I find it interesting that you associate this sort of thing with Peterson. Nietzsche has tended to be more fodder for the left, and I think the "death of God" tends to get rolled out more often by post-structuralists, or at least Continentals more generally, than anyone else. The "political right" has, by contrast, tended towards "God never died in the first place" (or "if 'God is dead and we have killed him,' nonetheless he is risen!"), holding up living traditions as a counterpoint to modernity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. For years Peterson has been droning on about how Nietzsche is the only atheist who understood the implications of atheism through his death of God frame. There are several lectures on Nietzsche by Peterson on this and he brings it up in a heap of podcasts. He quotes Nietzsche a lot.

Peterson is sometimes incoherent I would not have always said that he is Right - he is conservative but that's slightly differnt. I used to think of him more as a Centrist politically. He self-defined as a progressive leaning centrist. Although his support of Trump and Musk and even Thiel may have moved him further right.

Peterson's bogus obsession with "postmodern Marxists" - is really just Stephen Hick's frame - the guy he seems to borrow most of his philosophical (but not his religious) ideas from. I think his views on Nietzsche may come from Hicks too. People who are learned in postmodernism and Nietzsche tell me Hicks is confused and misread. Of course one man's misreading is another's theorised interpretation. :wink: Any thoughts on Hicks?

It seems we can do philosophy without bothering about metaphysics. We don't need metaphysics to do ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of language, history of ideas or phenomenology as far as I can tell.

We don't need to make assumptions, in the sense of holding some metaphysical view or other, to do science, and I count science as part of philosophy. We don't even have to make assumptions in order to critically examine metaphysical assumptions.

This discussion is shaping up -- no surprise -- as a terminological dispute about what counts as "metaphysics." Janus conceives of metaphysics as an addition to the common-sense approach to what we can see, what is uncontroversially the case, etc. Thus, as they so clearly put it:

I see accepting that basic human situation, accepting the world as we find it, as eschewing metaphysical speculation not as assuming any metaphysical framework — Janus

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it.

I'm going to make a familiar move here, though I know many don't agree with it. I'm going to suggest that we set aside the terminological wrangle (who is "right" about the word "metaphysics"?) and instead focus on the underlying issue. There is clearly a difference between looking at the world as Wittgenstein does, and as, e.g., Ted Sider does. Is someone "doing metaphysics" here? Let's not worry about it. Instead, let's ask into what these two ways of looking consist of, and what they would entail. Perhaps, after this very difficult subject is thoroughly understood, we might then feel we had reason to circle back and offer a (now ameliorative) definition of "metaphysics" -- or perhaps not.

I'm not sure if that's quite the difference. Perhaps can clarify, but I thought his point could variously be:

A. That there is a common sense metaphysics that can just be assumed (your reading);

B. That what is called metaphysics can just be done as part of each individual science; or

C. That methodologically one does not need to begin from metaphysics.

I think all three are true to varying degrees. Metaphysics is prior to the other disciplines in the order of generality, but not in the order of knowing. Indeed, in general we know the concrete and particular better than the abstract and universal.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn. For example, one cannot discuss the "origin of species" in biology, or different "types" of atom or molecule without the notion that different concrete particulars can nonetheless be "the same sort of thing" (i.e., the notion of species, essences, and universals coming into play). Likewise, questions of emergence includes the relationship of parts to wholes, and shows up in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Perhaps the most obvious example is causation.

Now, I think it's fair to say that scientists work on these sorts of issues all the time without conducting an analysis of being qua being. But, it does not seem to me to make sense to say that the way in which different particulars are the "same sort of thing" in chemistry is completely unlike and unrelated to how this is so in physics or chemistry, hence metaphysics, as the general study of this sort of issue. It seems problematic to have a unique causation specific to each science in particular.

One difficulty in supposing that such issues are unique to each science would be that, without a higher science, there is no way to determine what rightly constitutes a unique science in the first place. We have seen declarations of "Aryan versus Jewish physics," "socialist versus capitalist genetics," "feminist versus patriarchal political science," etc. There would be no unity, and strictly speaking no "science" or "philosophy" (singular) if all the issues in whatever was declared to be its own science were sui generis, but rather a potentially infinite plurality. This is perhaps related to the idea of each science as a unique, hermetically sealed magisterium (Latin Averroism redux).

