You’re the one who introduced Buddhism to the conversation. I’m simply pointing out that when Buddhism and western scientific materialism speak of the illusory nature of life and mind, they mean entirely different things. Materialism undermines reason, it doesn’t surpass it. It does this by treating reason itself as an evolutionary adaption, exactly as per Wieseltier’s criticism in the review of Dennett:

the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else.

Whereas Buddhists say the Buddha’s insight transcends reason:

These are those dhammas, bhikkhus, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, which the Tathāgata, having realized for himself with direct knowledge, propounds to others; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak.

Source

Hence - entirely different perspectives.

It's nonsense to say that Dennett thinks reason is "undermined". If he thought that why would take the trouble to write books that consist in reasoned argument.

I's not a corollary of his positon any more than than is of Buddhism that reason is "undermined". Reason is underpinned only by its own principles of coherence and consistency, not by anything beyond itself. Dennett could consistently say, just as Buddhism does, that the real transcends reason (in the sense that the map is not the territory).

One of the strongest arguments against materialism, Dennett’s or anyone’s, is the argument from reason.

It's nonsense to say that Dennett thinks reason is "undermined". If he thought that why would take the trouble to write books that consist in reasoned argument. — Janus

The grounds are like this - as has been discussed at length in the thread on whether information is physical, the conception of ‘reason’ in the history of philosophy, has generally been that the nature of reason is incorporeal or immaterial. This is because of the understanding that an intelligible truth, such as a logical or arithmetical proof, is self-evidently true to the faculty of reason itself, without any need to refer to an external (or corporeal) fact. So when we employ the various terms that are common in reasoned inference - if this, then that, if x is the case, then y must follow - we’re not relying on a physical fact to make the case, but on the relationships of ideas, which has the force of logical necessity. So the basic argument from this is that logic and reason themselves, can’t be reduced to, or understood in terms of, natural or physical relations or conjunctions; they rely on the fact that abstractions have real force or potency in their own right. That is what Wieseltier refers to as the ‘independence of reason’ (which is also referred to as ‘sovereignty of reason’.)

This line of argument has been developed at length by Alvin Plantinga, in the ‘evolutionary argument against naturalism’. I myself am not persuaded by some aspects of Plantinga’s argument, but the fact of its existence at least it ought to demonstrate that the accusation that ‘materialism undermines reason’, is a serious argument and not simply a statement of feeling or a throwaway line.

There’s another ground as well, which is the one Wieseltier refers to when he says that Dennett ‘animalises’ reason. This is the argument that, as the quotation says, if ‘reason’ is to be understood in biological terms, as an adaption or a means to survival, then why would one have any faith in reason? ‘Reason’ might be the name for an elaborate ruse on the part of the hominid brain, the aim of which is always ultimately the same thing, namely to survive and procreate. (That seems awfully close to the argument of that Californian professor we discussed recently, namely Donald Hoffman.)

And then there’s also the sense in which biological materialism undermines the sense of there being a cosmic reason for existence itself. Given that the theistic religions understand mankind as central to the cosmic drama, the appeal to evolutionary naturalism as a counter-argument often involves the claim, explicit or implicit, that life occurs ‘for no reason’, that it’s a kind of ‘chemical reaction’ that got started by a lightning strike or in an undersea vent, and then basically developed via an algorithm according to Darwinian principles, resulting, in Stephen Hawkings’ charming phrase, in the ‘chemical scum’ of human life.

All the things you've 'pointed out to me' over the years, amount to your explaining your point of view. We agree on some things, and disagree on many more, as I have always been opposed to scientific materialism, and so it would be mistaken to assume that I have been persuaded by your arguments. — Wayfarer

What I "pointed out" is a logical consequence of your own view. If you are unpersuaded by what I am saying, then that is simply a failure of rationality on your part, not a failure to be swayed by my general worldview.

However competing philosophical theories are adjudicated, it is not by reference to empirical observations about nature. If they were, then we'd no longer be doing metaphysics, but rather would be doing physics. Debates over, say, platonism vs. nominalism are not fought with competing sets of data: they're fought with a priori argumentation.

Science (under which I here broadly lump other empirical, evidence-based disciplines such as history) relies on observation and the collecting of evidence to bolster its theories, i.e. an empiricist methodology. Disputes which can be adjudicated empirically fall (at least in principle) within the ambit of the sciences. Ergo, to claim that a particular dispute - "design" vs. "no design" in this case - is not a matter for the sciences is to claim that it cannot be adjudicated empirically, i.e. that a designed universe is observationally indistinguishable from an undesigned one. That seems, at least prima facie to be an absurd claim (for one thing, in the case of the "design" hypothesis, it makes one wonder just what the designer has designed). Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that such disputes are not a scientific matter. If you see a flaw in my reasoning, please point it out, and please be specific.

