Asked and answered.

I suppose the answer could reduce to…space is comprehensible, perception of space is not. Hence, the difference.

Asked and answered. — Mww

n so far as space is merely itself a representation, and perception of representations is impossible, perception of space is incomprehensible. — Mww

If space is incomprehensible / impossible to perceive, then how is it possible to perceive the objects in it? Isn't perception of space necessarily deduced in the perception of objects? Surely that is what Kant meant by space and time are necessary a priori condition for appearance.

To believe in something that is not the case is a groundless belief or fallacies, but not an illusion. — Corvus

I believe "I saw an Ichthyocentaur in the garden". I reason that my belief was groundless.

Could I then not say "I was suffering an illusion"?

I believe "I saw an Ichthyocentaur in the garden". I reason that my belief was groundless.

Could I then not say "I was suffering an illusion"? — RussellA

Suffering sounds like from "illness" or "pain". No.
You were having a groundless belief, and your reason confirmed it as a groundless belief.

If space is incomprehensible….. — Corvus

It isn’t.

Isn't perception of space necessarily deducted in the perception of objects? — Corvus

No. The objective validity of that which relates the objects as separate from the perceiver, or as separate from each other, is deduced from perception of objects.

Deduction is a logical function; perception is a physiological activity. They do not relate to each other. A logical object cannot be perceived, a perceptible object has no need of being deduced.

If space is incomprehensible…..
— Corvus

It isn’t. — Mww

Sorry I thought you were claiming that space is incomprehensible.

No. The objective validity of that which relates the objects as separate from the perceiver, or as separate from each other, is deduced from perception of objects. — Mww

Were we not talking about perception of space? My point was that you cannot perceive objects without perceiving space. Space is presupposed in the perception of the objects. It follows that space or perception of space cannot be illusion, be transcendental or empirical.

All living things, from the very simplest, display intentional behaviours and perform tasks which mechanical devices do not — Wayfarer

We could be biological machines. Why should the philosophical doctrine of Determinism not be valid?

But by 'transcending the biological' I mean h. sapiens has capacities and abilities which are beyond those biological functions, amazing though they might be. — Wayfarer

Humans only discovered how to fly 120 years ago. How do we know that in another 120 years humans won't be able to explain our capacities and abilities in terms of our biological functions?

But I see that as reductionist - it reduces culture to a utility in the service of reproduction, or a by-product of it, rather than having an intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer

I agree that it may be distasteful to think that humans can be reduced to products of mindless evolution, but does this necessarily mean that this is not the case?

man 'the rational animal' is able to grasp through reason principles that are not perceptible to the senses alone — Wayfarer

Is this comparable to a mechanical logic gate which can make decisions based on what is input?

For example, time and space are transcendental ideas; they are not derived from experience but are the necessary conditions under which any sensory experience can occur — Wayfarer

Perhaps what are described as transcendental ideas have derived from the experience of evolving in synergy with the world for more than 3.7 billion years?

For instance, the concept of God, the soul, or the totality of the universe are transcendent ideas because they are beyond the scope of empirical investigation and human comprehension. — Wayfarer

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it?

Suffering sounds like from "illness" or "pain". No. You were having a groundless belief, and your reason confirmed it as a groundless belief. — Corvus

I always suffer when my beliefs turn out to be groundless.

I always suffer when my beliefs turn out to be groundless. — RussellA

That sounds like psychological not epistemological. :nerd:

Space is presupposed in the perception of the objects. — Corvus

Yes, but to presuppose is to deduce, it is not to perceive.

My point was that you cannot perceive objects without perceiving space. — Corvus

Then you must grant that space can affect the senses in the same manner as objects, which reduces to the necessity that space must have properties. At which point, upon determining that space cannot have properties, insofar as there is no possibility of space appearing to you as an object, you’ve contradicted yourself.

Yes, but to presuppose is to deduce, it is not to perceive. — Mww

Presupposition is condition, not to deduce.

Then you must grant that space can affect the senses in the same manner as objects, which reduces to the necessity that space must have properties. At which point, upon determining that space cannot have properties, insofar as there is no possibility of space appearing to you as an object, — Mww

Yes, isn't it what exactly Kant was pointing out? Space is a necessary precondition for appearance of objects in TI. But it is also an object of perception in material empiricism. (according to Antinomy of Pure Reason).