One need not study metaphysics, or "do metaphysics" to do biology, but one will invariably be forced to take up metaphysical questions at some point. One cannot even have a "science of life," without eventually getting around to the question "in virtue of what are all living things 'living'" which leads to the more general question "in virtue of what can all x be x, while being distinct beings."

I think all three are true to varying degrees. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hence my recommendation that we turn away from worrying about how to use "metaphysics" in true statements.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps it should be, but nevertheless it isn't ... Why invite a wrangle about it? Let's talk instead about what the philosophers are saying, regardless of who calls it "metaphysics" and who doesn't. But that does involve accepting that we can talk about concepts divorced from traditional assignments of certain words to those concepts.

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it. — J

I agree. To make a simplistic black vs white distinction : Empirical Physics is based on sensory observations, including those amplified by technology, of the "world as we find it". But Theoretical Philosophy, including Einstein's relativity theories, adds human reasoning in order to know what can't be sensed directly (e.g. what it would be like to ride on a light beam).

Non-human animals are empirical scientists, in that they come to understand the world via their innate senses. But, as far as we know, animals don't theorize about things unseen. Yet, they cope with the "world as they sense it" well enough to survive and evolve.

Since Philosophy is almost entirely theoretical & speculative, instead of observational & practical, I tend to equate Philosophy with Metaphysics, in the sense that its theories go beyond (meta) what we sense, to rationally infer (extrasensory) universal & general principles, including Holistic concepts vs Particular observations.

Ironically, those with Materialist worldviews tend to denigrate metaphysical (theoretical) Philosophy in favor of physical (evidential) Science. But the presumption that our universe consists entirely of material substances, as opposed to intangible, incorporeal, or ethereal forms, is itself a metaphysical conjecture*1.

The Materialist conjecture makes sense to most humans, perhaps because it is necessary for survival in the natural world ("red in tooth & claw)". By contrast, Philosophical speculations have little to do with living in the Natural world, but are necessary for coping with the Cultural world of human societies. All social animals must be able to "read" the minds of their fellows to some extent.

But for humans, in world-spanning societies (red in bullet & bomb), it is imperative to theorize what-it's-like for our social associates. Hence, we must metaphysically go beyond what's obvious (the crocodile smile) to speculate on the intention for future action. Metaphysics measures the world as we infer it. :smile:


*1. The word materialism has been used in modern times to refer to a family of metaphysical theories (i.e., theories of the nature of reality) that can best be defined by saying that a theory tends to be called materialist if it is felt sufficiently to resemble a paradigmatic theory that will here be called mechanical materialism.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy
Note --- Modern Quantum Physics*2 has been forced to deal with aspects of the real world, that are not objectively Material, nor classically Mechanical. It's mainly Mathematical & Logical, focusing on "things" unseen, and things that are not yet things (indeterminacy). Hence Meta-Physical.

*2. Quantum indeterminacy, in a philosophical sense, refers to the inherent uncertainty and lack of definiteness in the physical world at the quantum level, as described by quantum mechanics. It's not just a limitation of our knowledge or measurement techniques, but a fundamental feature of reality. This indeterminacy has sparked philosophical debate about the nature of reality, determinism, and free will.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=quantum+indeterminacy+philosophy

But of course, those who want to believe in a just personal God will always construct some kind of exculpatory theory or version of God in which suffering is either necessary, the result of some contamination, or entirely unrelated to the deity. — Tom Storm

Nothing is that simple for us anymore. Mental struggle and conversational suffering.

It's very shallow indeed if that's your "whole way of thinking about the problem of evil". — Janus

Ok. So it’s my whole way of thinking about the argument/syllogism called “the problem of evil.”

My whole way of thinking about God and suffering includes thoughts of what is “sin” and what is free will, what is the heart, what is love, why did God become a man and die, on a cross….

Anyone who might decide there must be no God because they think they understand the syllogism, had a shallow understanding of “God” or “all-good” or “suffering” or all of the above.

This forum, to me, is not really the place to account for God and suffering, as that would take Bible quotes and histories of saints and in the end, we will only be able to answer how God allows suffering by asking God, so if there is no God to you, there is not only no need to ask the question, but no need to think there would be an answer discoverable through our own reason.

