Maybe the answer is that space and time develop along with everything else. — csalisbury

I'm assuming everything else here means with Will/force or whatnot. That to me, would not go along with Schopenhauer's own system where space/time are transcendental and thus mediated by representation. However, representation doesn't exist on the scene until there is an organism that has representation. I would not think time and space are independent or prior to this.

The transcendental, as I understand it, refers to the (non-'existing') necessary logical/structural conditions for the possible existence of a certain class of entities/events (usually 'phenomena') Stepping outside of Schop, for a second, I don't see any a priori reason why transcendental conditions can't develop and change (unless one posits a single possible form of experience.)

To put it another way: Kant and Schopenhauer's transcendental categories are indeed the necessary conditions for Kant and Schopenhauer's phenomenal flux, but then, couldn't this experience of flux be supervenient on earlier experiential forms?

To put it another way: Kant and Schopenhauer's transcendental categories are indeed the necessary conditions for Kant and Schopenhauer's phenomenal flux, but then, couldn't this experience of flux be supervenient on earlier experiential forms? — csalisbury

If experiential forms can form representations. I thought only biological organisms can form representations in his view. Let me see if I can find a quote. Well, I'm not sure if this is as good, but I found this website which I think says what I am saying, but you have to scroll towards the bottom sections http://critique-of-pure-reason.com/schopenhauers-key-concepts-1-representation-vostellung/

@csalisbury Wasn't sure if you saw my last post.

I did read the article, which was lucid, but I wasn't sure how it tied in with the last few posts here.

I did read the article, which was lucid, but I wasn't sure how it tied in with the last few posts here. — csalisbury

It sounds like the recognize the point that the representations can't exist before the first animal. Though subjectivity exists before representations, it's hard to think that a world of objects exists before representations. From the article:

If space, time and causality are mind-dependent, then what can it mean to say that the Earth formed 4.5 billion years ago, before the advent of life? Before any knowing consciousness existed, what do “years” and “the Earth” refer to, and what does “formed” mean, without space, time, objects and causality?

Schopenhauer sees the problem:

Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent on the first knowing being [...]; on the other hand, this first perceiving animal just as necessarily wholly dependent on a long chain of causes and effects which has preceded it [...] These two contradictory views, to each of which we are led with equal necessity, might certainly be called an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge [...] [Vol I §7]

His answer is that the past exists now, for us, and came to exist for the first knowing consciousness. When it made this first appearance, it already had the character of endlessness in both directions, past and future. So, oddly enough, time had a beginning but was and is inherently beginningless. The same goes for the world as representation in general. Objects of the past are objects for us just as much as present objects are. This does rather make it seem as if ancestral objects are nothing but fictions. At least with objects which exist among conscious beings in the present we can say that they are manifesting the will, but now it seems that the ancient Earth and its objects and events are nothing but convenient stories. However this is not quite right. We say that the moon is about 400,000 kilometres from the Earth, yet neither the Moon nor this distance have any reality beyond our representations. The ancient Earth, separated from us by time rather than space, is no less real than this – which is still as real as can be – though it can obviously never be an object of perception for us. It is “less real” only insofar as we ordinarily think of ancient objects as somehow less real. — critique-of-pure-reason website

Oh yeah, I think it's definitely true, for Schopenhauer, that (re)presentations depend on (re)presenting organisms. In that bit I quoted from WWR in the OP, he's pretty explicit about that. But he also doesn't seem to really care about the paradoxes.

Oh yeah, I think it's definitely true, for Schopenhauer, that (re)presentations depend on (re)presenting organisms. In that bit I quoted from WWR in the OP, he's pretty explicit about that. But he also doesn't seem to really care about the paradoxes. — csalisbury

Right, but that doesn't seem right either.

I agree, and can only see 3 avenues out: panpsychism, some revamped noumenal theory (though I don't know exactly what that would look like) or mysticism. Or some combination of the 3.

I don't see any paradox in Schopenhauer's views. At best he's forced to 'admit' that there's something unknowable about the Will, which is hardly surprising because it's the noumenon. The time stuff isn't paradoxical unless you adopt assumptions from outside his framework.

