Yeah, I actually agree. The distinction between the 'objective' and the 'subjective' component is an useful heuristic but, as you note, it can muddle the waters.

Let's say that the child that killed the innocent person actually knows that shooting people can kill them. And, indeed, he intended to kill. Still, I would say that the degree of culpability is far less than that of an adult who commits an analogous act with the same intention. The sin is, as you say, different.

But I believe that the distinction of subjective and objective aspects of a sinful act can be a good heuristic. After all, in the example you propose, an innocent person has been killed by another and the dynamics of the crime is the same. So, of course both acts have that in common. They differ, of course, in the degree of responsibility of the transgressors. We cannot apply the same standards in evaluating the seriousness of the crime of the child and the adult (or, for that matter, an insane adult cannot be regarded as having the same responsibility of an adult with normally functioning mental faculties). So, yes, I agree with you that the sin is different, but the act itself can be regarded as the 'same'.

In the section of the Catholic Catechism I linked to in my first post in the discussion we read, for instance:

1862 One commits venial sin when, in a less serious matter, he does not observe the standard prescribed by the moral law, or when he disobeys the moral law in a grave matter, but without full knowledge or without complete consent.

Note that the Catechism accepts that the same act can correspond to very different sins.

The 'grave matter' is the 'act', i.e. the 'objective' component. In our example: the killing of an innocent person. The degree of knowledge and consent is the 'subjective' component. And the evaluation of the seriousness of the sin should take into account all the aspects of the sin. So my question is: if one takes all aspects into account, can a human being get that degree of culpability that deservers some form of eternal torment as a just, adequate punishment?

So, I agree, the distinction can actually create confusion. But it shows very well a deep problem in the "a sin against God is infinitely bad because God has infinite dignity" perspective.

I'm not a theologist, but I think that eternity should be distinguished from unending procession. Notably, the present can be regarded as 'eternal' in that the meaning of "now" isn't defined in relation to a time series. In this sense, your present emotions, as in the mood you have now, can be regarded as 'eternal' even though your moods are not permanent. Moods can also feel timeless in that those feelings do not involve temporal cognition. Also, the seven deadly sins seem to refer to moods rather than to actions; so I would guess that biblical references to eternal heaven or to eternal punishment should probably be interpreted in the presentist's sense of timelessness, rather than in the sense of unbounded duration. — sime

But, on the other hand, our experience seems to be fundamentally temporal. A process. Not something static. If time stops, can we really speak of beatitude or torment?

As you said, I mostly agree with you. And I also agree on this:

For my part, when I say infernalism has difficulties, this is not to say the other views don't themselves have difficulties — Count Timothy von Icarus

Regarding this:

When David Bentley Hart says that we couldn't be happy with our own ignorance about damned family members or their eternal torment without having been radically changed so as to be "replaced," he might be right. But this seems equally true vis-á-vis the truly wicked. What of the BTK Killer or Ted Bundy, or even a Jeffery Epstein would really remain once selfishness and attraction to finite ends is removed? Not very much it would seem, suggesting a sort of annihilationism within universalism (unless God is simply replacing the wicked). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I see what you mean. An universalist might say that the self of these criminals is extremely corrupted, but not irremediably so (for God). An afterlife purgatorial experience is the process in which such a wicked person is restored to being a proper 'image of God'. Does this lead to a complete replacement of the wicked person with a better version of themselves? Yes, in a sense. The wicked is, in some sense, annihilated in order to recover 'that person should have been'.

Universalism IMHO can use without problems the annihilationist language and up to a point take it literally. Up to a point, of course.

Or, to the infernalists' point, it seems that some might refuse to turn towards God.
...
Moreover, if one has disfigured the Imago Dei enough, are we still talking about a rational nature?

Or perhaps the Augustinian curvatus in se, the curving inward of the self in sin, becomes so extreme that, like a black hole, there is no escape velocity capable of pulling away from its gravitational pull. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The main problem that I have with infernalism (and to a lesser degree, also annihilationism) is that it relies upon an inflexibility of the fate after death. Unless one completely denies any role of free will in our salvation, during this life it is said that we can repent (and also fall) until the last breath. After death, we can't either fall if we are saved or be saved if we are damned. But why? Why should death be this kind of absolute 'cut-off' of our possibilities to spiritual progress?

The main problem with universalism seems to be that it has a kind of determinism in it. Salvation is an ultimately irresistible process. Can we be really free in such a scenario? Of course, in a sense yes. But the possibility of saying 'no' to any kind of loving relationship seems to be necessary for it being meaningful. At the same time, however, the possibility of restoring the loving relationship after the rejection seems to also be a necessary component of a loving relationship. IMHO this would mean that the possibility of salvation remains forever. Hence, I believe that philosophical arguments can lead us to endorse a reasonable hope of universal salvation, in the sense that it will remain always a possibility (if one assumes the existence of a loving God).

The case in Scripture seems more concrete though. ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

While I mostly agree with what you say after this (see below for the exception), it is also true that such texts has been interpreted in a way that precludes universalism, as you also point out. I agree with you, however, that the most natural reading of those passage is universalist.

But the New Testament also include many passage that indicate a division between the saved and the damned. And while one can argue that they can be read in a way that such a division is not truly final, they don't explicitly tell us that the division isn't final.

The Scriptures are therefore ambiguous. I don't believe that any kind of exegesis can fully resolve the matter, no matter how one tries. And honestly I am not sure of what to make of this. Maybe it is a good that the Bible is ambiguous for some reason. Maybe it is simply inconsistent on this point. This is one of the reason why I am an agnostic (although I have a strong sympathy towards theistic universalism in general, and the Christian version in particular).

