He points out that Hegel contradicts himself, wanting to have his cake and eat it with a system that, like mathematics or logic, is one "gigantic tautology," yet is supposed to tell us something substantive about the world: — Jamal

I like the circle analogy. The Absolute, as the premise, is the cause of the Hegelian dialectical process, but it is also what is supposed to emerge as the result of that process. So we have an eternal circular motion, similar to what Aristotle demonstrated was logically possible, but is actually physically impossible.

He puts things differently by saying he wants to reject Spinoza's verum index sui et falsi, which is something like, the truth is an index of or standard for the false, meaning what is false can be just read of from what is true. He proposes the alternative: falsum index sui atque veri, the false indicates both itself and the true. — Jamal

I believe that the issue which lies beneath this conundrum is the problem of the relationship between the true and the false. The true, we can never know with absolute certainty, yet we have certainty about the false, as the impossible, beginning with contradiction. This produces a categorical distinction between the false and the true, as the false is "the thing" which is impossible, while the true is the possible, which is not a thing at all, but a multitude of possibility. I believe that this description provides an explanation of Adorno's reference to what is "definite", and to the "concrete expression" in the radio broadcast you quoted.

This outlook is set up in a general way, with the question of "is a negative dialectics possible". The negative actually determines what is impossible, and that forms the determinate, the determinate negation. Since the negative produces the determinate as the impossible, the requirement is to invert the dialectical process, from the Hegelian proposal of determining the positive, which is actually fruitless (or impossible), to a more realistic method of determining the negative. Determining the impossible then places the possible into a proper perspective. I believe that is sort of what is meant at the top of p29, with "index sui atque veri". Falsity is the index for truth.

...that this falseness proclaims itself in whether negative dialectics is possible what we might call a certain immediacy, and this immediacy of the false, this falsum, is the index sui atque veri.

Here's an interpretation from "Adorno Studies Through a Glass Darkly: Adorno's Inverse Theology"

The determinate negation of the negative conditions in
which we find ourselves provides a glimpse of “the only
permissible figure of the Other.”22 Amending Spinoza in his
essay “Critique,” Adorno argues that “the false, once
determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an
index of what is right and better.”23 Echoing this remark in his
lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno again rejects Spinoza’s
proposition “that verum index sui et falsi, or that the true and
the false can both be read directly ... from the truth.” Here
Adorno contends that “the false, that which should not be the
case, is in fact the standard of itself: . . . the false, namely that
which is not itself in the first instance–i.e. not itself in the
sense that it is not what it claims to be–that this falseness
proclaims itself in what we might call a certain immediacy, and
this immediacy of the false, this falsum, is the index sui atque
veri. So here then, . . . is a certain pointer to what I consider
‘right thinking’.”24

https://www.adornostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/darkly.pdf

I believe that the issue which lies beneath this conundrum is the problem of the relationship between the true and the false. The true, we can never know with absolute certainty, yet we have certainty about the false, as the impossible, beginning with contradiction. This produces a categorical distinction between the false and the true, as the false is "the thing" which is impossible, while the true is the possible, which is not a thing at all, but a multitude of possibility. I believe that this description provides an explanation of Adorno's reference to what is "definite", and to the "concrete expression" in the radio broadcast you quoted — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I see what you mean. I relate this to the mundane fact that it's easier to criticize than to offer something positive, and it's somehow more productive to give a bad review than a good one: the false, or falsely presented, is what strikes us most and gives thinking purchase.

In case there's any misunderstanding, I don't really mean that negative dialectics seeks out the false just because that's the easy thing to do. It's more that the false is what stands out, needing to be addressed.

EDIT: I'm not sure if that works to be honest.

from the Hegelian proposal of determining the positive, which is actually fruitless (or impossible), to a more realistic method of determining the negative. Determining the impossible then places the possible into a proper perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's possible that this agrees with my own understanding of it.

Here's an interpretation from "Adorno Studies Through a Glass Darkly: Adorno's Inverse Theology" — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep, looks good.

To me Adorno seems to be saying that we shouldn't be satisfied with a weak kind of philosophy that pursues restricted problems or else abandons itself to relativism, subject to "contingency and whim". We should want some kind of unity. — Jamal

This I believe is the key point of lecture 4. The reading is quite difficult with numerous twists and turns, so I won't give a full interpretation without more study, but I'll make a few initial comments. The distinction between "system" and "systematization", where a "system" is a whole and objective, while a systemization addresses a specific subject, and is subjective, sets up the framework for the discussion.

The first twist, is that the meaning of "system" has really changed. Now, what "system" refers to in anti-system philosophy, is really systematization. So anti-system, or a-system philosophy, if it's decent philosophy, will demonstrate system in a latent form. The latent system is really quite tricky because it's where the subjective meets the objective.

The point though, is that this systematization type of thinking, which becomes "provincial", and even "cottage" at the end of the lecture, is what true philosophy must strive to avoid.

The first twist, is that the meaning of "system" has really changed. Now, what "system" refers to in anti-system philosophy, is really systematization. So anti-system, or a-system philosophy, if it's decent philosophy, will demonstrate system in a latent form. The latent system is really quite tricky because it's where the subjective meets the objective.

The point though, is that this systematization type of thinking, which becomes "provincial", and even "cottage" at the end of the lecture, is what true philosophy must strive to avoid. — Metaphysician Undercover

The first time I read this I thought wow, MU, you're a genius, I totally missed that twist!

And it's backed up by the notes for the lecture:

So great is the need for system that today systematization has taken its place unobserved. The explanation is assumed to be that the facts should find their proper place in an organized scheme that has previously been abstracted from the facts themselves.

This need ensures that even bodies of thought that claim to be anti-systematic (Nietzsche), or a-systematic, are latent systems. — p.33

So now I'm doubting my own interpretation of what he meant.

