• Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    Thomas Hobbes is the name that is most often invoked, at least in the context of political philosophy, in conversations focused on justifications of government. The story Hobbes tells should be familiar. In the absence of government, the ‘state of nature’ obtains, in which each individual, endowed with roughly equal faculties as everyone else, is engaged in perpetual war with every other individual. We kill each other for resources (competition), we kill each other pre-emptively (diffidence), and we kill each other for egoistic superiority (glory). What is Hobbes’s solution to this miserable state of affairs? For everyone to hand over to a government absolute power and authority (presumably, only over a limited territory; otherwise, there would only be one government in the world). This government, or State (I make no distinction here, although one might), protects persons from one another, and it does so by holding a monopoly on force.

    Clearly, such a solution – supposing it could work otherwise – would not work if everybody were as well-armed as the government itself is. That would defeat the whole purpose. The State is an absolute ruler, and this means that it may use force in ways, and to degrees, that no other person or non-governmental agency may. So, there are three features of the Hobbesian State: force, monopoly, and territory. This lines up neatly with Max Weber’s famous definition of the State, which is the most frequently cited: the State is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Even if this definition proves slightly inadequate in some particulars, it captures well enough the essence of what it means to be a State.

    One understandable concern which one may have is as follows: what if the State itself, monopolistic wielder of coercion that it is, is corrupt and seeks to use its coercive power for ill rather than for the social good? What if, in other words, the State is functionally a gang which plunders and dominates us, much as an aggressor would do in a state of nature? It is by no means obvious that a State would not do so; and it is therefore not obvious that a Statist society would be an improvement upon one that is Stateless.

    Hobbes insists that such is not particularly problematic. He provides a number of reasons for this, but the most compelling reason is that, in order to hold such a State in check, there would have to be another, even more powerful State, which would only serve to create the same problem anew.
    So, Hobbes is making two claims here, both of which may be understood (anachronistically) in game-theoretic terms.

    1. In the state of nature, where power is divided roughly equally among all persons, it is most rational for the individual to engage with her fellow human being violently rather than peacefully.

    2. Where power is distributed unequally, with enormous coercive power concentrated around a single person or agency, it is most rational for the individual to engage with her fellow human being peacefully rather than violently (this includes the persons comprising the State as well).

    Unfortunately for Hobbes, both of these theses are false. I wish to spend the most time discussing the second thesis, although I would like to devote some attention to the first claim too, since this is one on which many seem to agree with Hobbes. Thesis 1 is essentially a description of market failure, in which each individual acts correctly in her own narrow self-interest, and yet the net result is to make virtually everybody worse off than if they had all acted otherwise (for a fuller exploration of this, see my discussion ‘Anarchy, State, and Market Failure’). Specifically, everybody would be better off if we all engaged with one another peacefully rather than violently; our lives would not be as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ as they are in the state of nature. But, any individual who takes it upon herself to be peaceful rather than violent is making herself worse off: she will have fewer resources (because she does not kill for ‘competition’), she will be in greater danger from others (because she does not kill for ‘diffidence’), and she will have less glory too, although this strikes me as less urgent.

    Typically, cases of ‘market failure’, where individually rational decisions add up to sub-optimal outcomes for everyone, are expressed in game-theory by means of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game. However, the best scholarship on the prisoner’s dilemma suggests that there is far more to the ‘game’ of violence than Hobbes’s analysis allows. Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation, published in 1984 and still a subject of discussion in recent literature, explores the ‘iterated prisoner’s dilemma’, which is simply a repetition, indefinitely many times, of the basic prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly, the correct strategy for approaching the game alters fundamentally given iteration. Although there is still some dispute about precisely which strategy is superior, there is no question about the fact that the kinds of strategies that perform best are those which are ‘cooperative’; i.e. those which work well with other strategies, and allow them to do well too. Axelrod leverages this insight as a means of explaining the evolution of peaceful interaction between persons, making use of historical examples. His work has proved influential in game theory, economics, political science and evolutionary biology.

    Axelrod’s book: http://www.eleutera.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Evolution-of-Cooperation.pdf

    A recent article, indicating the present state of scholarship on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, and offering some constructive developments: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/4/12.html

    So, the best contemporary treatments of Hobbes’s (unintentionally) game-theoretic claims indicate that he is very probably wrong. In fact, peaceful cooperation can, does and did occur, even in the absence of a centralised government, because, when repeat dealings are taken into account, the strategies which work best are those which allow others to benefit as well, which implies a tendency towards peaceful cooperation rather than opportunistic predation (Hobbes’s mistake was to consider the prisoner’s dilemma only as a one-off game, but the logic of the game alters entirely once iteration is accounted for).

    So much for Hobbes’s first thesis. What of the second? Thesis 2 is also false, but much less controversially. Thesis 2 is a defence of totalitarianism, which few reasonable people would defend. An ‘absolute ruler’ is not a particularly attractive notion, and it is doubtful that it would make the world a better place, relative to its alternatives. What alternatives, exactly? One alternative would be anarchy. My own view is that Axelrod’s game-theoretic insights vindicate libertarian anarchy, although arguing for this directly is not something I shall be doing here (for more reflections on how we might bargain our way up to civilisation out of a Hobbesian state of nature without a government, see David Friedman, ‘A Positive Account of Property Rights’: http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html).

    Another alternative is the view which is most prevalent today among social democrats, conservatives, classical liberals, and practically everyone who is not an anarchist: a limited government. In answer to the question, ‘What is preventing a State from acting as it pleases, dominating and exploiting us endlessly?’, the answer is that there are certain ‘controls’ which act as ‘checks and balances’ on the State’s power (note that, when I speak of the State ‘acting’, I refer to the actions of those persons who comprise it, for collectives do not of themselves have the capacity to act).

    So, the success of a defence of the State must provide a satisfactory account of these checks and balances. It must explain convincingly how it is that the State’s power is restrained, so as to prevent a tendency towards totalitarianism. What I plan to do is to examine the three most commonly-cited checks and balances – separation of powers, written constitution, democratic process – and to provide some reasons for thinking that none of them serves effectively to restrain the power of the State. My claim is not that all States are totalitarian, but that there is a tendency towards totalitarianism, such that the checks and balances, to which such confident appeal is typically made, are shown to be unfit for purpose. To put it another way, both the anarchist and the non-totalitarian Statist agree that Hobbes’s thesis 2 is false, but for different reasons. I want to show that the latter’s reasons are inadequate.

