One of the salient characteristics of h. sapiens is to discover ideas that are able to be realised physically - to invent devices, such as these ones on which we're exchanging these thoughts, as a splendid example.

When you grasp a scientific principle, such as the law of motion, you are grasping an idea that is universally applicable and which can be exploited for physical ends. There are countless such examples in the history of science. According to a Platonist view, this is because humans alone are able to 'peer into the domain of the possible' and to retrieve from it things and ideas which have not existed previously. That is very close to the meaning of 'discovery'.

'if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.' From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.

I thought we sorted this one out already? Ideas are physical if you need them to be in order to maintain a cherished belief that a non-physical thing is impossible. But, if one isn't restricted by their own assumptions, then it's possible to observe that ideas exist and yet we have no means to measure their physical characteristics. How we have physical things that can't be measured in a physical way is seemingly problematic or the assertion that non-physical things do not exist is problematic. Does anyone have a forceful dismissive conjecture? Preferably with a map metaphor?

By information I understand "ideas" (signs, heuristics, algorithms) encoded in – processed by – a physical system. Unencoded "ideas" cannot affect physical systems and, in this sense, are not informational (vide C.S. Peirce, A. Turing, C. Shannon, S. Wolfram or D. Deutsch ... re: universal computation / universal quantum computation).

Reminds me of Wittgenstein's claim, meaning (information) is use. @Banno. — TheMadFool

Meaning is association. Use is established by habitual association. It's "chicken and egg" though, since habitual association is also established by use.

By information I understand "ideas" (signs, heuristics, algorithms) encoded in – processed by – a physical system. — 180 Proof

If a physical system can process abstract ideas, then there must be a causal relationship between the abstract ideas and the physical system which processes them. Agree?

I think that the first step in dispelling the materialist delusion is to understand that there is a causal relationship between abstract ideas and physical things. The second step, is to understand that unlike simple processing, where 'processed' is the effect, in the case of abstract ideas, the ideas are the cause and artificial goods are the effect.

Once "ideas" are encoded onto a physical system by being changed accordingly by another physical system (e.g. recording music) they then can be processed as (they become) "information". See the link provided in my previous post.

they then can be processed as (they become) "information". — 180 Proof

So encoding onto a physical system gives you encoded matter and that can be decoded and played back as music. Can you explain the necessity of the matter in its encoded state to become information? And how does that work or is it your perception?

A link which I referred to in my last post (from a previous post) further elaborates on the position I take on information.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-physical-origin-of-universal-computing-20151027/

Being published doesn't change the question. Is an information conversion necessary?

I think that the first step in dispelling the materialist delusion is to understand that there is a causal relationship between abstract ideas and physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

You moved on to the second step too soon. You may understand it, but could you offer a little more so I could too.

Obviously you're more interested in tit-for-tat point scoring than comprehension or an exchange of ideas, so I suggest you go play with yourself elsewhere. My position is laid out in a few or more posts if you care to read them. And if you don't, that's cool too. As for your question, it makes no sense to me probably because it's a non sequitur.

I think that the first step in dispelling the materialist delusion is to understand that there is a causal relationship between abstract ideas and physical things. The second step, is to understand that unlike simple processing, where 'processed' is the effect, in the case of abstract ideas, the ideas are the cause and artificial goods are the effect.

I wouldn’t describe it as “the materialist delusion”. But rather an ideology which doesn’t (from its own perspective) require a sentient being as the knower of abstract ideas. Take that knower out of the system and nothing has been lost.

I don’t think we as people who attribute a more fundamental role to the knower in this can dismiss this view. We are simply on the other side of the intellectual division between idealism and materialism. The other side of the same coin.

It's more like stress testing and you should welcome it. Anyway, I'll read what you write from now on.

Nicely put. I came across a phrase the other day, which conveys a lot about discovery and being in a few words.
“ you can’t become what you can’t see”

We have material brain states and these brain states have the ability to hold abstract ideas, so you can have material brain states in a causal relationship with material things. Why would that be a delusion?

dispelling the materialist delusion — Metaphysician Undercover

The view that abstract ideas can exist unsupported and can affect physical matter...?

Once "ideas" are encoded onto a physical system by being changed accordingly by another physical system (e.g. recording music) they then can be processed as (they become) "information". See the link provided in my previous post. — 180 Proof

So the ideas are changed by a physical system. How is this not a casual relation between ideas and a physical system?

You moved on to the second step too soon. You may understand it, but could you offer a little more so I could too. — Mark Nyquist

Do you see that blueprints are expressed ideas, which are causes in relation to the physical things which come into existence from the blueprints? Here's an example to demonstrate what I mean. Suppose I'm building a shed or some other small building, and I use the Pythagorean theorem to lay out my right angles. Do you see that this idea is the cause of that aspect of the shape of the building?

We have material brain states and these brain states have the ability to hold abstract ideas, so you can have material brain states in a causal relationship with material things. Why would that be a delusion? — Mark Nyquist

I agree with wayfarer, that "brain states" is an incoherent idea. The brain is always active so there is no such thing as the "state" which the brain is in. And if the brain was in a "state", then it would be inactive, and your talk of it being in a causal relation would not make any sense.

The view that abstract ideas can exist unsupported and can affect physical matter...? — Mark Nyquist

I didn't say anything about being unsupported. Read the following.

I wouldn’t describe it as “the materialist delusion”. But rather an ideology which doesn’t (from its own perspective) require a sentient being as the knower of abstract ideas. Take that knower out of the system and nothing has been lost. — Punshhh

Perhaps this ontology is better described as you do, but there is something incoherent about discussing abstract ideas which do not require a being for their existence. Most forms of idealism, like Berkeley's for example, propose the existence of Ideas independent from human minds, but as far as I know all such ideologies maintain a God of some sort to support the existence of those ideas. So they do not have an ideology which holds abstract ideas without the requirement of a knower.