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it.
— J
I agree. — Gnomon

Sure, it's perfectly good way to use the word, and my own preference. But I hope you also agree with me that "how to use the word correctly" (assuming this could even be determined) is much less important than understanding the issues various philosophers are raising when they talk about being, truth, structure, logic, et al. Who knows, it might turn out that the word is dispensable entirely, but the questions raised under its banner won't therefore go away. We might just need more perspicuous ways of talking about them.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn. For example, one cannot discuss the "origin of species" in biology, or different "types" of atom or molecule without the notion that different concrete particulars can nonetheless be "the same sort of thing" (i.e., the notion of species, essences, and universals coming into play). Likewise, questions of emergence includes the relationship of parts to wholes, and shows up in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Perhaps the most obvious example is causation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You could just as easily say that this is owed to the fact that Greek philosophy and science laid the basis for the whole development of modern science, that without the intellectual armoury provided by Aristotle and the other great minds of that tradition and it’s conceptual groundwork - substance, essence, accident, dynamic, potential - science would not have developed at all. Not for nothing that the scientific revolution occurred in the West and not India or China, which a millenia earlier were way ahead of Europe in terms of art and culture.

Would there be MS Word Tenplates had Plato not seen the Form?

Sure, it's perfectly good way to use the word, and my own preference. But I hope you also agree with me that "how to use the word correctly" (assuming this could even be determined) is much less important than understanding the issues various philosophers are raising when they talk about being, truth, structure, logic, et al. Who knows, it might turn out that the word is dispensable entirely, but the questions raised under its banner won't therefore go away. We might just need more perspicuous ways of talking about them. — J

I think this is an important point. Too often, people get bogged down in dictionary definitions and an almost obsessive categorization of language, at the expense of nuance and context.

This forum, to me, is not really the place to account for God and suffering, as that would take Bible quotes and histories of saints and in the end, we will only be able to answer how God allows suffering by asking God, so if there is no God to you, there is not only no need to ask the question, but no need to think there would be an answer discoverable through our own reason. — Fire Ologist

That's fair and I think once one is appealing to versus and lives of saints we are really moving away from philosophy and into a world of faith, dogma and doctrine. I heard the same point recently from a Hindu Uber driver who was incensed at 'stupid Christianity' with its superstitions and held that his gurus lives and the scriptures and how these aligned with science clearly demonstrated the superior truth of Sanātana Dharma.

We don't need to make assumptions, in the sense of holding some metaphysical view or other, to do science, and I count science as part of philosophy. We don't even have to make assumptions in order to critically examine metaphysical assumptions. — Janus

Interesting. Is this right?

Doesn't science rest on metaphysical assumptions such as the world is comprehensible and that reason and observations are reliable and there's an external world and causality - those kinds of things? Or do hold a view that methodological naturalism (as opposed to metaphysical naturalism) is a default common sense foundation that requires no justification other than our continued demonstrations of its reliability in action?

I think it's nonsense to say that science doesn't require or imply a metaphysic. The metaphysic of early modern science was: no metaphysics. That was largely based on Galileo's rejection of Aristotelian physics, but in a larger sense with the rejection of the ptolmaic cosmology in which metaphysics was embedded that characterised the 'scientific revolution'. And it was also a consequence of the fundamental division that early modern science and Cartesianism set up between mind and matter, and between the primary and secondary qualities, with the objective domain characterised entirely in terms of the measurable attributes of bodies and mind relegated to the domain of interiority and subjectivity. Which leads to the picture of a cosmos directed by the 'blind watchmaker', devoid of purpose and intentionality in which intelligence only appears as an adaptive trait and as an unintended consequence of those purposeless forces. And of course, part of the diabolical clevereness of that metaphysic is to deny that it's a metaphysic!

The main problem with our usual understanding of secularity is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Most of us assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed. — David Loy, Terror in the God-Shaped Hole

I'm not sure if that's quite the difference. Perhaps ↪Janus can clarify, but I thought his point could variously be:

A. That there is a common sense metaphysics that can just be assumed (your reading);

B. That what is called metaphysics can just be done as part of each individual science; or

C. That methodologically one does not need to begin from metaphysics.

I think all three are true to varying degrees. Metaphysics is prior to the other disciplines in the order of generality, but not in the order of knowing. Indeed, in general we know the concrete and particular better than the abstract and universal.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn. For example, one cannot discuss the "origin of species" in biology, or different "types" of atom or molecule without the notion that different concrete particulars can nonetheless be "the same sort of thing" (i.e., the notion of species, essences, and universals coming into play). — Count Timothy von Icarus

cosmological evidence that our space-time universe had a beginning in philosophical time — Gnomon

I can't make sense of the idea that the Universe had a beginning in time, and certainly not "philosophical time" (whatever that is meant to be). The beginning of the Universe was the beginning of time according to my understanding of the current theory.

