• Terrapin Station
    6k
    The only way birth can be moral is if the parent is committed to doing assisted suicide to his child if he asks and can't do it himself. Even if it's illegal. Also it is immoral for the parent to try to prevent his offspring from committing suicide if it's a level headed decision and must assist him/her with it.khaled

    Thanks for answering. That's an interesting view at least. ;-)

    That wouldn't come up very often (a kid going to their parent with a suicide request), but I suppose that doesn't matter.

    If you risk someone else's well-being in an attempt to improve your own and it doesn't work out, you owe that person to return them to their previous state.khaled

    Re this, of course no one was in a previous state of not being alive.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    The answer is obviously not because it's just like the gun example, the problem isn't the "giving birth" part it's the "they'll suffer if you do" part. Just like the problem isn't the "pull your finger back part" but the "they'll die" partkhaled

    To use an amusing earlier example, though, if pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger meant that the person who was "shot" would have to do their laundry, should it be a crime to shoot someone?
  • Roke
    123

    I’m attacking the position with an experimental approach because (honestly) I suspect this sort of view is a pathology of the logos. Reason alone never seems to untangle it for the afflicted.

    Here though, let me reiterate something important. There is an absolutely crucial distinction between the certainty that I should not have children and the certainty that nobody should. The former is fine and vasectomy or w/e makes sense. The latter is exactly the type of narcissism that serves as a precursor to the worst kinds of atrocity.

    The moral principle of preventing suffering is a byproduct of humanity’s life affirming orientation across an enormous span of time. It exists in a context. It is not a standalone axiom of the universe. To turn it against life itself is mere rhetorical sleight of hand and this is plainly obvious to most of us.
  • Moliere
    1.5k
    Well, if life itself didn't have suffering, then that wouldn't be a target. What is it about life itself that needs to be carried out in light of the fact that no one needs anything if there is no one there to care or be deprived in the first place? That is my question to you? Isn't it all about the projection of the parent in any of these cases you could possibly present? Why does the child have to bear out this projection?schopenhauer1

    There is nothing about life itself that needs to be carried out, because needs only happen within life -- just like suffering only happens in life. Valuing life isn't an ends-to-means kind of care, so it doesn't make sense that the child is "saddled" with the desires of some parent just by the mere fact that they are born.

    Not to mention that this is kind of far astray from suffering and has more to do with valuing autonomy and individuality.


    By entirety of life, I mean, you have the unique ability to prevent suffering for an entire life.schopenhauer1

    For me, then, this is reverts back to thinking of un-real persons as receiving some kind of benefit, which is just absurd. I'd say that valueing life isn't the sort of value that one is doing for the sake of which -- hence why it seems strange to me to say it's an agenda. The child is not a means to an end.

    This valuing life as an end unto itself you mention as a reason, can stand in place of the "agenda" the parents have in mind when creating a child. In this case, life itself is the agenda, and the child is the bearer for this agenda. The child needs to be born in order for the agenda to be carried forward- that is life itself. Why does life itself need to be experienced by a person though?

    Why does the suffering of a person matter? Why should autonomy figure in our moral reasoning?

    Of course there is no why. All reasoning comes to an end, including moral reasoning -- and the sorts of appeals being made here are not being made for some other reason. Suffering is bad, life is good, autonomy should be respected. These aren't values of the ends-means variety, but are the values by which we reason about how to act. They are a kind of terminus to moral or ethical reasoning.

    The big difference here is not an answer to these questions, but the degree of attachment you happen to feel to these sorts of things. You don't feel attachment to life, or at least not enough to balance out your attachment to the badness of suffering -- suffering is so bad, and a necessary part of life, that life does not have value for you to the degree it has for others.

    But is there really an answer you can provide to the answer of "why?" other than that suffering is really, really bad?
  • Moliere
    1.5k
    It doesn't address your argument at all because @schopenhauer1 is making a different argument from you. :D

    Click on my highlighted name and you should be able to read my argument to you:
    Moliere
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    There are things, probably lots of things, you would not like forced on you as an adult.

