If I had believed that the criticisms you offered had truly understood what was being proposed, I might be inclined to so believe. But, no. — Wayfarer

Ok. I'll bow to the true Scotsman. Those who disagree with you have not truly understood.

Those who disagree with you have not truly understood. — Banno

I haven't said that, either. I will deal with any cogent disagreements, but not those which betray a failure to grasp the point at issue. (If you would like to take this up again in the thread in which it started, please do. It is still active.)

The question that jumps out at me is: are the mathematical laws themselves physical, and, if so, how? I don’t expect an answer to that, as there isn’t one, so far as I know. But it makes a point about an inherent contradiction in physicalism. — Wayfarer

In formal logic, there is a difference between the domain of discourse - the a's, b's and c's that make up the content being discussed - and the logical connectives - the ^'s, ∃'s and =.

In physics, the content, the a's, b's and c's, are all of them physical. The connectives, including the mathematics, are not physical.

No presumption is made that 4+4=8 is physical.

He'd then be like someone who insists on moving the bishop along a column instead of a diagonal. Yes, he can do that, but it's not what we set out to do. — Banno

I like this metaphor.

A good explanation. It's a bit like setting up the domain of discourse to only include the physical, and sticking to that rule. What we ought keep in mind is that setting up the domain of discourse is making a choice as to what we include and exclude. — Banno

Agreed. Beyond that, just because you and I might agree that absolute presuppositions are not true or false, most people probably think they are. If that happens, their understanding of how the world works could be rigid and biased.

Corvus
...Collingwood is not saying these presuppositions are true, but that they underpin the method that was, historically, adopted. Further, if we instead of treating them as metaphysical truths treat them as methodological prescriptions, their truth is irrelevant. — Banno

This discussion has been great for me. There’s a bunch of things that have been bubbling around on the back burner that got brought out in the open. That has been really helpful.

Cheers. And likewise. Good thread.

The question that jumps out at me is: are the mathematical laws themselves physical, and, if so, how? I don’t expect an answer to that, as there isn’t one, so far as I know. But it makes a point about an inherent contradiction in physicalism.
— Wayfarer

In formal logic, there is a difference between the domain of discourse - the a's, b's and c's that make up the content being discussed - and the logical connectives - the ^'s, ∃'s and =.

In physics, the content, the a's, b's and c's, are all of them physical. The connectives, including the mathematics, are not physical.

No presumption is made that 4+4=8 is physical. — Banno

Not in formal logic. But surely the many fervent disagreements sorrounding the ontological status of numbers and scientific laws indicate that there is an issue there, beyond the strictures of formal logic. Specifically, the question of, if everything is indeed reducible to the physical, what of the nature of the mathematical reasoning that underpins physics? Why did Eugene Wigner's essay on The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences become such a celebrated essay in modern philosophy of physics?

But surely the many fervent disagreements sorrounding the ontological status of numbers and scientific laws indicate that there is an issue there, beyond the strictures of formal logic. Specifically, the question of, if everything is indeed reducible to the physical, what of the nature of the mathematical reasoning that underpins physics? — Wayfarer

It simply depends on what you call a "thing". It's pretty clear that thinking one can apply F=ma to 7+1=8 and find the mass of = is a category mistake.

These are different games. As if you had complained that a checkmate beats a royal flush.

That some folk make such errors does not imply they have a point.

The point is, it's a glaring contradiction:

[1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.
[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy.
[3] These substances behave in accordance with scientific principles, laws.
[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature.

If reality is wholly physical, why is it necessarily and lawfully answerable to non-physical mathematical reasoning, and why does that reasoning carry binding normative force?

From Collingwood's perspective, there is an absolute presupposition:

That reality is mathematically intelligible in a binding, law-governed way.

But physics cannot justify that presupposition. Formal logic cannot adjudicate it. Calling it a “different game” does not remove its necessity.

The point is, it's a glaring contradiction:

[1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.
[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy.
[3] These substances behave in accordance with scientific principles, laws.
[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature.

If reality is wholly physical, why is it necessarily and lawfully answerable to non-physical mathematical reasoning, and why does that reasoning carry binding normative force? — Wayfarer

There is only a contradiction because you don’t accept the possibility that mental processes can be understood in terms of physical, chemical, biological, and neurological processes. You and I agree that reductionist physicalist explanations for many phenomena are limiting and misleading. You just take it significantly further than I do.