    The Separation of Powers

    First, we look to the separation of powers. Simply, this is the idea that the State is divided into distinct, co-equal branches, each of which has a substantial measure of regulatory influence over the others, such that no single branch may exceed its constitutional mandate and abuse its power. Ideally, it is impossible for any given branch of government to become totalitarian, because the other two branches will not allow it to do so. If the executive becomes ‘too big for its boots’, then the legislature and the judiciary responsibly ‘step in’ and exercise their regulatory influence over it, so as to keep it in check. But is this, in fact, the way that it works? To address this question, we must not ask, ‘What are the three co-equal branches of government notionally intended to do?’ Rather, we must ask, ‘What do the three co-equal branches of government have a realistic incentive to do?’ Do the three co-equal branches of government have a realistic incentive to hold one another in check, and to prevent each other from growing in power?

    The correct answer is ‘For the most part, no’. It is not inconceivable that one branch of government exercise its influence responsibly and nobly over another, but this is untypical. In general, there is little or no incentive for this to happen, and in some cases there is an incentive for it not to happen. In order to explain why, let us consider a market illustration. Suppose there are two firms which sell a similar product, and are therefore market competitors. Let us say that they are both vendors of tea. Let us also imagine that each of these firms has some kind of regulatory influence over the other: perhaps they each own land that crosses the other’s import route, so that they can each disrupt the other’s supply of tea leaves. The two firms have a long-standing agreement that they will not exercise their disruptive influence, provided that their opponent’s market share not increase past a certain point (say, 50% of the market). Now, it is possible that one’s market share increase in such a way that does not threaten the other; perhaps the demand for tea increases, and both firms enjoy more sales. But, assuming that the demand for tea remain constant, it seems that any increase in the market share of one firm results in a decrease in the market share of their competitor. So, if one firm starts to increase in ‘power’ (market share), the competitor assuredly does have an incentive to make good on its threats and implement whatever regulatory controls it has at its disposal to hold it ‘in check’.

    But what if the two firms are not competitors at all, but sell complementary products? Suppose that one firm is a tea vendor and the other is a vendor of chocolate biscuits. Tea and chocolate biscuits are complements: ceteris paribus, as sales of one increase so do the sales of the other. If, therefore, one firm in this scenario attempts to boost its sales and increase its market share, this is actually to the benefit of the other firm. Each does well when the other does well.

    What does this tell us? It suggests that, when two or more agencies are in a position to exercise regulatory influence over the other(s), they have a realistic incentive to do so if the agencies are competitive, and they do not have a realistic incentive to do so if they are complementary. Are the executive, legislative and judicial branches competitive or complementary? The answer is implied in the question itself: they are each providing a different and complementary service. The legislature passes laws, the judiciary interprets laws, and the executive enforces laws. The more laws are passed, the more laws there are to interpret and enforce. What is more, all three branches of government benefit from perpetuating the following (untrue) commitment in the minds of their citizens: that the services which each branch provides can only be provided effectively by them. Quite simply, it is in the interests of the State in toto to maintain and grow the power of the State in toto; it is plausible that the growth of the power and influence of the State involves the growth of all three branches of government. In this sense, they have a ‘common cause’. Suppose that the majority of people could be persuaded that the State is not necessary in order to have a system of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution. All three branches would be equally threatened by such a phenomenon.

    This would imply that, typically, the three co-equal branches of government do not have a realistic incentive to exercise regulatory control over the others. What, then, would a true ‘separation of powers’ look like? We have already seen the beginnings of an answer in the analysis we have given. Competition separates powers. Suppose that, instead of power being separated between three different and complementary service-providers (i.e. law-producers, law-interpreters, law-enforcers), power was separated across n many competitors. One may suggest that this already obtains, since, if one does not like one’s own State, one may simply leave and go to another. But this, I believe, is to miss the point. States are territorial sovereigns. When we speak of checks and balances, we are looking for controls on the State’s power over the territory it governs. If the ‘You can always leave’ argument is taken seriously, then there really is no reason why the government should not be totalitarian after all. What we are looking for, then, is a separation of powers within the territory, and not between territories. And, as we have seen, it is markets, and not monopolies, which separate powers.

    It is beyond my purpose here to provide an account of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution in a Stateless society, but for explorations of these issues, see David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism.

    The Written Constitution

    Next, let us consider the limits established by a written constitution. This provides a set of formal boundaries, beyond which, notionally, the government may not act. Clearly, the mere existence of a written constitution serves as no protection in itself. Minimally, three further things are required. First, it must be created in a way that is fair (consider, for instance, if a constitution did exist, but it afforded the State totally unacceptable powers). Second, it must be interpreted in a manner that is fair and competent. Written constitutions are produced in specific historical contexts, and cannot possibly anticipate the myriad ways in which the world may change, let alone the ways in which its own language may change. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it must be enforced. At the risk of glibness, a piece of paper does not stop the bullet from a gun. It must be accompanied by the commitment, on behalf of those who are equipped to do so, to enforce its stipulations.

    A written constitution, then, must be accompanied by certain services: law-production, law-interpretation, and law-enforcement (a constitution, after all, is essentially a kind of law). These services are familiar: they are the services provided by the State itself. But this raises a problem, that the State is, in effect, made the judge in its own case. Since the State is responsible for establishing its own limits, interpreting the sense of these limits as time moves on, and seeing them enforced, there is a clear conflict of interests. It is not at all difficult to appreciate the nature of this conflict. Suppose that the State consisted of precisely one supreme ruler, who is responsible for establishing, interpreting and enforcing the limits on his own power. Clearly, he cannot be trusted to do so. If he could, it would only be because we have judged him to be a trustworthy ruler, in which case the constitution would be unnecessary in any case. Suppose, instead, that the State consisted of a group of rulers, all of whom were equally responsible for establishing, interpreting and enforcing their own limits. Would this be an improvement? Hardly; if they are all co-rulers, then they all share a common interest, that of growing the power of the State, and interpreting its constitutional limits as liberally and permissively as possible.

    It is at this point that the State’s apologist will draw attention to the fact that, while the State is indeed responsible for the production, interpretation and enforcement of its own limits, these services are provided by different branches of government, and therefore it is not a straightforward case of a group of individuals serving as their own judges. Appeal is being made, in other words, to the separation of powers. For this reason, I suggest that the ‘checks and balances’ provided by a written constitution do not serve as an extra defence, over and above the separation of powers. Rather, the defence against totalitarian tyranny which the constitution is intended to provide can only be trusted if we already have some independent reason for trusting the separation of powers. However, I have already provided reasons for thinking that the way in which power is separated in the States of our acquaintance is not adequate to protect against totalitarianism. This, in turn, would seem to render ‘constitutional limits’ largely impotent.