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it. — J

It seems then that you are redefining metaphysics as philosophy and not as merely one domain of philosophy. If metaphysics is philosophy then of course you can't do philosophy without doing metaphysics; you have simply stipulated that by your definition. I'm not going to agree because I don't think philosophy is all, or even mostly, metaphysics.

There is clearly a difference between looking at the world as Wittgenstein does, and as, e.g., Ted Sider does. Is someone "doing metaphysics" here? Let's not worry about it. Instead, let's ask into what these two ways of looking consist of, and what they would entail. Perhaps, after this very difficult subject is thoroughly understood, we might then feel we had reason to circle back and offer a (now ameliorative) definition of "metaphysics" -- or perhaps not. — J

I'm not familiar with Sider. I performed a quick search and it seems he is a 'modal logic as metaphysics' kind of philosopher. I'm not that much up on modal logic, but what I have encountered of it has led me to think it is primarily about what we can coherently imagine. So I would see it as semantics, not metaphysics. I'm open to rethinking this, though, given my sketchy knowledge of the subject.

I'm not sure if that's quite the difference. Perhaps ↪Janus can clarify, but I thought his point could variously be:

A. That there is a common sense metaphysics that can just be assumed (your reading);

B. That what is called metaphysics can just be done as part of each individual science; or

C. That methodologically one does not need to begin from metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not claiming 'A' because I don't think the commonsense understanding of the world is metaphysics, but is rather an evolved pragmatic practice.

I am not claiming 'B' because I don't think metaphysics needs to play any part if the sciences (although I agree that it may play a part, and that it has, historically speaking, played a part in shaping what we now call science).

I agree with 'C'. Methodologically we can in science do without metaphysics entirely.

Also I want to make a distinction between 'doing metaphysics' meaning holding one or another metaphysical standpoint, and speculating about ontological possibilities. The latter is an exercise in creative imagining which may feed into scientific theory to be sure. But I don't count speculating about what might exist as "doing metaphysics". To repeat, for me doing metaphysics means holding to a particular position regarding the fundamental nature or reality.

Indeed, in general we know the concrete and particular better than the abstract and universal.

I agree, but it's also true that most of our knowledge of particulars comes through generalizing, which I think amounts to recognizing regularities and patterns. I don't like the term 'universal' much because I think it's loaded with metaphysical baggage, and it really doesn't mean anything more that 'general'.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn. For example, one cannot discuss the "origin of species" in biology, or different "types" of atom or molecule without the notion that different concrete particulars can nonetheless be "the same sort of thing" (i.e., the notion of species, essences, and universals coming into play). Likewise, questions of emergence includes the relationship of parts to wholes, and shows up in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Perhaps the most obvious example is causation.

Those "parts" may be deemed by some to be metaphysics, but I wouldn't deem them to be so. Different concrete particulars can be the same sorts of things on account of shred morphologies. We don't need essences for that ( if you mean the idea of unique essences as opposed to essential characteristics). And of course I don't see universals coming into play, but just a human capacity to generalize on account of the ability to recognize patterns and regularities, as I already noted above.

The relationships of parts to wholes are multifarious, and I think it is basically a sematic issue. Like the 'Ship of Theseus" or the supposed puzzle about what constitutes a heap, these are just open to different ways of framing, and are thus semantic possibilities. We can say the ship of Theseus is the same ship or not depending on how we want to define it. When it comes to heaps if a number of items jumbled together doesn't resemble the general pattern of a heap then we won't call it a heap. There is no precise cutoff point and it depends on the kinds of items jumbled together.

