It seems really, really clear that most thinkers consider the thing-in-itself noumenal. Can you help me understand how this is the case, with Noumena/on being different from the thing-in-itself? It is just Kant being annoying and confusing"? — AmadeusD

There's a helpful Wikipedia entry on Noumenon (Philosophy). It discusses whether and in what sense the noumenal is synonymous with ding-an-sich (general view is that it's not synonmous, but that Kant was rather inconsistent with his usage).

But an important point concerns the etymology of the term, which I copy here:

The Greek word νοούμενoν, nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα, nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν, noeîn, 'to think, to mean', which in turn originates from the word νοῦς, noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος, nóos, 'perception, understanding, mind'. A rough equivalent in English would be "that which is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".

However, I think the 'rough equivalent' overlooks the subtlety of the fact that the term is derived from 'nous'. Nous is one of those seminal philosophical terms, associated with Aristotle but found throughout Greek philosophy, which is nowadays often translated as 'intellect' but means something much more like 'that which discerns what truly is'. Recall that in Platonic epistemology, only intelligible objects - the forms or Ideas - were actually real, and that empirical objects were a shadow or instantiation of the Forms of things.

In some form or another, this was preserved all the way up until Scholastic philosophy as matter-form dualism (hylomorphism). So in that context, 'the object of nous' was explicitly not a sensible object, but the Idea, Form, or Principle of an object (that which makes the particular what it is).

Now Kant changed the meaning of the term somewhat. Notice the remark taken from Schopenhauer in that article:

The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.

(This has been discussed before here, and others have opined that Schopenhauer was wrong in his assessment, but I can certainly see the sense in it.)

I didn't mean this entry to be so long, but what it gets at is that 'the noumenal' actually has quite a pedigree, prior to Kant, but that Kant appropriated the term, as Schopenhauer says, for his own purposes. But in the earlier philosophies, what was 'an object of thought' was not some unknown thing, but an Idea or Form which could only be grasped intellectually (or 'noetically') but which didn't exist on the plane of sensible (or sense-able) objects.

Consider all this a footnote.

general view is that it's not synonmous, but that Kant was rather inconsistent with his usage — Wayfarer

That is satisfying.

'the object of nous' was explicitly not a sensible object, but the Idea, Form, or Principle of an object (that which makes the particular what it is). — Wayfarer

Certainly helps clarify the lineage Kant was working from - and why he just redefined it.

But in the earlier philosophies, what was 'an object of thought' was not some unknown thing, but an Idea or Form which could only be grasped intellectually (or 'noetically') but which didn't exist on the plane of sensible (or sense-able) objects. — Wayfarer

Does this rely on that Platonic conception of the 'real' though? If so, I can see why Schop is considered wrong there, given that particular version of things doesn't really work for anything beyond Platonic discussion specifically (i.e Platonic forms tend to only be used as an exemplar or metaphor, rather than an example of anything actually being discussed - in my experience./reading).

Does this rely on that Platonic conception of the 'real' though? If so, I can see why Schop is considered wrong there, given that particular version of things doesn't really work for anything beyond Platonic discussion specifically (i.e Platonic forms tend to only be used as an exemplar or metaphor, rather than an example of anything actually being discussed - in my experience./reading). — AmadeusD

Understanding 'the ideas' is a very subtle and difficult thing. Not that I'm by any means an expert but I think I have an intuitive grasp. My heuristic is that 'the ideas' and the 'noumena' do not exist in the way that tables, chairs and apples exist. They are real on an altogether different level - which is the meaning of transcendent (again, a term which was adapted and somewhat modified by Kant).