I think it would be fair to say that the decline in support for infernalism has pernicious causes in a culture whose ethics has become hung up on only the worst sort of offenses, and a general comfort with sin and lack of concern with the spiritual life, etc. But it also has certainly been helped by the widespread expansion of access to critical texts and education in Greek, that make at least some of the efforts to radically re-read what New Testament texts appear to say in a straightforward manner appear to be little more than doctrinal massaging. A good infernalist response to these issues, IMHO, cannot rest on trying to bulldoze through these passages by explaining that "all in all," really means "all in some." — Count Timothy von Icarus

While what you see here makes sense, IMHO part of the reason why the West lost its interest in religion and spirituality actually is the extreme forms of infernalism that have long dominated the scene. The highly legalistic approach to spirituality in the West, the doctrine of the 'massa damnata' according to which even infants who die unbaptized are condemned at least to an eternal separation from God etc have contributed to a mass 'spiritual exhaustion'. Perhaps if the religious doctrines especially in the Dark Ages and in the early Modern age weren't so rigid, extreme etc, people would be less distant from religion in general (I suspect that you actually agree with this, but IMO it was worth to point out).


Edited for clarification

making God the victim — Bob Ross

Exactly, have you heard of the doctrine of the Trinity?

"What you did not do for the least, you did not do for me." (To paraphrase the Gospel).

It would be interesting to see someone try to flesh out this argument

I think this is a good point and, upon thinking about it more, I think it is per se possible that a sin could carry with it eternal punishment; but the kinds of sins we commit historically are not.

I am thinking of something like this:

1. A punishment which incorporates any form of infinitude must have as its corresponding offense one which has in that same form an infinitude. (principle of proportionality in justice)

2. No form of infinitude exists in any offense possibly made by creatures which have or currently exist in the universe.

3. Therefore, the punishment for any given offense possibly made by creatures which have or currently exist in the universe cannot contain any form of infinitude.

For all intents and purposes, I don’t think it matters if the infinitude is in terms of duration of the crime, repetition of the crime, the dignity of the offended party, etc. In the case of humans, which are the only example we have of a being capable of moral scrutiny, there has been nor are there any cases of an offense where (A) the offender was of infinite dignity, (B) the offense had—at least in part—infinite duration, or (C) the offense had—at least in part—infinite repetition.

If (to your point) Hitler were to be a creature which was eternally carrying out mass genocides, was torturing someone for eternity without any break, or a human (to your Vatican point) had infinite dignity and he tortured them; then it would be proportional to punish, by some means, with an eternal punishment.

To Vatican, I would say this is just their attempt at keeping up with the times; but humans do not have infinite dignity, nor is that possible.

The dignity of a thing is relative to its nature such that one closer to God is higher than one more remote; and God is has the highest dignity and is the only one with infinite dignity because He is perfectly good. Humans cannot be perfectly good, for their essence is never capable of being identical to their existence; and this is impossible because the only being capable of having the two identical is the kind of being which is subsistently existent (and human’s do not possess subsistent existence inherently from their essence).

That’s why Being itself is the only thing that can possibly be perfectly good.

1. A punishment which incorporates any form of infinitude must have as its corresponding offense one which has in that same form an infinitude. (principle of proportionality in justice) — Bob Ross

Okay, but what is the basis of this? Is it something like this?

1a. A punishment which incorporates any form must have as its corresponding offence one which has that same form.
2a. Infinitude is a possible form (or meta-form)
3a. Therefore, a punishment which incorporates any form of infinitude must have as its corresponding offence one which has that same form of infinitude

More precisely, you seem to be saying that a punishment of infinite duration can only be meted out for a transgression of infinite duration. And according to 1a this carries with it the claim that a punishment of a 10 minute duration can only be meted out for a transgression of a 10 minute duration, etc. The Aquinas quote from above addresses this:

In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life—sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time occupied in killing... — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

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For all intents and purposes, I don’t think it matters if the infinitude is in terms of duration of the crime, repetition of the crime, the dignity of the offended party, etc. — Bob Ross

Okay, but if you want to argue for a disproportion of punishment, then you must specify what is supposed to be infinite and finite. Is it duration? Is it that the punishment has infinite duration whereas the transgression did not have an infinite duration?

It’s pretty simple:

The Bible breaks down into sections.

The only section I'm concerned with are the four Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, which primarily focus on the life and teachings of Jesus.

Acts, on the other hand, chronicles the actions of the apostles and the growth of the church...

I know this may be hard for you to rationalize because you're quite poor at following anything outside of your prejudice...

Just because you find the word sin or repent in the Gospels doesn't mean that Jesus is passing Judgement.

And I already destroyed the poor accuracy in the interpretation and translation of the Greek word Metanoia, into the word Repentance. Which you yourself are too poor of a mind to even counter.

Meta = a change with and among, to move beyond, and has nothing to do with the sorrow or shame of repentance. Repentance is an improper translation of metanoia.

Or do you think Facebook changed its name to "Sorrow and Shame"? :roll:

No, you're just poor at reasoning in general.

You're trying to assert a different meaning for the original word within the Greek Bible (metanoia, a change of thought towards the Beatitudes [the teachings] of Jesus) to your dumb understanding (repentance, a feeling of very much sorrow about ones actions).

Which is why you ought to use the Douay-Rheims Bible. The Douay-Rheims translation was produced by translating the Latin Vulgate, which was the official Bible of the Catholic Church for centuries. The Vulgate was translated from the original languages (Hebrew and Greek) by St. Jerome in the 4th century. 

