In other words, I submit that the perceptual objects (which are after-the-fact constructions of the causes of the given sensations by the brain) are merely “purported” causes of the sensations because we can never be certain that the brain’s spontaneously constructed perceptual objects (BSCPOs) actually coincide with the “real” cause(s) of the subjective sensations, which cause(s) would necessarily have “predated” the brain’s act of spontaneous construction. — charles ferraro

Arguably the BSCPOs never coincide with the "real" causes. The brain constructed tree never is the tree itself.

More to the point, these models were either intended to be accounts of how the machine actually worked, or were intended to serve some purpose, as if to say, if it worked this way, then....

I am supposing that none of these, whether Kant or Schopenhauer or anyone else, supposed they were doing biology. I suspect they were trying to find a way to reconcile a theory of knowledge with what seemed to them to make sense, in the way of being consistent with, such observations as they could themselves make - call it a kind of reverse engineering from the thinking about thinking, to what must be true about the thinking for the thinking about thinking to make sense. I will accept correction on this.

Or, that is, the real value lies in the conclusions in the central part of their respective systems and what they're worth today. Either it's worthwhile today, or it's merely a piece of history, valuable as knowledge of history, as the value of alchemy is nothing to the modern chemist, but something to the historian of science. Sense?

we can never be certain that the brain’s spontaneously constructed perceptual objects actually coincide with the “real” cause(s) of the subjective sensations, which cause(s) would necessarily have “predated” the brain’s act of spontaneous construction. — charles ferraro

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I haven't read an awful lot of Kant, but wouldn't he consider subjective sensations to be intuitions?
Intuitions would be the things in themselves that we can never have direct access to. However, our scientific constructions(based on constructions of perceptual and conceptual objects) can assymptotically approach the truths of the real world as a limit.

Fast forward to present day neuroscience and find your answer.

I certainly expect present day neuroscience to continue to provide us with more precise detailed descriptions/explanations of the myriad complex ways in which the human brain processes subjective sensations into perceived phenomenal objects and perceived phenomenal states-of-affairs; but no matter how successful neuroscience may be, and continues to be, in this regard, it will, I think, still not be able to describe/explain where the subjective sensations come from (their originating source) before they undergo neuro-cognitive processing.

We do NOT know if the BSCPO's NEVER coincide with the "real" causes. We are, in fact, unfortunately unable to determine, with certitude, if the BSCPO's actually coincide with, or are accurate renditions of, the "real" cause(s) of the subjective sensations which comprised the BSCPO's. For all we know, the brain constructed tree may, or may not, be an accurate rendition of the real cause of the subjective sensations of which it is comprised. Explain to me, please, with specificity, how those "doing biology" today are superior with regard to ascertaining the originating source of human sensations when compared to these so-called alchemists.

Arthur Schopenhauer claimed that the human brain (the understanding) — charles ferraro

Notice the implicit materialist presupposition here in the equation of ‘brain’ and ‘understanding’. This also underlies the presumption that the ‘real causes’ are presumably neurobiological. Would that be corrrect?

For Kant, space and time were pure a priori intuitions and the manifold of sensations were a posteriori intuitions to which space and time were applied. The things-in-themselves would be the originating source(s) of the a posteriori sensations BEFORE being processed spatially and temporally.

Yes, it would! But who the hell knows where the unprocessed sensations come from in the first place? The processing of said sensations is certainly by the human brain (materialistic), but who knows what the nature of the originating source of the pre-processed sensations might be.

I like Aristotle for marveling that a translation was made at all (especially in De Anima). His confidence that it conveys something essential is based upon it having happened.
To imagine the process is meant to fool people is not the same thing as wondering what gets lost in translation.

I will let Schopenhauer address the point:

Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things, Veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it ; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemistry, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility — that is knowledge — which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result — knowledge, which it reached so laboriously — was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought 'matter', we really thought only 'the subject that perceives matter'; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Munchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs.

The World as Idea

I think you misunderstand me! My question could care less about the materialist/idealist dispute. In fact, personally, as a matter of record, I agree with Schopenhauer. But please explain to me what any of this has to do with explaining the originating source of human (under the skin) sensations.