Doesn't science rest on metaphysical assumptions such as the world is comprehensible and that reason and observations are reliable and there's an external world and causality - those kinds of things? Or do hold a view that methodological naturalism (as opposed to metaphysical naturalism) is a default common sense foundation that requires no justification other than our continued demonstrations of its reliability in action? — Tom Storm

We find the world to be comprehensible, so I don't see a need for any assumptions in that matter. We comprehend it in terms of causation and it might be argued that causation is a metaphysical assumption, since it cannot be observed as Hume claimed. Hume says we arrive at the notion of causation by observing constant correlations between events. I think that's part of it, but even it was the whole of it I don't think it counts as a metaphysical assumption but as simply a matter of habit, which is what Hume thought too.

Even animals show by their behavior that they think causally. Where I think Hume only told part of the story is that failed to acknowledged that we all feel causation in our bodies. We feel the sunlight and wind on our skins. We feel the force when we throw objects or wield a hammer or strain to walk up a steep hill and in all our bodily activities. Of course animals feel these things too, so causation, acting upon and being acted upon, is a natural aspect of embodiment.

That's all I have time for right now.

My whole way of thinking about God and suffering includes thoughts of what is “sin” and what is free will, what is the heart, what is love, why did God become a man and die, on a cross….

Anyone who might decide there must be no God because they think they understand the syllogism, had a shallow understanding of “God” or “all-good” or “suffering” or all of the above.

This forum, to me, is not really the place to account for God and suffering, as that would take Bible quotes and histories of saints and in the end, we will only be able to answer how God allows suffering by asking God, so if there is no God to you, there is not only no need to ask the question, but no need to think there would be an answer discoverable through our own reason. — Fire Ologist

It seems we think very differently. I cannot make sense of libertarian free will ̶ the kind of free will Christians posit when they claim that we are 100% responsible for our actions and will be judged for them, as to whether we will receive eternal reward or eternal punishment or, according to some accounts, a spell in purgatory.

There is no point saying that people have a shallow understanding of "all-good" ̶ that's a cop out in the context of philosophy because it dispenses with human reason. I for one do not say there must be no God, but I do say, and have said, that the human notions of perfect goodness and justice (which are the only ones we have access to) do not jibe with the world we live in, so something has to give.

You're just doing the usual religious apologist thing when they have no answer to the critique and saying what amounts to "God moves in mysterious ways". If God is beyond human knowing then why believe in God at all?

I agree with you that this forum is not really the place for theology. I think the faithful should find themselves content with their faith ̶ there seems to be no point asking questions of it which cannot be answered by human reason, and then turning the back on human reason. Better to turn the back on it from the start ̶ at least that would be consistent with faith.

We find the world to be comprehensible, so I don't see a need for any assumptions in that matter — Janus

Hmm. Not sayign you are wrong, but I probably wouldn't share that view. Sure we can navigate the world pragmatically, but claiming true comprehension overlooks the potential complexities beneath our experiences. Our confidence in “understanding” as you say often rests on habits of thought and inference, not on direct access to reality’s underlying structure. Habit and comprehension would seem to be different things.

We feel the sunlight and wind on our skins. We feel the force when we throw objects or wield a hammer or strain to walk up a steep hill and in all our bodily activities. — Janus

So you're a realist? I'd probably reserve judgment on this. We pragmatically engage a world of forces and sensations, but can we infer unmediated access to a noumenal reality beyond those experiential conditions? And at some level, sure, who gives a fuck? It works, so let's just intervene in the world. But isn't this just suppressing our metaphysical assumptions?

Sure we can navigate the world pragmatically, but claiming true comprehension overlooks the potential complexities beneath our experiences. Our confidence in “understanding” as you say often rests on habits of thought and inference, not on direct access to reality’s underlying structure. Habit and comprehension would seem to be different things. — Tom Storm

It is obvious that we comprehend the world, both in an everyday sense and in the enormously complex web of coherent understanding we call science. Some of our understandings may turn out to be incomplete or even wrong, to be sure. Is that what you mean when you refer to "true comprehension"?

You mentioned "complexities beneath our experiences"; by that I take you to refer to things we cannot gain cognitive access to? If so, I would say those are merely imagined possibilities which cannot really mean much, if anything, to us except as perhaps enjoyable, stimulating or even inspiring exercises of the imagination.

So, when I say we obviously comprehend the world, I'm only speaking in an everyday sense, a sense in which I would include science as an augmentation of the everyday. "Direct access to reality's underlying structure" seems to me to be a kind of nonsense. It is impossible, or even if you believed we can have it, having it would be impossible to prove. Comprehension and habit are not unrelated as I see it; you cannot develop habits without any comprehension...think of language in this connection. Animals comprehend their environments through forming habits too. Habit is a sign of comprehension, in other words.