This is why PENANCE is used rather than REPENTANCE in the Douay-Rheims Bible. And the Latin Vulgate because St. Jerome understood that METANOIA doesn't equate to REPENTANCE but rather PENANCE.

You're the idiot pointing to some poor translation of the Bible and saying "see this shit translation says repent."

That you didn't know the Beatitudes are the teachings of Jesus Christ, but thought the Apostles opinions on Christianity were, is fucking wild also...

Just goes to show you don't know shit about your own belief system.

It seems to me that there is a plausible trade-off between duration and intensity in terms of punishment. One might justly meet out a short, but intense punishment for a sin that occured over a long duration or vice versa.

The problem I see for St. Thomas here is that the claim that breeches in the order of man's conformity to the will of God continue forever itself has to presuppose that universalism is false. If universalism is true, then God is eventually "all in all," and all such breeches are repaired "at the end of the ages" (perhaps after "the age to come").

If universalism is true, there are no human, or even demonic crimes that have infinite effects. By the same logic, if annihilationism or infernalism are true, there are indeed such crimes.

The difficulty for both sides is that appealing to this seems to require begging the question and assuming that one of the positions is the case in order to make a claim about the duration and effects of any creatures' transgressions.

And I don't know if it works to say: "well the breech would be infinite if God didn't act," because I think this has to rely on a sort of nature/supernatural distinction that I find extremely unhelpful and hard to justify. Absolutely nothing happens without God, and so of course God is required for any repair. God is also required for baptism, for reference, for the sun to rise, etc.

Punishment delivered as a means of deterring other would-be transgressors is punishment oriented towards an end that is distinct from retribution. But clearly it will not deter anyone from sinning to continue to punish sinners after the Judgement, assuming that those who have been beatified are incapable of sin. One only needs a continuous deterence policy when the people one is hoping to deter are capable of transgressing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that is a good argument. :up:

There is quite a bit of literature on that objection, most of which I have forgotten. In any case, Aquinas does not say that deterrence is the only object of punishment. He would surely agree with you that the medicinal aspect of deterring others ceases to exist in the eschaton. If the objector had claimed that all punishment is merely medicinal/deterring, then I believe Aquinas would have attacked that premise. That is a premise that is present in our culture but was not present in Aquinas'.

But the larger issue is that, if one takes infants to be born under the rupture in the order St. Thomas refers to, this could be read as saying:

"All men are subject to damnation from conception, since they cannot repair the order that is ruptured in Adam. And they can do nothing to repair this order themselves." — Count Timothy von Icarus

In my opinion Limbo plays a more central role in Thomas' thought than is usually recognized, and there is nothing truly punitive about the natural beatitude of Limbo.

But can the dead not repent? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Catholic doctrine is firm that the dead cannot repent.

The tricky thing about this thread is that it is philosophical, not theological. Theologically speaking, Christian tradition accepts that the demons are damned and will never repent, and therefore you already have a precedent for the sort of conclusion that a universalist wants to reject. The purely philosophical spectacles perhaps have no need to take such a theological datum into account.

Dante pointedly dodges this question by not having a single sinner in the Inferno take any responsibility for their sins or show any repentance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Rather than a dodge, I see that as highly consistent with Christian tradition.

And I would agree with this, the idea of God as some sort of disengaged "third party" to sin does not make a lot of theological sense. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and that is worth pointing out in relation to the OP.

The question of whether eternal punishment is justified seems to me to be different from the question as to whether eternal punishment is theologically sound. The two need not go hand in hand, and indeed they usually don't go together, with the claim that God would be justified in punishing repetent sinners, but shows mercy instead, being a common one. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, that's a fair point.

Theologically, the focus on "extrinsic punishment" and "extrinsic reward," seems less helpful — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. I think that's fairly easy to avoid, but it is inevitably woven into this thread.

Yet aside from being an "opinion of recent theologians," this is also a conception right at home with many of the earlier Church Fathers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can say that many early Fathers understood the gaze of God to fall on the saved and the damned alike (with a different effect), but this does not mean that those "many" were universalists. Only a very small number of them were. ...I should probably just state outright that I disagree with Hart (and even Balthasar), and I think they distort the tradition.

But as you say, we can understand a universalist conclusion in different senses. It could be necessary according to justice, or it could be gratuitous according to mercy. I think the latter possibility is much more credible than the former qua Christianity. Yet for someone coming from a purely philosophical perspective in the 21st century, the idea that (eternal) Hell is unjust is at least understandable. Indeed, a very quick way to get at the infinitude question is to note that 21st century philosophers generally do not believe in angels, demons, the higher nous, and the eternal stakes that accompany such a paradigm. In a similar way, a new convert who reads Lewis' essay, "The Weight of Glory," would probably be blown away by the elevated anthropology.

(P.S. What source were you quoting Benedict XVI from?)

, , -

I will try to come back to these thoughtful posts. Time is short today.

Ok. So you're going Greek -> Latin -> English. Why not just do Greek -> English like most translations? The Greek is there. — BitconnectCarlos

The point you are making is true, and also elementary. :up:

(I highlight this only because the error continues to persist.)

No worries.

Pope Benedict's quote is from his encyclical Spe Salvi.

But as you say, we can understand a universalist conclusion in different senses. It could be necessary according to justice, or it could be gratuitous according to mercy. I think the latter possibility is much more credible than the former qua Christianity. Yet for someone coming from a purely philosophical perspective in the 21st century, the idea that (eternal) Hell is unjust is at least understandable. Indeed, a very quick way to get at the infinitude question is to note that 21st century philosophers generally do not believe in angels, demons, the higher nous, and the eternal stakes that accompany such a paradigm. — Leontiskos

Just a quick note here. I believe that questioning the ethical soundness of 'endless punishment' doesn't necessarily imply believing in universal salvation. That is, one can argue that 'endless punishment' is unjust and still assert that not everyone will be saved. One can certainly say without contradiction that nobody deserves to be eternally punished and that nobody deserves eternal bliss.