Space has both aspects of being a priori condition for perception as well as physical object. Space as object has its physical properties.

"Dimensions: Space is typically described in terms of three spatial dimensions (length, width, and height). In the context of spacetime in relativity, time is considered a fourth dimension.

Curvature: The curvature of space is a fundamental concept in Einstein's theory of General Relativity. Massive objects, like stars and planets, curve the fabric of spacetime around them, influencing the motion of other objects.

Expansion: The universe itself is expanding. Galaxies are moving away from each other over time, indicating that the fabric of space is stretching. This expansion is a key feature of the Big Bang theory.

Gravity: Space is influenced by gravity, and gravity is often described as the warping or curvature of spacetime caused by mass. Objects with mass, like planets and stars, influence the geometry of space around them.

Vacuum Energy: Even in seemingly empty space, there is a concept known as vacuum energy or dark energy. This is a mysterious form of energy that is thought to be responsible for the observed acceleration of the expansion of the universe." - ChatGPT notes

Yes, isn't what exactly Kant was pointing out? — Corvus

What….that reason can do pretty much whatever it wants? Sure, but then what?

Space as object has its physical properties. — Corvus

Not in CPR, is doesn’t.
(Glances up at thread title)

What….that reason can do pretty much whatever it wants? Sure, but then what? — Mww

Reason deals with both aspect of space as implied in Antinomy of Pure Reason in CPR.

Not in CPR, is doesn’t.
(Glances up at thread title) — Mww

Wouldn't it be better reading between the lines at times where it appears inconsistent and vague, rather than reading the word by word? :)
When there are Phenomenon and Noumenon in his system, he cannot possibly live with space and time as a priori intuition only. Objects and the world are existing in space and time as physical existence in front of him.

Not from my point of view. That something appears inconsistent and vague may be my fault, in which case reading between the lines just shirks the responsibility of doing a better job.

"It will be evident that what we here desire to say is that empty
space, so far as it is limited by appearances, that is, empty space
within the world, is at least not contradictory of transcendental
principles and may therefore, so far as they are concerned, be
admitted. " CPR B461 :)

Ok. Nothing untoward about that. It’s a footnote, and says nothing about perception of space or that space can be an appearance. It just says space with nothing in it is a valid conception, re: non-contradictory. In addition, the last sentence of the footnote warns that just granting the non-contradictory nature of the admission does not imply the possibility of the idea the antithetical argument presents. And in fact, the argument in the thesis denies such possibility.

Think….empty bucket. That the bucket itself encloses a space, and that enclosed space presents to sensibility no appearance, but without which that things could be put in the bucket that would be appearances, becomes impossible.

You’ve presented an antinomy justifying the antithesis of an idea. My response is merely a further counter-claim extending from the thesis of that idea.

Reason doing its thing, only this time from two different intellects, one on each side, rather than one intellect merely confusing itself by taking both sides. Or, maybe not being persuaded by one over the other.

But how can my concept of a Thing-in-Itself be more than just its appearance, if by definition it is impossible to conceptualise a Thing-in-Itself outside of its appearance? — RussellA

I think you need to step back and try to re-focus on the basis of this debate. It is that the mind is not a blank slate which passively receives impressions from the world, but an active agent that dynamically constructs the experience of the world ('the world'). The human brain is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science. It works on many levels, from the autonomic, parasympathetic to the unconscious, subconscious and conscious levels (and beyond!) I'll mention again a recent book on cognitive science and philosophy, Mind and the Cosmic Order, by Charles Pinter, which makes the case in the light of current science. I give some details in my OP Mind-Created World.

But the thing is, we can't see that process from the outside. We can't objectify the process, because it is the basis on which objectivity works - it is the process that creates both the object and the subject. And we also can't get outside it in the other sense of seeing the world as it would be in the absence of consciousness. (Yogis and mystics 'go beyond' but I'll leave that aside here).