So you're a realist? I'd probably reserve judgment on this. We pragmatically engage a world of forces and sensations, but can we infer unmediated access to a noumenal reality beyond those experiential conditions? And at some level, sure, who gives a fuck? It works, so let's just intervene in the world. But isn't this just suppressing our metaphysical assumptions? — Tom Storm

Why do say I'm a realist? I really don't see myself as any kind of "ist". I merely accept the warmth on my skin from the sun, the feel of the wind, and the sense of acting upon and being acted upon, as ineliminable aspects of my life. I accept the explanation of cause as not merely correlation, but as exchange of energy or force, because it jibes with my bodily experience and comprehending phenomena that way has produced a vast and coherent body of understanding the world that I see no need to question as a whole. That doesn't mean I think it is some kind of timeless, absolute truth, but merely that it is the best we have so far in the way of understanding the nature of the world we find ourselves in. The point is that it is an understanding, and a vast, complex and coherent one at that. So we most definitely do comprehend the world.

I don't think we can infer unmediated access to a noumenal reality; I don't even really know what that could mean, and I certainly don't think it could be all that important. I don't know what you mean by "suppressing our metaphysical assumptions" ̶ did you mean "supposing"?

Anyway I really gotta go do something...I got sucked back in.

I believe the real reason behind the claim that science disenchants the world is that it seems to foreclose on the idea of any kind of afterlife. People say science is dehumanizing and I can only think that the dispelling of the fantasy of an afterlife must be what they mean. — Janus

However, if there really is a life beyond this one, then foreclosing it would be momentous, would it not? If you don't believe in it, it is only a matter of a fallacious belief; but if you do, then something is at stake which might be more significant than anything else in your life.

Me, I'm wrestling with it. I think a lot of what is said about it is obviously mythical, but it remains, for me, at least an open question, and something that nags me, now I'm in my 70's. And that if it turns out to be real after all, it could be the ultimate in rude awakenings.

Some of our understandings may turn out to be incomplete or even wrong, to be sure. Is that what you mean when you refer to "true comprehension"? — Janus

Yes. I consider our understanding of the world to be tentative, the best we can do with what we know and how we know it.

You mentioned "complexities beneath our experiences"; by that I take you mean things we cannot gain cognitive access to? — Janus

Yes, but not necessarily in the Kantian sense - also our incomplete understanding of physics, maths, biology, consciousness, etc.

So, when I say we obviously comprehend the world, I'm only speaking in an everyday sense — Janus

I guess we agree on this.

Animals comprehend their environments through forming habits too. Habit is a sign of comprehension, in other words. — Janus

An animal can comprehend that an electric fence will hurt them btu they don't understand it - the whys and hows. I guess what I should've have said is understanding rather than comprehending.

I don't think we can infer unmediated access to a noumenal reality; I don't even really know what that could mean, and I certainly don't think it could be important. — Janus

I think we could only know what it meant if we could access it.

I don't know what you mean by "suppressing our metaphysical assumptions" ̶ did you mean "supposing"? — Janus

I meant supressing (but supposing also works - they are presuppositions) - in as much as we 'bracket' off our assumptions about the world when we take the sun and the earth and human science as true rather than just the product of contingent experince. And I guess some people might argue that contingent human experince is true enough to be getting on with.

Me, I'm wrestling with it. I think a lot of what is said about it is obviously mythical, but it remains, for me, at least an open question, and something that nags me, now I'm in my 70's. And that if it turns out to be real after all, it could be the ultimate in rude awakenings. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think we live in a world where people follow the same inferences, but end up in differnt places. I imagine that culture and foundational axioms are often at the heart of this difference.

I'd like to think I am open to idealism and other domains of understanding - higher consciousness, call it what you like. And frankly part of me thinks, the hope of getting a reliable reading of Heidegger alone is a lifetime's study, what hope to access anything close to the noumena. Is it even worth thinking about?

I'm interested in your point about "rude awakenings" (which might be a funny pun, too). I know you came to your thinking through a counterculture path, but do you think there's also an element informed by a potential fear of missing out? Of being wrong: and so one needs to keep searching?