Before the advent of modernity, this seemed to have been understood, because of the 'scala naturae', the Great Chain of Being, which stretched from matter (at bottom) to the Divine Intellect (at top) with humans being in a kind of intermediate level. So due to Reason, which was the spark of the divine intellect in humans (that which enables them to see what truly is), the Philosopher could 'ascend' to the 'realm of forms' (this was a kind of intellectual conversion or transformation). Of course, nobody believes this any more, it fell out of favour many centuries ago. I've found a few sources that articulate it, notably the SEP entry on early medieval scholastic John Scotus Eriugena - ' a particular level (of being) may be affirmed to be real by those on a lower or on the same level, but the one above it is thought not to be real in the same way. If humans are thought to exist in a certain way, then angels do not exist in that way.' But due to the 'flattening' of ontology in the transition to modernity, and the belief that only the physical is real, this is, of course, completely unintelligible to most.

Anyway this is all a major digression, for which I apologise, but it's a part of my personal philosophical quest.

That we can't reason to satisfying explanations of our phenomena — AmadeusD

Ya know….everything from the output of our sensory devices, to the input to the brain, and even through some of the regions of the brain itself…..we haven’t a clue as to what is actually happening, real-time? We are not the least conscious of all that transverse the nervous system proper, just as in speculative metaphysics, we are not conscious of any of our intuitive representations and precious little of the machinations of our understanding.

As I mentioned way back at the beginning, sometimes it doesn’t pay to ask too many questions. And in fact, the overall thesis of CPR is to relegate pure reason to experience alone, letting the transcendental side be merely of some relative interest, as in God, freedom and immortality and such, but not much else.

Not a problem - very much enjoying. Feel free to spam my inbox if you need somewhere to lay thoughts down, anytime. I will always attend.

letting the transcendental side be merely of some relative interest, as in God, freedom and immortality and such, but not much else. — Mww

Having just got through (i.e between our earlier interaction today (my time, anyway) and now) Kant's breakdown of the three arguments for God (A583-ish, i think through A630-ish) have me in this sort of mindset, now. Though, It is still just as unsatisfying to me.

A CPR reference substantiating your claim would be nice, to determine if we’re on the same page. — Mww

CPR B xx, A30 / b45, B xxvi, B 325, B327

While the thing-in-itself may have nothing to do with our knowledge of representations of physical objects in the empirical world, they very much have to do with those objects. Unless, once again, you have a CPR reference substantiating your claim. — Mww

It just sounds meaningless to say Thing-in-itself is a concept, but it is totally unknowable, and even unthinkable. It just exists outside of mind, but no one knows what it is, and it covers all the physical objects outside the mind. Therefore for example, we don't know what the books in front of us are like. Even if we see the books in front for us, but we don't know what they are??? That just sounds like a needless scepticism.

Thing-in-itselft must be the existences for us to think about, but not knowable. The concepts such as God, Souls, Freedom and Immortality fit in there, We can think about them, but we have no physical objects matching the concepts. That sounds more reasonable to me.

Meaning of "Empirical World"

Does the Empirical World exist within Appearances or does it exist the other side of these Appearances, whatever is causing these Appearances?

There are different "Worlds". One exists within the mind and the other exists outside the mind, independent of the mind. — RussellA

There is only one world called the empirical world, and it is outside the mind. Appearance is from the empirical world, and it is only in visual form i.e. the lights which are reflected from the objects in the empirical world.

So, we can see the books, trees and mountains, roads, houses, cars and hills. They are only the lights when we say appearance or phenomena.

But some appearances and phenomena are only images such as the objects you see in your dreams, imaginations and illusions. They are not in the form of lights in structure, hence the image quality are dim and less vivid than the images coming in the lights from the appearance and phenomena of the objects in the empirical world.

When I see a book in front of me, it is via the appearance or phenomenon from the object (the book) in the empirical world (outside of the mind). But when I pick up the book, open it, and read it, it is in the empirical world. The objects in the empirical world allow me to not just perceive, but also interact, such as picking it up, opening it, and reading it. The physical objects in the empirical world also continue to exist through time. The book I read yesterday, is still here to be read today, and will be there tomorrow to be read again even after years. The book you saw in your dream or imagination cannot be read, and you cannot interact with it in real life. It doesn't exist through extended time either. You might have seen it last night, but today it is very likely you cannot see it again.

