I just don't think God can be a man. — Bob Ross

Would you elaborate on why you think this? Is it not in God's power to have a trinitarian existence and to take human form? Does your thinking change if the man is a perfect man?

Anything one needs is in the Bible itself. Specifically the Gospels. If it doesn't align with that what good is it?

1 And seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain, and when he was set down, his disciples came unto him.  2 And opening his mouth, he taught them, saying:  

3 Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  
4 Blessed are the meek: for they shall possess the land.  
5 Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
6 Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice: for they shall have their fill.  
7 Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.  
8 Blessed are the clean of heart: for they shall see God.  
9 Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called children of God.  
10 Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
11 Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, for my sake

These 8 lines is how one becomes blessed to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.

Nothing more, Nothing less. Any one of those according to Christ.

Noone here can debate this. And they are the only lines that pertain to what it takes to become blessed to enter the Kingdom of Heaven under Christ.

If you want to do your Judaism, go for it. But that doesn't matter to Jesus. Only his beatitudes.

I would say so, because freedom of will is to will in accordance with one’s will. — Bob Ross

That's one sense, yes. Another is having the power of 'contrary choice', i.e. having the real possibility to autonomously choose an option instead of another.

But note that even if one accepts the notion of 'free will' in these two senses, if one assumes that the moral agent is a rational agent, it seems that to be rational and free one should be able to choose what he or she thinks is the 'better choice'. That is behind a true IMHO rational choice would be the one which is in accord with one believes is the 'better' choice.

If I am dying of thirst and I want to live, I am clearly 'free' to refuse to drink water. But if I am sufficiently aware that if I drink water I'll survive and I value my own life, choosing to not drink water seems to me an insane choice, i.e. a choice where some factors are constraining my liberty (or maybe somebody is forcing me to not drink water or whatever).

So if we accept 'free will' as the ability to act deliberately between options, we however must assume that, in order to be considered rational, the ethical agent must choose the 'better'. Otherwise, why should one choose at all?

Hmm, I would say acting rationally is about acting in accordance with reason; which pertains only to the form of thinking and never its content.
... — Bob Ross

I made a clear mistake before by talking about the well-being. Try however to consider 'be able to choose what one considers the better option' as a definition of 'rational freedom'.

Clearly the heroic father chooses to sacrifice his life to save the life of his child because he thinks it's the 'better option' (and I also think that he would think that it is better for him).

Also, a wicked murderer might think that killing innocent people act in that way because he clearly believes it is the 'best thing to do' (assuming that there is no insanity, external cohercion etc here).

I see your point; but it is still an act in accordance with one’s will, so it is free. What do you mean by freedom? — Bob Ross

So let's say that a man truly believes that what killing innocent people 'for fun' leads to a state of unending pain for him while he is also aware that refraining to do that allows him to escape that terrible destiny. Despite this awareness and without any coercion of any kind (of internal and/or external factors) or some moment of insanity, he still does it.

To me the choice would be completely inintelligible due to the profound incoherence. Being totally incoherent, it isn't in my opinion a rational choice. What do you think?

It does, thanks. That is very similar to my own story. Raised Catholic, fell away in adolescence, became interested in Buddhism and Eastern traditions, and then reverted back to theism and finally Catholicism in college. — Leontiskos

Interesting, thanks!

It would be hard to quickly introduce you to a very old and deep tradition. Edward Feser has a recent article on the topic, although it is now behind a paywall, "Aquinas on the Fixity of the Will After Death." — Leontiskos

Ok, I think I know something about that (if I am not mistaken, St Thomas bases his arguments on St. John of Damascus' views). I just don't find it pervasive. But IMO it is a digression.

But the quote you take from Aquinas says nothing about death. The claim is that humans can fix their end, which strikes me as uncontroversial. — Leontiskos

I was thinking about what Aquinas says here:

A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

I am simply not buying this, especially if one says also that during life one can repent until the 'last breath'. So, either one says that during life it's possible to fix irrevocably the wil in sin or one should adequately explain why such a thing must happen after death. Consider this passage from Spe Salvi (the encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI quoted before):

With death, our life-choice becomes definitive—our life stands before the judge. Our choice, which in the course of an entire life takes on a certain shape, can have a variety of forms. There can be people who have totally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to love, people for whom everything has become a lie, people who have lived for hatred and have suppressed all love within themselves. This is a terrifying thought, but alarming profiles of this type can be seen in certain figures of our own history. In such people all would be beyond remedy and the destruction of good would be irrevocable: this is what we mean by the word Hell. On the other hand there can be people who are utterly pure, completely permeated by God, and thus fully open to their neighbours—people for whom communion with God even now gives direction to their entire being and whose journey towards God only brings to fulfilment what they already are.

In the case of the damned, either the 'irrevocable destruction of the good in themselves' can happen during life or not. If it can happen then redemption can be impossible even during life in some cases. If not, then I do not understand how redemption is impossible. If it's impossible, then that very impossibility is a punishment of some sorts (either an active punishment or a definitive abandonment by God). I hope I made my reasoning clearer.