But it doesn't seem to fit. Part of the problem I think is that in these lectures Adorno is improvising. He goes from a few notes but otherwise makes it up on the spot, so it often doesn't tie together neatly, and that makes the arguments difficult to untangle. In this case, I don't think it's just the systematization he wants to avoid; it's also system in the traditional sense exemplified by German idealism, explaining the world from a single principle kind of thing.

The way I'd put it is, philosophy should avoid both traditional system and systematization, but it should take the energy of the former.

The provincialism he talks about can't just be a matter of systematization, because its problem is that it still acts like it's able to do traditional systemaic philosophy:

This consists in the fact that, in general nowadays, in the models it applies to reality, philosophy behaves as if the visibility of existing circumstances allowed it to survey all living creatures and subsume them under a unifying concept – this is something it still takes for granted.

But the problem here, I'm inclined to believe, is Adorno's presentation, which as you say is all over the place. Maybe he gets too carried away polemicizing. As it is, I don't know what he's referring to with the stuff about provincialism.

Actually, looking at it again it's clear enough that he's targeting Heidegger and the existentialists, because he mentions his book The Jargon of Authenticity in this connection, and that's who he is targeting in that book.

[time passes]

OK, I think I know what he's getting at, and I now think you're right. Provincial philosophies are latently systematic in that they secretly maintain that impulse to tie everything together by imposing their ready-made schemes (systematization), but they fail to take what is good about system, which is the organic development of such a system. In other words, they follow the letter, not the spirit, of system (pun not intended).

I don't think it's important so sort out this confusion (although the confusion might be entirely mine). What matters is:

1. Philosophy should treat phenomena as interconnected within an organized whole
2. This is possible without system in the traditional sense
3. And this takes what is good about system rather than merely abandoning it dismissively
4. Imposing one's own scheme on the phenomena from the outside is to take what's bad about system---the phenomena should be allowed to speak for themselves

I got there in the end.

The way I'd put it is, philosophy should avoid both traditional system and systematization, but it should take the energy of the former. — Jamal

That's what I thought after first reading. After second, I realized that he is actually promoting the need for a true philosophical system. To unlock this understanding required that I take the time to fully consider the distinction between system and systematization laid out at the beginning. Systematization treats one subject as a whole and so is subjective according to the choice of subject. A system "is the development of the fact from a principle, in a dynamic manner, in short, as a development, a movement that draws everything into itself, that takes hold of everything and is itself a totality; it claims objective validity such that, as Hegel would put it,7 nothing between heaven and earth can be conceived of as being outside such a system."

The difference between the two is the difference between part and whole. The systematization treats the part as a whole, and this is where I see the problem. Treating the part like a whole leaves out the aspects where one part relates to another, in the larger whole. So each subject (each form of science for example) will have its own systematization, and there could very easily be contradiction between the distinct systematizations.

The provincialism he talks about can't just be a matter of systematization, because its problem is that it still acts like it's able to do traditional systemaic philosophy: — Jamal

That's exactly the problem which he is bringing to our attention, systematization (in this context provincialism) pretends to be system, and this gives "system" a new meaning as such. This would leave a sort of void where the true "system" ought to be, and the "latent system" creeps in to fill the void.

The "latent system" is is similar to what I was talking about which brings the charge of scurrilous. This is the author's secret intention. When only systematizing a part of reality, as a single subject, there are personal reasons why the author likes to address that part, in that way, and this is why the systematization is subjective. For example, in my early criticism, I faulted Adorno for focusing on Hegel (systematizing), instead of philosophy as a whole (system). I implied that Adorno believed Hegel had authoritative power as a philosopher, and Adorno's intention was to tap into this power.

So the latent system is the secret intentions of the author in the systematization. Intention is "the good" of Plato, what Aristotle described as "that for the sake of which", final cause. The good is what sort of guides our knowledge directing it toward this or that subject. When a philosopher presents a systematization, or a multitude of systematizations, there is usually an undisclosed intention behind the author's choice of subjects and how to deal with them. This undisclosed intention is what really unifies the systematization, but that unity is relative to something external to it, a larger "objective", in the sense of a goal, and this makes a latent system.

And this very criticism, that of the aperçu-like
nature of my thinking, has frequently been levelled at me too, until
finally – simply because so many things came together and created a
context – it then lost ground in favour of other objections, without
my having had to put my cards on the table13 and without my having
had to show what joins up my various insights and turns them into
a unity. — 39

So a proper philosophical system has the true unified understanding of all reality as its goal (objective), and hides nothing in latency because there is no further concealed unifying principle. The objective, a system, is presented as a system, without any hidden intentions which would make what is presented as a system really a systematization.

After second, I realized that he is actually promoting the need for a true philosophical system. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is saying there is value in the need for a system, but he is not promoting the project of a philosophical system itself. He is on board with the modern rejection of systematic philosophy, and makes that quite obvious. This is where he differs from Hegel and Fichte (and Kant, although it’s more complex with Kant).

If you think his wish to preserve the energy of philosophical systems is evidence of a secret drive towards a full-blown system, then that’s going beyond what he’s saying, turning his critique back onto him. I don’t think there’s the evidence to make that accusation, though there’s an obvious tension in his position.

What he says about philosophical systems is a justification of his attempt to make sense of the world as an objective reality whose parts are connected without imposing an overarching metaphysical principle, such as spirit.