The book you see in the bookcase is presented to you as an appearance or phenomenon until you walk into it, pick it out and read it. If you are in the empirical world, you can do this. If you are not in the empirical world, you cannot do that.

There is no such thing as an internal world. In your mind, there are only perceptions. You seem to confuse with the perceptions thinking them as an internal world. There is only one world, and it is outside of the mind as the empirical world. What we see are appearance and phenomena which are the lights reflected from the objects in the empirical world.

In summary, there is an "Empirical World" inside the mind, within Phenomena, within Appearances, within the Sensibilities and within the Senses and there is also a "Mind-independent World" outside the mind. — RussellA

In summary how did you manage to cram in the whole universe into inside your mind? :chin:

It just sounds meaningless to say Thing-in-itself is a concept, but it is totally unknowable, and even unthinkable. — Corvus

Meaningless is one way to put it. Concepts are representations of the understanding, arising spontaneously from pure thought. To say, then, the thing-in-itself, a valid concept, is unthinkable, is contradictory.

Claiming it is both unknowable and unthinkable comes from possible misunderstanding of CPR. — Corvus

Agreed, as long as we’re still talking about the thing-in-itself as a concept. And more specifically, perhaps, misunderstanding the cognitive procedure proposed in transcendental philosophy.

It is not both unknowable and unthinkable object. — Corvus

But this exchanges the concept for an object. Now it is the case the thing-in-itself can neither be thought as an real object, for to do so presupposes the possibility of its phenomenal representation, nor knowable as a real object, for to do so presupposes a judgement on the relations by which it becomes a particular cognition. But it still can be thought as having a real existence.

Concepts arise in understanding. Understanding is the faculty of logic. The conception of the thing-in-itself fills a logical gap, re: justification for that which appears to sensibility. That’s all it was ever meant to do.
————-

Thing-in-itselft must be the existences for us to think about, but not knowable. The concepts such as God, Souls, Freedom and Immortality fit in there, — Corvus

Agreed. But this is very far from your claim here….

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. — Corvus

….which just is not the case.
————

Even if we see the books in front for us, but we don't know what they are??? That just sounds like a needless scepticism. — Corvus

Agreed, but with the caveat the object in front of us, is already known in a particular way, which is true because it carries the conception represented by the word “book”. One must agree, that until he learns an object, he cannot represent it with a name. If that is the case, everything ever learned, by any human person ever, at one time, had no name.

A better question, and one of the tenets of CPR is….how did a mere undetermined thing out there, be its mere appearance to our senses, get its name?

But this exchanges the concept for an object. Now it is the case the thing-in-itself can neither be thought as an real object nor knowable as a real object. But it still can be thought as having a real existence. — Mww

According to Kant, it requires your faith, not reasoning.

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus

….which just is not the case. — Mww

Your reason for the claim is? (preferably with the CPR source)

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus

….which just is not the case.
— Mww
Your reason for the claim is? — Corvus

See A333-338/B390-396, plus the footnote in B.

If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? — Corvus

As a Mind-Independent World can only be known by transcendental reason, and as a single photograph can only show the form of reason and not its content, a single photograph can never show a Mind-independent World.
===============================================================================

This thread is for reading Kant's CPR. Why try to show Berkeley's Idealism is incorrect? — Corvus

Kant refers to Berkelian Idealism in B275, which is part of his purpose in the Refutation of Idealism.

Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or else false and impossible; the former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable; the latter is the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary.

===============================================================================

In summary how did you manage to cram in the whole universe into inside your mind? — Corvus

Because a "mountain" as a representation in the Empirical World within the mind is different in kind to a "mountain" weighing one billion tonnes in a Mind-Independent World outside the mind.

I am not sure if a philosophical topic which is totally severed from the Empirical world has a meaning. Are you? — Corvus

The Empirical World is the world of Phenomena, and the Mind-Independent World is the world of Things in Themselves.

I am sure that the Mind-Independent World is of philosophical interest.

