I of course grant a good portion of what you say. Yet to my knowledge there are many variants of Judaism, with Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform branches being only very general examples of these. And if we for further example go back into antiquity, prior to the Maccabean Revolt, there were great sums of Hellenized Jews in Judeia.

As to the first question as to how one would not make the two compatible, would be someone who accepted a very strict divine command theory, where textual support or reference to oral tradition is analyzed for the rule one is to follow.

That tends to be the approach of orthodox Judaism, as an example. — Hanover

Slightly bringing this back into the purview of the general notion of the Good / the One: Kabbalah teachings, including those of the tree of life, are pivoted upon the Ein Sof - which holds the very same attributes as the Good (as previously discussed in this thread). This says it better than I can:

Ein Sof, or Eyn Sof (/eɪn sɒf/, Hebrew: אֵין סוֹף‎ ʾēn sōf; meaning "infinite", lit. '(There is) no end'), in Kabbalah, is understood as God before any self-manifestation in the production of any spiritual realm, probably derived from Solomon ibn Gabirol's (c.1021–c.1070) term, "the Endless One" (שֶׁאֵין לוֹ תִּקְלָה šeʾēn lo tiqlā). Ein Sof may be translated as "unending", "(there is) no end", or infinity.[1] It was first used by Azriel of Gerona (c. 1160 – c. 1238), who, sharing the Neoplatonic belief that God can have no desire, thought, word, or action, emphasized by the negation of any attribute. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ein_Sof

This then being - or at least gives all indication of being - the very same ontic reality interpreted via different filters of culture and reasoning.

I know it can get complex, but this reference for example illustrates that the Kabbalah and Orthodox Judaism are by no means two separate belief systems. Nor does the Kabbalah seem to in any way be a fringe system of beliefs in respect to Judaism at large, including when considering Orthodox Judaism.

Here, then, there appears to be a good amount of theological reasoning involved in relation to the nature of God and reality to total - and this in respect to Orthodox Judaism.

It so far feels like you are unfairly pigeonholing most of what Judaism consists of.

While this last suggestion might seem odd, it does to some degree describe the Judaic view, where faith in the existence of God is really not all that important from a daily living or eternal reward perspective. What is important is knowing the rule, studying the rule and following the rule. Faith, under this system, is in the righteousness of the rule, not in the existence of God himself. But always most important in not what you beleive and why you believe, but what you do. — Hanover

This is very easy to say, but exceedingly difficult to in any way comprehend. Should one understand that "duty and adherence" to "the righteousness of the rule" is done for no reason, motive, whatsoever? Unless what one addresses are automata - rather than sentient people - this can only be utter nonsense. And if there is some motive for so doing, this motive has nothing to do with "the existence reality of God" playing an important role in "a daily living or eternal reward benefit perspective"??? What other plausible reason could there be for "the righteousness of the rule"?

This is very easy to say, but exceedingly difficult to in any way comprehend. Should one understand that "duty and adherence" to "the righteousness of the rule" is done for no reason, motive, whatsoever? Unless what one addresses are automata - rather than sentient people - this can only be utter nonsense. And if there is some motive for so doing, this motive has nothing to do with "the existence reality of God" playing an important role in "a daily living or eternal reward benefit perspective"??? What other plausible reason could there be for "the righteousness of the rule"? — javra

I think I did hint at possible reasons, which would be historical effectiveness or simply it being the only tradition you know. And to be fair, that is likely why you do most of what you do. Norms are learned and accepted from within the culture you live. We can say we don't steal for all sorts of logical reasons and we can also cite to certain laws, but the reason we don't steal is the same reason you knock on doors, you wear a tie to work, you drive on the right side of the road, you call your elders sir, and so forth.

So why on earth would someone explore deeply into their tradition of inherited norms to determine how to best act? It would arise from a respect of tradition and a recognition of the successes such a tradition has previously yielded.

From Fiddler on the Roof:

Tradition, tradition! Tradition!
Tradition, tradition! Tradition!

Who, day and night, must scramble for a living,
Feed a wife and children, say his daily prayers?
And who has the right, as master of the house,
To have the final word at home?

The Papa, the Papa! Tradition.
The Papa, the Papa! Tradition.

Who must know the way to make a proper home,
A quiet home, a kosher home?
Who must raise the family and run the home,
So Papa's free to read the holy books?

The Mama, the Mama! Tradition!
The Mama, the Mama! Tradition!

At three, I started Hebrew school. At ten, I learned a trade.
I hear they've picked a bride for me. I hope she's pretty.