    Now it seems your using the excuse of the child's initial non existence to impose these on someone.
    Andrew4Handel

    Actually all I'm doing is stressing a very technical ontological point. You're not actually doing anything to anyone, consensually or not, prior to their existence, because there is no one to do anything to.

    For example I was forced to go to church several times the week my entire childhood which was a grim joyless environment and read the bible and pray every day. As an adult I have never chosen to do anything like that. It is something I would never chose but my status as a child meant I was powerless.Andrew4Handel

    What I think is worth looking at here is why that experience was presumably so traumatic for you that it would lead you to thinking that if other people would have to go through it, it's better if they simply don't exist at all.

    And something more specifically that's worth looking at there is this: some people can get something of value out of any experience--they can see positives in any experience, they can parse the experience differently while they're in it so that they get something of value out of it--perhaps even by mentally subverting it, focusing attention on things that one enjoys, seeing the humor in it, etc, they can treat every situation as one where something is learned and experience is gained, where those are seen as positives in and of themselves, and so on.

    So in your case, what made the difference between being able to see the positive sides of having to go to church, etc. and seeing it as instead so traumatic that you'd recommend no one ever have kids because of the possibility that some other kid will have to do something like go to church?

    It is not acceptable to rape someone when they are unconscious because of the impact when they become conscious.Andrew4Handel

    Aside from the fact that you're not seeing the distinction between whether a person exists or not (you're thinking of it simply as a question of whether someone is conscious--that's not the issue, the issue is that you can't do anything, pro or con, to a nonexistent), even if that were a good analogy, I don't have anything resembling conventional views on stuff like that, but I don't want to get into details on anything too controversial, because then that's all that anyone can ever focus on. (I've had that situation on message boards before.)

    Even if someone is not an antinatalist they can accept that the child did not chose to be bornAndrew4Handel

    Again, this is a category error, because there's not something to make a choice. It's not the case that you're doing something nonconsensually to anything.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    There is nothing about life itself that needs to be carried out, because needs only happen within life -- just like suffering only happens in life. Valuing life isn't an ends-to-means kind of care, so it doesn't make sense that the child is "saddled" with the desires of some parent just by the mere fact that they are born.Moliere

    This doesn't make sense to me. Suffering and needs happen within life. Do not "saddle" a child with the burdens of life by procreating them into existence is the argument. As far as the parents' desires- what I meant was that if a child does note experience whatever X agenda (pleasure, experience for its own sake, etc.) that is no loss for the potential child, only for the parent who is projecting what the child is missing. Other than that possible confusion, I don't understand your claim here.

    Not to mention that this is kind of far astray from suffering and has more to do with valuing autonomy and individuality.Moliere

    Well, I have mentioned that it is not just preventing suffering, there is a component that you are also not creating suffering on behalf of someone else so the child can live out X agenda (pleasure, fulfill a role in a family, etc). Again, the kicker here that you might not take into consideration is that no actual child is deprived of whatever X agenda that they might miss that the parent had hoped for the child.

    For me, then, this is reverts back to thinking of un-real persons as receiving some kind of benefit, which is just absurd. I'd say that valueing life isn't the sort of value that one is doing for the sake of which -- hence why it seems strange to me to say it's an agenda. The child is not a means to an end.Moliere

    I certainly hope the child isn't a means to an ends, but unfortunately, to the procreational parents of the child, that is what it becomes before its birth. The placeholder of that potential child is the reasons it should be procreated in the first place (to experience life, to create a family, etc.). It becomes the bearer of whatever agenda reasoning the parent had in mind for why the child was to be born, at the cost of preventing a person who will suffer.

    Why does the suffering of a person matter? Why should autonomy figure in our moral reasoning?

    Of course there is no why. All reasoning comes to an end, including moral reasoning -- and the sorts of appeals being made here are not being made for some other reason. Suffering is bad, life is good, autonomy should be respected. These aren't values of the ends-means variety, but are the values by which we reason about how to act. They are a kind of terminus to moral or ethical reasoning.