    As John C. Calhoun observed, scathingly yet lucidly, in his A Disquisition on Government, it will always be in the interests of the larger and more influential political party to exercise the powers granted by the constitution, and to ignore its limitations as far as is possible. Meanwhile, the weaker and less influential party will have the opposite incentives, to hold the larger party to obey its restrictions, and to resist and question every exercise of power, whether legitimate or not. The larger party will seek to ignore and flout its restrictions, and the weaker party will seek to uphold them. What will the outcome be? ‘In a contest so unequal,’ says Calhoun, ‘the result would not be doubtful.’ The larger and more powerful party will tend to be successful in enforcing its own interpretation of the limits placed upon it, and so, over time, there is an inevitable tendency towards a ‘liberalising’ (in a pejorative sense) of the constitution’s interpretation, and thence to totalitarianism.

    Democracy

    We look, finally, at the democratic process itself. The common-sense or ‘naïve’ model of democracy is that, if those in power start to exceed their constitutionally defined mandate, we, the people, simply vote them out. A minimal requirement for such an arrangement to succeed is that voters be, in general, politically well-informed. Unfortunately, from an individual perspective, there is very little reason to become well-informed. Suppose you live in a society, virtually all the members of which are politically well-informed already. If such is the case, there is little reason for you to take it upon yourself to become well-informed as well, for the rest of society can probably already be relied upon to reach the ‘right result’. Suppose instead that you live in a society, virtually nobody in which is well-informed. Here, again, it profits you little to become suitably well-informed, as here, too, your vote is highly unlikely to impact the outcome of any decision-making process. This, sadly, is an unavoidable ingredient in any collective decision-making process (except on an extremely small scale): because the individual’s contribution has mathematically negligible odds of swaying the final decision, it simply does not pay the individual to take it upon herself to become well-informed, given the significant costs in time and intellectual power that is required in order to do so.

    The proof is in the pudding. From experience, we know that the average voter is woefully ignorant. Countless studies have shown that a majority of voters cannot even name their constituency’s representative, let alone enumerate their representative’s voting decisions on recent bills. Even the rudiments of a country’s political system are unknown to an astonishing number of people. We can therefore understand the voter’s incentive structure as giving rise to a kind of market-failure: sure enough, if every voter becomes politically well-informed, then this will probably yield the best result possible, but any individual who takes it upon herself to do so is taking a course of action which costs her more than it benefits her.

    But, even supposing that a substantial number of voters were suitably well-informed, this of itself is not sufficient to keep a State from exceeding its constitutional limits. Voters, understandably, will tend to vote in their own immediate interests and in favour of the politicians who appear to represent their own values. If the predominant party happens to be the one which suits a given voter, that voter has little reason to vote against it. Let us remind ourselves that the State is an agency of coercion, and it is in the nature of coercion that it tends to be predatory in nature, benefitting one party at another’s expense. It follows that a State can only ever be a weapon to be wielded by some (to their benefit) against others (at their expense). In a representative democracy, the majority are positioned to benefit at the expense of those who are outvoted, regardless of whether or not the State exceeds its prescribed mandate.

    Let us lay these considerations aside. Let us assume, counterfactually, that a substantial majority of voters are both well-informed and care suitably about the State acting appropriately. What kind of effect will this have on the actions of the State? A private firm must continually satisfy its consumers in order to survive; the profit-and-loss system encourages the firm to be hyper-sensitive to the degree to which it effectively satisfies consumer preferences. If a large firm has a commercially poor week or month, it must ask itself what it must do immediately so as to reclaim its customers, who are at liberty to shop elsewhere upon the turn of a dime. The State, on the other hand, hardly faces such constraints. Elections are typically held once every four or five years, and so a voter whose preference alters must wait as long as this before they can select a new political preference. Even then, unless the voter can persuade suitably many of her neighbours, she may continue to be governed by a person or party whom she does not endorse. Contrast this with the freedom she has as a consumer: she may decide, as she lies in bed at night, to patronise a new supermarket in the morning, effective immediately, and her changed preferences are not dependent upon her successfully persuading her neighbours to shop where she shops.

    Finally, and perhaps most crucially, the representatives for whom we vote do not have an enforceable contract with us. If your elected representative violates every promise he makes on the campaign trail, you have no legal recourse. All you may do is wait for however many years it takes, cross your fingers, and hope in vain that your next choice has more integrity.

    How Optimistic Should We Be?

    In the above treatment, I have tried to show that there are good reasons for seriously doubting the effectiveness of the ‘checks and balances’ which are notionally intended to restrain State power. Recognising the inadequacy of these mechanisms should be cause for serious thought. The question with which we began was: 'Given that the State holds a monopoly on force, what is preventing it from acting as an aggressor in a state of nature would act?' Nothing less than the philosophical justification of the State may hang on this question. If, it transpires, there is little reason for thinking that the State is going to obey the limits placed upon it, then it may be little improvement at all. For clarity’s sake, I am doubtful that Hobbes’s analysis of the state of nature is the correct one, so what I am not arguing is that the ‘war of all against all’ is preferable to the present Statist situation. As Axelrod, Friedman and others have shown, there are good game-theoretic reasons for thinking that a State is not a necessary precondition for the emergence of peaceful cooperation; though, admittedly, this is a thesis to which I have not done justice in this piece. But if, as I argue, we have good reason for thinking, not only that Hobbes’s totalitarianism is mistaken, but also that the defences that are set in place to protect us from totalitarianism are not fit for purpose, we might have reason to look again at anarchy as the least-bad alternative. A positive defence of anarchy will, however, have to wait for another occasion.

    I will finish with this thought. It is often assumed that the anarchist must be terribly optimistic about human nature; she must take the view that human beings are essentially peaceful and selfless creatures who can be trusted to do the right thing, in the absence of a restraining influence. Meanwhile, those who are suitably pessimistic (or perhaps simply 'realistic') about human nature ought to want a State, so as to protect people from each other. Statism, so it goes, is the more grounded, sober, realistic position, which takes human nature as it is, and which takes human incentives seriously. I hope to have given pause to someone who might take such a view uncritically.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    One understandable concern which one may have is as follows: what if the State itself, monopolistic wielder of coercion that it is, is corrupt and seeks to use its coercive power for ill rather than for the social good?Virgo Avalytikh

    Right. That is one of the reasons why I say that political theory has to be underwritten by Christianity, or something like it. I mean, if you wanted to underwrite it with evolutionary biology - well, perish the thought. Even Dawkins knows that 'survival of the fittest' is a dreadful social theory. There has to be some rationale for treating others as one would treat oneself, if it is not to be something other than a wishful platitude - a real philosophical rationale, with some sense of binding power. It's hard to demonstrate in nature, although even if it were not, it would still not necessarily apply to h. sapiens, who is now many steps removed from nature.

    any individual who takes it upon herself to be peaceful rather than violent is making herself worse off: she will have fewer resources (because she does not kill for ‘competition’), she will be in greater danger from others (because she does not kill for ‘diffidence’), and she will have less glory too, although this strikes me as less urgent.Virgo Avalytikh

    Given that physical well-being is the only ultimate end. If, say, one imagined that some greater good, greater even than survival, awaited those who chose not to exercise brute physical power, then there might indeed be a rationale for peacefulness.

    we must ask, ‘What do the three co-equal branches of government have a realistic incentive to do?’ Do the three co-equal branches of government have a realistic incentive to hold one another in check, and to prevent each other from growing in power?Virgo Avalytikh

    The next few weeks will be highly instructive in this regard.