The son, the son! Tradition!
The son, the son! Tradition!

And who does Mama teach to mend and tend and fix,
Preparing me to marry whoever Papa picks?

The daughter, the daughter! Tradition!
The daughter, the daughter! Tradition!

So why on earth would someone explore deeply into their tradition of inherited norms to determine how to best act? It would arise from a respect of tradition and a recognition of the successes such a tradition has previously yielded. — Hanover

I've acknowledged the importance of tradition previously via the Crane quote.

But this then can raise the question of whether - for one example currently pertinent to the ethics of the US populace - such a thing as Christian Nationalism's desire to hold onto its Christian traditions ethically outweighs the very teachings of Jesus Christ himself - the latter, more often than not, stand in direct contradiction to the ethos of the former. A Christianity that holds no respect for what its official founder honored and desired ... sounds exceedingly vacuous - as something that JC's spirit might itself be utterly antagonistic to and angry about - at least to me.

And then you have various other traditions from all over the world, Judaic, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Inuit, and so on; none of which can cohabitate peacefully were each tradition to vie for a power over all others, this so as to remain in no way altered by any other, believing itself the sacred pinnacle around which all of life and sacredness and morality revolves.

Via examples such as these I then uphold that: Yes, tradition of course has its importance, but it ought not be the be-all and end-all to ethics and ethical conduct, very much including in relation to the so called "righteousness of rules".

To use previously addressed concepts and terminology: tradition does not of itself equate to that which is the Good - also addressed as "God" by some - and tradition, irrespective of what it might be, can only be good when it is aligned with the latter.

Philosophical accounts of theism are not necessarily more sophisticated, so I'd start by pushing back at that built in bias. — Hanover

Sure. I understand that some people might hold a view like this. I am asking for the more philosophical and the more sophisticated versions to see what people think and why. Given (and this is my experience) that most critical discussion of theism tend to involve Christian or Muslim literalism.

That is, to suggest that theism that aims to be philosophical is superior to theism that doesn't, is to implicitely reject theism in its own right. — Hanover

I guess whether one would agree or disagree with this would depend upon the theist or school.

From my perspective, a theism founded in philosophical thinking may be superior to a theism rooted in biblical literalism because it allows the concept of God to engage with the depth and complexity of human experience, rather than reducing it to a fixed narrative or comic book account. Literalism tends to confine the divine to specific events, texts, and cultural assumptions, often locking faith into outdated cosmologies or morality. Philosophical theism, by contrast, might be held to invite a continual process of reflection, integration, and reinterpretation, allowing the idea of God to evolve alongside our evolving understanding of reality. It doesn’t dismiss scripture, but reads it through a broader lens, seeing it as one expression of a deeper metaphysical truth rather than the only one. In this way, God is no longer just a figure in a narrative, but the deeper source from which meaning and existence arise.

Or something like this.

The question of reason is an interesting one. I don’t think I was necessarily thinking of reason as a marker of sophistication, though I can see why many people would. My sense of a more sophisticated theism might actually align more closely with phenomenological or mystical traditions - ones that aren’t strictly rooted in reasoning, but instead emphasize depth of experience, intuition, and presence.

But you've made me think a bit differently about this, so thanks.

Were they not Christians? Why not just return to Spinoza? I think his theology is more sophisticated than any Christian theology, including ideas such as identifying God with "being itself". — Janus

Could be.

Very crudely Spinoza seems to argue (and I have no deep reading of his work) that God is infinite substance: In Ethics, Spinoza seems to argue that there is only one substance in the universe, and that is God. Everything else (you, me, trees, ideas) is a mode or expression of that substance.

He also maintains that God is impersonal who doesn’t think, plan, love, or intervene in the world. "It" doesn’t make choices or have a will. It's more like a set of necessary laws or the structure of being itself.

I'm not sure what this gives us - god as immanence - what is a human to do with such an account? Any thoughts?

That longing for something to replace the religious consolations may be an important marker of those philosophers who aren't satisfied to be "modern" (using that word as I think you do), but it's not the whole story. — J

The story is that of ‘the modern world’.