    The big difference here is not an answer to these questions, but the degree of attachment you happen to feel to these sorts of things. You don't feel attachment to life, or at least not enough to balance out your attachment to the badness of suffering -- suffering is so bad, and a necessary part of life, that life does not have value for you to the degree it has for others.

    But is there really an answer you can provide to the answer of "why?" other than that suffering is really, really bad?
    Moliere

    Yes, as I stated to Terrapin, at the end of the day, these kind of axiologies are based on various ways we feel about the values they are based on. The value of preventing ALL future suffering at the cost of nothing FOR NO PARTICULAR PERSON, and the value of not creating suffering on the behest of someone else so that they can carry out someone else's vision of the agenda of what is valuable (pleasure, experiencing life, enculutraing, overcoming adversity, etc.) is what matters in this axiology. What I think gives strength to this argument over all others is the fact that there is NO COST. There is NO COST because no actual person is deprived of goods, but all the benefit of not being harmed would be the case. Sure, this means that all other aspects of experiencing life are considered not as important, but what does it matter to a person not born in the first place?

    Also, the lesser but still notable value (that you pointed out) that the child isn't being used as a bearer of the parental agenda of values that they think should take place for that new individual is also important here.

    Lastly, the collateral damage of undo suffering that happens to some degree (sometimes to the extremes) is always something to consider. But this is an imperfect argument because based on statistical weights of future outcomes more than any hardcoded axiological value to base it on.
  • Moliere
    1.5k
    but what does it matter to a person not born in the first place?schopenhauer1

    Exactly! :D It does not matter until the child is born. Mattering can only happen if there is a someone. There is a cost associated with your axiology -- the cost is life. And people do, in fact, value life. For yourself this seems like no cost because life is not worth much. But for most that is just not so.

    Do not "saddle" a child with the burdens of life by procreating them into existence is the argument.schopenhauer1

    Yeah, but why? This connects to what I was saying later about how people value life -- not for some end or other, but unto itself. There isn't an agenda, it's just something considered vauable -- that has currency. So it's not about a deprivation or a benefit to some non-entity. Valuing life isn't really about what we are doing to non-entities. The consideration isn't about saddling or burdening someone else with the horrrors of life.

    Life itself is just valuable, so procreation is as a relative good. That's the whole of it. Just like suffering has no real why behind it, but is generally seen as something that is worthwhile to avoid, prevent, or lessen.
  • Moliere
    1.5k
    Just a quick side-note -- valuing life unto itself differs from thinking that we should experience life, too. We do, after all, keep people in a vegetative state because we value life, even though they do not have experience -- certainly with some hopes that they'll come back to us, but this is just to note that the experiential angle isn't exactly what I'm getting at by saying people value life.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    Exactly! :D It does not matter until the child is born. Mattering can only happen if there is a someone. There is a cost associated with your axiology -- the cost is life. And people do, in fact, value life. For yourself this seems like no cost because life is not worth much. But for most that is just not so.Moliere

    Well, part of the argument is where benefits of life (like I guess, life itself and pleasure) do not matter unless there is someone there to be deprived. However it is an absolute always good to prevent harm even if no actual person existed for this benefit That is the asymmetry part of the argument. Pleasure is only good for those who exist. Someone being prevented from harm when they otherwise did not need to be harmed is always good, period (thus necessary harms of adversity to get stronger are moot points pre-birth).

    There isn't an agenda, it's just something considered vauable -- that has currency. So it's not about a deprivation or a benefit to some non-entity. Valuing life isn't really about what we are doing to non-entities. The consideration isn't about saddling or burdening someone else with the horrrors of life.Moliere

    Yes there certainly is an agenda- the agenda of being born to experience life. That is what the parent is projecting on behalf of another person, despite the fact that existence has non-trivial harms. Guess what though, being not born is not a harm, it is not a bad. Nothing is lost by not being born for any particular person. Certainly, suffering is prevented though which is always good.