I don't see any paradox in Schopenhauer's views. At best he's forced to 'admit' that there's something unknowable about the Will, which is hardly surprising because it's the noumenon. The time stuff isn't paradoxical unless you adopt assumptions from outside his framework. — The Great Whatever

Well, it's not necessarily the paradox as much time and space does not exist outside representing organisms. This, to me, raises a problem that I stated earlier so I will quote it down here:

But again, I do not think this answers the question. How is it that representations come out of nowhere at "x" particular time? If the representations do not come from the beginning along with Will itself, then there is no explanations for how representation, time, space, and causality even came about? You need to have the world of representation in order for time, space, and causality to be there in the first place. If it is not there from the beginning, then there is a gap in explanation that is similar to any other theory of mind, or epistemology in general whether materialist or idealist. — schopenhauer1

Let me qualify "x" particular time as I guess time 0 of the existing phenomenal organism with full blown subject/object double-aspect. Before time 0 there was no subject/object dichotomy. There is here a sort of step that is missing which is how things went from before time 0 to time 0. It's kind of like materialist/realists who want to explain the hard problem by piling on more scientific theory and neural networks, etc. f you get a enough threshold of neuron, BOOM consciousness and experience come about. Here, instead of neurons, we are piling on more Will until BOOM experience comes about. And if it is not about Will piling up to the threshold of representation, then again, I am just using that theory as a placeholder for the missing step between time 0 (representation with subject/object aspect) and before time 0 (no representation and no subject/object aspect).

Yeah, I mean I'm not all that interested in taking this convo from the top. The disagreements at that level are vast, insuperable, built of other disagreements. You think ppl share no world, I think they do. Idk, I guess we just have different approaches. I don't think, at this point, we can benefit much from one another.

It's fine. I'm a little sick of all of it myself I feel like I've already 'graduated,' no one has anything interesting to say on the subject I haven't heard already, and I think the important insights can't be communicated anyway.

Yeah, I mean I'm not all that interested in taking this convo from the top. The disagreements at that level are vast, insuperable, built of other disagreements. You think ppl share no world, I think they do. Idk, I guess we just have different approaches. I don't think, at this point, we can benefit much from one another. — csalisbury

It's fine. I'm a little sick of all of it myself I feel like I've already 'graduated,' no one has anything interesting to say on the subject I haven't heard already, and I think the important insights can't be communicated anyway. — The Great Whatever

Well, I thought I brought up a good point.

It's fine. I'm a little sick of all of it myself I feel like I've already 'graduated,' no one has anything interesting to say on the subject I haven't heard already,and I think the important insights can't be communicated anyway. — The Great Whatever

How is this any different from esoteric nonsense? If you can't communicate, or at least help someone understand what these insights are, they're only important to you. And unless you're about to claim that you're infallible, there is a concern about whether or not it's bullshit.

About the Chronos paradox and the need for representations to be supported by organisms?

I don't think I'm infallible, there's just always a cost to bothering with communication, and there's no obligation to bother with it. Is it really such a big deal that not everyone in the world agrees with you?

About the Chronos paradox and the need for representations to be supported by organisms? — The Great Whatever

Yes.

That's not what I said.

Mother Theresa was totally on board with-the-world-as-suffering view and not only surrounded herself with the suffering but often denied them ways of easing that suffering. This is empathy not for people but for proofs. Many pessimistic philosophers do the same with ideas about the suffering imo) — csalisbury

Sorry for the delayed response; I missed this before. To deny the suffering available means of ease would be perverse unless it was driven by doctrine (and maybe arguably then also); denying them on the grounds that they had been elected (or condemned) by God or Karma, or whatever higher authority or order, to suffer.

I'm not seeing it as "empathy for proofs" but as adherence to dogma. Do you mean to say that many pessimistic philosophers think that people should suffer, or that many pessimistic philosophers are wedded to their own dogma that people suffer more than they enjoy, and to their attendant dogma that therefore life is shit?

So you seemed to get the question but I did not see a response.

Why do you think the explanation given in section 7 of WWR is inadequate?