    Overall, I'm in agreement with Churchill's gloomy prognostication - that democracy has many dreadful shortcomings, but that it's the least evil of the possible alternatives. But, as you observe, that does depend on an educated populace capable of rational political decisions, something which certainly does seem lacking in the world's largest political economy at this time.

    Excellent essay, overall.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    Thank you for your comments. I just have one or two thoughts.

    That is one of the reasons why I say that political theory has to be underwritten by Christianity, or something like it.Wayfarer

    One problem with this, if we are taking incentives seriously, is: How do you make it such that everybody lives their life in such a way that is underwritten by a particular set of values? If everybody lived their life meek and mild, a government would not be necessary. But this only throws us back upon the question from which I begin: How do you guarantee that the government itself is going to adhere to such values? How people should behave is, of course, an important question, and I have my own views on this. But my emphasis has been focused more on incentives, how people realistically will behave.

    As I pointed out when I brought in Axelrod et al., there is a tendency towards peaceful cooperation which is not dependent upon the existence of an institution of monopolised coercion. What is more, this tendency is not dependent upon cultivating or instilling a particular set of values in oneself or one's children. What is remarkable (but true nonetheless) is that this peaceful cooperation occurs spontaneously in an environment of rational egoists (as game theory assumes people to be). If some people are not rational egoists, but meek Christian saints, this only serves to improve matters, but this is not necessary in order to achieve stable peace.

    So you are right to say:

    There has to be some rationale for treating others as one would treat oneself, if it is not to be something other than a wishful platitude - a real philosophical rationale, with some sense of binding power.Wayfarer

    But the rationale need not consist in an adherence to a particular set of values, however noble. The rationale is the one which is illustrated by the iterated prisoner's dilemma: successful strategies are those which can work well with other strategies, and this is why rational egoists will tend, counter-intuitively, towards peaceful cooperation.

    Overall, I'm in agreement with Churchill's gloomy prognostication - that democracy has many dreadful shortcomings, but that it's the least evil of the possible alternatives.Wayfarer

    Given the argument I have presented - that democracy, in the long run, does not serve as an effective defence against totalitarianism - I see no reason why Statism in any form is preferable to anarchy, both on moral and pragmatic grounds. As I pointed out, the State is a monopolistic agency. Part of what this means is that the State may engage in activities which others are prohibited (by the State) from engaging in. This implies that certain human beings are subject to a different set of restrictions from everyone else. I, for one, see no non-arbitrary justification for this.
  • NOS4A2
    8.3k


    Thanks for writing that. It was a really good read. It deserves more views.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    The rationale is the one which is illustrated by the iterated prisoner's dilemma: successful strategies are those which can work well with other strategies, and this is why rational egoists will tend, counter-intuitively, towards peaceful cooperation.Virgo Avalytikh

    But you’re still talking about managing others, about control strategies. Unless the culture has a sense of values which the citizenry can freely adopt, then it’s not a free society, by definition.

    You’re obviously highly educated and well-read, have you by any chance encountered the dialectics of the Enlightenment?
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    have you by any chance encountered the dialectics of the Enlightenment?Wayfarer

    I know of a book by that name, but I have not read it.

    Have you read Robert Axelrod's book which I mentioned, The Evolution of Cooperation?
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    No, but it looks interesting.

    But anarchy can’t possibly be a solution to anything. Would every person be required to construct their own road? Would there be no public property? It seems to me that anarchy is simply the social manifestation of chaos, so it would be ripe for being taken over by anyone offering order. In other words, it would most likely result in authoritarianism.

    The democratic state is not a monopolistic agency, but a contract between free individuals to manage their affairs in the most mutually beneficial manner.

    Basically I think your argument tends towards authoritarianism.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    Would every person be required to construct their own road?Wayfarer

    Roads, just as with all other goods and services (including rights-enforcement, dispute-resolution, military defence and money) would be produced privately by competing agencies.

    Would there be no public property?Wayfarer

    It depends on what you mean by 'public property'. If you simply mean 'property owned and controlled by the government', then no, there would be no such thing. If you mean 'a patch of land that is owned jointly by more than one person', then there is no reason, in principle, why such could not come about under anarchy. But if you mean 'property that is non-private' - i.e. property from which nobody in the world was excluded - then I doubt it, because scarce resources are such that everybody may not use them at once. So at least some exclusion must take place (I take 'exclusion' to be the defining hallmark of private ownership).

    It seems to me that anarchy is simply the social manifestation of chaosWayfarer

    With respect, this is precisely wrong. The absence of a human association which holds a monopoly on physical force is not chaos. Nor is the existence of such an association 'order'. My very argument is that it is the State which tends towards totalitarianism, regardless of what controls are set in place to prevent this from happening (including the democratic process itself). You are essentially in agreement with Hobbes in what I have identified as his 'thesis 1':

    'In the state of nature, where power is divided roughly equally among all persons, it is most rational for the individual to engage with her fellow human being violently rather than peacefully.'

    But, as I pointed out, game-theoretic reconstructions of this state of affairs shows that rational egoists tend towards peaceful order spontaneously. Not because they suddenly become good and benevolent people or because they develop a conscience, but because it is a winning strategy.

    The democratic state is not a monopolistic agency, but a contract between free individuals to manage their affairs in the most mutually beneficial manner.Wayfarer

    States are monopolistic agencies, by nature. They claim prerogatives which they forcibly prevent other persons from engaging in. If I were to 'tax' someone, or raise an army, or place paternalistic bans on other people's recreational behaviour, I would be forcibly subdued and incarcerated. If you acted like a government, you would be in jail. States are criminal organisation on a vast scale. They are essentially tax-farms, which perdure by continually aggressing against peaceful, productive people.

    Moreover, there is no contract such as you speak of. It does not exist. Certainly, no one has signed such a contract explicitly, but even if you were to claim that citizens consent to being governed implicitly by residing within an arbitrary territory, this would only hold true if you have some system for determining who owns the territory. Certainly, it cannot be said that the State owns the territory (that would be circular, since the social contract is being invoked so as to justify the existence of the State). So perhaps the territory is owned jointly by all the citizens. But why? Why these persons in particular, and only these persons? The only reason we recognise the 'citizens' to be who they are is because of (a) their legal status as such and (b) the arbitrary lines of a governed territory. But, we derive both of these things from the State itself, which is, once again, circular.