When I enrolled in Comparative Religion, the first class was taken by the Assoc Prof of that Department. It was a kaleidoscopic exploration of what I later came to understand was ‘the history of ideas’. That sounds a casual sort of phrase, but it’s a recognised sub-discipline, often associated with comparative religion. Its founding text was The Great Chain of Being, Arthur O Lovejoy ( 1936 - ‘Defining the concepts of plenitude, continuity, and graduation, the author demonstrates how a single idea can influence centuries of Western thought.’) Turgid reading and hardly made any headway with it when I bought it about 5 years back, but the underlying point remains - Lovejoy’s is a study of the various permutations of the traditional hierarchical ontology of the West over the course of centuries. I think that’s where I developed an interest in this kind of analysis. It has some similarities with philosophical hermeneutics and, I suppose, the Hegelian concept of the historical development of consciousness. But that’s the prism through which I’m looking at the question in posts of that kind.

Interesting. Then you certainly know more about it than I do. I see the connection with hermeneutics.

This is a little risky on TPF, but I'll go ahead and say that my main reason for standing a bit aloof from the historical-analysis perspective is that I associate it with various pessimistic (and moralistic) accounts of the decline of Western civilization, which I disagree with. ("We gave up the Greeks and we gave up Catholicism and now we're fucked!"). I see the opposite: intellectual and moral progress (often up-and-down, of course), astounding flourishing of the arts, to say nothing of the incomparably higher quality of life and education now available to the average denizen of Western civilization. (And denied, shamefully, to all those millions who are still "below average."). But this is a vast and controversial topic. All I can say is, if I were offered a Rawlsian "original position" lottery, and asked to pick a time and place to be incarnated over the past 3,000 years, while not knowing my sex, ethnicity, amount of economic power, physical health, education, et al., the choice would be obvious to me: right here, right now ("here" being understood as any European country with universal health care and good public libraries :smile: ).

I'm not sure what this gives us - god as immanence - what does a human do with such an account. Any thoughts? — Tom Storm

I could just as well ask what the account of 'god as transcendence' gives us. At least god as immanence is more comprehensible. According to some accounts Einstein agreed with Spinoza's view in seeing god as the laws of nature.

What does 'god as the ground of being' give us? Is that god different than Spinoza's? If so, how? For that matter what does any account of anything that cannot be seen, heard, felt, touched etc., give us?

It seems to me the only motivation for believing in god is the wish to be cared for. The wish of the child.

I agree with you. The purportedly historical account that says we have "lost something" without ever being able to say what it is that we have lost (apart from the capacity for believing that what our wishful imaginations tell us must be true, and of course there are a great many who have not lost that at all). Is the world as understood by science really less enchanting than the ancient myths? Not to me. Which is not to say the ancient myths have no literary value. The Odyssey is still a great read.

Spinoza seems to argue that there is only one substance in the universe, and that is God. Everything else (you, me, trees, ideas) is a mode or expression of that substance — Tom Storm

I just think it reads so much better as ‘only one subject’. This is where the translation of ouisia (being) in Aristotle has had such profound consequences (per the recent thread on that topic). ‘Substance’ is very easily understood as matter-energy, absent all reference to the subject. I’m sure that, in association with Spinoza’s reputation as a founder of secular culture, is why he provides a kind of half-way house for naturalists who eschew any form of the supernatural :yikes: whilst maintaining a link with the Grand Tradition.

The problem, as Spinoza goes on to diagnose, is that people normally desire “perishable things” which “can be reduced to these three headings: riches, honour, and sensual pleasure” (idem: para.3&9). As these things are “perishable”, they cannot afford lasting happiness; in fact, they worsen our existential situation, since their acquisition more often than not requires compromising behaviour and their consumptions makes us even more dependent on perishable goods. “But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, unmixed with any sadness.” (Idem: para.10) Thus, in his mature masterpiece, the Ethics, Spinoza finds lasting happiness only in the “intellectual love of God”, which is the mystical, non-dual vision of the single “Substance” “Subject” underlying everything and everyone. The non-dual nature of this vision is clearly announced by Spinoza when he says that “[t]he mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself” (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 36). Since, for Spinoza, God is the Whole that includes everything, it also includes your love for God, and thus God can be said to love Itself through you.
— Some Blog

if I were offered a Rawlsian "original position" lottery, and asked to pick a time and place to be incarnated over the past 3,000 years, while not knowing my sex, ethnicity, amount of economic power, physical health, education, et al., the choice would be obvious to me: right here, right now — J

Of course! Something else I’m well aware of. I’m not of the view that modernity is a moral cesspit on the road to self destruction - although it’s not a difficult case to make - but that modernity, for all of its marvellous progress, has a shadow side. Furthermore that as secular culture no longer has any reference point to the transcendent, this has considerable downstream consequences, if there is such a realm.