The point is, it's a glaring contradiction: — Wayfarer

Formally, there is a difference between the domain and the formation rules, and how each is used. The language is about the items in the domain, the rules for that language are not the subject of that language.

When a physicist looks for explanations in terms of physical substances, they don't presume that those explanations have mass.

You and I agree that physicalism, at the extreme, is erroneous - that maths does not have mass. We agree that this shows science to be incomplete. You try to explain this by supposing that there must be some other substance, some spirit, to go along with the physical. That brings in all the problems of dualism.

My response is less forthright - I am just pointing out that maths is something we do, rather than some sort of substance. Mathematics is a practice, a framework of reasoning, not a thing with substance.

No doubt this is another example of not truly understanding you.

(Can I point out how much I appreciate your putting up with my crap? Thanks for the replies. )

There is only a contradiction because you don’t accept the possibility that mental processes can be understood in terms of physical, chemical, biological, and neurological processes. You and I agree that reductionist physicalist explanations for many phenomena are limiting and misleading. You just take it significantly further than I do. — T Clark

Yep - sort of.

A coin (remember coins? It's how we used to do money) is just a bit of alloy, but it takes on a special role in some of our games. There is a physical description and a financial description, and perhaps never the twain.

No doubt this is another example of not truly understanding you. — Banno

No, I think we're operating in different registers. What you're saying is quite true about domains of discourse. But I'm extending that to a further argument about epistemology and about the inherent contradictions of physicalism.

There is only a contradiction because you don’t accept the possibility that mental processes can be understood in terms of physical, chemical, biological, and neurological processes. — T Clark

I’m not denying that acts of reasoning are reliably correlated with physical, biological, and neurological processes. I’m denying that logical relations themselves—validity, necessity, entailment—can be reduced to physical causation. Actually it's very much the kind of point that Collingwood is pressing in his Essay on Metaphysics. And, for that matter, to attempt to reduce normative argument to physical causation would require invoking the very normativity that the argument seeks to explain! Whenever you engage in reasoned inference - because of x, then y - you are appealing only to the relations of ideas, not to anything physical as such.

No, I think we're operating in different registers. What you're saying is quite true about domains of discourse. But I'm extending that to a further argument about epistemology and about the inherent contradictions of physicalism. — Wayfarer

Epistemology just is a domain of discourse.

You couldn't complete the formalising of your argument, and I think that's because there is a mismatch between your four presumptions and your conclusion. They are in different domains.

Re-arranged:

I’m denying that logical relations themselves—validity, necessity, entailment—can be reduced to physical causation. — Wayfarer

That's not unlike someone complaining about being given a fifty dollar note cut in half instead of twenty five dollars. I don't think Clarky disagrees - I certainly don't. I agree.

But I don't think we need ghosts to explain the difference.


(indeed, I don't think physics can be reduced to physical causation... but that's another topic...)

There is only a contradiction because you don’t accept the possibility that mental processes can be understood in terms of physical, chemical, biological, and neurological processes.
— T Clark

I’m not denying that acts of reasoning are reliably correlated with physical, biological, and neurological processes. I’m denying that logical relations themselves—validity, necessity, entailment—can be reduced to physical causation. — Wayfarer

I didn’t mean what I said as criticism and I don’t discuss my relationship with my children in neurological terms. The message I get from Collingwood is that you choose your metaphysical and epistemological tools based on the specific work you’re trying to complete. I can be a physicalist when I want to do cognitive science and an idealist when I want to go out to lunch with my kids.

Another gem from Collingwood (p46)

it is a special characteristic af modern European civilization that metaphysics is habitually frowned upan and the existence of absolute presuppositions denied. This habit is neurotic. It is an attempt to overcome a superstitious dread by denying that there is any cause for it. If this neurosis ever achieves its astensible object, the eradication of metaphysics from the Eurapean mind, the eradication af science and civilization will be accomplished at the same time. If a sufficient number of Europeans want to destroy science and thus accomplish the suicide of civilization, nothing I can do will stop them; but at present, in England, they have not the power to prevent me from warning those who neither share nor suspect their design.