Aquinas doesn't say anything in the text I quoted about the fixity of the will at death, so your points are not properly responding to what he is saying. If you don't think the human will is ever fixed, are you therefore of the opinion that someone can leave Heaven and go down to Hell? — Leontiskos

St Augustine said: "You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you". If one accepts that the union/communion with God is the highest good, when such a state is reached, one has simply no reason at all to abandon the state of eternal bliss and fulfillment. That's why I think that (if classical theism is true) one can't fall again.

In the state of hell, it's different, after all. One is in a state of torment and frustrated desires.

There is a general—and in my opinion, unfortunate—trend in Catholic theology towards this argument:

1. Humans are not capable of the level of freedom and consent necessary for mortal sin
2. Therefore, no humans commit mortal sins
3. Therefore, no humans go to Hell

It should be simple enough to note that (1) is strongly contrary to Catholicism, and that this argument therefore does not derive from Catholic tradition in any substantial sense. If historical Catholicism believes anything at all, it is that humans are capable of mortal sins. :lol: — Leontiskos

Correct. But of course this is persuasive only if one already believes that one can commit a mortal sin as defined by the official doctrine of the Catholic Catechism and that if one dies without repenting from such an act he is eternally condenmed to hell.
The related section of the Catechism defines mortal sin as:

1857 For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: "Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent."131

1858 Grave matter is specified by the Ten Commandments, corresponding to the answer of Jesus to the rich young man: "Do not kill, Do not commit adultery, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Do not defraud, Honor your father and your mother."132 The gravity of sins is more or less great: murder is graver than theft. One must also take into account who is wronged: violence against parents is in itself graver than violence against a stranger.

1859 Mortal sin requires full knowledge and complete consent. It presupposes knowledge of the sinful character of the act, of its opposition to God's law. It also implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to be a personal choice. Feigned ignorance and hardness of heart133 do not diminish, but rather increase, the voluntary character of a sin.

The fact that mortal sin requires a certain degree of knowledge and consent is where things get confusing. I doubt you believe that, say, a 5-year old child is capable of a mortal sin (even if you say to him or to her that, say, murdering innocent people qualifies as such and he or she does that). But if one considers the finitiness of our lives, the intricate web of relations and influences between a human being and the cultural, social and even physical context where he or she lives and so on, when we can safely posit the 'cut-off' between 'being able to commit a mortal sin' and 'being unable to commit a mortal sin'? For instance, at which age does one get the ability to commit a mortal sin?

I am just unconvinced by this. Also, what you say later about heaven is different. Eternal beatitude in heaven is a gift of God - not a 'just recompense' but God gives more that what is deserved. And supposedly one in Heaven has his or her innermost desires perfectly fulfilled, has full knowledge to experience the 'best possible state' and is actually experiencing perfect beatitude. It's clear to me why, in these condition, a truly rational agent would have the will fixed to remain in communion with God.

Sure, and the claim has never been that the only people who hold Hell to be unjust are universalists of type 1. — Leontiskos

Ok!

You keep assuming that premise, but I see no reason why one would have to hold to the fixity of the will at death in order to believe in Hell. — Leontiskos

I thought that the standard Catholic doctrine is just that: the orientation of the will of the damned is irreversibly fixed at death (otherwise, repentance could be possible after death, and those who do a post-mortem repentace would be still eternally damned, a possibility that the standard Catholic doctrine IIRC rejects).

But anyway, I agree that 'eternal hell' doesn't logically imply the fixity of the will at death. But IMO it is a central issue, isn't it?

I see various possibilities here:

1) Eternal hell is a just punishment that anyone that die in a state of mortal sin (to use Catholic language*) rightfully deserves. Even if the damned repents, it must suffer eternally because it is what justice requires.

2) Eternal hell is a just punishment that anyone that die in a state of mortal sin rightfully deserves. The damned's will is irrevocably fixed at death (or even before?) and they can't repent (because they can't desire it).

3) Eternal hell is a just punishment that anyone that die in a state of mortal sin rightfully deserves. But if one sincerely repents in Hell, then, he or she is mercifully allowed to go out from it (whether this means that the repentant goes to Heaven or not is irrelevant here).

4) The damned can condemn himself or herself forever if he or she persist forever in sin. That is, he or she can at any time repent, but there is the possibility that he or she never does and, in fact, continue forever to remain in sin (this is more or less C.S. Lewis' view).

(1), (2) and (3) require that eternal hell is a just punishment for a mortal sin (or the equivalent term in a different tradition). But note that (3) and (4) are compatible with a type of confident 'hopeful universalism' or at least that in eternity hell might be emptied (a confident hope, not a certainty, of course).

Clearly, if either (1) or (2) is true, then any kind of hope in a empty hell seems to me an irreasonable hope, if mortal sin is something that people can do.

Anyway, only (4) is compatible with the view that eternal hell is not retributive, God forever offers the possibility to everyone to repent and that the damned choose their state (and continue to choose that despite God's attempts to turn their wills).