    I have never encountered a social contract theory that is not formally question-begging, in that it must take the legitimacy of the State for granted as a premise, in order to go on and try to prove that very thing. For this reason, it is not surprising that ordinary social contract theories have been largely replaced by 'hypothetical' social contract theories; i.e. arguments to the effect that, even though there really is no social contract, it would still be rational for everyone to sign a social contract, and this is where the State derives its legitimacy (note that Hobbes was a hypothetical social contract theorist; he did not believe in the factual reality of a literal social contract). But such arguments are just as ineffectual. I cannot reasonably hold you to contractual obligations if you have not formally consented, regardless of how rational I think you would be to do so.

    Finally, it is simply beyond the power of the State to provide 'mutual benefit'. It is not in the State's gift to do so. Only voluntary trade can achieve this. The State exists by continually initiating force and invading the property of its 'citizens'. This, as I mentioned, is a purely predatory activity, which benefits one party at another's expense. Confiscationary levies, wars, paternalistic bans on recreational or life-saving drugs, the prison- and military-industrial complexes, the poverty industry (Welfare State), tariffs and embargos are not mutually beneficial. They benefit special interest groups at the expense of most other people.
  • Galuchat
    808
    For everyone to hand over to a government absolute power and authority...Virgo Avalytikh

    The OP seems to conflate authority and authoritarianism.

    The basis of political power may be either coercion or authority (the right which arises from a moral claim of legitimacy to control, command, or otherwise influence, the behaviour of others), regardless of political structure (egalitarian or stratified). The possibility that any human institution can become corrupt is not disputed.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    The OP seems to conflate authority and authoritarianism.Galuchat

    An odd observation. I don't believe I ever use the word 'authoritarianism'. In the phrase you quote, I am attempting to reconstruct Hobbes's position. In the story Hobbes tells, the people do hand over authority to the State. Remember, Hobbes does believe that the State is legitimate, precisely for this reason. So this would be in line with how you would define 'authority'. Whether Hobbes's story is convincing is obviously another issue.
  • Galuchat
    808

    Granting authority doesn't necessarily entail the exercise of "absolute power" (authoritarianism).
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    Granting authority doesn't necessarily entail the exercise of "absolute power" (authoritarianism).Galuchat

    That's fine. But Hobbes does speak of the authority that is granted to the State as being absolute (which is why I have described Hobbes as a totalitarian). As I mentioned, I am re-constructing Hobbes's own position.
  • Galuchat
    808
    As I mentioned, I am re-constructing Hobbes's own position.Virgo Avalytikh

    And using the (agreed, but for different reasons) falsity of Hobbes' (supposed) two theses to justify anarchism or limited government as alternatives to totalitarianism.

    Then dispensing with the limited government ("non-totalitarian Statist") alternative, because its proponents' reasons for rejecting Hobbes' second thesis are inadequate.

    My point remains unaddressed.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    And using the (agreed, but for different reasons) falsity of Hobbes' (supposed) two theses to justify anarchism or limited government as alternatives to totalitarianism.

    Then dispensing with the limited government ("non-totalitarian Statist") alternative, because its proponents' reasons for rejecting Hobbes' second thesis are inadequate.
    Galuchat

    Yes, that is what I have done. I have argued that the protections which the non-totalitarian Statist believes constrain the State's power are unfit for purpose.

    My point remains unaddressed.Galuchat

    Perhaps you can formulate more clearly what your objection is, in relation to the arguments I have presented.
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Would there be no public propertyWayfarer

    Anarchy is all about public property. Anarchy is socialism without the state.
  • Galuchat
    808
    My point remains unaddressed.Galuchat

    Perhaps you can formulate more clearly what your objection is, in relation to the arguments I have presented.Virgo Avalytikh

    Feigning ignorance doesn't become you.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178


    No, you must do your own hard work. Formulate your objections clearly and thoroughly, if you want them responded to (which I am happy to do). At least do me that respect - my piece was 4,000 words, and you have taken issue with part of a sentence from its introduction, which is, as I pointed out, a reconstruction of Hobbes. You have suggested that my argument confuses 'authority' with 'authoritarianism', but you have not substantiated this claim. In fact, what I have said is:

    My claim is not that all States are totalitarian, but that there is a tendency towards totalitarianism, such that the checks and balances, to which such confident appeal is typically made, are shown to be unfit for purpose.Virgo Avalytikh

    If you have an objection to this thesis, by all means make it. Maybe I really am ignorant, but it is not yet clear what objection you are trying to make. Please hold your own writing to the same standard that you are holding mine, as is right.
  • ssu
    7.9k
    Everyone of us is a child of our time, so was Thomas Hobbes.
    He lived through the bloodiest time of English history, and was influenced by exciled royalists when writing Leviathan. And was also a teacher to the Prince of Wales, later king Charles II.

    The fact is that events in the real World have an effect in philosophers and their philosophy.
  • Vessuvius
    117

    I see reason to speak of the position occupied by any manner of society as tending toward certain extrema, in the absence of any governmental entity of the abstract, that one may refer to as the 'state', of sufficient influence, to lay claim to the exercise of force, as being permissible, and a right vested thereby, within its own sphere of authority. That is to say, I find merit in the case of your previous assertion, that the whole of a society, needn't collapse unto itself, in the event that those traditional forces which restrict its most instinctive, and primal motivations, come to fade from view. Those residing within its boundaries, may likely recognize the need, and be confronted in the midst of their plight with little else, to adapt, and seek out some means, regardless of nature, or form, to achieve the reestablishment of order, amongst the chaos. Thus, it can be inferred readily, that as man is a subject of the rational, and strives to accord with those decisions which reflect this sentiment, by way of action, when any great disorder within his system of dwelling arises, it is necessary, and represents the most sensible course, to rectify such irregularities, and hopefully, address the heart of the matter, prior to such time as the loss of function becomes irreparable. For which, the medium of exacting such a need as that described, whereby its resolve can be brought to the fore, is cooperation. As it is a trait of our kind to inflict undue hardship, upon others, even our own brethren, it is true also, that the conditions which guide us, retain a purity, in counterbalance to those proclivities which we often entertain, that evince only malice, and entail only greater conflict than before, in their respective outcome(s). When none can hear any longer the cries of the helpless, nor can bear sight to the losses of one's nation, without succumbing themselves to the same agony of which each is an exemplar, all shall grow inclined, to reverse what pattern of social and moral decay has emerged, for the betterment of all. One's lifetime consists of an endless shifting between these states of living; though, perhaps not with the weight in imagery, comparable in magnitude to that which my chosen portrayal thereof, might indicate.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178


    Why are you writing like you're 400 years old? Are you trying to sound like Thomas Hobbes?
  • Vessuvius
    117


    I stand as an aged man before my time.
  • Vessuvius
    117


    In all earnestness my choice of prose serves only as an established preference, in relation to both form, and style. Beyond which, there can be found no other reason to account for that same decision of mine. This is truest when it is acknowledged that to express oneself in such a fashion, seldom lends itself to clarity, as perceived by another. One even has the ground to argue that its effect, is to that end, not merely an hindrance, but wholly detrimental, also.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    This is truest when it is acknowledged that to express oneself in such a fashion, seldom lends itself to clarity, as perceived by another.Vessuvius

    Verily!
  • Vessuvius
    117


    Indeed!