@Corvus
I've been rethinking this exchange between us. I think I jumped on it to quickly.

I feel that Metaphysics must investigate the presuppositions for their truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable, and then present them to Scientific inquiries as the preliminary foundation for their embarking the researches and experiments and coming to establishing Scientific laws and principles, and further hypothesis on the subject of their inquiries.
— Corvus

Your understanding of metaphysics is different from Collingwood’s and mine. Or at least my understanding of Collingwood’s understanding.

For that reason, Metaphysics is the central and critical part of Science. Science must not accept what is listed as "absolute presuppositions" without critical analysis and investigation into them before finding out on their truth and validities.
— Corvus

This is not how I see it. — T Clark

Yes, investigating absolute presuppositions is a worthwhile exercise. That's what we are doing here in this thread and what happens all the time on the forum. @Wayfarer is a strong voice for a non-physicalist approach. I tend to be somewhere in the middle, seeing the value of both physicalist and non-physicalist approaches. There are many others here I would call committed physicalists.

The difference for me is that the standard that gets applied is not "truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable", it's usefulness--The fruitfulness of the work that is performed under it's banner.

Actually, it occured to me after spending a few hours on Collingwood's Essay in Metaphysics yesterday, that I might fairly be accused of what he criticizes as 'pseudo-metaphysics'. The salient point is this:

There will also be something which I call pseudo-metaphysics. This will be a kind of thought in which questions are asked about what are in fact absolute presuppositions, but arising from the erroneous belief that they are relative presuppositions, and therefore, in their capacity as propositions, susceptible of truth and falsehood. Pseudo-metaphysics will ask such questions as this, where AP stands for any absolute presupposition: Is AP true? Upon what evidence is AP accepted? How can we demonstrate AP? What right have we to presuppose it if we can't? — Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics

Now, I generally question the veracity of '[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy'. So, in so doing, am I engaging in pseudo-metaphysics? I'm pretty sure that's how @Banno would see it.

Here is where I think Collingwood has helped me clarify what I am (and am not) doing. His point about metaphysics is that it is not primarily concerned with being qua being, in the traditional sense. Rather, each school of physical science operates against a background of absolute presuppositions that shape what counts as an admissible question or explanation within that science. 'Practical metaphysics', if you like, or even 'phenomenology of culture'.

Crucially, the effectiveness of such presuppositions does not depend on their being true—or even believed to be true—but simply on their being assumed. For that reason, trying to settle which scientific or metaphysical framework is “fundamentally right or wrong” by arguing for or against the truth of its presuppositions is misguided. What metaphysics can do, instead, is identify those presuppositions and examine the conundrums that arise when they are asked to do more work than they can sustain.

And that leads on to Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi, who come along after Collingwood, with their 'paradigms' and 'tacit knowledge'. They're covering similar territory albeit from different perspectives.

In any case, I acknowledge that my habitual antagonism to philosophical materialism is probably a little misplaced in this context, given that I now have a better grasp of what Collingwood was up to. It's been a valuable learning experience.

I'm pretty sure that's how Banno would see it. — Wayfarer

Yep.

"Close the door"
Is "Close the door" true? Upon what evidence is "Close the door" accepted? How can we demonstrate "Close the door"? What right have we to presuppose it if we can't?

These questions are infelicitous.

Same for "Construct explanations only in terms of matter and energy".

Thanks.

Now, I generally question the veracity of '[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy'. So, in so doing, am I engaging in pseudo-metaphysics? I'm pretty sure that's how Banno would see it. — Wayfarer

I don’t think so. If you were asking whether or not, it’s true, perhaps. But you don’t have to do that in order to reject it. You can just say it doesn’t work. It’s not the right approach to take here.

Beyond that, I don’t think Collingwood was taking a position on what absolute presuppositions were the best in particular situations.

His point about metaphysics is that it is not primarily concerned with being qua being, in the traditional sense. Rather, each school of physical science operates against a background of absolute presuppositions that shape what counts as an admissible question or explanation within that science. ' — Wayfarer

Yes, I think that’s right. I’m gonna put this from Collingwood in again. I’m pretty sure I posted it earlier in this thread. It really clarified things for me. I think it shows that an absolute preposition is nothing exotic or mystical. It’s something straightforward that we deal with every day.