To put it in one of the quotes I read on this forum (I've since read the book it came from):

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned. — Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, Dan Zahavi

There is quite a bit of discussion about this idea in current culture, see for example this video Is Reality Real? I'm not endorsing everything in it, but it shows at least how even neuroscience tends to undermine scientific realism is asking these questions.

We could be biological machines. — RussellA

It's an invalid metaphor, as organisms display fundamental characteristics which machines do not. Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions. Organisms do not conform to that description and besides are not created by an external agency to serve a purpose. The mechanist analogy is a hangover from early modern science.

I agree that it may be distasteful to think that humans can be reduced to products of mindless evolution, but does this necessarily mean that this is not the case? — RussellA

That is part of a much larger argument. My view is that the idea of mindless nature is specific to a particular phase of cultural development which was dominant in the late modern period, but which I believe is falling from favour.

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it? — RussellA

Kant would say that it's because the mind has a tendency to seek answers to unanswerable questions.

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it? — RussellA

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation. IN altered states, things become comprehensible which are not in normal waking consciousness. The reality of those things (as with a soul) are up in the air, or perhaps leaned-against. But there are concepts such as the 'soul' or a clear conception (at a very base level) of something 'unimaginable' that don't inspire typical incredulity or awe in those mind states. Being and not being do not always appear contradictory in those states.

We know very little about them and their function. My policy has been, and remains to wait until far more work has been done into the nature of the mind and its, hitherto almost ignored functionality, before making any sweeping statements of the kind made in the 18th and 19th (or even 20th) centuries about them. Without a systematic consideration of that which we know apply, but don't yet understand it seems a bit premature to posit absolutes about the ability to perceive/conceive certain things.

You’ve presented an antinomy justifying the antithesis of an idea. My response is merely a further counter-claim extending from the thesis of that idea. — Mww

There are more quotes from CPR suggesting that Kant had the dual perspectives on the concept of Space. By the way, this quote is not from the antinomy.

"If, now, I add the condition to the concept, and say that all things, as outer appearances, are side by side in space, the rule is valid universally and without limitation. Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object, but also at the same time the ideality of space in respect of things when they are considered in themselves through reason, that is without regard to the constitution of our sensibility." - CPR B44/A28

" .... We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience; and yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality-"

Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object — Corvus

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago.

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago. — Mww

No it doesn't. I make no comment on what you're actually saying/trying to say or whether interpretation is an issue - but it certainly did not sound like that.

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation. IN altered states, things become comprehensible which are not in normal waking consciousness. — AmadeusD

By "approximation", do you mean that the "soul" can be understood as a figure of speech such as "gravity" can be understood as a figure of speech?

It is that the mind is not a blank slate which passively receives impressions from the world, but an active agent that dynamically constructs the experience of the world ('the world'). — Wayfarer

:up: I think that Kant would agree.
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But the thing is, we can't see that process from the outside. — Wayfarer

:up: Yes, as an Indirect Realist, I would agree with both Dan Zahavi, who wrote "The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned" and Beau Lotto who said "Is there an external reality. Of course there is an external reality , the world exists, it's just that we don't see it as it is. We can never see it as it is".

If Kant had had the technology in 1781, he could have created the 2021 YouTube video Is reality real? These neuroscientists don’t think so.
==============================================================================

It's an invalid metaphor, as organisms display fundamental characteristics which machines do not. Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions. — Wayfarer

Where does Kant's "a priori" come from?

Yes, machines are built by external agents, ie, humans.

But it seems equally the case that humans have been "built" by an external agent, ie, the world in which they live, the world in which they have evolved and the world in which they have to survive or be wiped out. Not consciously built, but built nevertheless by the situation it finds itself. In the same way that sand dunes have been "built" by the wind acting on the particles of sand, a process of Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.

As the SEP article on Embodied Cognition writes
Unifying investigators of embodied cognition is the idea that the body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition in ways that require a new framework for its investigation.

As the Wikipedia article on Enactivism writes
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment
===============================================================================

My view is that the idea of mindless nature is specific to a particular phase of cultural development which was dominant in the late modern period, but which I believe is falling from favour. — Wayfarer

If nature isn't mindless, what kind of mind do you envisage nature having?
===============================================================================

Kant would say that it's because the mind has a tendency to seek answers to unanswerable questions. — Wayfarer

Isn't this a lost cause, answering the unanswerable?