(Spoiler alert - The final episode of the recently-aired White Lotus has young Piper Ratliff, an idealist young adult from wealthy family, drawn to Buddhism, who announces she wants to spend a whole year at a Thai monastery/training centre. Her mother wisely tells her to try it out for a few days first, after which she tearfully confesses that she couldn’t live without aircon and decent food. Totally resonated with me.)

But the times are changing. I think the typical modernist materialism has past its peak, science itself is becoming much more holistic. But, you know, Western civilisation is really on a knife edge and could well bring about its own demise.

Some people confuse materialism as a philosophical view with materialism in the sense of consumerism—a sad misleading conflation!

It seems to me the only motivation for believing in god is the wish to be cared for. The wish of the child. — Janus

For me it seems more aesthetic or about meaning making - the wish for life to be significant - as a bulwark against the tragedy of living. But no doubt it is differnt things for differnt folk.

What does 'god as the ground of being' give us? Is that god different than Spinoza's? If so, how? For that matter what does any account of anything that cannot be seen, heard, felt, touched etc., give us? — Janus

Yes, why even use the word God?

Some people confuse materialism as a philosophical view with materialism in the sense of consumerism—a sad conflation! — Janus

But no doubt some will argue that the word of disenchanted rationalism and modernity has allowed us to retreat into crude things like money in place of spiritual riches.

I went on a similar journey a while ago and came to strikingly similar conclusions. In fact, I grew up contending with colloquial arguments for theism--especially from stereotypical Protestantism--as I found none of them convincing; I then explored some of the more prominent figures in the mainstream debates in theology (such as the new atheists, william lane craig, etc.) and found them likewise unconvincing; and then, eventually, I came across Ed Feser's "Aristotelian Proof" and it was bizarrely different than any other argument I had heard. I didn't find it convincing, but I started reading on Acquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Plato, and the like on classical theism and found the argumentation for and metaphysics of God vastly different than mainstream theology. In short, I ended up convincing myself, somewhere along that journey, of the classic theism tradition.

Where I think this becomes particularly interesting is that questions like the problem of evil take on a different character. If God is not a being among beings but Being itself, then the moral structure of reality flows from the nature of God, who is goodness itself, rather than from some being telling us how we should live. What does this mean for the problem of suffering?

Yes, indeed it does: it becomes interesting (I would say) for all topics in theology. God is the ipsem ens subsistens, the actus purus, divinely simple, an intelligence, a will, the ultimate cause of everything's active existence, etc.; and it follows that:

1. God's willing a thing as real is identical to Him thinking of it as real.
2. God qua intelligence and qua pure actuality cannot think of a thing as real other than relative to its perfect form.
3. God, then, cannot will a thing into existence in a manner where it is not in correspondence with its good.
4. So God must be all good willed.

So why is there badness in the world then?

Because:

1. Creation always entails a hierarchy of value of goods.
2. When that creation is willed in a perfect manner (viz., the good of each thing is willed in accordance with its perfect form respectively) and given #1, this allows for the possibility of privations.
3. Those privations are not willed by God: they are the absence of good.

This is also why Acquinas rightly points out that the euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma: God is perfectly good, He then must be perfect at what He is, and He then must be perfect at being an intelligence, and so He wills what is good exactly because He is perfectly good. His goodness is out of necessity---not by choice.

For me it seems more aesthetic or about meaning making - the wish for life to be significant - as a bulwark against the tragedy of living. But no doubt it is different things for differnt folk. — Tom Storm

Surely the ideas themselves have their own beauty. Why would we need to believe they are literally true to enjoy that beauty? To claim that would be to claim there is no beauty or meaning in fiction.

How can life be more significant than it already is? It would only seem so if we believed there is more of it, and a much better life to boot that lasts forever. That is the essence of Buddhism, Hinduism and the Abrahamic religions. If someone is able to believe such things, then I have no argument with that, but better that they keep to their beliefs and do not reveal their doubts by wishing to convert others for moral support. That shows weakness of conviction.

Also living is not wholly a tragedy in my view. On balance I would say there is more joy and interest than misery and boredom.

In any case what does 'god as ground of being' offer for the seeker of consolation? Does the ground of being care about us, or the animals or any life? To think so would seem to be a gross anthro-projection.

There are parts of religion I admire—mindfulness, stillness, equanimity, acceptance, love, compassion—you don't need all the superstitious stuff for those. In fact, I think it only gets in the way by confusing the issue.