Do you disagree with this summary:

1. Philosophy should treat phenomena as interconnected within an organized whole
2. This is possible without system in the traditional sense
3. And this takes what is good about system rather than merely abandoning it dismissively
4. Imposing one's own scheme on the phenomena from the outside is to take what's bad about system---the phenomena should be allowed to speak for themselves — Jamal

He is saying there is value in the need for a system, but he is not promoting the project of a philosophical system itself. He is on board with the modern rejection of systematic philosophy, and makes that quite obvious. This is where he differs from Hegel and Fichte (and Kant, although it’s more complex with Kant). — Jamal

I did not read it like that. The "need for a system" speaks for itself. I think he rejects systematic philosophy as systematization. Further, he shows how the current use of "system" actually refers to what he calls systematization. So what is known as "anti-system philosophy" is really anti-systematization. He is anti-systematization, so we could call him "anti-system", but he really promotes the need for a proper philosophical system.

Anyway, I'll give it another read, and make a report one way or another.

he really promotes the need for a proper philosophical system. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this is ambiguous. He promotes the need for a system, in that he thinks there is something important in this need that can be redirected into "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought". But I don't think he's saying he wants to actually do a philosophical system.

I had a look at ND itself:

If one speaks in the newest aesthetic debates of anti-drama and anti-heroes, then negative dialectics, which holds itself distant from all aesthetic themes, could be called an antisystem. With logically consistent means, it attempts to put, in place of the principle of unity and of the hegemony of the supra-ordinated concept, that which would be outside of the bane of such unity. — ND, Prologue

The philosophical system was from the very beginning antinomical. Its very first signs were delimited by its own impossibility; exactly this had condemned, in the earlier history of the modern systems, each to annihilation by the next. The ratio which, in order to push itself through as a system, rooted out virtually all qualitative determinations which it referred to, ended up in irreconcilable contradiction with the objectivity to which it did violence, by pretending to comprehend it. It became all the more removed from this, the more completely it subjugated this to its axioms, finally to the one of identity. The pedantry of all systems, all the way to the architectonic ponderousness of Kant and, in spite of his program, even Hegel, are marks of an a priori conditional failure, documented with incomparable honesty by the rifts of the Kantian system; in Moliere pedantry is already the center-piece of the ontology of the bourgeois Spirit. — ND, Relation to System

All emphatic philosophy had, in contrast to the skeptical kind, which renounced emphasis, one thing in common, that it would be possible only as a system. This has crippled philosophy scarcely less than its empirical currents. Whatever it might be able to appropriately judge is postulated before it arises. System, the form of portrayal of a totality in which nothing remains external, sets the thought in absolute opposition to each of its contents and dissolves the content in thought: idealistically, before any argumentation for idealism. — ND, Idealism as Rage

EDIT: But our disagreement here is just the result of the real ambivalence in his position, which is dialectical: he is both against and for system.

EDIT: Incidentally, how should we reference quotations from ND, given that the various versions of the Redmond translation have different paginations? Above I’ve just referred to the section titles, and in a couple of versions these have numbers too, which I’m guessing refer to the old Ashton translation. I guess it’s not a huge deal when we’re using electronic copies that can be searched.

Some reflections concerning dialectics in general...

But our disagreement here is just the result of the real ambivalence in his position, which is dialectical: he is both against and for system. — Jamal

Here I'm tempted as always to resolve the contradiction by saying that his position is not really one of dialectical contradiciton, that it's more like: he is against X aspects of system but he is for Y aspects of system, which replaces the contradiciton with a simple differentiation. But Adorno always resists this, believing that this is identity-thinking in action.

So I should ask myself: is something lost when I resolve the contradiciton in that way? Perhaps what is lost is that aspects X and Y are not really separable into discrete sets of aspects, these having this effect and those having that. In other words, the non-identical in those aspects, or in system as such, is lost when the contradiciton is dissolved. The aspects are part of an inextricably tied up bundle of mutually dependent phenomena, so separating them breaks and thereby hides all the interconnections, thus their characteristics, and thus the unique characteristics of system itself.

So what is then lost is that his critique of system is not in fact extricable from his promotion of it. More precisely what is lost is the open tension in his view, which he doesn't want to be neatly wrapped up so we can move on to the next problem. EDIT: The key here is that the persistence of contradictions is a mode of truth.

That's a bit weak but I'll leave it there.

And it's not like he clearly demarcates X and Y aspects anyway. For example, in the lectures he seems to approve of the "principle of unity," but in ND, quoted above, he says that negative dialectics seeks to replace that principle. Contradictions all the way down.

But this is ambiguous. He promotes the need for a system, in that he thinks there is something important in this need that can be redirected into "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought". But I don't think he's saying he wants to actually do a philosophical system. — Jamal

That idea, "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought", has given me much difficulty in understanding. I just couldn't get it. Here is another stab at it:

Upon further reading, I realize that the lecture gets very complex and difficult at page 38, where he addresses Heidegger directly. This induces me to reassess my interpretation of the defining aspect of "system". I had interpreted the essential feature as being one whole which includes everything, but now I'm inclined to see it as 'being guided by one principle'. So in the notes we see "System in this philosophical sense is the development of the fact from a principle, in a dynamic manner, in short, as a development, a movement that draws everything into itself...". And at page 39 when he says that the question of the possibility of philosophy without a system hasn't been given the serious thought it deserves, he says: "The question then becomes how can thought be unified if it is not guided by a principle?"

Now the difficult part of the lecture. When he addresses the influence of Heidegger on philosophy, he describes a change, a transformation of the concept of "system", a "secularization", whereby "system" becomes a "latent force". The central question is the unification of thought, how is thought unified. The issue of unification is brought up in the quote I already provided from page 39, where Adorno speaks of criticism of his own "apercu" thoughts, and says he didn't have to lay his cards on the table and reveal what unifies his thoughts. It is implied that the unifying force may remain latent. The issue is that without a guiding principle philosophy would be whimsical, or arbitrary. But the question appears to be, can the unifying principle remain latent within a philosophy?