I do believe, however, that 'infernalism', i.e. the possibility that some will eternally be in hell, in the case of (4) is just incredibly unlikely. I know that C.S. Lewis would say that no one (or very few) among the damned will repent. But IMO this is questionable. In either case, in scenario (4) - and also in scenario (3) - no one is forever beyond hope.

That's why I believe that in order to 'justify' hell, one must believe that eternal hell is a just punishment in a proportional, retributive justice. And to return to the topic of the discussion, I believe that this necessarily implies that human beings must be able to be perefectly/infinitely culpable to deserve that.
IMHO if there are mitigating factors it seems to me that an unending torment can't be a proportional, adequate. There must be no mitigating factors to ensure perfect culpability. I am questioning that it is possible for humans (at least in this life).

I hope that this helps.

This will ultimately run up against objections to Manichaeism if the illness has no proper cause. In Christianity even when sin is conceived as an illness the proper cause of that illness is a volitional act, whether Adam's or Satan's. — Leontiskos

I believe that universalist generally assume that the cause of sin are volitional acts.

Then Hart would seem to be logically committed to a Limbo of some kind, at least theoretically. He thinks God cannot damn the sinner and he also thinks the sinner does not deserve salvation. The deserts of the (existing) sinner are therefore something in between those two options. — Leontiskos

I disagree. I believe that he thinks that no one deserves salvation but God will forever act in order to save all and accomplish (perhaps after an incredible number of ages) that design.

I'm not sure why you say that the sinner is in a limbo.

*One is free to use an equivalent term if one doesn't like the Catholic language used here (in fact, I believe that my thoughts here are pertinent for any 'infernalist' view, not only the 'official/traditional Catholic one...).

A world where the denial of free will is somewhat common is a world where this low anthropology is in the air — Leontiskos

Just to clarify, I don't believe that denying the possibility to be perfectly culpable is denying free will or moral responsability. In fact, assuming that we are enough free in this life to be perfectly culpable is in my opinion an idealized view of human beings. I don't think we enjoy such a degree of freedom or autonomy.

Of course, this does not mean that we cannot deserve very severe punishments. I ma just questioning that we can deserve infinite ones.

Wouldn't an implication of your view be that everything is ultimately permissible in some sense? Moreover, it would seem to imply that it doesn't matter what we do because even without repentance for sin, there would be salvation. Does that strike you as theologically sound?

Jesus doesn't demand repentance for sin though. Why keep bringing up Judaism as if it matter anything to Jesus?

We're speaking of Christianity, and thus Christ. Not the Judaism he rejected.

↪boundless Wouldn't an implication of your view be that everything is ultimately permissible in some sense? Moreover, it would seem to imply that it doesn't matter what we do because even without repentance for sin, there would be salvation. Does that strike you as theologically sound? — NotAristotle

No. One can say that sincere repentance is still needed to escape a state of eternal torment. But there is no 'time limit' after which repentance is just impossible.

repentance is a feeling of much sorrow and torment. Which has nothing to do with the Greek word Metanoia. Which the Romans poorly translated into re-poenitire. The Romans frequently adapted Greek concepts, but translated them through their own cultural, political, and moral lenses, which altered their meanings. This is especially true with philosophy and religion.

Yes, I agree that it is painful. But maybe it is a necessary pain. Think of it as the pain caused by a cure for a terrible disease.

For instance, if I mistreat people I love. When I acknowledge that I made a mistake, I can experience repentance and a desire to be better in the future (in fact, without such a desire it would be something like 'regret'*, maybe, not 'repentance'). Think about it as the pain one suffers because of surgery. Such a pain is necessary for healing.

I believe that healing (both physical and psychological) can be a painful process. But sometimes experiencing that pain is necessary to get better and be better. Even in human relationship, if I, say, treat badly someone I love, acknowledging the mistake can be painful but that pain might be a necessary step for healing and reconciliation.

*I am not anglophone, but I think that 'regret' can mean simply 'wishing to not having done an action', while 'repentance' is, in fact, a sincere acknowledgment of having being wrong coupled with a sincere desire to be a better person and reconcile with whom one has offended, mistreated or whatever.

Okay, I see, then one actually can be subject to infinite punishment, correct? Assuming they never repent (and given an eternity to do so). That is even without perfect culpability, the refusal to change heart is, in itself, meritorious of punishment.

Here's the point: metanoia, is the Greek word where as the Latin translation is purposefully altered to mean something vastly different:

Metanoia (μετάνοια) in Greek literally means a change of mind or a transformative rethinking. It implies an internal shift in perspective—almost existential—a turning toward a new way of being, seeing, or living. It’s often active, forward-facing, and creative.

Repentance, from Latin paenitentia (root of penitence), is soaked in guilt, punishment, and moral debt. It implies sorrow for wrongdoing, often linked to confession, penance, and shame. It's passive backward-facing, tied to regret.

Repentance creates the "Pale-Criminals" Nietzsche speaks about in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

The shameful doer of a single deed that defines them.

