows another what is in the box. Therefore we can dismiss (ii) along with (iii). The only thing we're left with is (i), that there is something inside each box. So the analogy really tells us nothing about the relationship between language and what's inside, pain, or other feelings whatsoever, "what's in the box".

Quick addendum: re. the football player faking pain: I take Wittgenstein as promoting the idea that fake pain behaviour is not pain behaviour, even if it looks like it. — jkg20

This is why deception is relevant and significant. If we agree that communication is an act of showing another what's in the box, we have to account for why we sometimes there is deception, and we cannot distinguish the real showing from the fake showing. Fake pain behaviour is not pain behaviour, but we can be deceived into thinking that the fake pain behaviour is real pain behaviour. This makes our dismissal of (ii) "nobody can show any body else what is inside their box", a little bit ambiguous, needing qualification. We can show others what's in the box, but we can also hide (keep private) what is inside the box, through deception. The showing depends on how we choose to act.