But please explain to me what any of this has to do with explaining the originating source of human (under the skin) sensations. — charles ferraro

But, what kind of explanation are you seeking? I had assumed that with your references to 'brain' and 'under the skin' that you're looking for a neuro-physiological explanation. Are you not?

Not necessarily. I am seeking any explanation that works. See my response to I LIKE SUSHI.

However, neither Schopenhauer, nor Kant, ever attempted to explain where the body’s subjective sensations came from in the first place; i.e., what the nature of their originating source might have been prior to the brain’s construction of the perceptual objects out of them. — charles ferraro

Actually, I think you're mistaken in that regard. Schopenhauer has quite a lot to say about the brain, and had a particular interest in optics. Kant likewise was quite well informed scientifically and lectured in science as well as philosophy. So the general question is addressed in Schopenhauer, in terms of the way the human brain interprets stimuli. He's not interested in the physiological details, but an analysis in terms of will and idea, which he takes as being the fundamental constituents of human reality.

So again, if you're not looking for a neuro-physiological account, I'm not clear on what you're actually asking.

Yes, Schopenhauer certainly had quite a lot to say about how the brain processed sensations (he did not use the term stimuli), especially visual sensations, into empirical objects, but where did he, or Kant, have a lot to say about WHERE THE SENSATIONS CAME FROM BEFORE THEY WERE PROCESSED BY THE BRAIN INTO EMPIRICAL OBJECTS. Kant speaks of the manifold of sensation as "being given." And this is as detailed as he got.

where did he, or Kant, have a lot to say about WHERE THE SENSATIONS CAME FROM BEFORE THEY WERE PROCESSED BY THE BRAIN INTO EMPIRICAL OBJECTS. — charles ferraro

Merleau-Ponty may be more help here than Kant or Schopenhauer.
Sensations, stimuli don't 'come from' an outside, nor do they originate in an inside. THey only exist as an interplay between the two, as an interactive coupling in which what constitutes body and world are mutaally determined.

"We cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which "interprets," "deciphers," or "orders" a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses. Matter is "preg-nant" with its form, which is to say that in the final analysis every perception takes place within a certain horizon and ultimately in the "world." We experience a perception and its horizon "in action" rather than by "posing" them or explicitly "knowing" them. Finally the quasi-organic relation of the perceiving subject and the world involves, in principle, the contradiction of immanence and tran-scendence.'

Francisco Varela, a student of Merleau-Ponty's approach , developed his enactive approach out of it.

"The central concern of the enactivist position in a perceiver-depdendent world stands in contradistinction to the received view that perception is fundamentally the truthful reconstruction of a portion of the physical world through a registering of existing environmental information. in the enactive approach reality is not a given:it is perceiver-dependent, not becasue the perceiver "constructs" it as he or she pleases, but becasue what counts as a relevant world is inseparable from the structure of the perceiver."

Very interesting alternative approach to addressing the issue, precisely because it questions a basic assumption of the accepted epistemological paradigm; viz., that elemental, primordial sensations exist first in a state of isolation and are subsequently synthesized, integrated, or constructed by the perceiving subject into empirical objects that comprise the world.

If you reference a prior discussion of mine on this Forum entitled "Is the Foundation of British Empiricism Sensible?" you'll see that I, too, in my own way questioned the legitimacy of the basic assumption of isolated primordial sensations.

The brain is also part of the construction of reality, and, if you have doubts about reality, you must have doubts about the brain because it’s part of it.

I believe you're missing my main point which is as follows:

Schopenhauer claimed that the human Understanding (the brain) spontaneously applied the Principle of Cause and Effect to human sensations.

The fundamental assumption was that it was possible for the human Understanding to spontaneously construct a veridical cause (the empirical object) out of the isolated, non-synthesized sensations (the effects).

But, then, the question arises as to what the originating source of the isolated sensations is before the brain constructs the empirical object out of them?

In other words, how can we verify that the cause of the isolated sensations before the brain constructs the empirical object out of them is identical to the cause of the isolated sensations after the brain constructs the empirical object out of them?