In repentance shame defines.

↪boundless Okay, I see, then on your view one actually can be subject to infinite punishment, correct? Assuming they never repent (and given an eternity to do so). That is even without perfect culpability, the refusal to change heart is, in itself, meritorious of punishment. — NotAristotle

I think that maybe yes, if one is wicked and refuses forever to change one's heart, then yeah I guess that technically speaking it is a logical possibility. Maybe one can forever confirm such a choice. But if repentance is also forever a possibility, then, hope remains.

But if repentance is a possibility (and if one who repents is allowed to get out of the state of torment (sooner or later)), then no one is actually beyond hope (at least of escaping the state of torment).

That's why I think that the main problem with 'infernalism' isn't just 'eternal torment' as a possibility. But the view that at some point the destiny is irremediably fixed coupled with the view that we can earn an unending punishment of perpetual torment.

Note that an annihilationist also posits an 'unending punishment' in some sense. But the advantage here is that the annihilationist doesn't posit a punishment of infinite suffering. So, probably, the annihilationist escapes the objection in the sense that the punishment is never claimed to be 'infinite' in an important sense. Of course, whoever gets annihilated isn't 'saved' but at least doesn't experience pain.

(Please not that I am an agnostic BTW. So I'm not sure this can be said to be 'my view'...it is certainly a view that I have sympathy for)

Metanoia (μετάνοια) in Greek literally means a change of mind or a transformative rethinking. It implies an internal shift in perspective—almost existential—a turning toward a new way of being, seeing, or living. It’s often active, forward-facing, and creative. — DifferentiatingEgg

I get what you mean but I do not know* of any Greek (or even Syriac) Christian author according to whom some kind of remedial suffering is not needed for salvation. I mean even universalist ones do not deny this and, in fact, ancient Christian universalists thought that the very/extremely painful remedial experience of the temporary hell is necessary for salvation for those who are not saved during life (during which some remedial suffering must occur).
Acknowledging e.g. to having been wrong, to have done shameful deeds, to have ruined the relationship of loved ones and so on can be quite painful. But it is a necessary step for healing. If I refuse to experience the pain that comes from that acknowledgment, maybe the result is that I will in fact experience a worse fate because I refuse to experience what is necessary to heal.

So, while your point might be true, I don't think that it has support from ancient writers. But note that 'penance' in the sense of an excessive self-mortification conveys the notion that suffering must go beyond what is necessary. In this sense, yeah, If one intends 'penance' in this sense, then it seems to be truly a mistranslation.

*I am just an amatheur, so do not take my word as 'exhaustive'. But I do not recall any ancient universalist that believed that repentance can be entirely without pain.

(IIRC, even in psychoterapy it is acknowledged that in some cases the patient must confront with one's shortcomings, fears and so on and such a confrontation, while painful, is necessary to heal. If one refuses to do that confrontation in these cases, psychoterapy is useless...)

I am sorry but I have to leave now. I hope to manage to come back tomorrow. Sorry in advance for the possible delay in my answer.

I think another potential issue is the eternal possibility of repentance, faced with an eternal afterlife with no further consequences, why would someone repent? Don't you think the horizon of death, that is, our finitude, is what demands repentance of us?

I get what you mean but I do not know* of any Greek (or even Syriac) Christian author according to whom some kind of remedial suffering is not needed for salvation. — boundless

Doesn't make a difference what people think, unless they think they know better than Jesus, which goes to show they're fluffing their own ego at that point.

The text is the text, and well, we see that the authors of the original Greek Bible chose metanoia, so saying that you don’t know of any writers or authors... well, you're glossing over the facts of the words in favor of a poor translation through reification.

If you have children, here's hoping (facetiously) they don't learn a poor version of mathematics all because someone wanted to put their own spin on the concepts of math... 7+4 = 11 regardless of how you may want to twist it to some other value.

The only hell a person might go through is their own bad conscience, if they ever stoop that low to feel a bad conscience to begin with. Not by way of Jesus, as Jesus does not judge, for he was sent into the world as God's undying Grace. One need not feel any torment over past actions.

.

The Gospels is longer than a page. And what do you got you panties in a twist for? I literally learned something here from you. Metanoia vs Repentance is even better than Penance vs Repentance.

Everything else is reified through Judaism.

I have no idea what "finite sins" are; no one talks like this.

If you want to argue against eternal or everlasting punishment (depending on your view of time) and whether it's just or not, I think there is a simpler way to argue the point.

Most Christians, for example, argue that God is omniscient, which means that God knows everything that can be possibly known. It certainly would be reasonable to conclude that before God created you, he knew who you would become and, at the very least, would know many of the choices you would make freely. So, as part of his omniscience, he would know before creating you that you would probably make choices that would lead to eternal punishment. If God knew this before creating you, then creating you would be inconsistent with his moral character because the outcome would be devastating for that person. Why would any loving being create a person whose ultimate end would be torturous? Even a being that is not omniscient could reasonably deduce such an outcome. At the very least this is an argument against eternal punishment and is inconsistent with how many religious people define God.