As for 'stamping my feet', I have been on these forums for a good while, at various times I have entered elaborate arguments in favour of the views I hold which I'm not going to repeat in detail on every occasion. What I provided is my general attitude towards the matter, and I stand by it.

Could you do me the favor of providing a link to a discussion (with me, or with anyone else) in which you in fact did offer arguments in favor of your views? Not to be uncharitable, but the closest thing to an argument I've yet seen you muster is a sort of appeal to adverse consequences (i.e. "it would be terrible for society if materialism is true, ergo materialism must be false"), which is most definitely fallacious reasoning. The rest comes from name-dropping your circle of preferred authors and linking to things other people have written, rather than putting their points into your own words, and distilling them into cogent arguments which can be analyzed on a premise-by-premise basis, or anything of the sort.

I don't think even the nature of 'purpose, intention or design', or arguments about what these amount to, are in scope for the physical sciences (although they may be for natural philosophy proper).[...]

AFAIK, "natural philosophy" is simply an antiquated term for "science;" thus, there is little relevant distinction between the two in modern times.

Design, purpose or intention doesn't incidentally mean an endorsement of 'intelligent design', which I am generally averse to, on account of my dislike of American evangelical protestantism.

This would seem a genetic fallacy. I myself am likewise no fan of intelligent design creationism or of evangelical Protestantism, but to regard ID as false "on account of" one's dislike for its main proponents is fallacious. Good arguments can be propounded by bad people.

However, the nature of life and mind remain elusive. Certainly there is no 'vital spirit' as an objective substance, but the allegory I prefer to think in terms of, is the relationship between letters and meaning, or between microelectronics and drama - you won't find TV shows or the characters that play them, inside a television set, you won't find the meaning of a text inside the ink and paper in which it is reproduced.

I grant that the nature of mind (at least in terms of the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, etc) is poorly understood: however, it is as poorly-understood by philosophy as it is by science! And science (unlike philosophy) can have important and relevant things to say about the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness, the workings of the brain, its ontogeny and phylogeny, and a host of other problems which a priori philosophy is mostly impotent to tackle.

However, I deny that the nature of life itself remains elusive. What, exactly, is elusive about it? Again, we have dissected life to its component atoms, and have acquired exquisitely detailed understanding of its workings, down to the level of molecules in many cases. Certainly, much remains to be discovered, but there is nothing fundamentally mysterious about life anymore: science has demystified it.

More of the 'promissory notes of materialism'.

Sure. And as I said above, the good money is on a physicalistic/naturalistic science to solve these problems, given its extraordinarily successful track record, and given the extraordinary paucity of successes of its alternatives. So, you'd do well to extend those promissory notes to materialism than to its alternatives: it has much better credit.

Could you do me the favor of providing a link to a discussion (with me, or with anyone else) in which you in fact did offer arguments in favor of your views? — Arkady

The old forum has died. In any case in this thread I have provided detailed responses to your questions here, here, and especially here, and here. There must be about - what - 2,500 words written in response to your criticisms (although some of them you didn't respond to and anything that strays too far from your customary positivist scientific realism seems to go by you.)

to claim that a particular dispute - "design" vs. "no design" in this case - is not a matter for the sciences is to claim that it cannot be adjudicated empirically, i.e. that a designed universe is observationally indistinguishable from an undesigned one. That seems, at least prima facie to be an absurd claim (for one thing, in the case of the "design" hypothesis, it makes one wonder just what the designer has designed). — Arkady

How is it an empirical question? Could a 'non-designed universe' ever be compared to 'a designed universe'?

In a Scientific American cover story on the Multiverse, we read the following:

Fundamental constants are finely tuned for life. A remarkable fact about our universe is that physical constants have just the right values needed to allow for complex structures, including living things. Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Leonard Susskind and others contend that an exotic multiverse provides a tidy explanation for this apparent coincidence: if all possible values occur in a large enough collection of universes, then viable ones for life will surely be found somewhere. This reasoning has been applied, in particular, to explaining the density of the dark energy that is speeding up the expansion of the universe today.

DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? (cover story). By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug 2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. 6p.

So, notice the reasoning here: Weinberg and Susskind find the actual 'fine-tuning argument' is embarrassing, because, by golly, it really does seem to show that we're not simply accidental tourists, that the universe, in Freeman Dyson's words, 'really did seem to know we were coming'. But not to worry! Why not just posit gazillions of other universes! And then we save the 'accidental tourist' theory! It's so easy! And nobody can ever resolve it! That sure kicks the ball into the long grass, doesn't it.