    Let us hope, that all those in observance of this exchange of ours can appreciate the great irony which underlies it.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    Let us hope, that all those in observance of this exchange of ours can appreciate the great irony which underlies it.Vessuvius

    Hold not thy breath.
  • Vessuvius
    117


    Nor yet speak of thy deceit as truth.
  • Vessuvius
    117


    Seeing as I have since grown fatigued((5:31 am)), and would rather not be forced to produce work that fails to concur with a certain idealized standard that I myself strongly feel to be necessary, I must now rest. Though, I will have for some time, the desire to maintain our prevailing dialogue, with respect to those general notions for which it was given, at the outset((however much my favor lies with the ironic, as well)).

    ((The latter likely being a truth to which you can attest, without fault.))

    Good-night((or, perhaps afternoon?)). Und danke frau.


    P.S To clarify the meaning of my previous line of phrase; I am an asthmatic you see, and consequently cannot at all hold my breath, without encountering great discomfort. When I then remarked "Nor yet speak of thy truth as deceit", the implication was that no such deceit can be found, as it is an element that seems almost foreign to your own character ((just as the former feat is to mine)). In either event, I at last recognize how it may have been needed, to provide a depth of context for that sake, beforehand. Oh, irony, what contorted webs of wonder hath thou woven for we!
  • fdrake
    5.8k
    @Virgo Avalytikh

    General question: what kind of markets do you think can exist without governments, and why?

    Quite simply, it is in the interests of the State in toto to maintain and grow the power of the State in toto; it is plausible that the growth of the power and influence of the State involves the growth of all three branches of government.Virgo Avalytikh

    The same analysis would hold for firms. As does this apt (though repurposed) description of firms attempting to obtain and keep market control:

    t will always be in the interests of the larger and more influential political party (firm) to exercise the powers granted by the constitution, and to ignore its limitations as far as is possible. Meanwhile, the weaker and less influential party (firm) will have the opposite incentives, to hold the larger party to obey its restrictions, and to resist and question every exercise of power, whether legitimate or not. The larger party will seek to ignore and flout its restrictions, and the weaker party will seek to uphold them. What will the outcome be? ‘In a contest so unequal,’ says Calhoun, ‘the result would not be doubtful.’ The larger and more powerful party (firm) will tend to be successful in enforcing its own interpretation of the limits placed upon it, and so, over time, there is an inevitable tendency towards a ‘liberalising’ (in a pejorative sense) of the constitution’s interpretation (regulatory principles), and thence to totalitarianism (removal of regulatory principles' efficacy, no democratic influence over aggregate corporate behaviour).Virgo Avalytikh

    And the latter description of the state also applies to a firm which already has disproportionate influence:

    A private firm must continually satisfy its consumers in order to survive; the profit-and-loss system encourages the firm to be hyper-sensitive to the degree to which it effectively satisfies consumer preferences. If a large firm has a commercially poor week or month, it must ask itself what it must do immediately so as to reclaim its customers, who are at liberty to shop elsewhere upon the turn of a dime. The State (approaching monopoly firm), on the other hand, hardly faces such constraints.Virgo Avalytikh

    The war you so aptly characterise between the people and the state is actually fought between the people and state + firms. Money and power go hand in hand; money can transform into political influence, having a very successful firm incentivises exercising what influence you have to get more money; and thereby more power. In that regard, regulatory capture is a shadowy compromise firms make with (market) states through collective action (lobbying, bribery, propaganda, owning school curricula, etc). That is, they do this so that they do not suffer the effects of regulations, and make political action that puts more regulations in place, or allows the regulations which are in place to be more readily enforced, less likely. The ideal situation for the megacorp's profits is no regulation at all. Unfortunately, the regulations are there to protect people (albeit minimally) from firms' behaviour; if your bottom line is profit as a firm, your bottom line isn't the prosperity of those who work for you or buy your products - at least, you can't go from one to another logically without an explanatory circumstance.

    I think a lot of the things you've written are insightful, but going for a misconceived target. You wanna criticise undemocratic centralisation of influence, power and wealth? You also have to take your aim at the market and the self interested behaviour of firms.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    I'm appreciative of your comments.

    General question: what kind of markets do you think can exist without governments, and why?fdrake

    I'm not entirely certain what you mean by 'kinds' of markets. I understand a 'market' to be a process, in which the participants are buyers and sellers of goods and services. I understand markets to be 'free' just in case the exchanges take place by way of peaceful voluntarism rather than by threat or use of force (as in the case of theft, extortion, and so on). If the initiation of force and the invasion of private property are objectionable - and I believe that they are - then the non-existence of the State is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of a free market. So the only way I can think to answer your question is that the kind of market which would exist in the State's absence is, I hope, a free one, in the sense that voluntary exchanges are not interrupted and invaded by an aggressor, however benevolent.

    The same analysis would hold for firms. As does this apt (though repurposed) description of firms attempting to obtain and keep market control:fdrake

    First - and I do not offer this as a rebuttal, but merely as a principle to bear in mind - we must never fall into the trap of thinking that 'States', 'firms', 'corporations' or 'markets' subsist. These are aggregations of individual persons, and it is only these persons who are the real actors, the conscious agents. Neither States nor firms have their own inherent agency. So, ultimately, there are only individuals in act, and these individuals may act with and against one another in two ways: either they may treat with one another peacefully, or else they may initiate force against one another and invade the other's property. Franz Oppenheimer distinguishes these as the two different ways of acquiring resources: the former is the 'economic means' and the latter is the 'political means'. What distinguishes them is that the former leads to mutual benefit, and can, in principle, be multiplied endlessly, whereas the latter is predatory, and benefits the aggressor only at the expense of the aggressed-against.