This is just a general response to your opening statement.

↪Leontiskos I have no idea what "finite sins" are; no one talks like this. — Sam26

That phrase does not appear anywhere in the post you cited. Perhaps you are responding to the wrong person.

Ya, that was meant for Bob Ross and it's part of the title of the thread.

Interesting, thanks! — boundless

Sure.

But IMO it is a digression. — boundless

It could be relevant but I don't see it as philosophically central.

I am simply not buying this, especially if one says also that during life one can repent until the 'last breath'. — boundless

I don't think you understand what Aquinas is saying, because what Aquinas says there does not contradict the possibility of repentance "until the last breath."

Along the same lines, Aquinas might say that at a wedding a couple, "fixes the end of union, and have the will to unite, until death do them part." This in no way implies that the couple will never divorce. When Nietzsche talks about eternal recurrence he is engaged in a very similar idea to Aquinas.

Incidentally, a lot of people believe that wedding vows are impossible, and it is for the same basic reason that they believe mortal sins are impossible. The idea is that humans don't have the power to incur such lasting consequences, in this case such lasting promises.

In the case of the damned, either the 'irrevocable destruction of the good in themselves' can happen during life or not. If it can happen then redemption can be impossible even during life in some cases. If not, then I do not understand how redemption is impossible. — boundless

That is a reasonable argument. I would say that their evil can become subjectively irrevocable during life, but that the Catholic Church holds out hope for their repentance based on factors external to their person. For example, a saint might shake them out of their complacency. It may be worth pointing out here that if everyone turns out fine in the end, then there is no ultimate need to evangelize or even help others.

Note that a corollary to your premises is that irrevocable destruction of the good only ever occurs at death, and not because of death. As if, coincidentally, anyone who ends up in Hell is on a declining path that bottoms out at the exact moment of death, and not a moment before.

Your basic idea here is that death is an arbitrary cutoff, and you are working that idea via the Church's doctrine that no living person is beyond repentance. I think the basic response is that death is not an arbitrary cutoff from God's point of view (nor from Aquinas' philosophical perspective). The notion that the time of our death is arbitrary is already a denial of God's providence. Theists do not believe that people have untimely deaths and get unfairly damned by sheer luck.

One reason I find the fixity of the will at death reasonable is because it is an epistemically conservative position. Infinite reincarnation is much less epistemically conservative, as are accounts of formative post-death experience. The slogan YOLO (you only live once) is widely shared even in pluralistic societies, and that same basic epistemic intuition undergirds the fixity of the will at death. I do not find plausible the idea that our earthly lives are too short for moral or spiritual formation, or that we have some good reason to think that our earthly lives are accidental, such that our destiny-orientation will be fundamentally changed by temporal experiences outside our earthly course. If humans can fix their end, then the point at which it is fixed can always be called "arbitrary" by someone or another. I see no reason to believe that the natural human life is not sufficient for the moral and spiritual responsibilities enjoined on it by Christianity. ...Heck, we even see in aging people a tendency to become "fixed in their ways," as if fixity increases in proportion to natural death. Empirically speaking we seem to have asymptotic habitus.

St Augustine said: "You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you". If one accepts that the union/communion with God is the highest good, when such a state is reached, one has simply no reason at all to abandon the state of eternal bliss and fulfillment. That's why I think that (if classical theism is true) one can't fall again. — boundless

Okay, so it seems that you think that the human will only ever arrives at unmovable rest in God himself. That it can never place its (permanent) end in something other than God. That sounds like Hart, and it carries with it no philosophical difficulties, but I think the difficulties begin to arise when we move beyond philosophy, into theology and particularly Scripture.

In the state of hell, it's different, after all. One is in a state of torment and frustrated desires. — boundless

Flannery draws a nice comparison between Hell and the problem of evil. A similar argument could be made: if humans are not able to rest in evil, then why do so many humans rest in evil? If Hart were right about the ineluctability of the good, then there would be no such phenomenon as the chronic addict. The universalist is again and again forced to impose a strong dichotomy between the created order and what they think is a better arrangement, "What is and what should never be." If the premises of universalism were true then it seems to me that Satan and Adam would never have fallen at all, there would be no evil, there would be no chronic addiction, there would be no child starvation, etc. If the good were ineluctable in the way that the universalist posits then the created order would look entirely different.

Correct. But of course this is persuasive only if one already believes that one can commit a mortal sin as defined by the official doctrine of the Catholic Catechism and that if one dies without repenting from such an act he is eternally condenmed to hell. — boundless

I think one only has to believe in the notion of mortal sin. If you don't believe in Hell, then you don't believe in mortal sin, at least not really. This is because mortal = mortality = death = finality. In Scripture death itself is a consequence of sin.