But it seems equally the case that humans have been "built" by an external agent — RussellA

As soon as you have to enclose the key word in scare quotes, it's game over ;-)

Unifying investigators of embodied cognition is the idea that the body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition in ways that require a new framework for its investigation - SEP — RussellA

'New' in comparison to what, do you think?

If nature isn't mindless, what kind of mind do you envisage nature having? — RussellA

The kind that manifests where living organisms appear.

Isn't this a lost cause, answering the unanswerable? — RussellA

It can be, but I still find the term 'soul' meaningful, although it's notoriously difficult to define such terms. The Aristotelian approach of the soul being the form of the body - note that 'form' is nothing like 'shape', more like 'organising principle' - rings true to me.

As soon as you have to enclose the key word in scare quotes, it's game over — Wayfarer

Machines are built by an external agents, who happen to be conscious humans. Humans are built by an external agent, which happens to be an unconscious world.

The Merriam Webster definition of "build" as "to form by ordering and uniting materials by gradual means into a composite whole" doesn't refer to the cause as being either conscious or unconscious.
===============================================================================

'New' in comparison to what, do you think? — Wayfarer

New in comparison to traditional cognitive science, which conceived of the brain as the source of all cognitive mental processes, rather than the brain being just a part of a body that interacts with its environment.

Still not buying the idea of 'build'. But agree with the re-definition according to enactivism.

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago. — Mww

I read the other translation copies of CPR, and they all seem to be saying the same thing.
When you are seeing a tree in the garden, that is perception via your sensibility.  The tree is seen out there in the world, and space is also in the world.  You see the tree in the external world, but you cannot say that space is in your mind (which you have been saying). That doesn't add up.

But when you are doing Geometry, you think about a triangle. The triangle is in your mind i.e. intuition. You cannot think about the triangle in your intuition without space for it. The space in this case is in your mind, as a necessary a priori condition.

So, Kant was not simply saying that all space is internal and necessary a priori condition for all perception.

Rather, he had two cases of explanation for space to be both in the world externally for the sensibility perception, and also space as internal necessary a priori condition for intuition when performing Geometry proofs, or imagining a postbox on the street in your mind.

Still not buying the idea of 'build'. — Wayfarer

The word "build" is intended more as a figure of speech than literally.

In fact, when you wrote "Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions", your word "built" was also intended more as a figure of speech than literally, as many machines are in fact built by other machines, as in a car factory.

Your word "built" inferred the figurative meaning "consciously designed" rather than the literal meaning "physically built".

The same for Kant, in that the term "Transcendental Idealism" should also be considered as a figure of speech rather than literally.

he had two cases of explanation for space….. — Corvus

Yes, he did. One was the transcendental exposition, the other the metaphysical exposition. The former concerns objects thought, re: your example regarding mere geometric figures, the latter objects perceived, re: your example of seeing the tree. Both expositions restrict space to the mind, or, as I prefer, the condition of the subject, and can only be attributed as external to the subject, iff it is a property of things-in-themselves, which, of course, cannot be determined as being the case.

So, Kant was not simply saying that all space is internal and necessary a priori condition for all perception. — Corvus

Sorry, but I cannot find a justification that it isn’t exactly that. In other words, I find that is precisely what he’s saying. And not only that with respect to perception, but indeed, because the space in which the extension of things occurs cannot be thought away as can all its properties, it absolutely must reside in the subject himself.

Guess you didn’t think about the empty bucket, huh? I was kinda looking forward to your account of what kind of sensation you got from its apparent emptiness.

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago.
— Mww

No it doesn't. — AmadeusD

Hmmmm……

He said Kant said: Our exposition therefore establishes (…) the objective validity…
I said: The objective validity (…) is deduced
He said Kant said: …..presented to us outwardly as object….
I said: …..relates the objects as separate from the perceiver.

You’re quite correct; my fault. The pressure waves corresponding to the sounds of these two sets of words would be somewhat different.

Still, isn’t somewhat different synonymous with pretty much the same?

Jeeezz….and I thought I was the last remaining fundamental literalist in the generation infamous for them.