So that is how Adorno approaches Heidegger. In my understanding, Heidegger employs the concept of "region" in "Being and Time", so that "Being" is divided into modes of Being generally corresponding with the three aspects of time, past present and future. "Being" is not a single principle, but a sort of plurality of distinct aspects derived rom the aspects of time. I would say that this plurality is unified by a single principle "time", but perhaps Adorno see things differently.

Starting from page 38, he explains how, from Heidegger the concept of system undergoes a qualitative change:

This means – and I am not
embarrassed to say that at this point I feel a certain emotion – that
the path on which system becomes secularized into a latent force
which ties disparate insights to one another (replacing any architectonic
organization) – this path in fact seems to me to be the only road
still open to philosophy. Admittedly, this path is very different from
the one that passes through the concept of Being, exploiting en route
the advantages provided by the neutrality of the concept of Being.
And it is from this standpoint that I would ask you to understand
the concept of a negative dialectic: as the consciousness, the critical
and self-critical consciousness of such a change in the idea of a philosophical
system in the sense that, as it disappears, it releases the
powers contained within itself. — p38

Then at page 39 the latent force is described as what produces the unification of thought, so that the unity of thought becomes the central issue. He distinguishes positive thinking from negative by applying an internal/external distinction. Positive thinking imposes its own authority on itself, and creates its own objects from within itself, while negative thinking is in a sense a response to the external, the situation, or environment, what "confronts" it.

We might say, then, that thought which aspires to be authoritative without
system lets itself be guided by the resistance it encounters; in other
words, its unity arises from the coercion that material reality exercises
over the thought, as contrasted with the ‘free action’ of thought itself
which, always concealed and by no means as overt as in Fichte, used
to constitute the core of the system. — p39

However, we cannot forego, or overlook the latent aspect of this unity, so he adds:

I would ask you to combine this
with an idea that I have hinted at in quite a different context, that
of the idea of the secularization of system or the transformation of
the idea of system, in other words, with the fact that philosophical
systems have ceased to be possible. — 39-40

I interpret this as meaning that philosophical systems are not possible because we now have a form of contradiction where the latent aspect, which forms the system or unity, is within, yet at the same time the philosopher must be guided by the external circumstances. So Adorno gives priority to the external, and seems to imply that confrontation of external circumstances must be given priority over the latent tendency toward system. I believe that the implication is that the internal inclination toward unifications is inverted to the external inclination of division. Hence "blasting open the phenomena".

Now we have a duality of criticism, noological, as directed inward toward judgement, and phenomenal, as directed outward toward phenomena. This duality Adorno recognizes, but refuses to separate, so he sort of rejects the duality. And in this way, the power that was formerly directed inward toward criticism of judgement, creation and production of a coherent system, is directed outward toward the criticism of individual phenomena, the "blasting open".

Thinking would be a form
of thinking that is not itself a system, but one in which system and
the systematic impulse are consumed; a form of thinking that in its
analysis of individual phenomena demonstrates the power that
formerly aspired to build systems. By this I mean the power that is
liberated by blasting open individual phenomena through the insistent
power of thought. — p40

And the conclusion:

This means that something of the system can still
be salvaged in philosophy, namely the idea that phenomena are
objectively interconnected – and not merely by virtue of a
classification imposed on them by the knowing subject. — p40

I'd say that conclusion is doubtful. What supports " the idea that phenomena are
objectively interconnected"?

The final issue is the naivety of modern philosophy in relation to visibility. This naive attitude produces a sort of provincialism. This I take as a belief that our immediate circumstances are indicative of reality as a whole. This is where the incompatibility between the positive (system) and the negative (confrontation of phenomena) is exposed in philosophy. This I believe is the "philosophical cottage". It's the belief that the conditions which I am subjected to are indicative of the conditions which others are subjected to. And this produces a false unity (system). The real issue which arises in my mind, is how can he support this claim that "phenomena are objectively interconnected" when "phenomena" is already plural, and they can be blasted open with the power of thought. How can we justify an objective interconnectedness?

Do you disagree with this summary:

1. Philosophy should treat phenomena as interconnected within an organized whole
2. This is possible without system in the traditional sense
3. And this takes what is good about system rather than merely abandoning it dismissively
4. Imposing one's own scheme on the phenomena from the outside is to take what's bad about system---the phenomena should be allowed to speak for themselves — Jamal

I'll answer this now.
1. I agree that this is a sort of conclusion which Adorno makes, but I do not see that it is justified.
2. The problem is that system is what unites phenomena. Adorno turns the power of philosophy around to blast apart phenomena, but there is no reason to believe that phenomena, as a multiplicity already, has any sort of interconnectedness other than that granted by a system.
3. Really, he is taking the "power" of system, its force, or even its "latent force", and redirecting this. So we cannot say that this takes "what is good about system", because as Plato pointed out, the same power can be directed toward either good or evil. Adorno has not provided us the principles required to judge whether his proposed redirection of this power is good or bad. The critical point I believe, is his proposed duality of criticism. Criticism of judgement is generally based in principles of good and bad, correct and incorrect, or true and false. If we do not hand priority to this sort of judgement, how could we criticize phenomena? We have no principles for this.
4. I agree with this. I think the idea that we could get to the outside of phenomena is the naivety he refers to, the visibility of the world. This produces a false sense of objectivity. It is like the common assumption of "independent reality". What this does is separate the subject from the reality, leaving the subject with one's system of judgement as outside the phenomena which is to be judged. We ought to leave the phenomena to speak for themselves, as you say, but then as I say, we need principles to support any supposed interconnectedness.

So, I agree with you that what you present is pretty much consistent with what Adorno argues, but I think it may not be tenable. It may actually be the case that philosophy without system is really impossible, and the latency which he refers to is actually the essence of true "system". I've pointed out the reasons for considering this, but I'll reserve final judgement for now.

there is no reason to believe that phenomena, as a multiplicity already, has any sort of interconnectedness other than that granted by a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't there? Is this a Thatcherite point, i.e., there's no such thing as society?