But no doubt some will argue that the word of disenchanted rationalism and modernity has allowed us to retreat into crude things like money in place of spiritual riches. — Tom Storm

They might argue that and in my view they would be wrong. The world of consumer culture is disenchanted to be sure. But the world of science is anything but disenchanted. And we still have all the old worlds of music, poetry, literature, painting, architecture, the crafts, the natural world. We lack nothing the ancients had except their superstition. And when I say we lack their superstition I do not mean to refer to the multitude. That said, I would say the multitude are far less miserable today than they were in ancient times.

How can life be more significant than it already is? — Janus

I think the point is that life can alwasy be imbued with more meaning based on change subject to one's experience - changes in thinking, in belief, in situation. For instance, having children might enhance the significance. For some God makes life more bearable, meaningful, attractive. But I suspect this only works if you think God is real, not if you think it is merely a charming fiction.

Also living is not wholly a tragedy in my view. — Janus

Sure. I think where you sit on this depends on what you go through and how your experince makes you feel.

There are parts of religion I admire—mindfulness, stillness, equanimity, acceptance, love, compassion—you don't need all the superstitious stuff for those. — Janus

Me too. I even appreciate the little I understand of mysticism and spirituality.

They might argue that and in my view they would be wrong. The world of consumer culture is disenchanted to be sure. But the world of science is anything but disenchanted. And we still have all the old worlds of music, poetry, literature, painting, architecture, the crafts, the natural world. We lack nothing the ancients had except their superstition. And when I say we lack their superstition I do not mean to refer to the multitude. That said, I would say the multitude are far less miserable today than they were in ancient times. — Janus

This may well be correct.

I think we both agree that if you're looking for vulgar, shallow displays of status and materialism; gaudy expressions of soulless wealth - you'll find no shortage of examples in religion, spiritual traditions, and cults alike. Even the ostentatious wealth of the Vatican shows us how Mammon and spiritual traditions are not necessarily incompatible.

. . . modernity, for all of its marvellous progress, has a shadow side — Wayfarer

Amen. Totalitarianism, mechanization, and, as you discuss so well, the tendency to treat humans as sophisticated bits of matter with "needs" and "goals" that must be arbitrary.

For some God makes life more bearable, meaningful, attractive. But I suspect this only works if you think God is real, not if you think it is merely a charming fiction. — Tom Storm

Sure, and as I said I have no argument with people's faiths—provide they don't think it is more than that. When that happens, they start expecting others to agree with them. History is full of examples. I also think that people who need such beliefs to give their lives meaning lack imagination.

Sure. I think where you sit on this depends on what you go through and how your experince makes you feel. — Tom Storm

Certainly! And it might also be a matter of neurotransmitters in some cases.

Me too. I even appreciate the little I understand of mysticism and spirituality. — Tom Storm

Yep. I also appreciate the poetry and imagination of some mysticism and spirituality. I also think think that life, even just existence. is, ultimately, a mystery.

I think we both agree that if you're looking for vulgar, shallow displays of status and materialism; gaudy expressions of soulless wealth - you'll find no shortage of examples in religion, spiritual traditions, and cults alike. Even the ostentatious wealth of the Vatican shows us how Mammon and spiritual traditions are not necessarily incompatible. — Tom Storm

Yes, much in religion is also materialistic and consumerist. The Catholics insofar as they yield obeisance to Mammon, do not follow the teachings of Jesus, which makes them hypocrites in my view.

Amen. Totalitarianism, mechanization, and, as you discuss so well, the tendency to treat humans as sophisticated bits of matter with "needs" and "goals" that must be arbitrary. — J

I agree that totalitarianism is bad per se, but is mechanization bad as such? Are humans not material beings with needs and goals, some of which are arbitrary and others pretty much necessary (and by necessary I don't mean the need for consolation, I count that as one of the "arbitrary needs")?

Must we gild the lily?

If you're going to say you don't believe in God, you'd better be sure what you mean by 'God,' right? — Tom Storm

I've been reading this thread since there was only one page, but I've never quite known what to say. This line stood out, and I have to ask: why?

Me not believing in God is a fact of social praxis (and one I could be wrong about, though I have a hard time seeing how), and it's predicated on me not quite understanding what a God is supposed to be. I've grown up among a mix of Catholics (roughly 70%) and protestants (roughly 30 %), during a time when the ecumene was very popular. I've heard a lot of the arguments. They all went over my head. The disconnect seems far more primal:

...is it the case that atheism should evolve its thinking about the notion of God beyond the cartoon versions? — Tom Storm

How, though? On the God TV, I either get the cartoon, or I get static. The cartoon may be silly, but it's got the advantage that we both, the theist and me, can understand it. And on account of that I know (and I believe them) that that's not what they believe. What *do* they believe instead? At that point all I can do is shrug.