[quote="T Clark;1032677"Ithem--"[An absolute presupposition] is a thing we take for granted in [our thinking]. We don't question it. We don't try to verify it. It isn't a thing anybody has discovered, like microbes or the circulation of the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted." [/quote]

I still don't see an argument that supports a conclusion that any particular metaphysics or presupposition is needed in order to do science. Science, as I understand it, is about observing empirical phenomena, imagining causation-based hypotheses that are consistent with currently accepted science to explain what has been observed and then proposing predictions that seem to be entailed by the hypotheses and experiments to test whether the predictions are observed or not.

Where is the need for any metaphysics (in the traditional sense) or even in the Collingwood sense (of absolute presuppositions)?

The difference for me is that the standard that gets applied is not "truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable", it's usefulness--The fruitfulness of the work that is performed under it's banner. — T Clark

Science and Metaphysics are the subjects which pursue truth. If the absolute presuppositions has nothing to do with truth and drawing the borders of the subjects, then what nature of usefulness and frutfulness could they expect to have from the presuppositions?

I still don't see an argument that supports a conclusion that any particular metaphysics or presupposition is needed in order to do science. — Janus

Clearly, I disagree, although many people feel is you do.

Science and Metaphysics are the subjects which pursue truth. — Corvus

I don’t see it that way. Science looks for knowledge—not the same as truth. And as Collingwood wrote:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

I don’t see it that way. Science looks for knowledge—not the same as truth. And as Collingwood wrote: — T Clark

Knowledge sounds too subjective and loose. Science is a rigorous subject which pursues verified truth on reality and universe. My knowledge on Astronomy is rudimentary. I wouldn't say it has much to do with Science.

But I know that some Scientists want to find out the truth if there are planets with life and civilization like ours out there somewhere in the space or in another galaxy.

then what nature of usefulness and frutfulness could they expect to have from the presuppositions? — Corvus

You haven't answered my main question to you yet.

Knowledge sounds too subjective and loose. Science is a rigorous subject which pursues verified truth on reality and universe. My knowledge on Astronomy is rudimentary. I wouldn't say it has much to do with Science. — Corvus

Are you saying astronomy isn’t science? We’ve had discussion here before about what’s included in science and what isn’t. They’re never very fruitful.

You haven't answered my main question to you yet. — Corvus

That’s true. This thread is about identifying the absolute presuppositions of pre-1905 modern science, not justifying the value of metaphysics. If you want to start a new thread on that, I will participate.

Are you saying astronomy isn’t science? We’ve had discussion here before about what’s included in science and what isn’t. They’re never very fruitful. — T Clark

No, that wasn't what I was saying at all. I said that in order to hint you that knowledge of something can be subjective - not much to do with Science. Knowledge can be private. It is justified belief. Science wouldn't want to pursue it, if it were a rigorous Science.

This thread is about identifying the absolute presuppositions of pre-1905 modern science, not justifying the value of metaphysics. — T Clark

Sure, so I thought we could discuss on the meaningfulness of "absolute presuppositions" in critical way. The content of the absolute presuppositions seem very much metaphysical in nature anyway.

Sure, so I thought we could discuss on the meaningfulness of "absolute presuppositions" in critical way. The content of the absolute presuppositions seem very much metaphysical in nature anyway. — Corvus

As I indicated, I don’t think this is the correct threat for that discussion. If you want to start a new one, I will participate.

As I indicated, I don’t think this is the correct threat for that discussion. If you want to start a new one, I will participate. — T Clark

The OP's purpose seems to be discussing how we see these kinds of presuppositions fitting to our own understanding of how the world works.

My purpose in starting this discussion is 1) to discuss the specific presuppositions described and 2) to see how other people see these kinds of presuppositions fitting into their own understanding of how the world works. — T Clark

It seems to be much relevant to the OP, and help understand the topic better, if we were to discuss the meaningfulness of the absolute presuppositions, and how they relate to, and support Science.

I don't see a point starting a new OP for it. It would be redundant and there wouldn't be much new material in it.

I don't see a point starting a new OP for it. It would be redundant and there wouldn't be much new material in it. — Corvus

I am not interested in participating in a discussion on this at the moment.