Universal salvation of course implies that all punishment will be temporary. But universalism says much more than merely asserting the finite duration of punishments: that all will, ultimately, be saved and experience eternal blessedness. I don't think that universalists claim that eternal bliss is 'just' since nobody actually deserves it. It is seen as a gift of God's grace and mercy.

On the other hand, I believe that it is legitimate to question the doctrine of 'eternal hell' even from a purely retributive (and proportional) account of justice, as I pointed out before. I think we shall keep the issues separate here. Rejecting the infinite duration of punishment doesn't necessarily imply the acceptance of the doctrine of universal salvation.

Penance is a duty, an action in Christianity that's like prayer, alms giving, or as we can see in the very next few lines... Fasting. — DifferentiatingEgg

Ok, let's say we go with penance.

"I came not to call the just, but sinners to penance."

If penance is a duty, then sinners are still bound by duty. We can adopt a non-judgmental attitude about it, but duty hasn't vanished. If one hasn't fulfilled a duty, then one has fallen short; one has done less than what is required or expected of them. What do we call falling short of a duty, then?

Pope Benedict's quote is from his encyclical Spe Salvi. — boundless

Thanks, that was my guess.

Rejecting the infinite duration of punishment doesn't necessarily imply the acceptance of the doctrine of universal salvation. — boundless

That's true, but universalism in the first sense I noted and rejection of Hell really do go hand in hand. They are logically distinct positions, but that sense of universalism logically entails the rejection of Hell on the grounds of justice. What threads like this are concerned with is precisely the thesis that Hell is unjust.

I don't think that universalists claim that eternal bliss is 'just' since nobody actually deserves it. — boundless

Hart has recently further popularized the thesis that Hell is unjust, and if a Christian views Hell as unjust then salvation is not undeserved. That is, if it is unjust for someone to not be saved, then salvation is not gratuitous.

(I assume it goes without saying that the traditional doctrine of Hell is a doctrine of eternal Hell.)

Edit: Can you give me a snapshot of your religious affiliation and background? It will help me respond on point. I myself am a Catholic with an affinity for Orthodoxy.

I am now realizing in my rambling first post it probably would have been more helpful for me to note that all sin was generally taken as being primarily a sin against God. And I would agree with this, the idea of God as some sort of disengaged "third party" to sin does not make a lot of theological sense.

Yes, but is this sin against God, whereof God is not the thing directly offended nor the offender, warrant eternal punishment?

The question of whether eternal punishment is justified seems to me to be different from the question as to whether eternal punishment is theologically sound. The two need not go hand in hand, and indeed they usually don't go together, with the claim that God would be justified in punishing repetent sinners, but shows mercy instead, being a common one.

I don’t see how eternal punishment can be theologically sound if it is unjust: God is perfectly just, so God cannot eternal punish if it is unjust to do so.

Grace is an another essential aspect of most theological theories; but it does not override justice. Viz., grace does not partake in unjust things and justice must still be served.

But wouldn't that be philosophy, the love of wisdom, and science?

Religion can go hand-and-hand with philosophy: specifically theology. It doesn't always, but it can. Religion is about worship through tradition; theology on the nature of God.

What I mean here is that you simply cannot get a logical, objective answer to what is morally right and wrong. It's not a question of retrospect or our ignorance. The question is inherently subjective, hence you cannot get an objective answer to

Ok, so you are taking a moral anti-realist position; but theology tends to presuppose moral realism.

Perhaps I am misreading Acquinas, but it seems as though, even in your excerpt, he is arguing that sin is the disruption of God's order and, as such, incurs a debt of eternal punishment. — Bob Ross

I missed this. To use an analogy, imagine that a pipe breaks and the water that was flowing through it is now flowing out onto the ground. This is an order being disturbed, and as long as the pipe remains broken, the water will continue flowing out onto the ground. It will flow out onto the ground for all eternity if the cause/pipe is never repaired. Put crudely, Aquinas is saying that we are able to break our own pipes in ways that we cannot repair, and that Hell flows out of this.

Okay, but what is the basis of this? Is it something like this?

I am not taking a principle of equality but, rather, proportionality. It is not that a, e.g., sin that happened for 10-minutes has to be punished with a punishment that lasts 10-minutes; however, the punish must be proportionate. I cannot put to death a person for stealing one turnip.

In the case of a punishment that has any sense of infinitude in it (e.g., infinite duration, repetition, etc.) it seems always disproportionate to the sin (like the turnip example) because the sin, being finite in every way imaginable (in practical affairs), does not remotely approach any infinitude.

E.g., a 10-minute sin of adultery cannot be proportionate to an eternally repetitive punishment of being cheated on. That violates proportionality: don’t you think?

Okay, but if you want to argue for a disproportion of punishment, then you must specify what is supposed to be infinite and finite. Is it duration? Is it that the punishment has infinite duration whereas the transgression did not have an infinite duration?

I am saying any combination of a sin that itself contains no form of infinitude with any punishment that contains at least one form of infinitude. This means that neither the offender nor offended parties are of infinite dignity and the durations were finite.

This could be, e.g., stealing a loaf of bread and eating it with a punishment of having your things stolen for an infinite amount of times; or stealing a loaf and eating it with a punishment of feeling pain for all eternity (with no break).