Anyway MU, I'll ponder your thorough analysis and get back to you in a day or two. I'll say right now though, that I don't really see the problem. I mean, I see the tension, but I think it's just another way of stating Adorno's dialectical attitude to system, and the proof will be in the pudding.

Philosophical systems are myths (though we forget this while they're giving us purpose). When an old myths dies (as Hegel's did), the energy that was bound up in it becomes disorganized. We end up with a religious smorgasbord.

That's a good way of putting it. And from Adorno's point of view neither the myth nor the smorgasbord are good options, on their own.

System, the form of portrayal of a totality in which nothing remains external — ND, Idealism as Rage

Note his way of wording this. I think it implies there is an alternative form of the portrayal of totality, namely that which does not contain everything and which is not closed.

Isn't there? Is this a Thatcherite point, i.e., there's no such thing as society? — Jamal

But this interconnectedness is by means of system. The issue is, if we reject system philosophy, what would maintain interconnectedness. If there is nothing other than system philosophy which produces interconnectedness, then it is still needed, and cannot be replaced by the inverse. The question is still, how is thought unified.

And from Adorno's point of view neither the myth nor the smorgasbord are good options, on their own. — Jamal

So are you saying that he thinks we still need system thinking, along with the inverse, a philosophy without system is actually not possible?

If there is nothing other than system philosophy which produces interconnectedness, then it is still needed — Metaphysician Undercover

Like Adorno, I don't accept the antecedent. Things are really connected, before a system is applied to them. Indeed we could think of that as his main point, since the problem with philosophical systems is that they forget the real interconnectedness in their drive to cover everything with their own schemes.

Now, if you are looking for some kind of foundational argument justifying the claim of interconnectedness, I think you will look in vain, because negative dialectics is demonstrative and anti-foundational, rather than progressing in a linear fashion from, say, a proof that the world exists. I'm not quite clear: is that the kind of thing you're expecting he should do?

So are you saying that he thinks we still need system thinking, along with the inverse, a philosophy without system is actually not possible? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I just meant what I said before, the interpretation of his position that we both agree on. Myth represents philosophical systems and the smorgasbord represents fragmentation. This is probably very un-Adornian, but I feel like he wants a middle way between them.

Finished LND 4

I noticed, thanks to y'alls efforts, how "systemization" isn'tis a contrast-class, but one that isn't as described as "System" in this lecture. "System" is something that philosophy at one time pursued and should continue to preserve that spirit, whereas systemization is a pre-figured tabulating system with a bucket labeled "Not of interest", or something along those lines -- I get the idea that given we cannot have a true System in the manner which philosophy once pursued we have, in order to fulfill that need for a system, replaced it with systemization which has the appearance of a system without any of the drive for what motivated the philosophical system in the first place: not just totalizing, but a grasping of the universe, and with the end of LND 4 -- not just a grasping, but rather a grasping of all that is such that human beings come to live free lives.

So "System" is that which cannot be achieved, but likewise for Adorno there's an impulse in there that he seems to believe is necessary in order for philosophy to progress at all.

In LND 5 I get the sense that Adorno is missing out on a lot of what makes Marxism so great -- while some of his predictions are false what he offers is the explication of a worldview from the philosophical perspective such that one need not adopt bourgeois philosophy, and while his utopian visions have yet to be achieved Marx's contributions to a proletariat philosophy have been invaluable as a basis for reflection. He takes Rousseau's notion of the social contract to include the economic flows wherein people, born free, came to live in chains. His articulation between slave and worker, and the relationshiop between worker/owner is invaluable for analyzing power relationships, and not just in an academic sense -- but in terms of real world organizing.

Without articulating how selling one's labor-time is exploitative, for instance, there'd be no practical political basis for workers to struggle on the shop floor. Rather, and this did happen, they ought join liberal societies of association for workers rather than disrupt the flow of commerce.

But if the relationship in which exchange is freely taking place is exploitative unto itself then this gives political justification -- as in an articulatable standard that could hold across people as something they can consistently demand together -- for industrial agitation.

But, I gather this will be a frequent point of thinking for me -- because it seems Adorno is trying to save what's worth saving, whereas I'm pretty much just a Marxist who doesn't see it as a doomed project or something which has been falsified, but a proper political philosophy for the working class which has aided many sorts of the have-nots in their struggle to have.

EDIT: On the flip-side, his criticisms are also very valuable -- I'm not disagreeing with them so much as reacting to them from my own perspective.

I am glad that you focused upon exploitation and inequality because it points back to the centrality of lordship and bondage in Hegel's Phenomenology. That another existence can cancel a sense of that for oneself by simply being there is Hegel's 'state of nature' in contrast to Rousseau and Hobbes.

Like Adorno, I don't accept the antecedent. Things are really connected, before a system is applied to them. Indeed we could think of that as his main point, since the problem with philosophical systems is that they forget the real interconnectedness in their drive to cover everything with their own schemes. — Jamal

This is why Adorno's philosophy gets difficult for me. I find that there is ambiguity, or vagueness in the distinction between "system" as a thing, and the act which is creating the thing. Notice that in my first interpretation I took "system" to mean a whole which includes everything, the totality of reality. From this interpretation I could not get beyond the idea that he promotes system thinking. However, I noticed at the part where he talks about Heidegger that "system" thinking refers to following a single principle, and this is what unifies thought. So I went back to the beginning of the lecture and found that he actually defines "system" as a movement of thought which follows a single principle. So "system" must be properly understood as the activity of a certain type of thinking, not as the thing produced by that type of thinking

So the interconnectedness we are talking about here, is relations of thought. And we can criticize these relations with the criticism of judgement, as he says. We can also criticize phenomena, and "phenomena" refers to how the material situation appears to us through sensation. You propose a "real interconnectedness" of phenomena, but how are we supposed to derive this? Any connections we make are made within our minds, by our minds, and the same holds for divisions. So I don't see how "real interconnectedness" can be supported. Or even if we assume it, it drops from relevance like Kant's noumena.