Stuff like "God is being itself," might help people who have developed a concept of God past the cartoon to understand things. For me? So what is "being itself" is a big enough problem in itself - without relating it to God (a concept I mostly relate to religious praxis, but is utterly alien to my daily life). It feels like there's quite some reification going on, but I'm unsure, and even if I were to assume I have point, I'd be unsure what on the dual end of "God <-> being" is there to be reified.

For instance, I feel the same way about concepts like "love" or "justice". I don't use these words, I don't fully grasp their scope, but if it came up I could investigate what I think is being reified here: feelings, patterns of action... etc. In contrast, the word "God" seems to be entirely superfluous wherever it shows up in discussions about, say, "being". We're not on the same page, the theist and I. It's more a lack of topic on my part than a disagreement. I don't argue from the cartoon God, but if you'd ask me what sort of God I don't believe in the cartoon God is all that I can offer. The rest just makes my head spin - and as a result remains utterly irrelevant to my day-to-day conduct.

You may notice that avoided making myself a poster-book atheist in the above post, resorting to phrasings like "the theist and I", rather than "the theist, and I, the atheist" or some such. Now I am an atheist. And I might have used such phrasings in another post (probably have on these boards?). The reason I'm not doing it on here is that I feel this muddies the waters. I think there are very real (and generalisable) differences between atheists like me, who grew up among believers but never really solidified as a believer himself, and atheists who started out as believers and changed their mind. The latter must have had some sort of sense of what "God" is supposed to be, and they probably retain some sort of memory of that (though re-interpretation according to current life-situations can make "fair" recall difficult).

An example: when Dawkin's God Illusion was new I picked it up in a bookshop and randomly read a chapter. I think it was about the ill influence of religion, and Dawkins used as an example the treatment of the indiginous population of Australia by the settlers. I was reading this, and my first thoght was: but wasn't this more about civilisation? Sure, religion plays a big part here, and sure missionaries would have played a big part, but... My second thought was to close the book and put it back on the shelf. I'd only later learn what a big deal the book was. Now, here you'll see what I paid attention to regarding the topic: I didn't emphasise religion - I looked at a broader context. Do I disagree with Dawkins? No idea. My disinterest didn't stem from what he was saying; I just felt this was too tendentiously argued. Too much shallow rhetoric, beyond the validity of any point here. But me not focussing on religion is compatible with my day-to-day context: I'm living in highly secular country; I have little interest in God as a topic (when I try to understand what God is, I try to get along with theists - the topic itself is of no interest to me).

Then there's my motivational structure: all the big questions that come up - the meaning of life, life after death, free will etc. - none of that means much to me. They're not "big questions" to me; more like intellectual diversions, somewhat akin to crossword puzzles. Any answers to those questions feel inconsequential. I locate the disjunct between theists and me (and other athiests probably) here. So I don't think I need to figure out what "God" is to be an atheist. Not caring is enough. There are theists who can't seem to imagine what "not caring" feels like, sometimes to the point of denying that I don't care (because clearly that's impossible). That polemic-laden apologist who thinks I don't want to believe in God because that allows me to sin (unlike other atheists, I don't think that's pure rhetoric; it makes sense for them to think this), or the benevolent Catholic who thinks I'm in my (prolonged) doubting phase.

My intuition is that the God concept is meaningless by design. It's a hermeneutic buffer zone that inherits meaning from the bordering areas and allows for a game of constant goal-post shifting. That's the impression I get when I read those more sophisticated takes. They feel plausible for a while, until I realise that my mind went astray and I forgot to think of "God". But I don't take that intuition seriously enough to want to explore this line of thinking, much less actually argue it. I'm literally a Godless person; beyond the cartoon God there is nothing I can talk about.

Do I disagree with Dawkins? No idea. My disinterest didn't stem from what he was saying; I just felt this was too tendentiously argued. Too much shallow rhetoric, beyond the validity of any point here — Dawnstorm

In a distant galaxy, a long, long time ago, I was drawn into the mysterious realm of internet forums by reading a review of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, by an acerbic, leftist cultural critic named Terry Eagleton. Eagleton published an hilariously scathing review, Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching - from which I quote below. He says that Dawkins, too, seems to have a very hazy idea of who or what God might be:

Dawkins speaks scoffingly of a personal God, as though it were entirely obvious exactly what this might mean. He seems to imagine God, if not exactly with a white beard, then at least as some kind of chap, however supersized. He asks how this chap can speak to billions of people simultaneously, which is rather like wondering why, if Tony Blair is an octopus, he has only two arms. For Judeo-Christianity, God is not a person in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or ‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects.