What's dawning on me is not at all romantic: it's the fear of God's judgement which is said to occur at the time of death. (That struck me recently when I watched a feature on Mt Athos, in an interview with the head monk.) In Buddhist terms, no God is involved, but Buddhists have just as vivid a depiction of the hell realms as well as the other realms which await one in the next life. That scares me a lot more than the idea that death is simply the end - the fact that one is condemned to exist and that many of the possible existences that await might be considerably less fortunate than the one I find myself in. That is something often found in Buddhist texts, although Buddhist modernism tends to neglect it.

What's dawning on me is not at all romantic: it's the fear of God's judgement which is said to occur at the time of death. (That struck me recently when I watched a feature on Mt Athos, in an interview with the head monk.) In Buddhist terms, no God is involved, but Buddhists have just as vivid a depiction of the hell realms as well as the other realms which await one in the next life. That scares me a lot more than the idea that death is simply the end — Wayfarer

Well, that would certainly provide some incentive.

Yes, I find the idea of death as 'the end' oddly attractive and tidy.

The Buddhist idea of afterlife is not based on a soul, I understand, but more like a stream of consciousness that (what is the famous metaphor?) is like a candle lighting another candle. If there is no continuity or 'eternal essence' how is such a hell realm understood? Doesn't punishment only make sense in a context of continuity?

The oft-stated idea that the Buddha says there is no self, tout courte, is mistaken. The Buddha denied there was a permanent self 'set like a post' or 'immovable like a mountain peak' that migrated life to life. But asked outright 'does the self exist?', the Buddha declined to answer. When asked later why, he said he didn't want to side with those ascetics who maintain that kind of 'eternal self', or on the other hand, to say that 'there is no self whatever', as the questioner would not have understood it.

So the idea that there are future lives, but no single individual, is how it comes across in popular culture, but it's not entirely accurate. It is well known that in Tibetan Buddhism, reincarnate lamas are said to be able to recognise the possessions of their former incarnations - that is part of the test for recognising them. It's not a soul that is reborn, but a mind-stream ('cittasantana') that has manifested again (voluntarily, in the case of lamas, whereas for most other people it's due to ignorance). And liberation from the cycle relies on the extinction of the idea of a self to which karma is attached. That's the theory, anyway. But the practical upshot is, everyone else is destined for some future existence in one of the 'six realms'.

moving away from philosophy and into a world of faith, dogma and doctrine. — Tom Storm

God is obviously a big puzzle piece in the history of philosophy and on this forum. I get it. But it is just as reasonable to conclude this “God” doesn’t exist, as it is to conclude we must not understand this “God” in the first place, and, using this same reason, neither can be proven to be the sounder conclusion, or premise. About “God”. God doesn’t exist, or even if God exists and his existence makes no contradiction, we may not understand God anyway - both are sensible estimations of this “God” in philosophy.

What becomes the point of further discussion using this “God” in our arguments if we can’t use religious sources and experiences to make further distinctions? We would have to ignore that this God might not exist to clarify “God and suffering in the same good world.” Ignoring the fact that God may not exist is not reasonable if on the other hand one isn’t sure one has any idea what “God” means. So we are stuck. Without saints and some other religious experiences to draw from besides our words and arguments and logic, we are stuck.

“God” becomes a placeholder in such philosophic discussions that once directly analyzed seems interchangeable with “everything” and “nothing” or “the one” or “truth” or “being itself”, or “Self” - so I would rather talk about those other things as a philosopher talks, and only talk about this God as one who believes this God actually exists talks.

Hindu Uber driver who was incensed at 'stupid Christianity' with its superstitions and held that his gurus lives and the scriptures and how these aligned with science clearly demonstrated the superior truth of Sanātana Dharma. — Tom Storm

That all sounds silly. Interesting uber ride though. But there is no superior truth. Just truth. Christianity and Hinduism, and Buddhism and Taoism, and Islam, and Judaism, at base, agree on this. Just one truth if “truth” is to have any meaning. Many schools of Hinduism ultimately value the truth of love above all, which, like Christians, seems the “superior” value to me. Again, what good metaphysician or epistemologist or logician would care to parse all of that? And what believer in God would find fruit doing the parsing with no recourse to the experience of other believers, and to do so with people who don’t believe?