    Do firms, like States, have an incentive to increase their own power and influence? And, if so, does this mean that firms are fundamentally like States in an important sense? Yes and yes, but only in the sense that firms, like States, are composed of persons, and it is natural for persons to want to increase their own power and influence. It is not as though there is some thing called a State, and some other thing called a firm, and it turns out that these two things are somehow related, like one genus is to another. In the world of purposeful action and incentives, there are only persons, and the similar incentives of the State and of the firm are a function of their being composed of persons.

    So what is the difference between a State and a firm? A State is an agency of monopolised coercion, and a firm is not. To be a Statist is to believe that there is a certain class of persons who may engage in activities which are impermissible for non-governmental agents, and which non-governmental agents ought to be punished for engaging in. Governmental activity has most in common with the activities of those whom we recognise as criminals and criminal organisations. As Murray Rothbard has it, there really are no 'governments'; there are only certain associations of persons who act in a manner that we recognise at 'governmental'. And if we judged their actions as non-governmental, we would see them as criminal.

    Firms, on the other hand, are composed of persons who are subject to the same rules as the rest of us (barring governmental privilege). The firm (the persons comprising it) are making an offer of goods and services, and the consumer may choose whether or not to enter into an exchange with a given firm. To allow the existence of a firm is not to allow that there is a class of persons who may aggress against other persons with impunity. Firms exist (in whatever sense they may be said to exist) on the same continuum of peaceful voluntarism as other behaviours which people ought to have the right to engage in. This is what Robert Nozick's famous Wilt Chamberlain thought-experiment is intended to illustrate.

    And the latter description of the state also applies to a firm which already has disproportionate influence:fdrake

    Firms (some of them) certainly have undue influence in a Statist society. But a firm's 'power' may derive from only two sources: the consumer, and the State. In the absence of the State, the firm must continually serve the wants of consumers in order to survive. There is no question - and this is a point on which Marxists and right-libertarians ought to agree - that there is an unholy and totally corrupting alliance between private industry and the State. The market leaders in a given industry benefit far more from the regulatory power of the State than they would from its absence; the net effect of government regulation is to preserve and entrench the position of the market leaders, by imposing costs which the market leader's competitors are much less equipped to bear. States are the monopolists and bestowers of monopoly privilege par excellence. As I pointed out in my analysis, it is only competition which separates powers.

    The war you so aptly characterise between the people and the state is actually fought between the people and state + firms.fdrake

    So, there is some truth in the above statement, in that those who are in a position to benefit from illicit government privileges have every reason to do so. But I cannot see how firms in general are at war with me. I benefit from the goods and services which they sell me, and they benefit from my patronage. Unless I believe that the goods and services which I purchase are such that I should be furnished with them unconditionally - and I see no reason why that should be the case - there is no war to speak of, here.
  • fdrake
    5.8k
    I'm not entirely certain what you mean by 'kinds' of markets. I understand a 'market' to be a process, in which the participants are buyers and sellers of goods and services. I understand markets to be 'free' just in case the exchanges take place by way of peaceful voluntarism rather than by threat or use of force (as in the case of theft, extortion, and so on). If the initiation of force and the invasion of private property are objectionable - and I believe that they are - then the non-existence of the State is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of a free market. So the only way I can think to answer your question is that the kind of market which would exist in the State's absence is, I hope, a free one, in the sense that voluntary exchanges are not interrupted and invaded by an aggressor, however benevolent.Virgo Avalytikh

    Well, your characterisation of a market is quite limited there. You stipulate under what conditions a market is free, without considering what a market is!

    Markets can have lots of characteristics. They can function through direct barter between producers without currency, they can function almost entirely through currency and so on. The social organisation of the market says a lot about the social organisation of the society. You can reverse this; the social organisation of the society constrains what kind of markets make sense in it. In ours, with a division of labour and few primary producers, you need a general currency. In an economy that runs on infrastructure investment or there are purchases required or promoted that exceed the available funds of economic agents, there needs to be a credit system (as ahistorical as that description is). When you have more monetary value flowing around than all redeemable physical representatives, you need to move away from things like the gold standard to fiat and digital currencies etc etc.

    If you're going to treat markets as independent of states, this is a bit bizarre if states are required for certain market organisations - especially the one we have now globally, no? Markets like ours need banks and laws governing the banks. Markets like ours need trade laws to interface with social institutions. State and market entwine, and have a revolving door staffing policy (at least in the UK and US), firms form alliances with dictators. More on this later...

    I wonder why you leave access control to goods out of the definition of a free market? It's possible, and occurs often, that one simply does not have a choice over where you buy your stuff or get your services from; in the case of large corporate aggregates, or firms that control access to goods like broadband over large areas... This is a soft power of coercion (access control) that a large firms can and do often have now. Such firms get power by the market consolidating money in the hands of those who are successful and shining out competitors when there are access controls in place (EG, a company owns an IP on a necessary invention or has exclusive extraction rights on a natural resource). They need a lot of money to own the IP or the infrastructure required, which makes wealth concentrate more. A person can't just start a new competitor company; "Yes, gas is too expensive, I'll start my own oil rig!".

    It's extremely likely that there would be companies with such power without enforceable regulatory principles; there are already regulations in place and companies skirt them as much as possible.

    First - and I do not offer this as a rebuttal, but merely as a principle to bear in mind - we must never fall into the trap of thinking that 'States', 'firms', 'corporations' or 'markets' subsist. These are aggregations of individual persons, and it is only these persons who are the real actors, the conscious agents. Neither States nor firms have their own inherent agency.Virgo Avalytikh

    This is extremely strange, as corporations and states have their own independent agency. A politician can sign a treaty for a country which effects all citizens, a state can limit the workday hours for all workers. Picking up the thread of markets being social forms that emerge from aggregates of people; more generally, aggregates of economic agents have both emergent effects and create institutions which act on the aggregate level; legal systems, healthcare rights, tax breaks, citizenship rights, immigration controls...

    The individual agents that make up institutions can exercise the powers those institutions are endowed with. Like, say, the global tobacco lobby, establishing the UK foreign territories as a global tax haven, starting wars, doing... everything people do together. Social institutions play a vital role in the analysis of anything economic; markets are social institutions, aggregates of people make institutions like lobbying groups and firms, which can have powers (and interests!) different from the interests of those in the social institutions!

    Firms exist (in whatever sense they may be said to exist) on the same continuum of peaceful voluntarism as other behaviours which people ought to have the right to engage in.Virgo Avalytikh

    This is just wrong; real companies can and do have institutional powers not reducible to the individual powers of their agents (only an aggregate can have laws). Real companies have both a legal existence separate from their individuals (see that giant building in the Cayman Islands which is the site of >90 international companies' home bases), resource access that empowers them beyond the level of their individuals, and vectors of power that allow them to leverage the resources they have to their ends (lobbying, bribery, trade deals, ownership rights on IP etc).