(published around 2006, which explains the cultural references.)

Another review, this time of a book by David Bentley Hart, 'The Experience of God'. Hart is mentioned in the original post:

the New Atheists ingeniously deny the existence of a bearded fellow with superpowers who lives in the sky and finds people’s keys for them. Daniel Dennett wants to know “if God created and designed all these wonderful things, who created God? Supergod? And who created Supergod? Superdupergod?”—thereby revealing his lack of acquaintance not only with Augustine and Thomas but with Aristotle.

It was Aristotle who wrote that “one and the same is the knowledge of contraries.” Denys Turner, in his recent Thomas Aquinas...puts the matter like this: “Unless…what believers and atheists respectively affirm and deny is the same for both, they cannot be said genuinely to disagree.”

Hart's definition - and it's a word that should be treated with extreme caution in this matter - is that God is 'the one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things.'

Rather hard to make a cartoon out of, I agree.

If you're going to say you don't believe in God, you'd better be sure what you mean by 'God,' right?
— Tom Storm

I've been reading this thread since there was only one page, but I've never quite known what to say. This line stood out, and I have to ask: why? — Dawnstorm

If someone tells me they believe in the God of Moses, the burning bush, and the ark with all the animals, that's a very different conception compared to someone who talks about the God of classical theism. The former, most priests and vicars don't believe in.

Hart's definition - and it's a word that should be treated with extreme caution in this matter - is that God is 'the one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things.'

Rather hard to make a cartoon out of, I agree. — Wayfarer

it. I'm literally a Godless person; beyond the cartoon God there is nothing I can talk about. — Dawnstorm

I don’t doubt you. But there’s a long and complex tradition of writing behind classical theism - a view of God as immutable, impassible, and necessary - that spans centuries. There’s much to engage with if you’re immersed in the tradition. That said, I totally understand if you or others have no interest in it. I’m simply interested in what others believe and why. This thread isn’t so much an attempt by me to articulate a more complex view of God, but rather to hear from others for whom this matters.

I didn't find it convincing, but I started reading on Acquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Plato, and the like on classical theism and found the argumentation for and metaphysics of God vastly different than mainstream theology. In short, I ended up convincing myself, somewhere along that journey, of the classic theism tradition. — Bob Ross

Now this interests me and it is central to what I have been saying. Different conceptions of God carry with them fundamentally different meanings, implications, and theological commitments.

I agree that totalitarianism is bad per se, but is mechanization bad as such? Are humans not material beings with needs and goals, some of which are arbitrary and others pretty much necessary (and by necessary I don't mean the need for consolation, I count that as one of the "arbitrary needs")? — Janus

Yes. I was thinking of mechanization as an improper model for understanding how humans -- and other forms of life -- coexist with each other. Otherwise, it has its uses. Technology, as you say, is neither good nor bad.

Hart's definition - and it's a word that should be treated with extreme caution in this matter - is that God is 'the one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things.' — Wayfarer

OK, but I think we need to pose C. S. Lewis's question: Is it conscious? Or perhaps Hart meant this to be obvious by including "omniscient".

But no doubt some will argue that the word of disenchanted rationalism and modernity has allowed us to retreat into crude things like money in place of spiritual riches.

The two aren't unrelated though, right? Hume has been extremely influential, particularly in Anglo-American thought and the broader culture. The "is-ought gap" is something of a popular dogma, and I would guess that moral anti-realism has a pretty large market share of all college educated younger adults. Of course, Hume relies on modern assumptions, most notably a "deflation of reason" whereby he can claim that reason, the intellect, or the "rational part of the soul" possess none of its own desires, but is instead merely a calculating tool that helps to correlate pain and pleasure with different sensations and then helps us predict the best ways to act to achieve certain ends judged as good on these grounds.

Actually, there is an argument here that I think is quite good that such a view makes truly rational and free agency impossible. Every end can only be judged good relative to some other finite end, and there is ultimately no way to choose between different potential "ultimate" or even "benchmark" ends in a rational manner (no one, "truly best" standard).

Likewise, there is no love of goodness and truth for their own sakes (i.e., the desires of the "rational soul" that allow us to transcend current desire and belief in the old model). Hence, every end must be ordered to some other end, in a sort of infinite regress. Yet, "justification must stop somewhere" and when it does it will bottom out in a standard that is chosen not because it is known as "truly best," but instead through inchoate impulse and instinct. David Bentley Hart writes about this a lot from the phenomenological side, but I don't think he makes the most cogent presentation of it. This is also an issue for epistemic as well as ethical pragmatism.

