When he talks about the accessibility relation R (p. 4), he says that a world H2 is accessible to H1 if every proposition A that is true in H2 is possible in H1. But then he defines a proposition A is possible in the world H1 iff there is a world H2, accessible to H1, in which A is true. But isn't this circular? In order to understand what the accessibility relation means, I need to know what it means a proposition be possible, but to understand what means a proposition be possible, I need to know what the accessibility relation means. — Nicholas Ferreira
The whole point is that Kripke explains it in terms of a concept (accessibility) which requires the notion of possibility to be understood, which seems to be circular. — Nicholas Ferreira
Well, I don't think I've conflated accessible and possible, for me it's very clear the difference, and I agree with everything you said. But I still cannot understand exactly how this two terms are to be formally expressed without requiring one another. — Nicholas Ferreira
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