The fact that mortal sin requires a certain degree of knowledge and consent is where things get confusing. I doubt you believe that, say, a 5-year old child is capable of a mortal sin (even if you say to him or to her that, say, murdering innocent people qualifies as such and he or she does that). But if one considers the finitiness of our lives, the intricate web of relations and influences between a human being and the cultural, social and even physical context where he or she lives and so on, when we can safely posit the 'cut-off' between 'being able to commit a mortal sin' and 'being unable to commit a mortal sin'? For instance, at which age does one get the ability to commit a mortal sin? — boundless

This is an example of an elaborate argument for the idea that there is no such thing as a mortal sin. Such arguments are almost always epistemic, as this one is. If you want me to engage an argument like that you will have to make it more formal, as dangers of emotion and rhetoric become rather pronounced in these areas.

And supposedly one in Heaven has his or her innermost desires perfectly fulfilled, has full knowledge to experience the 'best possible state' and is actually experiencing perfect beatitude. It's clear to me why, in these condition, a truly rational agent would have the will fixed to remain in communion with God. — boundless

Yes, that is a reasonable account. :up:

Ok, I am here. But unfortunately, I'll be unable to answer in the next few days.

↪boundless I think another potential issue is the eternal possibility of repentance, faced with an eternal afterlife with no further consequences, why would someone repent? Don't you think the horizon of death, that is, our finitude, is what demands repentance of us? — NotAristotle

Well, the motivation would be: "I will continue to suffer if I never repent". Yes, maybe some won't take seriously this kind of thought. But for how long? Assuming, also, that 'in the the world to come', one has an increase of knowledge about God, why one's sins were sins and so on, maybe one would take more seriously the possibility to repent.

The only hell a person might go through is their own bad conscience, if they ever stoop that low to feel a bad conscience to begin with. Not by way of Jesus, as Jesus does not judge, for he was sent into the world as God's undying Grace. One need not feel any torment over past actions. — DifferentiatingEgg

Let's consider a serial killer who repents for his heinous crimes. Would you really think that a sincere process of repentance would not involve suffering?

Also, I would say that healing itself can be quite painful. If repentance is a turning away the will to the good by fully acknowledging that one has wickedly and taking responsibility for one's own wicked acts, I would say that the pain can be necessary for this process of 'turning away'. I really can't see why suffering goes against the 'turning of the will'.

One doesn't need to repent in order to change ones ways...

The repentant criminal is none other than Nietzsche's "Pale Criminal" who hangs his head in shame and is now defined as the doer of one deed that not defines his identity, some deed that is an externalized anchor of the past...

Metanoia (μετάνοια) in Greek literally means a change of mind or a transformative rethinking. It implies an internal shift in perspective—almost existential—a turning toward a new way of being, seeing, or living. It’s often active, forward-facing, and creative.

Repentance, from Latin paenitentia (root of penitence), is soaked in guilt, punishment, and moral debt. It implies sorrow for wrongdoing, often linked to confession, penance, and shame. It's backward-facing, tied to regret.

Jesus seeks to transform through the Beatitudes, which are connected with Joy, not shame and guilt, as he didn't come to pass any judgements.

John 3:17 For God sent not his Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by him.

I don't think you understand what Aquinas is saying, because what Aquinas says there does not contradict the possibility of repentance "until the last breath." — Leontiskos

A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

Ok. I try to start from the beginning. Aquinas says that one can fix his will in sin. The infinite duration of punishment is due to the fact that the damned has a fixed will in sin therefore the damned can't repent because he will never will never want to do that.

To me this mean that at least after death, according to Aquinas, the sinner can't turn away the will from evil. During life, as I understand it, the sinner can fix his will in evil but at any moment he can end such a fixation by repenting.

Incidentally, a lot of people believe that wedding vows are impossible, and it is for the same basic reason that they believe mortal sins are impossible. The idea is that humans don't have the power to incur such lasting consequences, in this case such lasting promises. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure the two cases are the same. One can fix his own will in marriage and sincerely take the vow but a certain point he can 'fall'. One can make a lasting promise but one can break the promise, because the will isn't invariably fixed either in the good in this life. Of course, I would say that breaking the lasting promise here is wrong (assuming the spouse is still loving and faithful), but it seems to me standard Christian understanding that even the righteous can 'fall' at any time.

So, yeah, I can imagine that one can fix his will to remain in sin 'forever' but it doesn't necessarily imply that the will at a certain point must become irrevocable.

That is a reasonable argument. I would say that their evil can become subjectively irrevocable during life, but that the Catholic Church holds out hope for their repentance based on factors external to their person. For example, a saint might shake them out of their complacency. It may be worth pointing out here that if everyone turns out fine in the end, then there is no ultimate need to evangelize or even help others. — Leontiskos

I honestly think that the idea 'if everyone will be ultimately saved, then evangelization is useless' suffers from various problems. First, if there is a temporary hell, one might still want to avoid that others avoid that. Second: people might actually turn away from evil if they feel loved. Not sure why you think that evangelization becomes useless if universal salvation is true.

Regarding the rest... I'm not sure how to respond then. If some are saved by 'external factors to their person', then why only some?
I would assume that standard Catholic teaching is that any kind of 'external intervention' alone is insufficient without some 'internal intervetion' from the sinner.