I missed this. To use an analogy, imagine that a pipe breaks and the water that was flowing through it is now flowing out onto the ground. This is an order being disturbed, and as long as the pipe remains broken, the water will continue flowing out onto the ground. It will flow out onto the ground for all eternity if the cause/pipe is never repaired. Put crudely, Aquinas is saying that we are able to break our own pipes in ways that we cannot repair, and that Hell flows out of this.

This is interesting; because one could make the argument that some disruptions (viz., sins) could cause an infinite causal chain of disturbances of the proper; and I would say if this were to happen, which is very unlikely, then it would have some sort of infinite demerit and may be punished (potentially) by eternal punishment.

It is also worth noting that it may be proportionate to punish a sin that did contain infinitude in a finite way: I am not sure. Sometimes we punish by way of absence of fellow reward; e.g., all these kids get a cookie but that one kid that misbehaved: the kid gets punished by way of others being rewarded. So it may be proportionate to punish those who have committed a sin of infinite demerit with the absence of eternal life in heaven. I'll have to think about it; however, what I am arguing is that a punishment that itself involves an infinitude cannot possibly be proportionate to a sin that contains no infinitude: whether that be in duration or dignity.

I don’t see how eternal punishment can be theologically sound if it is unjust: God is perfectly just, so God cannot eternal punish if it is unjust to do so. — Bob Ross

What was saying is that eternal punishment might not take place even if it is not unjust. One does not need to claim that it is unjust in order to argue against it.

My point was that God is not the offended party like the victim: God cannot be a victim. So God may be offended, and it is right to point out every sin is an offense against God, but God is not the offended party of which we take into consideration its dignity to calculate the correct punishment.

With respect to the Trinity and the sacrifice, you would be right to say that God was the victim there: I just don't think God can be a man.

I don’t think Judaism itself dictates a 12-month purgatory (e.g., there are plenty of jews that believe in eternal punishment); and Islam is also an Abrahamic religion. — Bob Ross

Twelve months is the max. Not everyone stays the full term. The word here is 'Gehenna,' the same one Jesus talks about in the gospels and we would translate to hell. Jewish tradition says that Gehenna was created before the world and is much more vast.

I agree with that, if that is what they are saying. I think one could argue that God has a propensity for graciousness; but grace doesn't override justice. God would still have to punish those who do wrong: grace goes above and beyond what is owed, justice is about what one is owed.

In the case of Christianity, God is the one that takes on the burden of sufficing justice through Christ; and this is how God is able to be gracious and just (as you probably know very well).

Still, I would say that the degree of culpability is far less than that of an adult who commits an analogous act with the same intention

I would argue that they would have the same culpability; for children are given less because we assume they don’t have such knowledge. If we assume that this child does completely understand what they are doing like an adult and have not been swayed by someone else (as children are quite maleable), then why would we not try them as an adult?

The 'grave matter' is the 'act', i.e. the 'objective' component. In our example: the killing of an innocent person. The degree of knowledge and consent is the 'subjective' component.

Yeah, that’s fine for conveyance purposes; but, again, the intention is inextricably linked with their knowledge; so the degree of knowledge to me is a part of the act. I am just splitting hairs here though: just ignore me (:

if one takes all aspects into account, can a human being get that degree of culpability that deservers some form of eternal torment as a just, adequate punishment?

It depends on if the act is indeed of infinite demerit, I would say. For if one knows what they are doing and does it overwhelmingly freely; then how would one not be held fully liable for it?

If murder is a sin that carries infinite demerit, the perpetrator knows this, the perpetrator knows that they should not murder, the perpetrator does it for the fun of it (and not of necessity or coercion or what no), then why would they not be held culpable to the highest order?

Edit: Can you give me a snapshot of your religious affiliation and background? It will help me respond on point. I myself am a Catholic with an affinity for Orthodoxy. — Leontiskos

Well I try, It's a bit complicated, I guess.

Currently I would say 'none' as I am agnostic. As I said in one of my previous posts, I have a strong sympathy with theistic universalism (both Christian and non-Christian).

I was raised Catholic and for some years I was quite religious. During adolescence I started to have doubts about it and gradually I distanced myself form Christianity. During the last decade, I gradually became more and more interested in Eastern religions, Buddhism especially. During the last years I grew more sympathetic to theistic worldviews and since last year I studied a lot of Christian theology, especially the universalist-leaning authors (both ancient and modern).

I do acknowledge the importance of joining some spiritual tradition since 2018 (when I was at the 'peak' of my 'Buddhist' period, so to speak). But for several reasons, I seem to be incapable or unwilling to do that. Some of these reasons are simply psychological, others are more philosophical (e.g. philosophical doubts about doctrines (such as the traditional position on hell etc), doubts about some ethical norms and so on).

Not sure if this helps.

That's true, but universalism in the first sense I noted and rejection of Hell really do go hand in hand. They are logically distinct positions, but that sense of universalism logically entails the rejection of Hell on the grounds of justice. What threads like this are concerned with is precisely the thesis that Hell is unjust. — Leontiskos

If by 'Hell', you mean the traditional 'eternal Hell', yes, I agree that universalism is also based in considering eternal torment as unjust as a punishment. But also annihilationists raise the same concern. And, if we go outside Christianity, for instance many Indian religions (both theistic and non-theistic) would raise the same concern, without however endorsing a form of universal salvation.

IMHO the greatest problem of infernalism is the claim that the fate is irrevocably fixed at death, which in my opinion implies that eternal hell must be a retributive infinite punishment imposed on the damned (and not, say, the natural result of a choice as some free-will defenders of the traditional view claim). Even if one accepts that eternal torment is logically possible, that is an additional claim.