Adorno seems to propose blurring the boundary between criticism of judgement and criticism of phenomena, but how can this help? What I think, is that we are to take phenomena as the consequences of the thinking of others, and we criticize it as a criticism of the judgements which created it. But then it all turns into a criticism of judgement, and we need principles by which to criticize.

Now, if you are looking for some kind of foundational argument justifying the claim of interconnectedness, I think you will look in vain, because negative dialectics is demonstrative and anti-foundational, rather than progressing in a linear fashion from, say, a proof that the world exists. I'm not quite clear: is that the kind of thing you're expecting he should do? — Jamal

The question is whether philosophy without system is possible. We do not have to prove that the world exists, nor even assume that the world exists, because we are dealing solely with thinking. The reality of the material world is sort of irrelevant. From this perspective, we have a creative activity of following a principle to unify thought, as "system", and we also have critical analysis, or the negative dialectics Adorno proposes which is an activity of division (blast apart). If we reject the creative activity of following a principle, and adhere strictly to the critical activity, as a type philosophy, we are confronted with the latency, which tends to indicate system. In other words when we remove ourselves from system thinking in the constructive way, there is still a latent tendency toward system thinking in the deconstructive way. There is a guidance from the philosopher's intentions in one's act of criticizing. So new a problem arises, because a philosopher must criticize according to some principle(s) which unify ones thoughts, or else it's all whimsical and incoherent. Now we're right back to the issue of "system". Isn't the best critical philosophy one which judges all according to the same principle, therefore a system?

I hesistate to follow you down that rabbit hole, because I find it hard to relate to your concerns. I think you're making it more complex than you need to. Or, more charitably, you're a hardcore idealist who cannot accept Adorno's materialism.

But what you're saying does go to the heart of the subject-object relation, which is a central part of his thinking; and there is in fact a dialectical antagonism in his thinking between objects as non-conceptual and objects as ineluctably mediated—so I'll try responding.

From this interpretation I could not get beyond the idea that he promotes system thinking. However, I noticed at the part where he talks about Heidegger that "system" thinking refers to following a single principle, and this is what unifies thought. So I went back to the beginning of the lecture and found that he actually defines "system" as a movement of thought which follows a single principle. So "system" must be properly understood as the activity of a certain type of thinking, not as the thing produced by that type of thinking

The thing produced being a philosophical system such as Kant's transcendental idealism or Fichte's Science of Knowledge, yes? Well, why not both? They're part of the same deal. I don't think Adorno makes an important distinction between the activity of making a system and the resulting philosophical system itself, or if he does it's along the lines of the systematization/system distinction.

But it's central to Adorno that there is not just thought; philosophical system is almost synonymous with idealism, for him. When he speaks of phenomena he means the objects of experience, which he wants to treat as non-conceptual, or not entirely conceptual. His basic thrust with regard to the status of phenomena is materialist and anti-idealist. The question of idealism vs realism is something I think he goes into in more detail in ND itself. For now I find it helpful to maintain a more-or-less naive picture of the subject-object relation, with the mind here and semi-mind-independent things over there. (In the end, he is neither idealist nor naive realist, but somewhat Kantian, but without inaccessible noumena (maybe that's another way of saying he's a Hegelian without Spirit)).

So the interconnectedness we are talking about here, is relations of thought. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, which interconnectedness are we talking about? Adorno is saying there is an interconnectedness beyond thought, not only beyond philosophical systems but obscured by philosophical systems.

So the interconnectedness we are talking about here, is relations of thought. And we can criticize these relations with the criticism of judgement, as he says. We can also criticize phenomena, and "phenomena" refers to how the material situation appears to us through sensation. You propose a "real interconnectedness" of phenomena, but how are we supposed to derive this? Any connections we make are made within our minds, by our minds, and the same holds for divisions. So I don't see how "real interconnectedness" can be supported. Or even if we assume it, it drops from relevance like Kant's noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover

So this is a classic argument for idealism: real interconnectedness must obviously be understood in thought, so such a real interconnectedness, beyond thought, cannot be supported, therefore there is only thought—or else we go with Kant's solution.

Though I cannot see the attraction of this approach, I'm happy to keep an eye out to see how he criticizes idealism further down the line. Suffice to say, it's one of his biggest targets, perhaps his biggest (he thinks empiricism always ends up in idealism too).

EDIT: I forgot...

We can also criticize phenomena, and "phenomena" refers to how the material situation appears to us through sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

We should be careful. Adorno has an interesting theory of bodily experience, and tends to use "somatic" when he is talking about sensation, because he believes the concept of "sensation" is implicated in the subjectivization characteristic of idealism, i.e., the concept of sensation takes something physical and relational and unjustifiably turns it into something mental and private. This idealist pressure of thought is demonstrated by your own way of wording things here, I think.

Incidentally, it might help to put the somatic in context: irreducible suffering, non-conceptual and resisting the conceptual, testifies to the non-identical:

The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth. For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated. — Adorno, ND

In LND 5 I get the sense that Adorno is missing out on a lot of what makes Marxism so great -- while some of his predictions are false what he offers is the explication of a worldview from the philosophical perspective such that one need not adopt bourgeois philosophy, and while his utopian visions have yet to be achieved Marx's contributions to a proletariat philosophy have been invaluable as a basis for reflection. He takes Rousseau's notion of the social contract to include the economic flows wherein people, born free, came to live in chains. His articulation between slave and worker, and the relationshiop between worker/owner is invaluable for analyzing power relationships, and not just in an academic sense -- but in terms of real world organizing. — Moliere

I've only skimmed the lecture and will have re-read it, but from my dark post-Marxist point of view he might actually be too uncritical of Marxism. I think he agrees with most of what you say here. What he rejects are mainly (1) the proletariat as the revolutionary subject and universal class, and (2) the teleology of history. (And probably (3) a strict economic determinism (whether or not that is actually Marx's position)).