    Life itself is just valuable, so procreation is as a relative good. That's the whole of it. Just like suffering has no real why behind it, but is generally seen as something that is worthwhile to avoid, prevent, or lessen.Moliere

    I see no need to put life with harms above preventing harm. The only person who loses out is the sadness of the parent for not fulfilling their projected value of life for its own sake.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    Just a quick side-note -- valuing life unto itself differs from thinking that we should experience life, too. We do, after all, keep people in a vegetative state because we value life, even though they do not have experience -- certainly with some hopes that they'll come back to us, but this is just to note that the experiential angle isn't exactly what I'm getting at by saying people value life.Moliere

    Then the same question remains. Why is life considered more important than preventing harm, when no actual person is losing out only the parent's sadness of not fuliflling projected value of life.
  • Moliere
    1.5k
    That is the asymmetry part of the argument.schopenhauer1

    I suppose I'd just say this asymmetry is false, then. Or, at least, I do not believe in the asymmetry between these. Preventing harm is only important if someone is there for harm to be prevented. And, even then, preventing harm is also a relative good -- causing harm can be the right thing to do, in certain circumstances. This is because all ethical claims rely upon there being ethical agents; there is no absolute or ultimate ethical rule which must be satisfied, come what may, even if we do not exist. Ethics are a human concern, and so eliminating the agent from which they spring sort of undercuts the very basis of any ethical claim.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    Do not "saddle" a child with the burdens of life by procreating them into existence is the argument.schopenhauer1

    I know you're not trying to do this, but it's worth noting how difficult it is to state something like you want to state here without suggesting the idea of doing something to someone who doesn't exist yet.

    if a child does note experience whatever X agenda (pleasure, experience for its own sake, etc.) that is no loss for the potential child,schopenhauer1

    Nothing can be any loss or gain or anything to a "potential child."

    What I think gives strength to this argument over all others is the fact that there is NO COST. There is NO COST because no actual person is deprived of goods,schopenhauer1

    If Jim and Janis want to have a child but do not because of social pressures (maybe even a law) against it, doesn't that create suffering for them?
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    I suppose I'd just say this asymmetry is false, then. Or, at least, I do not believe in the asymmetry between these. Preventing harm is only important if someone is there for harm to be prevented. And, even then, preventing harm is also a relative good -- causing harm can be the right thing to do, in certain circumstances.Moliere

    Not in the circumstance of no person existing at all (but has a potential to ). In cases of potentiality of possible people, there is an absolute way to prevent all harm, with no relative trade-offs that affect a person.

    Ethics are a human concern, and so eliminating the agent from which they spring sort of undercuts the very basis of any ethical claim.Moliere

    This doesn't make sense. It again values life itself as something that must be had in the first place. Ethics is about right course of actions. If there are people around then follow the right action. If there are no people around, ethics does not matter. People don't need to exist for ethics Rather, if people around, ethics then can take place. There is a big difference. We don't live to be bearers of existence, or bearers of ethics. We just happen to live and thus exist and think about ethical concerns.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    However it is an absolute always goodschopenhauer1

    :lol:

    Someone being prevented from harm is always good, period.schopenhauer1

    Which is factually incorrect. Things are only good or bad to particular people who exist and who feel that that thing is good or bad.

    Guess what though, being not born is not a harm, it is not a bad. Nothing is lost by not being born for any particular person.schopenhauer1

    Again, to people who want to have a child, not having one, where that's not by their choice, is suffering. Why wouldn't you care about alleviating the suffering of people who actually exist?
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    Nothing can be any loss or gain or anything to a "potential child."Terrapin Station

    Correct.

    If Jim and Janis want to have a child but do not because of social pressures (maybe even a law) against it, doesn't that create suffering for them?Terrapin Station

    Yes, there is a component that the suffering is on behalf of someone else. If someone suffers cause they can't do an action that will cause suffering to others, that is still not a good thing that takes place, as it is causing the suffering for someone else. The kicker again, is that someone else did not need to suffer..unlike people who are already born that may need some type of adversity to get to a stronger outcome.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    Which is factually incorrect. Things are only good or bad to particular people who exist and who feel that that thing is good or bad.Terrapin Station

    The terminus is preventing harm with no cost to any particular person. I cannot conjure an infinite amount of reasons. That is the starting place. Who created the first cause.. etc. So at the end of the day, no argument can go beyond the values of the ethical premise. We discussed this and something we agree with to that small extent.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    Yes, there is a component that the suffering is on behalf of someone else.schopenhauer1

    The suffering isn't on behalf of someone else, it's their personal suffering, due to their desires not being met.