Now, as it happens, in the years since this article was written, a controversy has erupted in which that author, George Ellis, is a player. This controversy is about whether string theory, and the related mutiverse cosmology, are scientific theories at all (for which, see Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics, Nature.) Ellis and Silk recommend circumspection with respect to some of the wilder theories in circulation. In the other corner, we have Max Tegmark, Sean Carroll, and others, for whom no speculative metaphysics is too far-out provided the mathematics makes some kind of sense.

So when you work out a way, in this climate, to resolve the question of the 'grand design', then do let us know.

The grounds are like this - as has been discussed at length in the thread on whether information is physical, the conception of ‘reason’ in the history of philosophy, has generally been that the nature of reason is incorporeal or immaterial. — Wayfarer

That's not grounds, it is merely what some philosophers thought about the nature of reason in the past. Many modern philosophers think that this way of thinking about reason is based on the fact that we cannot intuit the source of our thoughts in brain activity.

I'm not arguing for that standpoint, I'm arguing that it is one plausible explanation for the idea that reason is "immaterial". Remember, to say reason is immaterial is to postulate the existence of immaterial substance or process.. This is to posit dualism. The problems with this view were definitively brought to light in the Cartesian picture; which is a vision of totally brute mechanical matter, and substantively separate minds perceiving its activities and (somehow?) interacting with it.

What does it mean to say that thought is not physical or material?

• Does it mean that it is not a perceptible object of the five senses? But then energy and causality are also in this category; they are known only by their affects, as thought is. Desire and emotion are in this category. Regularity, similarity and difference are in this category. Kant's twelve categories and life itself is in this category. It is obvious that none of these things are direct objects of the senses; but is this fact sufficient to warrant saying that they are not aspects or activities of the material?

• Does it mean that thoughts do not have their origin in neural activity? If not, then how do you explain the origin of something "immaterial" (whatever that might even mean) in something material? If to say something is immaterial is just to say it cannot be directly observed. then no one will argue with that. But then to reify that idea of immateriality into a position of some utterly vague notion of 'immaterial substance' would seem to be wrong-headed, because you cannot even say precisely what you are arguing for.

We don't know what the correlation between rational thought and neuronal activity is, but there seems to be very good reason to believe that there is such a correlation. Personally, I don't believe the question can ever be definitively answered due to the fact that we cannot directly perceive the neuronal generation of thought; but any fruitful approach to an answer cannot be based on positing two entirely separate substances, a material and an immaterial; that much seems clear.

if ‘reason’ is to be understood in biological terms, as an adaption or a means to survival, then why would one have any faith in reason? — Wayfarer

Reason provides its own justification for having faith in it; because it works. We don't know what the source of reason is, but if we have reason to believe that its origin is in "animality" (an idea which is supported by the great deal of evidence for evolution) why should that diminish our faith in it? We know it works, so no theory about its origin could ever undermine our faith in it.

There seems to be an indwelling material, vegetative, animal intelligence in nature itself I would say, yet it seem impossible to see how that will ever be directly observable. I would be tempted to call that material intelligence God, and think that reason, as well as instinct, imagination, intuition, emotion and volition have their sources in that material intelligence.

And then there’s also the sense in which biological materialism undermines the sense of there being a cosmic reason for existence itself. — Wayfarer

But the cosmos is existence itself. How could there be a reason for that existence "outside of" itself. As Far as I know the Buddhists posit no positive reason for existence, but only the negative reason of attachment. I prefer to think that the reason for existence lies in God's (nature's) desire to produce greater and greater creations; nature as an artist. I also like the idea that everything in nature, in fact nature/God itself has not only a temporal, but an eternal existence. As Plato said: "Time is the moving image of eternity". Materialism in its broadest conceptions does not conflict with this at all, so far as I can see.

it is merely what some philosophers thought — Janus

All philosophy is what 'some philosophers thought'.

The problems with this view were definitively brought to light in the Cartesian picture — Janus

That is one version of dualism, which depicts mind as 'a substance', with many well-known and copiously documented problems,

Does it mean that thoughts do not have their origin in neural activity? — Janus

I will refer to the same argument that I referred to in the information as physical thread. What does 'originate' mean?

Ask yourself this: what about something like a logical principle, such as the law of the excluded middle, or the law of identity. Do you think that is something that could be said to have 'its origin in neural activity'? I would say not: it is a principle that a sufficiently intelligent being is able to discern. And the same principle can be applied to many articles of 'the furniture of reason', such as number. Whatever kind of brain you have, you will be obliged to recognise that 2 does in fact equal 2. That is not something which 'originates in the brain'.