But the world as idea, with which alone we are here concerned, only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time. Since, however, it is the most universal form of the knowable, in which all phenomena are united together through causality, time, with its infinity of past and future, is present in the beginning of knowledge. The phenomenon which fills the first present must at once be known as causally bound up with and dependent upon a sequence of phenomena which stretches infinitely into the past, and this past itself is just as truly conditioned by this first present, as conversely the present is by the past. Accordingly the past out of which the first present arises, is, like it, dependent upon the knowing subject, without which it is nothing. It necessarily happens, however, that this first [pg 040] present does not manifest itself as the first, that is, as having no past for its parent, but as being the beginning of time. It manifests itself rather as the consequence of the past, according to the principle of existence in time. In the same way, the phenomena which fill this first present appear as the effects of earlier phenomena which filled the past, in accordance with the law of causality. Those who like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos (χρονος), the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment here referred to at which time appears, though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him, since he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease, and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene. — selection of section 7 of WWR

This is a bit convoluted, but if I unpack it, he is saying that time did not exist before the first organism, even if appearances say otherwise. This shows his sympathies to Kant's transcendental idealism. Time and space are only existent in a mind, but are not existent outside this. Thus, before the first organism, time is non-existent. Rather, timeless Will is, in actuality, the ever present, and the idea of a a beginning and end is just an appearance of the mind, but not the reality of the situation. I get this. The only answer that makes sense here to my question is that, time/space/causality has always been around as the objective form of Will. The time before representing organism (Kronos) is only a trick of time itself. There was no time before the first organism, and all things that can be said to happen before that, did not happen in any absolute sense, but only in the seeming sense, that it "seems" like things happened before the first organism, but it did not.

This to me, just seems intuitively not convincing. It does seem that there was a time/space causality before the first organism. Though, I understand and put much value in his idea that there needs to be some sort of mind-dependent time/space/causality framework by a representing organism for phenomenal events to take place, it seems quite an odd theory to say that everything relies on the first organism's ability to represent the subject/object relationship for the whole of existence to be realized. Schopenhauer would even concede that time and space from the point of the first representing organism would at least move forward as we are familiar. How it is that that organism just "is" without cause, seems a bit odd.

This to me, just seems intuitively not convincing. It does seem that there was a time/space causality before the first organism. — schopenhauer1

There was, but this fact only arises once consciousness does. In other words, the way consciousness is structured is such that it must project time backward.

Do you mean to say that many pessimistic philosophers think that people should suffer, or that many pessimistic philosophers are wedded to their own dogma that people suffer more than they enjoy, and to their attendant dogma that therefore life is shit? — John

No, I think most pessimistic philosophers begin as sincere sensitive souls, who truly wish that things were different. But this kind of pessimism easily devolves (or calcifies) into a narcissism of suffering, of striking the pose of the the Saint in Agony. It's worth noting that Beckett, Cioran & Schopenhauer all had exquisitely maintained hair. I've mentioned that before, I think, here or on the other forum and I've also mentioned my favorite anecdote - Cioran's letter to someone or other about seeing Beckett on a park bench and being just bowled over with envy for how deeply he appeared to be in despair. Susan Sontag, apropos of Cioran, describes the pessimistic style as often veering dangerously close to a 'coquettishness of the void.' . One becomes invested in one's pose and routine, which begins earnestly, but which becomes a well-oiled machine that runs on examples and aestheticizations of suffering. To quote Beckett: ''I must have got embroiled in a kind of inverted spiral, I mean one the coils of which, instead of widening more and more, grew narrower and narrower and finally, given the kind of space in which I was supposed to evolve, would come to an end for lack of room"

(btw, re: Mother Theresa, "I think it is very beautiful for the poor to accept their lot, to share it with the passion of Christ. I think the world is being much helped by the suffering of the poor people." This is, for sure, perverse.)

There was, but this fact only arises once consciousness does. In other words, the way consciousness is structured is such that it must project time backward. — The Great Whatever

I actually don't think he is saying that time existed in any absolute sense before consciousness. Rather, I think he is saying that we believe that time existed before consciousness because it simply appears that way based on how consciousness is structured. So, before the first organism, in the absolute sense of the term, there was no actual time. This is why I find the notion odd. The organism had to be around at all times for there to be any phenomenal world of appearances. You cannot even say that there was Will before time and then there was Will + time. If you do say this, then you have the odd notion that time is being caused, when that is not his theory. Time/space/causality is simply the flip side of will. Time/space/causality only adheres in organisms. Organisms cannot exist before point 0. Since time/space/causality is the flip side of will, since organisms need to exist for there to be time/space/causality, then organisms had to exist in some ever present state for there to be time/space/causality.