    If someone suffers cause they can't do an action that will cause suffering to others,schopenhauer1

    You have no idea that the action will cause suffering to others. That's speculation. Meanwhile, there are existent people who really are suffering because they can't have a kid through no choice of their own.

    he terminus is preventing harm with no cost to any particular person.schopenhauer1

    Not being able to have a kid when you want one is a cost to a particular person.

    Not that that has to do with what you were commenting on. "Preventing harm" is only categorically good to the individuals who feel that it's good. It's simply false to suggest that it can somehow be good outside of that.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    The suffering isn't on behalf of someone else, it's their personal suffering, due to their desires not being met.Terrapin Station

    No I mean, the import of the argument relies on creating harm for someone else.

    You have no idea that the action will cause suffering to others. That's speculation. Meanwhile, there are existent people who really are suffering because they can't have a kid through no choice of their own.Terrapin Station

    Then their suffering is their own and not exposing a lifetime of suffering for another- with no cost to any particular person (that is to say an actual child). It's not like the child already exists and there is a relative trade off.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    No I mean, the import of the argument relies on creating harm for someone else.schopenhauer1

    The "import of the argument"? What argument? We're simply talking about people suffering or not. There are actual people who suffer (and who would) if they can't (or couldn't) have a child for physical or social reasons. That's not an argument. It's a fact about people suffering, a fact about a cost (in terms of suffering).
    Then their suffering is their own and not exposing a lifetime of suffering for another- with no cost to any particular person (that is to say an actual child).schopenhauer1

    It's their own suffering and that's a cost. They ARE actual children.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    It's their own suffering and that's a cost. They ARE actual children.Terrapin Station

    So exposing a new person to all possible suffering it may incur in order to alleviate the suffering of a present person on one particular issue, is justified? That makes no sense to me.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k
    So exposing a new person to all possible suffering it may incur in order to alleviate the suffering of a present person on one particular issue, is justified? That makes no sense to me.schopenhauer1

    If your goal is to reduce suffering, and there's a chance that the child won't experience suffering, at least not anywhere near the actually existent people who are suffering (because they can't have a kid), then it should make sense to you, because that could easily result in less suffering. That is, it should make sense to you if your goal really is to reduce suffering.
  • Moliere
    1.5k
    Not in the circumstance of no person existing at all (but has a potential to ). In cases of potentiality of possible people, there is an absolute way to prevent all harm, with no relative trade-offs that affect a person.schopenhauer1

    Preventing all harm to whom, though?

    I'd say we've reached something of an impasse here. The case for the harm to the potential of possible persons is just not a case that means much of anything to me. But I'd just be rehashing what I said and what you are responding to here.

    I see by absolute you mean something different than I had thought, though. You mean something along the lines of certain, or perfect.

    This doesn't make sense. It again values life itself as something that must be had in the first place. Ethics is about right course of actions.schopenhauer1

    Does it not make sense, or is it something you disagree with?

    I actually disagree that ethics is about a or the right course of actions. And perhaps that could be fruitful to explore, though it would take us pretty far astray from the OP -- so another thread, another time. I'll close with the opening paragraph from Susan Wolf's Moral Saints to hint at what else I might be thinking of, though -- and say that I think ethics is about living the good life, just to give it a slogan:

    I DON'T know whether there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that neither I nor those about whom I care most are among them. By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be. Though I shall in a moment acknowledge the variety of types of person that might be thought to satisfy this description, it seems to me that none of these types serve as unequivocally compelling personal ideals. In other words, I believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive. — Susan Wolf
  • Michael Ossipoff
    1.5k