He agrees with a lot of historical materialism and, I think, buys right into Marx's analysis of alienation, the commodity, and exploitation.

Without articulating how selling one's labor-time is exploitative, for instance, there'd be no practical political basis for workers to struggle on the shop floor. Rather, and this did happen, they ought join liberal societies of association for workers rather than disrupt the flow of commerce.

But if the relationship in which exchange is freely taking place is exploitative unto itself then this gives political justification -- as in an articulatable standard that could hold across people as something they can consistently demand together -- for industrial agitation. — Moliere

You're right that Adorno's approach does little for working-class organization, but that's because he probably sees the extraction of surplus-value as one aspect or way of looking at the more generally alienating and dominating nature of capitalist society. That is, he de-prioritizes it.

But, I gather this will be a frequent point of thinking for me -- because it seems Adorno is trying to save what's worth saving, whereas I'm pretty much just a Marxist who doesn't see it as a doomed project or something which has been falsified, but a proper political philosophy for the working class which has aided many sorts of the have-nots in their struggle to have.

EDIT: On the flip-side, his criticisms are also very valuable -- I'm not disagreeing with them so much as reacting to them from my own perspective. — Moliere

But I can understand the Marxist assessment that Adorno is effectively regressive. If the working-class remains the agent of change, his thinking is not much use, or counter-productive. That said, I think his hatred of capitalism exceeds that of Marx, so I'd say yes, he's definitely worth reading even from that Marxist point of view.

EDIT: Also you might want to have a look at the Adorno-Popper debate, part of the "positivism dispute" in the social sciences, in which Adorno seems to have been put in the position of defending Marxism. It might supply a different picture of his relationship with Marxism. I used ChatGPT to produce a summary of it because there's a lot to read and I've got enough on my plate. I can post it here if you're interested.

EDIT 2: A personal reflection. What strikes me now is that the Frankfurt School were facing up to the failure of working class revolution and the absorption of the working class into bourgeois society and culture (which was not the case in Marx's time), long before I was born, and yet it's only in the last ten years or so that I've faced up to this in my own thinking. I imagine you might say that they were over-reacting, perhaps understandably given the world situation at the time; personally I think their disillusionment still stands (but I don't particularly want to infect you with it).

Finished LND 4

I noticed, thanks to y'alls efforts, how "systemization" is a contrast-class, but one that isn't as described as "System" in this lecture. "System" is something that philosophy at one time pursued and should continue to preserve that spirit, whereas systemization is a pre-figured tabulating system with a bucket labeled "Not of interest", or something along those lines -- I get the idea that given we cannot have a true System in the manner which philosophy once pursued we have, in order to fulfill that need for a system, replaced it with systemization which has the appearance of a system without any of the drive for what motivated the philosophical system in the first place: not just totalizing, but a grasping of the universe, and with the end of LND 4 -- not just a grasping, but rather a grasping of all that is such that human beings come to live free lives.

So "System" is that which cannot be achieved, but likewise for Adorno there's an impulse in there that he seems to believe is necessary in order for philosophy to progress at all. — Moliere

Yep, that's how I read it.

On the topic of realism it would be interesting at some point to compare Adorno with McDowell. They seem very close, and also very distant. For both, the objects of experience, though not ideal, are conceptually mediated; but for Adorno, this mediation goes wrong and leaves stuff out.

Or, more charitably, you're a hardcore idealist who cannot accept Adorno's materialism. — Jamal

Yes, that's the issue, appropriate principles (which i haven't yet seen), are required for acceptance, justification.

But what you're saying does go to the heart of the subject-object relation, which is a central part of his thinking; and there is in fact a dialectical antagonism in his thinking between objects as non-conceptual and objects as ineluctably mediated—so I'll try responding. — Jamal

You and I disagree as to what gets placed in the "subject" category of the subject-object relation, and what gets placed in the "object" category. For example, I said "society" refers to a concept, you said it refers to an object. I haven't yet seen from Adorno any clear principles as to how to categorize. In fact, when he said that he doesn't recognize a clear distinction between criticizing judgement and criticizing phenomena, I found this to be an indication that he is intentional blurring the separation between these categories. You say the subject-object relation is a central part of his thinking, but is blurring the boundary between them a central part of what he is doing? I don't see how that could be conducive to understanding.

The thing produced being a philosophical system such as Kant's transcendental idealism or Fichte's Science of Knowledge, yes? Well, why not both? They're part of the same deal. I don't think Adorno makes an important distinction between the activity of making a system and the resulting philosophical system itself, or if he does it's along the lines of the systematization/system distinction. — Jamal

The problem is that there is a fundamental difference between activities of change, and static states. Aristotle demonstrated how the two, as "becoming", and "being", are incompatible. Becoming cannot be described with the same terms as states of being, and states of being cannot be described by the terms of active becoming. So if we allow the same word, "system" to refer to both, that would be a serious ambiguity which could lead to equivocation and misunderstanding.

It may be the case that Hegelian dialectics of logic allow for this sort of "both", by allowing that being is subsumed within the category of becoming. If this is the case, then I would argue that Hegel is mistaken. Aristotle demonstrated decisively how describing the active becoming as consisting of states of being leads to an infinite regress, and unintelligibility. So the Hegelian approach, of allowing that states of being are negated by the antithesis, in the activity of becoming, which is a synthesis of the two, is actually a recipe for unintelligibility. The contraries, being and nothing are allowed to coexist, in contradiction, within the synthesized "becoming". That is the problem with making the descriptive terms of "becoming" (or activity in general), the same as the descriptive terms of being.