Universalism is clearly also based on the view that sin is more like an illness, a terrifying illness-like corruption that causes damage to both the sinners and others. Universalists generally think that 'hell' is like a bitter and painful medicine that is seen as necessary to heal the soul to an uncorrupted state (as you probably already know...).

Hart has recently further popularized the thesis that Hell is unjust, and if a Christian views Hell as unjust then salvation is not undeserved. That is, if it is unjust for someone to not be saved, then salvation is not gratuitous. — Leontiskos

To be fair, in his book 'That All Shall be Saved' (p. 51-52) Hart seems to explicitly deny this construal of this thought:

I remain convinced that no one, logically speaking, could merit eternal punishment; but I also accept the obverse claim that no one could merit grace.
...
Our very existence is an unmerited gift, after all

I would argue that they would have the same culpability; for children are given less because we assume they don’t have such knowledge. If we assume that this child does completely understand what they are doing like an adult and have not been swayed by someone else (as children are quite maleable), then why would we not try them as an adult? — Bob Ross

Well, the reason we don't treat them in the same manner is because we assume, reasonably I believe, that children are too immature to qualify as proper moral agents and not because they are 'younger'.

Yeah, that’s fine for conveyance purposes; but, again, the intention is inextricably linked with their knowledge; so the degree of knowledge to me is a part of the act. I am just splitting hairs here though: just ignore me (: — Bob Ross

No, actually I think that your point is valid. It is an useful abstraction. But it can be misleading.

It depends on if the act is indeed of infinite demerit, I would say. For if one knows what they are doing and does it overwhelmingly freely; then how would one not be held fully liable for it? — Bob Ross

Well, I guess that then it would be just to give the appropriate retribution (at least in the case of retributive proportional justice we are assuming now).

But IMHO one should consider also the claim that acting rationally is also acting for the good for oneself. That is, acting rationally is acting in a way that leads truly to one's own well-being.

If a moral agent knows with perfect clarity that an action is actually detrimental for himself or herself and still chooses to do that, is the action done freely?
But even if we assume that such a scenario is possible, it is debatable that in our present life we have enough clarity of mind to be perfectly culpable. It seems to me that our knowledge is imperfect, we are influenced in some ways to external circumstances in a way that in part is outside of our control and so on.

So, I repeat my question: can a human being really have the sufficient knowledge and deliberative power to be deemed as worthy of an infinite/perfect culpability and consequently infinite punishment?

If murder is a sin that carries infinite demerit, the perpetrator knows this, the perpetrator knows that they should not murder, the perpetrator does it for the fun of it (and not of necessity or coercion or what no), then why would they not be held culpable to the highest order? — Bob Ross

As your example shows the murderer seems to value more his or her 'fun' than his or her long-term - in fact - eternal fate. Which, in my opinion, shows that the murderer in this example is not really acting rationally.

If I truly believe that some kind of action brings a fate of eternal torment to me, it seems that doing it would be foolish on my part. Can a foolish action be truly free?

Just like, say, if I am dying of thirst, assuming that I want to live and that I know that drinking water can save my life, my refusal to drink water seems a completely irrational act. Of course, if I have some kind of insanity I might refuse to drink water or if I am coerced by someone or something to not drink I won't drink, but in both cases I am under the influence of some kind of ignorance, coercion or whatever, i.e. situations that I am not really free.

Certainly not the Judaic traditions of Sin, Repentance and Atonement.

Sin puts distance between man and God under the laws of Judaism, where as Jesus EMBRACES even the sinners to bring them into his fold. Hence why he sits with them unjudgingly. To lead by example of his beatitudes and TEACH them a better way of life through SHOWING his example. To AWAKEN and bring them into the LIGHT.

That Christians here don't understand that is wild af.

That you thought Jesus was a judging cunt to toss bitches asunder into God's angry wrath... that's you all projecting your own hate as if that's what Jesus stands for. BUT some how you apes forgot Jesus represents God's UNDYING GRACE and TRUTH.

John 1:17 For the law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.

TRUTH didn't come by the Apostles, TRUTH isn't in the LAWS OF GOD which MOSES brought...

Jesus brought TRUTH AND GRACE...

So let the sink in for a moment...

All the JUDAISM before Jesus is not the TRUTH.

Sin, Repentance and Atonement, and all the other Judaic traditions are UNTRUTH to the BEATITUDES OF JESUS CHRIST.

The BEATITUDES are the TEACHINGS OF CHRIST. Nothing else. Not what the Apostles like Paul say... he's the resentful cunt most of you Christians worship...

And yall make a whorship out of Christianity by worshipping Paul rather than taking in the lessons of Jesus Christ and his beatitudes.

Well, the reason we don't treat them in the same manner is because we assume, reasonably I believe, that children are too immature to qualify as proper moral agents and not because they are 'younger’.



I agree; however, in your hypothetical we were hypothesizing a child which indeed had the same maturity as an adult and, consequently, my argument seems immune to this rejoinder.

No, actually I think that your point is valid. It is an useful abstraction. But it can be misleading.




:up:

If a moral agent knows with perfect clarity that an action is actually detrimental for himself or herself and still chooses to do that, is the action done freely?





I would say so, because freedom of will is to will in accordance with one’s will.

But IMHO one should consider also the claim that acting rationally is also acting for the good for oneself. That is, acting rationally is acting in a way that leads truly to one's own well-being.





Hmm, I would say acting rationally is about acting in accordance with reason; which pertains only to the form of thinking and never its content. 

To me, a rational agent could be a Hitler or a Ghandi; so long as one’s course of action is in accordance with logic and reason. 