And what does he mean his religion aligns better with science? Which science is aligned to which religion, and when? Science today, or science from 500 years ago, or science as it will be in 500 years? Aligned with which eternal wisdom, in a superior manner? Silly. Reincarnation aligns with being born again in Christ. Does reincarnation of one eternal soul align with any science better than simply rebirth in heaven?

There is nothing about Christianity that requires the repudiation of any empirical laws or scientific facts and observations. The problem of evil is a valid syllogism. It’s just not sound. Because it misunderstands any tangible, lived experience of “God” for sake of some hypothetical “Omni-being” thing called “God”. That need not exist for sake of argument.

However, if there really is a life beyond this one, then foreclosing it would be momentous, would it not? If you don't believe in it, it is only a matter of a fallacious belief; but if you do, then something is at stake which might be more significant than anything else in your life.

Me, I'm wrestling with it. I think a lot of what is said about it is obviously mythical, but it remains, for me, at least an open question, and something that nags me, now I'm in my 70's. And that if it turns out to be real after all, it could be the ultimate in rude awakenings. — Wayfarer

I don't 100% believe there is no afterlife, but it really is nothing more than a fantasy, whether oriented towards the pleasant or the unpleasant, for us earthlings given that we could have no way of knowing. I find it impossible to believe in eternal punishment which would be the only version of an afterlife that scares me.

If there really is a life beyond this one, then I'll deal with it then. It's only the assumption that one or other of the Abrahamic religions might be the only true one(s) that I would need to worry about my own personal suffering post mortem. If there is judgement then I assume the judgement would be made on the basis of whether or not one has lived an ethical life. We should know that about ourselves. I know that I have lived an ethical life, by and large; I have always tried my best to avoid harming others and helping them where I can.

I could never buy the Christian idea that you just need to believe in Jesus as your savior. I think preoccupation with personal salvation is a form of egoic attachment anyway. On the Buddhist view the being that inherits my karma will not be me, so why would I be any more concerned about that being than the beings who will inherit the Karma of others?

I spent years seeking enlightenment; meditated virtually every day for eighteen years, and all I got were a few powerful epiphanies, somewhat akin to my copious psychedelic experiences, and the ability to still the mind. It wasn't a waste of time because I am now calmer and more accepting of life as it presents itself. That calmness frees me up for creative pursuits; I'm no longer preoccupied with trying to solve problems that cannot be solved.

I turn 72 this year, and I feel calmer about death than I ever have. It is not death, but dying that frightens me somewhat if I choose to think about it. You know the old saying : "A coward dies a thousand deaths" ̶ I can't see any point in worrying about something you can do nothing about.

I don't 100% believe there is no afterlife, but it really is nothing more than a fantasy, — Janus

So, which?

I can't see any point in worrying about something you can do nothing about. — Janus

Death can’t be avoided but if there does turn out to be an afterlife then what one has or has not done may indeed be highly significant.

I don't 100% believe there is no afterlife, but it really is nothing more than a fantasy, — Janus

I am a Catholic, so I hope and believe in an afterlife, but it all sounds impossible to me. The body supports my consciousness and my consciousness is where I live and breath, so if my body dies, where and how could I exist anymore? Stuff of fantasy for sure.

But I believe anyway. Because God makes no sense either, and really my own existence with all of its questions and knowledge of illusion, makes no sense either. None of it makes sense, so, to me, there is plenty of room to trust God anyway.

So, which? — Wayfarer

It's not a matter of "which"; I don't hundred percent believe there is no afterlife, because I have no way of knowing if that is true. And because none of us can know whether it is true until we die (if then) it cannot be more than a fantasy ̶ meaning it is something which is imagined, not known.

Death can’t be avoided but if there does turn out to be an afterlife then what one has or has not done may indeed be highly significant. — Wayfarer

All we can do anyway is try to live the best lives we can, ethically speaking. Worrying beyond that is worrying about something you can know nothing about and can do nothing about.

That's all fair enough and quite Kierkegaardian ̶ you admit it is a leap of faith, and I respect that.

I like your response. I’m not going to agree with all of it of course, but let's not let a little thing like God come between us. :wink:

None of it makes sense, so, to me, there is plenty of room to trust God anyway. — Fire Ologist

I would like to believe that a higher intelligence makes perfect sense, but sense that we’re not able to apprehend - after all we see ‘through a glass, darkly.’

sense that we’re not able to apprehend — Wayfarer

What use is a sense we can't apprehend ̶ what could it be to us?