    ”Ultimately, they aren’t the reason why I was born, or why I was born in a world like this one” — Michael Ossipoff
    .
    No they WERE the reason you were born in THIS world.
    .
    1. I didn’t say they weren’t the reason why I was born in THIS world. I merely said that they weren’t the reason why I was born, or why I was born in a world like this one.
    .
    2. But, as a matter of fact, they WEREN’T the reason why I was born in this world.
    .
    I was born in this world because it’s the world that’s consistent with the person that I was, because the experiencer and his/her physical surroundings are a complementary pair.
    .
    Yes, as part of this world, one’s parents are definitely part of the mechanism that, in this experience-story, has produced the person. And so they’re a significant part of what makes this world consistent with you. As such, then, yes they’re part of the reason why you were born in this world, if you want to say it that way.
    .
    But no, they certainly are not THE reason why you were born in this world.
    .
    I realize that Materialists will disagree with much of what I’m saying.
    .
    Had they not decided to have birth you could have been born into a world of immortal robots.
    .
    Alright, I can’t criticize that because I was the one who brought up a world of immortal robots. But I wasn’t really right to do so, because how could someone be in the beginning of a life, in a world where no lives begin?
    .
    Had Mr. & Mrs. Ossipoff decided not to give birth, then I’d nevertheless have been born in a world similar to this one, to parents similar to them.
    .
    So that’s one thing that I don’t blame on them.
    .
    They're not the reason you're born but they're the reason you were born HERE.
    .
    (I still don't really accept your premise that a person is the cause of his own birth or part of the cause…)
    [/quote[
    .
    You wouldn’t, if you’re a Materialist. We don’t subscribe to the same metaphysics. I propose Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
    .
    ”But I suggest that there’s no reason why anyone would be born into a societal-world like this one, unless they’d gotten themselves into a major moral-snarl, over a number of lifetimes, digging themselves deeper each time.” — Michael Ossipoff
    .
    Whoa whoa whoa there I'ma have to give you a speeding ticket. Why'd you turn Hindu so fast what the heck?
    .
    When wasn’t I?
    .
    What does one's moral actions in his current life story have to do with him reincarnating?
    .
    Your subconscious attributes, inclinations, wants, needs, predispositions at the end of this life determine what kind of a world is consistent with the person that you (subconsciously) are. Consistency is the requirement of experience-stories, because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.
    .
    You never said people reincarnate.
    .
    I’ve been saying it at The Philosophy Forum since I arrived at The Philosophy Forum.
    .
    Reincarnation plausibly follows, as a natural and plausible consequence of Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
    .
    No, I’m not claiming to prove that there’s reincarnation.
    .
    In any case, whether you do or don’t reincarnate, you won’t know that you did or didn’t, because, either way, you won’t remember that there was this life.
    .
    In fact, according to your theory then what follows death is NOT reincarnation but the repetition of the exact same life like in Nietzsche's book thus spake zarathustra. Since you're the cause of your own life story then after death, you should cause the same life story again. You don't move on to another life story.
    .
    Above, I said:
    .
    “Your subconscious attributes, inclinations, wants, needs, predispositions at the end of this life determine what kind of a world is consistent with the person that you (subconsciously) are.”
    .
    Your subconscious attributes, inclinations, wants, needs, predispositions at the end of this life are the determiner of your next life. What makes you so sure that those things will be the same at the end of this life as they were at the beginning of this life and the end of the previous one?
    .
    Wait. Right there you’re saying a contradiction. That’s contrary to the definition and nature of hypothetical stories. There are infinitely-many, and there are all of them, including the bad societal worlds in which hardly anyone is an anti-natalist. … — Michael Ossipoff
    .
    I might have misspoke there. What I meant was that
    .
    P1: if THIS world turned antinatalist it would reduce the chances of someone getting born here.
    .
    Undeniably. The probability of birth here would be zero.
    .
    P2: there are worlds where no pain is possible
    .
    Not necessarily. I’d say probably not. A physical world is bound by logic, not made-to-order, and must operate according to its physical laws. So P2 is far from certain.
    .