Note that a corollary to your premises is that irrevocable destruction of the good only ever occurs at death, and not because of death. As if, coincidentally, anyone who ends up in Hell is on a declining path that bottoms out at the exact moment of death, and not a moment before. — Leontiskos

Ok. But if the irrevocable destruction of the good happens before death, then, some might be in a hopeless state before death. I honestly never heard that, at least nowadays, the 'official doctrine' says that.

Or maybe you're saying that the prior fixation in sin causes the destruction of the good at death. But again, I would have thought that traditional catholics generally believe that 'until there is life, there is hope'.

Your basic idea here is that death is an arbitrary cutoff, and you are working that idea via the Church's doctrine that no living person is beyond repentance. I think the basic response is that death is not an arbitrary cutoff from God's point of view (nor from Aquinas' philosophical perspective). The notion that the time of our death is arbitrary is already a denial of God's providence. Theists do not believe that people have untimely deaths and get unfairly damned by sheer luck. — Leontiskos

I am not sure what to respond here. Let's take the example of the two murderers I made before:

"Murderers A and B kill together an innocent person. They are discovered by the police and in the gunfight are both shot by the police, who shot in self-defence. Murderer A dies on the spot. Murderer B is taken into hospital and saved from the medical staff. During the time in prison, murderer B repents."

I believe that this kind of scenario is actually somewhat common. From an outside perspective at least, it would seem to me that the two murderers are not given the same chance to repent. Note that in the example I made, all actions that lead to A's death and B's survival are done by humans who are exercising their free will.

If death isn't arbitrary, as you say, but occurs for anyone at the 'right time', doesn't this imply some kind of determinism?

I see no reason to believe that the natural human life is not sufficient for the moral and spiritual responsibilities enjoined on it by Christianity. ...Heck, we even see in aging people a tendency to become "fixed in their ways," as if fixity increases in proportion to natural death. Empirically speaking we seem to have asymptotic habitus. — Leontiskos

But why don't you believe that if the damned become more aware of God in the next world they just can't repent, especially considering that, if there will be torment in hell, they'll also suffer?

I see what you mean, but at the same time, aren't humans beings with finite knowledge and finite will-power? Why an increase in knowledge can't bring at least some sinners to repent after death?

Okay, so it seems that you think that the human will only ever arrives at unmovable rest in God himself. That it can never place its (permanent) end in something other than God — Leontiskos

I quoted Augustine from the 'Confessions', not Hart. Augustine famously said that our heart can only find rest in God (and God made us for Himself). Not sure why see this particular thing as controversial.

A fuller quote of the same passage:

Great are You, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is Your power, and of Your wisdom there is no end. And man, being a part of Your creation, desires to praise You — man, who bears about with him his mortality, the witness of his sin, even the witness that You resist the proud, — yet man, this part of Your creation, desires to praise You. You move us to delight in praising You; for You have made us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You

Isn't what Augustine says here uncontroversial?

If one is in communion with God, one's heart is at rest, so one has no reason to 'fall again'.
IMHO using the 'fixity' of the destiny of the blessed to argue that the fate of the damned must be 'fixed' because otherwise the blessed could also fall again doesn't consider that in the case of the blessed, there is a clear reason why the blessed would not want to fall away.

If the damned's will is fixed in evil it must be due to a completely different reason.

Flannery draws a nice comparison between Hell and the problem of evil. A similar argument could be made: if humans are not able to rest in evil, then why do so many humans rest in evil? If Hart were right about the ineluctability of the good, then there would be no such phenomenon as the chronic addict. The universalist is again and again forced to impose a strong dichotomy between the created order and what they think is a better arrangement, "What is and what should never be." If the premises of universalism were true then it seems to me that Satan and Adam would never have fallen at all, there would be no evil, there would be no chronic addiction, there would be no child starvation, etc. If the good were ineluctable in the way that the universalist posits then the created order would look entirely different. — Leontiskos

Maybe the possibility to do evil (note the word 'possibility') is necessary for everyone to be eventually in full communion with God. So the universalist could still say that the existence of evil is compatible with the view that ultimately all we be saved.
Regarding the chronic addict, I am not sure. Again, I would say that if the 'chronic addict' goes to Heaven, probably the communion with God will free the addict from his or her addiction.

I think one only has to believe in the notion of mortal sin. If you don't believe in Hell, then you don't believe in mortal sin, at least not really. This is because mortal = mortality = death = finality. In Scripture death itself is a consequence of sin. — Leontiskos

One can believe that mortal sin lead to annihilation, for example. Like 'eternal torment', annihilation too is of course irrevocably final. I'm not sure that mortal sin as understood in these terms necessarily imply that the consequence is 'unending torment'.

Outside what you think that Scriptures say, are there any other reasons why do you think that the traditional view of hell is preferably over some kind of annihilation?