Cioran is so handsome :3

I actually don't think he is saying that time existed in any absolute sense before consciousness. — schopenhauer1

Time doesn't really 'exist,' for Schopenhauer, since existence is 'reality' or roughly 'causality,' which presupposes time. Time isn't real in the Kantian framework in a very substantive sense -- it's ideal.

Time/space/causality is simply the flip side of will. Time/space/causality only adheres in organisms. Organisms cannot exist before point 0. Since time/space/causality is the flip side of will, since organisms need to exist for there to be time/space/causality, then organisms had to exist in some ever present state for there to be time/space/causality. — schopenhauer1

You are thinking of the world as temporal in-itself, which Schop. denies. It's as if the organisms are 'keeping' time in place, so they had to be around since the beginning, making sure that the time before there was time didn't cause a paradox. But if you scrap all that and realize that time isn't real in the above sense, none of this is problematic.

Great images, csalisbury! I agree with you about the aesthetization of suffering which is characteristic of such narcissistic figures.

It would seem that in order to render the aesthetization of their suffering on the grand scale, they must also universalize it, that is they must take it to represent a great and universal truth; and they are consequently wedded to the dogma that life is shit (and of course in their own eyes they have in some sense, in their greatness, risen above it, like the proverbial lily that grows in a dungheap).

Time doesn't really 'exist,' for Schopenhauer, since existence is 'reality' or roughly 'causality,' which presupposes time. Time isn't real in the Kantian framework in a very substantive sense -- it's ideal. — The Great Whatever

The first part of your statement seems to be a misreading of Schop to me. Existence is reality- yes. However, "roughly causality which presupposes time", One part of causality is the result of time and space's presence which happens in a fourfold root structure that he called The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I don't get how causality, time, and space are not manifest in world of appearance? It seems real in the sense that it is part of the world of appearances.

As for your second statement that time isn't real in the Kantian framework, yes I just said that when I said time doesn't exist in any absolute sense for Schopenhauer and that this follows Kantian's transcendental framework. So you seemed to restate what I said as if I did not agree with you.

You are thinking of the world as temporal in-itself, which Schop. denies. It's as if the organisms are 'keeping' time in place, so they had to be around since the beginning, making sure that the time before there was time didn't cause a paradox. But if you scrap all that and realize that time isn't real in the above sense, none of this is problematic. — The Great Whatever

This is also seems to be a misreading to me. I already agreed that Schop is sympathetic to Kant's transcendental idealism, and thus time is not real outside independent of mind. I get that. But I don't see how it follows that time isn't real. Will needs time/space/causality in order for the world to be Will and Representation. Otherwise, the world is just Will and not representation. You have a couple problems if you say the world is just Will and representation is not "real". Here are some problems:

1) Clearly Schop thinks that representation is fair game, and that this is an "aspect" of reality that is the flip side of Will.

2) If Will is primary and representation is an illusion or somehow subordinate or secondary, then you have to explain how it is that representation is created by Will. This is the same problem as the materialists when it comes to problems of consciousness. A materialist who does not understand the hard problem of consciousness might say- "at point x, enough neurons got together and poof the first primitive first-person, experiential consciousness came about!". At the same point, you will have the problem with your (possible?) interpretation of Schop. There is first Will (just think of this as the "neurons" in the materlist theory). You have enough Will and poof, out comes representation. That does not seem right.

So, in order to counteract this idea, we have to say that representation is not secondary, but is rather the flip side of Will that ensures that there is always an object for the subject. It was there all along. However, this conclusion leads to the odd idea that organism were there all along. In other words, the most primitive organism was ever present along with Will.

Here is the thing- you can say that representation is an illusion and Will is primary, but this is almost as bad as the fallacy of eliminative materialists that say consciousness is an illusion. The illusion, has to be accounted for. The illusion of time's existence is still something that exists- qua appearances as rel rather than absolutely real. This appearance could not be "created" or "caused" since that does not exist outside of time/space. The ever present must exist along side the time-contingent in this model. The odd conclusion is that the first organism has to always be around as it can never be caused.