Irregardless, let’s say we consider rationality to encompass some aspect of the contents of reasoning (in conjunction with its form): wouldn’t a rational person will what is good, then? For what is good is what should be; and if we are being purely rational, without egoism, then it seems as though we would grasp that what is good is what matters; and this sometimes includes ourselves. E.g., the father that sacrifices himself for his children in an act of fatherly heroism is surely not acting irrational by sacrificing himself knowing well that it will not lead to his own well-being; but, rather, it is exactly the understanding, through reason applied impartiality to reality, that it is good, and perhaps obligatory, for him to protect his children at all costs.

can a human being really have the sufficient knowledge and deliberative power to be deemed as worthy of an infinite/perfect culpability and consequently infinite punishment?



I don’t think, in practicality, humans are perfectly culpable (at least most of the time); but they tend to do things sufficiently freely where they are culpable. I am not following why an infinite punishment would require ‘perfect culpability’. Was Hitler perfectly culpable? Maybe not, but he was sufficiently culpable of his crimes—don’t you think?

The infinitude, by my lights, of punishment is not a reflection of some perfect culpability involved; but, rather, as a proportionate punishment to the sin. To your point, if the sinner is not sufficiently culpable, then we may excuse their action; but, again, this is really muddied speech for “this sinner didn’t commit the act we thought they did because of such-and-such factors involved”.

If I truly believe that some kind of action brings a fate of eternal torment to me, it seems that doing it would be foolish on my part. Can a foolish action be truly free?





I see your point; but it is still an act in accordance with one’s will, so it is free. What do you mean by freedom?

I don't really find these questions to be resolvable in terms of philosophy. The case in Scripture seems more concrete though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Curiously, I agree entirely with this statement but I think the Scriptures strongly support Hell on balance. For example, Hart's move with aion is extremely old, and writers since at least Augustine have been pointing out that it is pretty wild for someone to take something like Matthew 25:46 and interpret aionion differently in the two instances within a single verse. That is a good example of my difficulty with universalist Biblical interpretation. If we handed Mt 25:46 to someone who has no horse in the race, they would easily come to the conclusion that aionion means the same thing in both instances, and that "aionion zoen" ("eternal life") is not meant to be temporary.

Or from John Henry Newman:

“Of course we must not press the words of Scripture; we do not know the exact meaning of the word ‘chosen’; we do not know what is meant by being saved ‘so as by fire’; we do not know what is meant by ‘few.’ But still the few can never mean the many; and to be called without being chosen cannot but be a misery.” — Newman, Plain and Parochial Sermons

Other famous difficulties for the universalist are the eternal damnation of the demons and Matthew 26:24. Augustine covers most of this in City of God XXI, which is as fresh today as it was then. A very tight and charitable analytic critique of Balthasar's position can be found in Kevin Flannery's, "How to Think about Hell." Regarding the Pauline passages, many of the best Pauline scholars such as N. T. Wright find the universalist's interpretation highly puzzling. In general I would say that it's not a coincidence that the tradition leans so heavily against universalism, and universalism has always struck me as a conclusion in search of an argument. On my view the philosophical case fares better than the theological case.

But I'm going to try to stick closer to the philosophy in this thread, both because the OP focuses on it and because it is Holy Week in Rome.

Not sure if this helps. — boundless

It does, thanks. That is very similar to my own story. Raised Catholic, fell away in adolescence, became interested in Buddhism and Eastern traditions, and then reverted back to theism and finally Catholicism in college.

Note that I wrote what follows before I had read this post of yours. I will try to return to the remainder of this last post of yours later on.

---

So, the 'fixation' in sin must come after death. But why? — boundless

It would be hard to quickly introduce you to a very old and deep tradition. Edward Feser has a recent article on the topic, although it is now behind a paywall, "Aquinas on the Fixity of the Will After Death."

But the quote you take from Aquinas says nothing about death. The claim is that humans can fix their end, which strikes me as uncontroversial.

Not sure how these objections are just 'cultural' and not 'rational'. — boundless

Is there one in particular you want to pursue? I'm not sure I have time to try to speak to them all.

Aquinas doesn't say anything in the text I quoted about the fixity of the will at death, so your points are not properly responding to what he is saying. If you don't think the human will is ever fixed, are you therefore of the opinion that someone can leave Heaven and go down to Hell?

Let me address your culpability point:

can a human being reach a level of culpability that deserves a punishment of unending pain (of some sort)?
Personally, I lean to answer 'no' to this question even if the 'sin' is 'objectively infinitely bad'. — boundless

There is a general—and in my opinion, unfortunate—trend in Catholic theology towards this argument:

1. Humans are not capable of the level of freedom and consent necessary for mortal sin
2. Therefore, no humans commit mortal sins
3. Therefore, no humans go to Hell

It should be simple enough to note that (1) is strongly contrary to Catholicism, and that this argument therefore does not derive from Catholic tradition in any substantial sense. If historical Catholicism believes anything at all, it is that humans are capable of mortal sins. :lol:

More generally and philosophically, this goes to the point I made above about C. S. Lewis', "The Weight of Glory." If one has a low anthropology where humans are not capable of much and therefore cannot be held responsible for much, then the conclusion that one cannot incur eternal consequences is ready to hand. A world where the denial of free will is somewhat common is a world where this low anthropology is in the air. I realize you claim that humans are capable of a great deal, just not Hell, but the general point stands.

Yet from a Christian perspective it is not at all clear that the low anthropology supports the capax Dei. That is, if humans don't have the power to sin mortally, then they probably also don't have the power to accept a gift of salvation, or to be deified. The "eternal consequences" that humans cannot effect are bidirectional. Created freedom always has a dual potency, and this is precisely why "Corruptio optimi pessima" (the corruption of the highest is the lowest). It's no coincidence that the same world which holds to a low anthropology has also lost its grasp on human dignity and nobility. The reprobate and the saint disappear simultaneously.