Another point is that neuroscience has shown that the mind can actually cause material changes to neural configuration. That happens in cases where there has been damage to one area of the brain, and where the mind re-organises the activities of the brain to compensate. It also happens because learned skills influence neural configuration. Those are some of many examples of 'top-down causation', where volitional or cognitive activity acts 'downward' on neural matter. If the mind were the product of the brain, you wouldn't expect to see that - changes ought only to go 'upward' from the material layer. The same can be said of many psychosomatic effects, even the placebo effect.

We don't know what the source of reason is, but if we have reason to believe that its origin is in "animality" (an idea which is supported by the great deal of evidence for evolution) why should that diminish our faith in it? We know it works, so no theory about its origin could ever undermine our faith in it. — Janus

We only know that it works because we are able to reason. Reason is the criterion for making that judgement. Where I'm dubious, and suspicious, about Dennett's reasoning, is that he purports to explain reason in terms of adaptive necessity. He animalises reason, exactly as Wieseltier says.

There seems to be an indwelling material, vegetative, animal intelligence in nature itself I would say, yet it seem impossible to see how that will ever be directly observable. — Janus

We already discussed that.

But the cosmos is existence itself. — Janus

Carl Sagan: 'Cosmos is all there is, and ever will be', a canonical statement of naturalism. I didn't think you maintained that naturalism was all-inclusive, although you don't seem to be able to make up your mind. In any case, a traditional epithet of the Buddha is that he is 'lokuttara' which means 'world-transcending'; which is central to this debate.

All philosophy is what 'some philosophers thought'. — Wayfarer

Yes, obviously, so what is it above that? Why is it a ground for thinking that thought is immaterial?

That is one version of dualism, which depicts mind as 'a substance', with many well-known and copiously documented problems, — Wayfarer

Right, so please give an account of the other version.

I will refer to the same argument that I referred to in the information as physical thread. What does 'originate' mean? — Wayfarer

Check the dictionary. You know what "originate" means. Do you think thoughts originate in the brain or not. If not, then where?

We already discussed that. — Wayfarer

Not to my satisfaction. Here is the discussion you referenced:

Why do you think it makes it easier to understand "how it works" if you postulate a transcendent, that is separate, intelligence? — Janus


Because it is impossible to demonstrate that there is anything answering to the description of ‘spirit’ that is ‘imminently bound to the nature of things’. If you claim such a thing exists, Daniel Dennett is quite within his rights to ask ‘well, what is this “spirit”? What is the evidence that any such thing exists?’ And I’m pretty sure you won’t be able to show any evidence. — Wayfarer

It is equally impossible to demonstrate that there is a mind or spirit that is transcendent so this answer is nothing more than a red herring. The question was 'which conception of spirit makes it easier to understand how it could act in nature?'. It seems obvious to me that this would be the immanent notion of spirit, or God, or mind or whatever you want to call it.

Ask yourself this: what about something like a logical principle, such as the law of the excluded middle, or the law of identity. Do you think that is something that could be said to have 'its origin in neural activity'? I would say not: it is a principle that a sufficiently intelligent being is able to discern. — Wayfarer

Where else would a logical principle originate but in a brain/mind as a generalization of the nature of its experience? Isn't the "sufficiently intelligent being that is able to discern it" just a being with the requisite complexity of neural activity? Do you think you would be able to recognize logical principles if you were given a frontal lobotomy?

Another point is that neuroscience has shown that the mind can actually cause material changes to neural configuration. That happens in cases where there has been damage to one area of the brain, and where the mind re-organises the activities of the brain to compensate. — Wayfarer

Yes, the brain, just like the body, can, within limits,reorganize itself to compensate for damage. I don't see why a physical organ would not be able to cause physical changes. Note, though, that unlike you I don't separate the physical from the mental and the spiritual; so the brain is a spiritual organ in virtue of its physicality, not in spite of it.

We only know that it works because we are able to reason. Reason is the criterion for making that judgement. Where I'm dubious, and suspicious, about Dennett's reasoning, is that he purports to explain reason in terms of adaptive necessity. He animalises reason, exactly as Wieseltier says. — Wayfarer

Do you really want to claim that human reason has not evolved and adapted over the estimated million or so years that human beings have existed as a species? It is the human animal that has evolved. The animal is not contrary or separate to the spirit; it is the spirit; which means that animals are spiritual beings too, just as we are.