Whether Kant intended the (negative) noumena as part of the Empirical world or the Mind-Independent World is ambiguous. Sometimes he treats the noumenon as a part of the Empirical World, and sometimes he treats the noumenon as part of the Mind-Independent World. In classical philosophy, Plato etc, the noumenon is part of the Empirical World.

From Wikipedia Noumenon

In Kantian philosophy, the noumenon is often associated with the unknowable "thing-in-itself" (German: Ding an sich). However, the nature of the relationship between the two is not made explicit in Kant's work, and remains a subject of debate among Kant scholars as a result.

As regards tables and chairs, we perceive them in our Sensibilities as Phenomena. If they exist as Things in Themselves in a Mind Independent Word then they are unknowable, meaning that we can never know whether they do or do not exist. But we do know about tables and chairs, meaning that our knowledge about them must have come from our Empirical World, as Ideas or Forms, ie as Noumena.

We can only know about Things in Themselves in general in a Mind Independent World using transcendental reasoning, in the same way as used by Kant in his Refutation of Idealism in B275.

There is only one world called the empirical world, and it is outside the mind. Appearance is from the empirical world....................When I see a book in front of me, it is via the appearance or phenomenon from the object (the book) in the empirical world (outside of the mind).................. The physical objects in the empirical world also continue to exist through time.................There is no such thing as an internal world. In your mind, there are only perceptions. — Corvus

I wrote that there are different "Worlds". One exists within the mind, an "Empirical World", and the other exists outside the mind, a "Mind Independent World"

From the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "empirical" means i) originating in or based on observation or experience, ii) relying on experience or observation alone often without due regard for system and theory.

"Empiricism" means i) the practice of relying on observation and experiment especially in the natural sciences ii) a tenet arrived at empirically.

So far, the word "empirical" refers to what exists in the mind rather than what exists outside the mind, inferring that an "Empirical World" also refers to what exists in the mind rather than what exists outside the mind,

The SEP article on Rationalism vs Empiricism also distinguishes between an external world and an internal world

The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place primarily within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge. Knowledge itself can be of many different things and is usually divided among three main categories: knowledge of the external world, knowledge of the internal world or self-knowledge, and knowledge of moral and/or aesthetical values.

You say that there is only "one world", and in this "one world" physical objects continue to exist through time. IE, whether one million years ago or one million years into the future. But we know that one million years ago there were no humans, meaning that in this "one world" you are referring to, humans are not a necessary part.

So how can this "one world" be an "empirical world" if humans are not necessarily there to observe it?

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus

….which just is not the case.
— Mww
Your reason for the claim is?
— Corvus

See A333-338/B390-396, plus the footnote in B. — Mww

Could you please specify and explain which sentences in the CPR pages warrant or relate to your claim? Thanks.

as a single photograph can only show the form of reason and not its content — RussellA

A photograph is to show visual image, not the form of reason. It is nonsense to say that a photo can only show the form of reason. It doesn't make sense.

Kant refers to Berkelian Idealism in B275, which is part of his purpose in the Refutation of Idealism. — RussellA

In that case, would it be the case that you have been mistaken Kant's refutation of Idealism as Kant's TI?

Because a "mountain" as a representation in the Empirical World within the mind is different in kind to a "mountain" weighing one billion tonnes in a Mind-Independent World outside the mind. — RussellA

In that case, should it not be a representation of the empirical world in your mind, rather than an internal world inside you? It sounds too far-fetched for you to carry an internal world weighing one billion tonnes in your head.

More later~

Nope, not gonna do that. You asked for a reference, you got it, do with it as you will.

Nope, not gonna do that. You asked for a reference, you got it, do with it as you will. — Mww

I have read the pages in CPR, but couldn't find any part which back your claim that my proposition (regarding to Thing-in-itself and the concepts i.e. God, Souls and Freedom) is not the case. Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded.
I didn't just asked for the reference. I asked for your reasons for your claims (preferably with the reference). You only forwarded the reference, which appear to be unrelated, and you refuse to clarify on the relation of the reference and your claims. Your postings seem to be lacking consistency and truths from the facts. :chin: :wink:

Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded. — Corvus

Suit yourself. Hell, you might even be correct.