The materialist will seize hold of this notion of independent Ideas or Forms, with complete disrespect for the support given by the knower, "God", and insist that such Ideas cannot interact with the physical world. But this is nothing but a total misrepresentation, a strawman, because the independent Ideas or Forms of the I\idealist are understood to interact with the physical world through the means of God, just like we understand human ideas to interact with the physical world through the means of human beings.

I don’t think we as people who attribute a more fundamental role to the knower in this can dismiss this view. We are simply on the other side of the intellectual division between idealism and materialism. The other side of the same coin. — Punshhh

I think that any view which proposes a dichotomy between material (or physical) objects, and immaterial (or non-physical) objects, without the possibility of any interaction between the two, ought to be dismissed as completely unrealistic. And, it is really only the deluded materialists who propose such a view, as a strawman representation of dualism. They can easily demonstrate that such a view is untenable, therefore they dismiss dualism. The so-called "problem of interaction" is often touted by materialists as a conclusive argument against dualism. But these same materialist appear to be completely unaware that this "problem" was resolved long ago by Plato, in the same work which demonstrates that dualism provides the only rational approach toward understanding the nature of reality.

So I don't accept your "other side of the same coin" analogy. These materialists who deny interaction haven't got a knower at all, because the knower provides the medium of interaction. They haven't got "a coin" in the analogy. They propose two sides, the physical and the non-physical, without any coin which the two sides are properties of. Then they demonstrate that such a position is untenable. Now, instead of realizing that what they've missed is the coin itself, (true reality), they propose one side of the coin as the correct representation of the coin. Of course that is a misrepresentation.

I didn't say anything about being unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, I can't always read endless threads to know everyone's positionn so sometimes I just ask. Thanks for your effort in explaining.

I've used the term brain state as both static and dynamic. Physical brains will always be in a dynamic state and information linked with brains will always be in a dynamic state. I agree, any theory of information that uses a static state is suspect.

Try this:

A dynamic brain holding mental content is physically equal to a dynamic brain state, as a definition.
Or; BRAIN(mental content) = brain state

And this, brain state = information, also BRAIN(mental content) = information

Equivalent states are BRAIN(specific mental content) = BRAIN(mental content) = brain state

The idea is to map observed specific mental content to a specific brain state. Static or dynamic.

If you define information in this way you have defined information as physical and the answer to 'Is "information" physical?' is 'Yes'.

So an observation is that how you answer the question depends on how you define information.

I've used the term brain state as both static and dynamic. Physical brains will always be in a dynamic state and information linked with brains will always be in a dynamic state. I agree, any theory of information that uses a static state is suspect. — Mark Nyquist

I really think that "dynamic state" is oxymoronic. So any type of theory which talks about a state as anything other than static would seem incoherent to me. I'll see if I can explain this to you. Suppose something like a brain is dynamic, actively changing. You might describe its condition at one time as state #1 and its condition at a following time as state #2, and we could conclude that there was active change between #1 and #2. But we cannot combine state #1 with state #2 to say that these are actually one "dynamic state" because we've already made the premise of two distinct states. And we cannot describe the activity between #1 and #2 as a state because we've already designated it as the change between state #1and #2, therefore not definable as a "state".

A dynamic brain holding mental content is physically equal to a dynamic brain state, as a definition. — Mark Nyquist

So this definition is clearly unacceptable, as incoherent.

A static state is not a dynamic state and a dynamic state is not a static state. Both exist and both are states. What would be incoherent?
Going from state 1 to state 2 is a stepped approach and lacks continuity. It's a calculus thing.

So the ideas are changed by a physical system. How is this not a casual relation between ideas and a physical system? — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously, "ideas" do not cause themselves to be encoded. :roll:
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-physical-origin-of-universal-computing-20151027/

Right, the second physical system you referred to ("being changed accordingly by another physical system") causes the ideas to be encoded. So there is a causal relation between this physical system, and the non-physical ideas.

And that causal relation between an idea and physical system is what?

And that causal relation between an idea and physical system is what? — 180 Proof

It's a causal relation between the physical and the non-physical, contrary to what you were saying. Look:

Ideas" are abstract and therefore are not in causal relation to facts. — 180 Proof

Unencoded "ideas" cannot affect physical systems and, in this sense, are not informational (vide C.S. Peirce, A. Turing, C. Shannon, S. Wolfram or D. Deutsch ... re: — 180 Proof

After telling me to read a physics textbook, you are familiar with Newton's third law aren't you? It's the law of interaction. If a physical system is causing changes to something non-physical, then the non-physical must be causing changes to the physical. Don't you think so?

:roll: :sweat:

So which is it that you actually believe, what you first stated, that non-physical, abstract ideas have no causal relations with physical systems, or what you later demonstrated with your words, that non-physical, abstract ideas have causal relations with physical systems?

:point:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/592581

Did you ever take lessons on how to use the English language, 180? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your posts just don't make any sense.

"GORT! KLAATU BARADA NIKTO."

Information is an abstract concept , a value we project on available claims with specific instrumental value. Those claims describe facts of our world.
So the question doesn't really makes much sense. Does information has an empirical foundation?..sure it does like any other similar concept (Logic, Calculation, Freedom,Knowledge, consciousness Etc).
Information "doesn't exist" in nature as an ultimate "entity" or whatever ontology one might prefer.
We as observers value claims that are based on facts and they can be used to inform our thoughts and actions.