    P3: pain is possible in this world
    .
    Most undeniably.
    .
    C: this world should turn antinatalist to reduce the number of people that have to experience pain
    For one thing, P2 is doubtful at best.
    For another thing, even if P2 were true, C still wouldn’t follow, unless you believe in Materialism or something similar.
    .
    The number (actually an infinity, not a number) of people of people who have to experience pain has exactly zero dependence on whether or not this world turns Antinatalist. …by Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, but not by Materialism.
    .
    Your logic would still make an argument for antinatalism
    .
    I support Antinatalism, but not for the fallacious reason usually given by Antinatalists.
    .
    ”So, I agree with anti-natalism in that sense.” — Michael Ossipoff
    .
    Wait so you're an antinatalist now? I thought you were trying to argue AGAINST it
    .
    No, not at all. I’ve given two good reasons for Antinatalism.
    .
    What I disagree with is the faulty metaphysics, the Materialist myth, by which Antinatalists usually argue for Antinatalism.

    (By the way, yes, requested assistance with voluntary auto-euthanasia should be available to everyone and anyone. Not because suicide makes any sense, but as insurance regarding things that can happen to someone that would spoil their quality-of-life.)
    .
    Michael Ossipoff
    .
    December 19th (Roman Gregorian Calendar)
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  • Andrew4Handel
    938
    Aside from the fact that you're not seeing the distinction between whether a person exists or not (you're thinking of it simply as a question of whether someone is conscious--that's not the issueTerrapin Station

    Do you think a person exists when they are recently dead and their body is intact?
  • Terrapin Station
    6k


    Yes, but obviously in a limited sense, since they're dead/not functional, they don't have "personhood" in the philosophical sense, they're not due the same moral considerations (although I wouldn't say they're due no moral considerations), etc.
  • Andrew4Handel
    938

    What matters to me is the potential for harm. A dead person exists but has no potential for harm.
    I don't t like to do things that have the potential for harm like I will not work in the weapons industry and build a bomb.

    What matters with a (deeply) unconscious person is they can in the future be harmed. Not that they can be harmed whilst you are abusing them.

    On the other hand it seems like plants and the environment cannot be harmed although they exist because they do not appear conscious.
  • Terrapin Station
    6k


    None of that amounts to being able to do anything, pro or con, consensually or nonconsensually, to someone who doesn't exist.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.4k
    believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive. — Susan Wolf

    Yes, and there is no need to strive for anything if no-person existed in the first place. No need to make people strive for a good if they can be prevented from existing (to not experience harm). To make someone in order for them to pursue some model of well-being makes little sense, if they didn't exist to need anything in the first place. We will always have this back and forth as I will always bring up the idea that no one needs anything to begin with if they don't exist in the first place to need it.
  • Andrew4Handel
    938
    None of that amounts to being able to do anything, pro or con, consensually or nonconsensually, to someone who doesn't exist.Terrapin Station

    I have not claimed someone non existent is being forced to do anything.

    However I did give the example of a vase, a vase comes to exist by an act of force on preexisting clay and then the vase is made to exist by someone else's actions.

    You seem to be quibbling or prevaricating about the boundary between coming into existence and not existing.

    Before a child comes to exist there is the potential and material for a child to come to exist. A humans psychological desire to create a child is also real and can motivate the action of turning preexisting matter into a new child. So I do not think there is non existence in the sense you seem to be referring to.

    Are you claiming nothing is forced on a child? I mentioned how straight after birth I was indoctrinated and forced into strict religious routine. It was not free of parental force at any stage in my childhood and I had to painfully struggle to leave including nearly dying by suicide attempt.

    I still think your point is a semantic mistake. Or a mistake about the relationship between intention and action. Before John Lennon was shot his assassin intended to shoot him and that intention was a significant causal event (that played a causal role in the eventual murder). My intention, not to create a child is preventing me causing a pregnancy.

    This seems similar to your apparent moral stance. If someone has every intention of Killing John Lennon you wouldn't prosecute them until the bullet exited the gun.
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