    Also in the real world, people must work otherwise we don't eat. In general, this involves selling one's labour to a company in exchange for a wage. Obeying the dictates of the company becomes a necessity for getting food in your mouth and a roof over your head. Anyone who's ever had a performance review has felt the sheer power that firms have over their lives; they are not innocent, and cannot be understood as just a group of individuals; the manager who has to enforce an enforced redundancy decision is also just doing their job. The upper management are just doing their thing to increase the profits of the company and keep it going. Companies have a real existence and interests separate from their workers, separate from their shareholders and especially different from their stakeholders and staff (global oil, petrochemical and industrial agriculture vs climate change anyone? Tobacco companies vs the terrible impacts of smoking on health?)

    So, there is some truth in the above statement, in that those who are in a position to benefit from illicit government privileges have every reason to do so. But I cannot see how firms in general are at war with me. I benefit from the goods and services which they sell me, and they benefit from my patronage. Unless I believe that the goods and services which I purchase are such that I should be furnished with them unconditionally - and I see no reason why that should be the case - there is no war to speak of, here.Virgo Avalytikh

    You might think differently if you were on another end of the supply chain; maybe if your workplace had installed suicide nets and window bars to make sure that anyone thinking of throwing themselves out of the window to escape the terror of their day to day factory experience you would see that malevolence towards your staff is fully consistent with the bottom line of your target demographic. The government interferes and demands the company installs the nets, truly a humanitarian intervention.
  • Virgo Avalytikh
    178
    Well, your characterisation of a market is quite limited there. You stipulate under what conditions a market is free, without considering what a market is!fdrake

    Well, it’s not true that I have not considered what a market is; I just wasn’t certain exactly what you intended by your question. One reason for this is that I do not offer, and should not be thought as offering, a structural vision, or a set of principles for ‘social organisation’. I may make predications about what a market might look like in the absence of the State (I strongly suspect that there would be currency, for example), but it is not my place to dictate what the aggregation of peaceful activity between persons ought to look like. That would be quite illiberal of me, and therefore contrary to my own principles.

    If you're going to treat markets as independent of states, this is a bit bizarre if states are required for certain market organisations - especially the one we have now globally, no? Markets like ours need banks and laws governing the banks. Markets like ours need trade laws to interface with social institutions. State and market entwine, and have a revolving door staffing policy (at least in the UK and US), firms form alliances with dictators. More on this later...fdrake

    If there is some way that a market might work, such that it is dependent upon the existence of the State in order to work that way, then obviously it would not work in that way in the absence of the State. But I don’t see this as particularly problematic. It’s true that the markets of our acquaintance are intimitely involved with the State, but that does not imply that a market is eo ipso dependent upon the existence of a State – which it is not.

    I wonder why you leave access control to goods out of the definition of a free market?fdrake

    I do, mainly because the ingredients of a market – private property, exchange, prices, and so on – are, in part, rationing mechanisms, and the reason why such mechanisms are necessary is because we live in a world of scarce resources. It is precisely this fact of scarcity which means that there cannot be an unqualified right of ‘access’ to such a resource. ‘Freedom’, like so many of the foundational concepts in political philosophy, is rather nebulous and can potentially mean almost anything. What would ‘free access’ to a scarce resource even look like? If the resource is scarce, then it is literally impossible for everyone to have unbounded access to it. Not that you are suggesting such a thing. But this does mean that the ‘freedom’ of a ‘free’ market must be tied to something rather more definitive; namely, private property rights. Hence why the ‘freedom’ of the market consists in the non-invasion of property.

    (EG, a company owns an IP on a necessary invention or has exclusive extraction rights on a natural resource).fdrake

    Does IP mean intellectual property? If so, I would point out that ideas – the stuff of intellectual property – are non-scarce resources, and treating them as though they need to be rationed is a Statist phenomenon. Patents are, in effect, government-granted monopoly licences, not free-market phenomena. Also, exclusive extraction rights – rights bestowed by whom? Again, this sounds like we are talking about a State franchise. As I mentioned, the State is the pre-eminent bestower of monopoly privilege.

    If I understand you, you are arguing that a service-provider is (softly) coercive, if it is practically difficult to patronise a competitor. I suppose the problematic issue is the vagueness of ‘soft coercion’. Either the firm is invading your property, or it isn’t. If you believe that you have an unconditional claim to, e.g., oil, then the firm is violating your property rights by neglecting to furnish you with it. If, more plausibly, you do not have an unconditional claim to the oil, then your having to pay the price they want for it is not coercive. Since one cannot have an unconditional right to a scarce resource (for this would imply that everyone be able to exploit endlessly a resource which literally cannot be exploited endlessly), private firms, I suggest, are straightforwardly non-coercive.

    This is just wrong; real companies can and do have institutional powers not reducible to the individual powers of their agents (only an aggregate can have laws).fdrake

    Our sticking point seems to be an ontological one: whether collectives of persons have their own inherent agency, above and beyond the agency of the individual persons which comprise them. Quite simply, individuals are persons; groups are not. Sometimes, we might speak of groups as though they were an organism with their own inherent capacity to act, but this is non-literal. The Greeks called this linguistic phenomenon synecdoche, the improper predication of a property of a part to the whole. We do this in sport, when we say ‘Portugal has scored a goal’ when in fact it is not true that a country has kicked a ball into a net. Or we might say of a woman that she is ‘blonde’, when in fact it is only a principal part, her hair, that is blonde (her entire body is not simply and unqualifiedly blonde). And we do this with human collectives, too: ‘Germany is in talks with Spain’ (this might be two people talking in a room), ‘The country is mourning the death of its monarch’ (persons mourn, countries do not).

    The examples you provide are not counter-instances to this ontological insight. Certainly, multiple persons might act jointly, and their actions might affect lots of other persons. But this does not imply that a collective is a subsistent entity in its own right. To illustrate, my scrabble club has 4 members (one day we will take over the world), but every Wednesday we engage in collective, collaborate activity with one another (playing scrabble). So we may say, ‘That scrabble club is playing scrabble’. And this is true, in a sense. But the thing we designate as a ‘scrabble club’ is not some fifth thing, subsisting, acting, desiring, intending, over and above the four members.

    So, this, which is true . . .

    Also in the real world, people must work otherwise we don't eat. In general, this involves selling one's labour to a company in exchange for a wage. Obeying the dictates of the company becomes a necessity for getting food in your mouth and a roof over your head.fdrake

    . . . does not logically imply this, which is not . . .

    Companies have a real existence and interests separate from their workers, separate from their shareholders and especially different from their stakeholders and stafffdrake

    You might think differently if you were on another end of the supply chainfdrake

    Perhaps I would; but, then again, this is not really an argument.
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