Carl Sagan: 'Cosmos is all there is, and ever will be', a canonical statement of naturalism. I didn't think you maintained that naturalism was all-inclusive, although you don't seem to be able to make up your mind. In any case, a traditional epithet of the Buddha is that he is 'lokuttara' which means 'world-transcending'; which is central to this debate. — Wayfarer

I do think in naturalistic terms. I don't even know what it could mean to think in supernaturalistic terms; I wouldn't know where to begin. Buddha's epithets are irrelevant, I think, rather than "central" to this debate. That is mythology not philosophy. I don't believe you know what Buddha's purported "world transcendence" could really mean; it is a vague notion. (if you did know about it it would be in such a way that you could not speak about your knowledge, but only show it in your manner of being).

By the way I am not denying that there might be an afterlife, but I do deny that we could know it if there were, or that it is a matter of reason as opposed to a matter of faith. I have no argument with people trying to imagine, intuit or have faith in such ideas; if it useful to them and helps them live better then that's great. But such ideas, insofar as they are outside the ambit of inter-subjective corroboration and agreement cannot be the subject of either science or philosophical argumentation (and the latter seems to be what we are attempting to do here). As an aside, I believe such otherworldly ideas should not be matters that influence law, public policy, morals, ethics and so on. Religion and politics should be kept well separate).

I don't even know what it could mean to think in supernaturalistic terms; I wouldn't know where to begin. — Janus

I can see that. Metaphysics is difficult.

This is a typical example of your apparent inability to deal with objections except by becoming condescending.

The fact is that you can't produce a coherent account of what it means to think in supernaturalistic terms, and you are attempting to hide that fact by resorting to your usual cheap tricks.

For every argument supporting any metaphysical position there is a potentially more sophisticated argumemt supporting its opposite; that is the nature of dialectic.

The old forum has died. In any case in this thread I have provided detailed responses to your questions here, here, and especially here, and here. There must be about - what - 2,500 words written in response to your criticisms (although some of them you didn't respond to and anything that strays too far from your customary positivist scientific realism seems to go by you.) — Wayfarer

None of these contain arguments. Do you not understand the difference? All you have done is quoted other sources, stated your view, and so forth. But, you have provided no reasons for supposing that materialism (or physicalism, naturalism, and allied positions) is false. It has nothing to do with my "positivist scientific realism;" it has to do with you never defending your views, only stating what those views are and complaining about those views you don't like.

ow is it an empirical question? Could a 'non-designed universe' ever be compared to 'a designed universe'? — Wayfarer

I think it couldn't be any other way. Again, if an undesigned universe is empirically indistinguishable from a designed one (that is, each hypothesis makes the exact same predictions, and both are equally well-supported by the same set of observations), then just what is the designer supposed to have designed?

In a Scientific American cover story on the Multiverse, we read the following:

Fundamental constants are finely tuned for life. A remarkable fact about our universe is that physical constants have just the right values needed to allow for complex structures, including living things. Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Leonard Susskind and others contend that an exotic multiverse provides a tidy explanation for this apparent coincidence: if all possible values occur in a large enough collection of universes, then viable ones for life will surely be found somewhere. This reasoning has been applied, in particular, to explaining the density of the dark energy that is speeding up the expansion of the universe today.

DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? (cover story). By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug 2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. 6p.

So, notice the reasoning here: Weinberg and Susskind find the actual 'fine-tuning argument' is embarrassing, because, by golly, it really does seem to show that we're not simply accidental tourists, that the universe, in Freeman Dyson's words, 'really did seem to know we were coming'. But not to worry! Why not just posit gazillions of other universes! And then we save the 'accidental tourist' theory! It's so easy! And nobody can ever resolve it! That sure kicks the ball into the long grass, doesn't it.

Now, as it happens, in the years since this article was written, a controversy has erupted in which that author, George Ellis, is a player. This controversy is about whether string theory, and the related mutiverse cosmology, are scientific theories at all (for which, see Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics, Nature.) Ellis and Silk recommend circumspection with respect to some of the wilder theories in circulation. In the other corner, we have Max Tegmark, Sean Carroll, and others, for whom no speculative metaphysics is too far-out provided the mathematics makes some kind of sense.

So when you work out a way, in this climate, to resolve the question of the 'grand design', then do let us know.

I admit I have not read this in detail, as you have provided yet another quotation in lieu of actually discussing something yourself. I will only say that I have never defended the veracity of the multiverse, many-worlds hypothesis, string theory, or anything of the sort (and I agree that, to the extent that they don't make testable predictions, then they're not science). It is simply a subject outside of my knowledge (or even interest, really).