This is an example of an elaborate argument for the idea that there is no such thing as a mortal sin. Such arguments are almost always epistemic, as this one is. If you want me to engage an argument like that you will have to make it more formal, as dangers of emotion and rhetoric become rather pronounced in these areas. — Leontiskos

Well, one can certainly say that "I believe that Scripture and Tradition say that and are infallible (at least in issues like this one)" but it isn't a philosophical argument. I am not saying that everything we believe must be philosphically justified.

I honestly I don't see why I 'should' make the argument 'more formal'. And as I just said the problem isn't IMO the possibility of a final punishment but actually it is that I don't find the reasons why a punishment of unending torment can be an adequate, proportional punishment for human sins, when one takes into account the finitude of human beings.

As I also said, I believe that an annihilationist can argue that annihilation can be a 'finite, final punishment' becuase the suffering experineced in that case is finite. But unending torment is a different kind of thing. The punishment in the latter case involves an infinite amount of suffering.

I believe that, considering the finitude of human beings, it is a normal question to ask why a human being might really deserve a punishment that involves an infinite amount of pain.

Just a quick, but hopefully adequate, answer

Metanoia (μετάνοια) in Greek literally means a change of mind or a transformative rethinking. It implies an internal shift in perspective—almost existential—a turning toward a new way of being, seeing, or living. It’s often active, forward-facing, and creative. — DifferentiatingEgg

I believe that we have simply different ways to understand what a 'repentance' even in the 'active, forward-facing and creative' sense might imply.

I believe that repentance is also a process of healing and such a healing might involve potentially suffering.

I also believe that acknowledging past mistakes as mistakes, wicked acts as wicked acts etc and take full responsibility for them is part 'repentance'. Of course it doesn't stop at that as it is a re-direction of the will towards the good, which is often 'active, forward-facing, and creative'. But that it doesn't involve suffering it seems to be impossibile (maybe not in all cases, but still).
Of course, suffering here is not 'the point'. It doesn't mean that one must seek to suffer. One should seek healing. Healing and the redirection of the will is the point. But maybe some remedial suffering is necessary for that.

I don't know. This makes totally sense to me. Not sure why you imply that 'metanoia' must involve only positive emotions.

I believe that repentance is also a process of healing and such a healing might involve potentially suffering — boundless

Suffering isn't an absence of joy or sadness...repentance is different from suffering also, attempting to equate the two as the same, well, of course we won't see eye to eye.

Not sure why you imply that 'metanoia' must involve only positive emotions. — boundless

It didn't say that it did, but it shows Jesus doesn't demand one to be repentant, but rather to achieve metanoia, a transformed mindset vs a bad conscience.

The bad ruminant cannot achieve joy because they're stuck with undigested feelings of shame and guilt.

Jesus has nothing to do with shame and guilt.

Thus... repentance is not a feeling Jesus demands of his followers.

Hence the "glad tidings" of Jesus.

Ok. I try to start from the beginning. Aquinas says that one can fix his will in sin. — boundless

But you've already deviated from the text. The text says:

• "A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity [...] also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly."

That's a kind of syllogism, and you are trying to contradict a conclusion without addressing the premises, which is a form of begging the question. We can formulate it this way:

1. A man fixes his end in sin
2. Therefore he has the will to sin, everlastingly [or: he sins in his own eternity]

Note that nowhere here is the claim that a man fixes his will in sin.

So the first question to ask regards (1). Do you disagree with (1)? Do you think (1) is impossible, or something?

To me this mean that at least after death, according to Aquinas... — boundless

But I've already pointed out that the quote says nothing at all about death. How are you interpreting Aquinas to be saying something about death when he in no way mentions death? We can't engage Aquinas if we are not attending to the words he writes. In that case we are not engaging Aquinas at all, and are really engaging something else, perhaps a strawman.

So, yeah, I can imagine that one can fix his will to remain in sin 'forever' but it doesn't necessarily imply that the will at a certain point must become irrevocable. — boundless

No one is saying "must." What is being said is, "Can." And if we couldn't will something for eternity then how could we fix our end in that something? If one can fix their end then—ceteris paribus—they can will that end for the term appropriate to the act, and for eternal beings this term is eternity. Someone who thinks we can't will marriage for life will not get married, or admit that a couple can properly perform the act of fixing their joint, earthly end. Someone who admits that the couple can perform that act must also admit that the end can be willed for the term of earthly life.

I honestly think that the idea 'if everyone will be ultimately saved, then evangelization is useless' suffers from various problems. — boundless

Well read what I actually wrote: "If everyone turns out fine in the end, then there is no ultimate need to evangelize or even help others." What do you think about that?

I'm going to leave it there for now. This conversation is beginning to sprawl and becoming unwieldy, and what is needed is for you to attend to the words and arguments on offer, rather than deviating from those words and arguments. If you don't properly read and interpret the words of Aquinas or myself, then I fear that multiplying words will do me no good. Maybe narrowing the conversation will make it easier to attend to the actual words being written.

There's a previous thread that takes this argument and applies it to the ethics of believers: The moral character of Christians