Thgyhjm

This is because our other senses e.g touch and hearing give parallel evidence, and because the testimony of others gives parallel evidence (strengthened by our allowing for their experience to be different), plus all previous scholarship.

Young says things are projective, namely out there and in our heads at the same time. From the Varela quote I get that we humans are built as part of what is to be perceived, in order to perceive what is to be perceived.

Just as I knew when I was a kid but then that was just me.

We do NOT know if the BSCPO's NEVER coincide with the "real" causes. — charles ferraro

I seem to have missed this reply - sorry!

Of course we do! At the same time we need a whole raft of definitions, absent which we'll be like two duelists dueling blindfolded in the dark in different rooms.

What do think "perceptual object" means? And "coincide" and "real cause" and even "real" and "cause"?

I buy Kant as conceding practical knowledge all day long. That buries at once and for all times any questions about seeing trees. But we can still ask about the entire process in non-practical terms. And even at the first cut it's obvious that you never did, never have, and never will see any tree whatsoever, ever. To understand that you need merely, at the simplest level, think about the function of light in seeing.

As to progress in neuro-chemistry and biology since Kant or Schopenhauer's time, I assume there has been some - even a lot. But even with that I don't think they answer the basic how - or even if they can or are trying to. It is in some way a seeming ultimate question - that kind of question that drives from afar, and is never answered but restates itself always to be beyond the lights of the respective science.

I certainly expect present day neuroscience to continue to provide us with more precise detailed descriptions/explanations of the myriad complex ways in which the human brain processes subjective sensations into perceived phenomenal objects and perceived phenomenal states-of-affairs; but no matter how successful neuroscience may be, and continues to be, in this regard, it will, I think, still not be able to describe/explain where the subjective sensations come from (their originating source) before they undergo neuro-cognitive processing. — charles ferraro

This is what's called "the hard problem of consciousness." It is discussed here often. I checked, there are currently three or four active threads where it is being discussed. No reason we can't do it here too.

Faced with the two possibilities of:

(1) the human brain (the understanding) spontaneously constructs perceptual objects

and

(2) the human brain (the understanding) does not spontaneously construct perceptual objects

What are the reasons that we'd believe one over the other?

Or, phrasing it somewhat differently, what are the reasons why we'd believe the epistemology of Schopenhauer over the epistemology of Sartre?

Also, isn't it interesting how we have to resort to BELIEVING, or NOT BELIEVING, in the truth of epistemologies, rather than relying, instead, on the possibility of empirically verifying them, or not? We know the empirical reasons why we believe that Einstein's theories are "truer" than Newton's.

Also, isn't it interesting how we have to resort to BELIEVING, or NOT BELIEVING, in the truth of epistemologies, rather than relying, instead, on the possibility of empirically verifying them, or not? We know the empirical reasons why we believe that Einstein's theories are "truer" than Newton's. — charles ferraro

Hopefully empirical evidence has some bearing on why you'd believe one over the other.

This is the inherent weakness that attaches to all philosophical theories, no matter how marvelously they may have been constructed. Beautiful theories all destined to go nowhere. Dead ending because the truth of their hypotheses is not subject to the possibility of any empirical verification.

"When and while I think in the first person, present tense mode, I must necessarily exist."

Question: Can this famous Cartesian epistemological hypothesis be empirically verified?

The answer, I submit, is yes. However, with the peculiar proviso that the empirical verification (thought experiment/thought act) that occurs must always remain subjective and personal, rather than objective and public.

This is the inherent weakness that attaches to all philosophical theories, no matter how marvelously they may have been constructed. Beautiful theories all destined to go nowhere. Dead ending because the truth of their hypotheses is not subject to the possibility of any empirical verification. — charles ferraro

I would be interested in arguing in the negative; against what I take the above to mean - on it's face.

Some philosophical theories are falsifiable/verifiable, are they not? Seems to me that they most certainly can be. Most aren't, but I digress...

I mean, I argue - mostly - along the lines of Ockham's razor and methodological naturalism.

My own theory of mind is quite verifiable/falsifiable.

Science have one of those?