A photograph is to show visual image, not the form of reason. It is nonsense to say that a photo can only show the form of reason. — Corvus

The Mind-Independent world can only be known using transcendental reason.

Reasoning is a logical connection between several strands of an argument, for example, the syllogism. A syllogism has the same form, in which a conclusion is drawn from two premises, regardless of its content.

For example, i) all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal ii) all dogs are animals, all animals have four legs, therefore all dogs have four legs.

As a syllogism can only have content when its form is complete, reason can only have content when its logical form is complete.

A single photograph as a single premise is only one part of a logical sequence within a reasoned argument, and as its logical form is incomplete, it cannot be said to have content.

This is why a single photograph cannot show a Mind-Independent World, as knowledge about a Mind-Independent World requires Transcendental Reason, and reason in order to have content requires a complete logical form. A single photograph as a single premise cannot have the necessary content for a Transcendental Reason as it is an incomplete logical form.
===============================================================================

In that case, would it be the case that you have been mistaken Kant's refutation of Idealism as Kant's TI? — Corvus

No.

From the Wikipedia article Transcendental Idealism

Transcendental idealism is a philosophical system founded by German philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. Kant's epistemological program is found throughout his Critique of Pure Reason (1781). By transcendental, Kant means that his philosophical approach to knowledge transcends mere consideration of sensory evidence and requires an understanding of the mind's innate modes of processing that sensory evidence.

In his Refutation of Idealism is his Theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me" B276.

These are not contradictory positions.
===============================================================================

In that case, should it not be a representation of the empirical world in your mind, rather than an internal world inside you? — Corvus

Of course, that's why in our internal world is a representation of the external world.
===============================================================================
As an aside, the Thing in Itself has nothing to do with God, the soul or freedom.

Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded.
— Corvus

Suit yourself. Hell, you might even be correct. — Mww

For your claim to be correct, you need the argument and valid conclusion backed by the original source. But you failed to produce that, and when re-asked for it, you refused to do so. Hence the conclusion. :wink:

This is why a single photograph cannot show a Mind-Independent World, as knowledge about a Mind-Independent World requires Transcendental Reason, and reason in order to have content requires a complete logical form. — RussellA

1. You didn't need to take a photo of the whole MI World. Just a part of it would have done. No one can take a photo of the whole world in a single shot anyway.

2. You seem to think a world is some logically reasoned object. A world is a totality of the domain in which you specify all the attributes about it. But since you haven't done so, I was assuming that you were meaning the world in which we live in.

For your claim to be correct — Corvus

I’m not making a claim; I’m merely citing a source-specific refutation of yours.

I’m not making a claim; I’m merely citing a source-specific refutation of yours. — Mww

I was meaning, your claim " ….which just is not the case.
— Mww"

Why is it not the case?

I was meaning, your claim " ….which just is not the case.
— Mww" — Corvus

My statement that your claim is not the case is proved in the reference. The only thing that has to do with me, is I know where to look for the refutation of your claim.

My statement that your claim is not the case is proved in the reference. The only thing that has to do with me, is I know where to look for the refutation of your claim. — Mww

I was asking which part of the reference backs up your claim, but you refused to provide the evidence.

You seem to think a world is some logically reasoned object. — Corvus

The Empirical World inside us we know through our sensibilities. The Mind-Independent World outside us we know through Transcendental Reasoning about the Empirical World inside us.

In his Refutation of Idealism is his Theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me" B276. — RussellA

You cannot prove the existence of the objects in space outside of you by simply saying you are conscious of your own existence. You could be conscious of your existence in your dream or hallucination. Does that prove any existence of the objects in space outside of you?

These are not contradictory positions. — RussellA

Not contradictory, but not making sense either.

The Empirical World inside us we know through our sensibilities. The Mind-Independent World outside us we know through Transcendental Reasoning about the Empirical World inside us. — RussellA

Do you have the CPR reference for backing that points up? No Wiki or SEP, but CPR.