Adorno, it appears shares my disdain for Hegelian dialectics. Notice the way that he rejects Hegelian "synthesis". If the opposing terms are true negations there can be nothing left for synthesis, and if they are not true opposites the premise fails. So Hegelian dialectics is a misunderstanding from the outset.

Well, which interconnectedness are we talking about? Adorno is saying there is an interconnectedness beyond thought, not only beyond philosophical systems but obscured by philosophical systems. — Jamal

If we assume an interconnectedness which is "beyond thought", then we need proper principles to distinguish this type of interconnectedness from that which is imposed by thought. Kant provides a good example. At this point, after reading lecture 4, I would say that Adorno seems intent on blurring the distinction.

Here's an example of the need for distinction. Advocates for the application of systems theory in science, will say that a weather storm, like a hurricane, can be modeled as "a system". This system is assumed to be a composition of interconnected active parts, interconnected through their activities, and operating as a whole, an object," the system". The problem is that in reality there is no such boundary between the low pressure area and the high pressure area, just a gradation, and the supposed boundary which makes all that interconnected activity into "a system" as a whole, an object, is completely "imposed by thought".

This is common in modern thought, to impose an arbitrary boundary on activity, create "a system", and treat that created system as if it is a real, independent object, "beyond thought". I would argue that this is similar to how you claim that "society" refers to an object. You impose some arbitrary boundaries on activities, and you clim that there is an object here, called "society". But your object is simply a creation of boundaries imposed by thought.

The lesson here is that thought imposes "system" on the interconnectedness which is beyond thought, because "system" is the current trend in thinking. In reality, we have very little understanding of this interconnectedness, referred to in physics by terms like "strong force", "weak force", "gravity" "electromagnetism", and in social studies, "intentions", "emotions" "morals" etc.. We can model these activities as "systems" and "societies", but the boundaries or limits of the interconnectedness, which produce "the object", imposed by thought.

We should be careful. Adorno has an interesting theory of bodily experience, and tends to use "somatic" when he is talking about sensation, because he believes the concept of "sensation" is implicated in the subjectivization characteristic of idealism, i.e., the concept of sensation takes something physical and relational and unjustifiably turns it into something mental and private. This idealist pressure of thought is demonstrated by your own way of wording things here, I think. — Jamal

I'm interested to learn more. I really do not see the anti-idealism which you refer to, yet. His criticism seems true and honest, not directed at at any specific group, but approaching idealism and materialism equally.

I've only skimmed the lecture and will have re-read it, but from my dark post-Marxist point of view he might actually be too uncritical of Marxism. I think he agrees with most of what you say here. What he rejects are mainly (1) the proletariat as the revolutionary subject and universal class, and (2) the teleology of history. (And probably (3) a strict economic determinism (whether or not that is actually Marx's position)).

He agrees with a lot of historical materialism and, I think, buys right into Marx's analysis of alienation, the commodity, and exploitation. — Jamal

You're right that Adorno's approach does little for working-class organization, but that's because he probably sees the extraction of surplus-value as one aspect or way of looking at the more generally alienating and dominating nature of capitalist society. That is, he de-prioritizes it. — Jamal

Fair. I was very much reacting to the text because I'm used to having to defend Marxism -- and I suspect we just have a slightly different set of experiences which can account for what is basically an aesthetic preference. I agree with his criticisms, but felt like I needed to point out positives since that is my habit.

But I can understand the Marxist assessment that Adorno is effectively regressive. If the working-class remains the agent of change, his thinking is not much use, or counter-productive. That said, I think his hatred of capitalism exceeds that of Marx, so I'd say yes, he's definitely worth reading even from that Marxist point of view. — Jamal

Here I think there's a certain agreement then, too -- because I tend to take the intersectional approach, and by so doing I can point to more than the labor struggle as examples that I have in mind: Not just the Soviet Union, but also the labor movement. And not just the United States' labor movement, but also the modern Chinese labor movement. And not just labor, but also race. And not just race, but also sex.

But I know this is not at all orthodox, or Marx's position, or what Adorno is addressing. I just see Marx's analysis as influencing a lot of the disciplines which inform these various struggles in addition to the obvious, direct applications such as Lenin's and the labor movement's.

Still, I'll not digress too much on this as we go forward. I'll accept Adorno's appraisal and keep trucking along -- I got it out of me now :D

EDIT: Also you might want to have a look at the Adorno-Popper debate, part of the "positivism dispute" in the social sciences, in which Adorno seems to have been put in the position of defending Marxism. It might supply a different picture of his relationship with Marxism. I used ChatGPT to produce a summary of it because there's a lot to read and I've got enough on my plate. I can post it here if you're interested. — Jamal

Heh, naw. I'll just slot it into the eternal List -- things that could be interesting to visit, but for now I'll stay focused on the lectures and ND.

EDIT 2: A personal reflection. What strikes me now is that the Frankfurt School were facing up to the failure of working class revolution and the absorption of the working class into bourgeois society and culture (which was not the case in Marx's time), long before I was born, and yet it's only in the last ten years or so that I've faced up to this in my own thinking. I imagine you might say that they were over-reacting, perhaps understandably given the world situation at the time; personally I think their disillusionment still stands (but I don't particularly want to infect you with it). — Jamal

I can see it either way -- I think I was just reacting because I'm in the habit of pointing out good things, given how unpopular Marx tends to be. Reading the criticisms I think he's correct about Marx and various failings of Marxism -- I certainly wouldn't venture to say something as stupid as he didn't understand it! :D

But, I'll keep the apologism reigned in.