I am not interested in participating in a discussion on this at the moment. — T Clark

OK, fair enough.

I still don't see an argument that supports a conclusion that any particular metaphysics or presupposition is needed in order to do science. — Janus


Clearly, I disagree, although many people feel is you do. — T Clark

I don’t see it that way. Science looks for knowledge—not the same as truth. And as Collingwood wrote: — T Clark

Knowledge sounds too subjective and loose. Science is a rigorous subject which pursues verified truth on reality and universe. My knowledge on Astronomy is rudimentary. I wouldn't say it has much to do with Science. — Corvus

I agree with T Clark that science is the search for knowledge―for knowing how things work―and not for truth. This is so because scientific theories cannot be proven to be true, and even whether they can be definitively falsified is apparently a matter of debate among philosophers of science. By "theory" I am not referring to observational posits. If I say "all swans are white" that can be falsified by discovering one swan of a different colour. If I say "there are black swans" that can be verified by discovering one black swan.

So, it seems we can say that the observation of nature is concerned with what appears to be the case, and that could count as a search for truth. With complex theories like relativity, and QT, it seems to be more about a search for what works. We cannot directly observe the warping of spacetime or the collapse of the wave-function, and it seems that what is the case, or truth, is relevant only to what can be confirmed or dis-confirmed by direct observation or mathematics and logic.

If we understand science to be simply involved in coming to understand how things seem to work, then what would you cite as being a necessary presupposition underpinning that investigation?

I was seeking some knowledge on Astronomy. I bought a telescope, and watched the Moon surface in order to have some knowledge on the Moon. Is that a Science?

I know how to ride a bike. My knowledge on how to ride bike has increased since I bought a new bike. Is my knowledge on the bike a Science? Surely not. Knowledge can be objective and also subjective. But knowledge is not something Science or Metaphysics pursues.

Science seeks more than knowledge. It seeks verified truths and laws on the operations and nature of the universe.

So folk here would be happy to claim they know stuff that is not true...?

The observational knowledge of science is of course true. The hypotheses and theories as to how the processes observed work are defeasible models. They cannot be definitively demonstrated to be true. For example can we say that relativity theory is true? What would that mean? Truth seems to be regarding statements about states of affairs. What state of affairs could make relativity theory true?

Relativity gives us a more accurate method for predicting or plotting trajectories and positions than Newtonian mechanics, so is it then more true? Can we equate accuracy and truth? Does truth come in degrees like accuracy?

The observational knowledge of science is of course true. The hypotheses and theories as to how the processes observed work are defeasible models. They cannot be definitively demonstrated to be true. — Janus

Ok. Good reply.

Of course it assumes that the observational knowledge is separable from the hypotheses and theories. But using a thermometer involves applying a theory of heat, and using a telescope involves applying a theory of light.

Hence the Duhem–Quine thesis, that "the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to
experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses".

And the ensuing demise of naive scientific methodology to the myth of the given.

But using a thermometer involves applying a theory of heat, and using a telescope involves applying a theory of light. — Banno

is it just a theory of heat or light, or is using what we know works like using a ruler to measure? I mean a thermometer works reliably as attested by experience regardless of whether we believe heat is the agitation of molecules and a telescope works to make objects appear closer regardless of whether we think light consists of particles or waves.

...a thermometer works reliably as attested by experience — Janus

Does it? Try setting that out. Sometimes it's 22ºC by the thermometer and feels cold; sometimes, too hot. The water freezes at about 0ºC, but only more or less - and boils at a bit under 100ºC....

And all these have theoretical explanations...

Are we to say the thermometer works because experience certifies it, or are we only interpreting our experience so as to show that the thermometer works?

:wink:

Thermometers seem to be accurate enough to serve the medical industry. In my experience they show I have elevated temperature when I experience the symptoms of fever. Sure things like boiling point can vary due to atmospheric pressure, but this can also be accurately accounted for by barometer. I'm not claiming that instruments are absolutely accurate, whatever that might mean, but they are accurate enough to serve our purposes, and their accuracy wouldn't change if we suddenely found that our theories as to how they work were incorrect.

I'm puzzled.

What you argued was that observational knowledge was true, but that theoretical knowledge might be dubious.

What you pointed out , in agreement with my post, is that our observations are justified by theory.

Here is a simplest example, that we all heard in the elementary school.

1) The litmus paper turned red, when immersed into acid.

This is a knowledge from an observation. But after many experiments and tests, Science will use inductive reasoning from 1), to draw a universally true statement or law, which says,

2) Acid turns litmus red.

That is what Science pursues, not the 1), which is just a general knowledge from observations.

The OP doesn't want to discuss this topic further, so I am out from this thread. Thank you.

The OP doesn't want to discuss this topic further, so I am out from this thread. Thank you. — Corvus

No. I said I don’t want to discuss it further now. I didn’t say I minded if someone else does.

The OP doesn't want to discuss this topic further, so I am out from this thread. Thank you. — Corvus

Although I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Although I appreciate your thoughtfulness. — T Clark

Thank you for your appreciation. :)

I'm saying that some technology is based on observation of how things behave, not on theories that explain why they behave the way they do. The analogue thermometer is based on the observation that things expand when heated, an observation which does not rely upon a theory of the nature of heat.

A telescope is based on the observation that lenses magnify the view of objects and is not reliant on a theory of optics. Even if the theory of optics came first and the actual telescope second, our knowing that telescopes magnify the appearance of objects does not rely on an understanding of the theory of optics.

Our observations of the behavior of animals, plants and nature in general does not rely on theories. Aboriginal peoples understood nature very well without need of scientific theories.

The analogue thermometer is based on the observation that things expand when heated, an observation which does not rely upon a theory of the nature of heat. — Janus

Yeah, it does. In order to determine that something has expanded on heating, we have to compare it to something else, and assuming that the something else has remained unchanged. Nor was it wrong for Martin Horký and Francesco Sizzi to ask if telescopes distorted the images of Saturn and Jupiter. The acceptance of these observations came along with the development of the theory of optics. Aboriginal people embed their understanding of the world in stories in order to make sense of them, in much the same way as Aristotle and Newton. Calling one set of stories "theory" and the other "myth" is pretty arbitrary.

The Duhem–Quine thesis stands. Observations are embedded in our overall understanding of how things work.

No, we know from observation that metals expland more than wood, for example does with heat, and wood more than metals with moisture. We know that wood will burn and (most) metals wll not from observation and that metals become hotter when left out in the sun whereas than many other materials.

Also the Aboriginal understanding of the the land and behavior of animals did not rely on their stories. The stories are like theories that attempt to explain why what has been observed is as it is.

we know from observation that metals expland more than wood, for example does with heat, and wood more than metals with moisture. — Janus

You're just layering theory on top of theory here. And thinking that the indigenous understanding of the land is separable from what they say about the land is absurd.

Why are you so wed to this idea - that observations are somehow inviolably non- theoretical? Intuitive realism? Anti-relativism or fear of epistemic circularity? Habit?

You've provided no counter-argument, just hand-waving.