It seems to me that there is a plausible trade-off between duration and intensity in terms of punishment. One might justly meet out a short, but intense punishment for a sin that occured over a long duration or vice versa.

The problem I see for St. Thomas here is that the claim that breeches in the order of man's conformity to the will of God continue forever itself has to presuppose that universalism is false. If universalism is true, then God is eventually "all in all," and all such breeches are repaired "at the end of the ages" (perhaps after "the age to come").

If universalism is true, there are no human, or even demonic crimes that have infinite effects. By the same logic, if annihilationism or infernalism are true, there are indeed such crimes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with all of that, technically speaking.

The difficulty for both sides is that appealing to this seems to require begging the question and assuming that one of the positions is the case in order to make a claim about the duration and effects of any creatures' transgressions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Appealing to what, though? Aquinas has independent reasons to believe that a breach that has not been repaired by the time of death will never be repaired, and therefore he is not begging the question. I'm not convinced that universalism is really on his radar at all, which is why I wouldn't say that he has presupposed something about it.

I think there are good arguments for the fixity of the will at death even though it’s not a hill I would die on. But I don’t find it plausible, within the Judeo-Christian tradition, to say that the will can never be fixed in anything other than God.

I would prefer to postpone a properly theological discussion at least until the Roman Easter Octave has concluded, even though in my opinion the most secure and relevant premises to this debate are theological. With that said, I am not opposed to exegeting Aquinas, as I am the one who inserted him into this thread.

Philosophically, there is some merit to an argument that <Only a very substantial act is able to incur an eternal consequence; humans are not capable of such substantial acts; therefore humans cannot incur eternal consequences>. That second premise fits within our cultural milieu. I don't see how I would make much headway against that premise without outside help. In our secular culture, the stakes are all thought to be quite low, at least in relation to eternity.

E.g., a 10-minute sin of adultery cannot be proportionate to an eternally repetitive punishment of being cheated on. That violates proportionality: don’t you think? — Bob Ross

Yes, and I also think that a 100 minute punishment would violate proportionality in the exact same way. That was my point. I am not saying that it must be exactly 10 minutes to be proportionate, but equality and proportion are related, after all.

Okay, but if you want to argue for a disproportion of punishment, then you must specify what is supposed to be infinite and finite. Is it duration? Is it that the punishment has infinite duration whereas the transgression did not have an infinite duration? — Leontiskos

I am saying any combination of a sin that itself contains no form of infinitude with any punishment that contains at least one form of infinitude. — Bob Ross

Yes, and I have been asking you what form of infinitude is at stake. Is your answer to that question, "There is some form of infinitude at stake, but I am not able to say what that form is"? I mean, if you don't know what is infinite, then how do you know that something is infinite? Specifically, you seem unwilling to commit to the position that the duration is what is infinite, but I only want you to commit to some object of infinitude.

This is interesting; because one could make the argument that some disruptions (viz., sins) could cause an infinite causal chain of disturbances of the proper; and I would say if this were to happen, which is very unlikely, then it would have some sort of infinite demerit and may be punished (potentially) by eternal punishment. — Bob Ross

It's not really related to causal chains. Suppose there is a pipe that helps control water levels in the Great Lakes. Water flows through that pipe at 10 gallons per minute. Now suppose you break the pipe and it is never repaired. If the Earth is destroyed four billion years from now then 2.1024e+16 gallons of water would have flowed through that pipe.* And you might say, "Ah, I merely broke a pipe. I didn't cause 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage." But in fact you did cause 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage, by breaking the pipe. The counterargument that breaking a pipe is disproportionate to 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage simply does not hold water.

The likely objection is that someone could not possibly be expected to know that by breaking the pipe they would cause 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage. To this the traditional Christian would say, first, that our acts involve more culpability and knowledge than we wish to admit, and second, that there are those who break the pipe and fix their end in sin, the mysterium iniquitatis. Hitler is often taken as an unobjectionable example of this. If we reach the point where this is taken to be rare but possible, then I will be satisfied.

- :up:

* Assuming, of course, a cuendillar pipe, which raises questions about how you managed to break it. :wink:

If by 'Hell', you mean the traditional 'eternal Hell', yes, I agree that universalism is also based in considering eternal torment as unjust as a punishment. But also annihilationists raise the same concern. And, if we go outside Christianity, for instance many Indian religions (both theistic and non-theistic) would raise the same concern, without however endorsing a form of universal salvation. — boundless

Sure, and the claim has never been that the only people who hold Hell to be unjust are universalists of type 1.

IMHO the greatest problem of infernalism is the claim that the fate is irrevocably fixed at death — boundless

You keep assuming that premise, but I see no reason why one would have to hold to the fixity of the will at death in order to believe in Hell.

Universalism is clearly also based on the view that sin is more like an illness, a terrifying illness-like corruption that causes damage to both the sinners and others. — boundless

This will ultimately run up against objections to Manichaeism if the illness has no proper cause. In Christianity even when sin is conceived as an illness the proper cause of that illness is a volitional act, whether Adam's or Satan's.

To be fair, in his book 'That All Shall be Saved' (p. 51-52) Hart seems to explicitly deny this construal of this thought — boundless

Then Hart would seem to be logically committed to a Limbo of some kind, at least theoretically. He thinks God cannot damn the sinner and he also thinks the sinner does not deserve salvation. The deserts of the (existing) sinner are therefore something in between those two options.