I gave you the definition. It is not mine, I did not make it up - I am adhering to the given definition. — AmadeusD

But if you are adhering to it, then what is wrong with the argument I provided you?

Think about it, Amadeus. You claimed that humans are not special. I asked what you meant by 'special'. You gave me a definition of 'special'. I gave you an argument showing that, according to the definition you provided, human beings are special. Then in response you start waving your hands around in the air, as is too common on your part.

If you accept the definition you provided, then what is wrong with my argument?

But if you are adhering to it, then what is wrong with the argument I provided you? — Leontiskos

I've treated it. In response, you essentially made the claim that certain novelties of being human is what supports the label, right? If that's wrong, correct me and I'll have another go. If that's right:

We only have two options:
1. "special" is human-centric (i.e to do with only the human lens on the world, let's say). In this case, Humans are the norm. Babies are the norm. Nothing special going on; or
2. it's not human centric and choosing specifically human attributes to support use of the label reverts to a sneaky form of using 1. It also violates the definition, eventually, as if all beings (or most) beings on Earth carry with them specificities and uniqueness not shared by others, then that is normal. Nothing special about being unique.

So in any case, It doesn't seem humans are special outside of the (totally fine, reasonable and acceptable) parochial, contingent and non-metaphysical use.

It is extremely tedious having to walk through this again in the face of claims like this:

I gave you an argument showing that, according to the definition you provided, human beings are special. — Leontiskos

Because you didn't do this. You claimed it. The argument didn't work. I have "thought about it" a lot.

The argument didn't work. — AmadeusD

Why not? Again, in order to claim that a formal argument did not work, you must show that a premise or inference is incorrect. The only attempt you made at such a thing was your claim that other species use language, and so I revised the argument (because it never depended on that isolated claim anyway). So what premise or inference is incorrect in my revised argument?

Here it is again with the language part removed for your benefit:

1. Humans are the only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God"
2. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special {this is from your definition}
3. The only species which "uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God," is a species that is different from what is usual
4. Therefore, humans are special — Leontiskos

I can draw this out if it's really necessary. My argument could be summarized as follows:

• L1. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special
  
  • {from the definition AmadeusD provided}
• L2. Humans are different from what is usual
• L3. Therefore, humans are special

Your response is something like, "If everything is special then nothing is special," which results in the notion that this idea of 'special' is . This is your argument:

• A1. If that which is different from the usual is special, then everything is special
• A2. But not everything is special
• A3. Therefore, it is not true that that which is different from the usual is special
  
  • {modus tollens}

The problem is that you've made your argument an enthymeme by omitting A3, and this is significant given that A3 generates your self-contradiction. Namely, A3 is a rejection of a particular definition of 'special', and that definition is the one that you yourself provided. Hence my complaint. (Note that A3 contradicts (2) in my own argument.)

You keep implying that the definition that you picked out is insufficient:

The definition of special is "better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual." — AmadeusD

The more rational route would be to simply admit that you want to revise your definition, namely by omitting that final clause, "or otherwise different from what is usual." This would result in a definition such as, "better or greater than what is usual." But that still leaves you with a difficult argument to make, namely the argument that humans are not better or greater than what is usual.

L1. If something is "different from what is usual," then it is special
{from the definition AmadeusD provided}
L2. Humans are different from what is usual
L3. Therefore, humans are special — Leontiskos

L2 is false (it is usual to be unique, and choosing human traits above others is arbitrary).

A1. If that which is different from the usual is special, then everything is special
A2. But not everything is special
A3. Therefore, it is not true that that which is different from the usual is special
{modus tollens} — Leontiskos

Yep. It's not that the definition is inadequate or that 'special' is arbitary under those terms - it's just meaningless. which leads me to believe only the anthropocentric use matters. If that's the case, I have no problem(which I've noted) but this is entirely contingent and we cannot say that humans are special, other than in this contingent, parochial sense.

You keep implying that the definition that you picked out is insufficient: — Leontiskos

I do not. As above, L2 is false under this definition. I do not need to revise it at all. I cannot follow you, because you're not making much sense.

So, to run again the claim you made that "babies are special". The support was that babies become adult humans, and humans are special.

As noted, if this is a claim contingent on being a human, looking at other humans(seems that it is, by your elaborations) - humans can be special in the contingent sense outlined above, but babies cannot. They are entirely usual for a human.

Humans are only special insofar as the majority of beings are special. Is that hte type of 'special' you mean? If so, it's pretty empty to me. If you genuinely mean humans are 'special' per definition, I think you're committed to the anthropocentric use which to me, precludes babies being special.

But that still leaves you with a difficult argument to make, namely the argument that humans are not better or greater than what is usual. — Leontiskos

Not hard at all for a non-theologist.