Of course, the advocate of the Humean or "pragmatic" views might just shrug and say it is what it is. If reason is just a calculator, we shouldn't expect for an sort of ultimate ordering of teloi. Whether this affects happiness and people under the sway of such view's capacity to "live a good life," or "be good people," is another question. However, at the very least, the phenomenon of a "crisis of meaning" seems to cause many people very real mental anguish (and to motivate self-centered hedonism in at least some cases). I think Charles Taylor is correct in saying that this particular sort of crisis is distinctly modern; I have never seen it in older works of fiction, whereas it is almost the definitive issue in much literature from the 19th century onwards.

That is, it is possible to be rule oriented and someone who looks to tradition for answers and who interprets the rules passed down through the generations and still be atheistic.

E.g., some forms of Confucian thought that

All I can say is, if I were offered a Rawlsian "original position" lottery, and asked to pick a time and place to be incarnated over the past 3,000 years, while not knowing my sex, ethnicity, amount of economic power, physical health, education, et al., the choice would be obvious to me: right here, right now ("here" being understood as any European country with universal health care and good public libraries :smile: ).

But part of the calculus here is that the peasants laboring under the medieval nobility, or the tenant farmers who lived contemporaneously with Jane Austen's landed gentry are considered "part of that elite's society," whereas, through a sort of neat accounting trick, we have decided that the slaves mining metals for Westerner's phones, the child laborer who sewed their clothes in a sweltering Dhaka factory, or the migrant workers who picked their food out in the fields, are each not "part of the Westerner's society." Hence, we might think that are least some of the claims about "radical improvements for even the poorest" play too much off the accidents of national borders, and the way in which globalization has simply allowed the West to export most of its lower classes safely to the other side of national borders. Afterall, more people live as slaves today than in any prior epoch, and a great deal more in conditions that might be fairly deemed "wage slavery." Likewise, anyone who prioritizes animal well-being to any significant degree can hardly look at modern agriculture as much more than "hell on Earth."

That is, I think there is a certain distinct weakness to "veil of ignorance" when employed in the context of globalization and late-stage capitalism. There might also be a significant problem of time preference. Currently, it is not clear what the final toll of the ecological disasters wrought by modern liberalism will be. There is good reason to think that they might be extreme though, since the nations that are most geographically and politically vulnerable to climate change are also those set to continue to experience exponential population growth this century. Given whose consumption drives climate change, this looming catastrophe might be considered another case of "exporting misery."

Anyhow, more to the point on "backwards looking" ideologies that focus on things like "virtue," etc., I will just point out that these might be justified in liberalisms own consumption-focused empirical terms. The Amish are a fine example, in that they live in a developed country and yet eschew three centuries of technological innovation. They also have a great deal of serious problems, for instance, only educating their children to 8th grade, a fairly repressive culture, etc. It's not anything you'd want to replicate. Yet they manage to become wealthier than their neighbors, building larger net worth in spite of having vastly larger families. Likewise, they have a longer healthspan despite avoiding modern medicine. At one point they had an adult lifespan almost twice that of the surrounding population. They also perform better on a number of other metrics considered important by the welfare economist.

It's not that hard to see at least some of the reasons for this, which tie into their culture. But it's at least a challenge to liberalism that avoiding its consumption driven lifestyle and ethos, or its balkanization, might enough to overcome the economic disadvantages of giving up automobiles, electricity, the internet, secondary education, modern medicine, etc.

This is a little risky on TPF, but I'll go ahead and say that my main reason for standing a bit aloof from the historical-analysis perspective is that I associate it with various pessimistic (and moralistic) accounts of the decline of Western civilization, which I disagree with. ("We gave up the Greeks and we gave up Catholicism and now we're fucked!"). — J

Why is it risky? You're going on about it all the time.

But note that it is fallacious to draw intellectual conclusions from a state of desire. "I associate P with pessimism; I oppose pessimism, therefore I assert ~P." That's emotional reasoning 101.

More precisely, someone draws a distinction between the pre-modern and the modern, and you anticipate an argument about decline. Opposing the presumed thesis of decline, you assert that there is no real distinction between the pre-modern and the modern (because if there is no distinction then there can be no decline). "I don't think there is a decline, therefore there is no real difference between the pre-modern and the modern," is an invalid argument. It is also a form of sophistry, given the fact that you are asserting a truth ("There is no significant distinction") only to achieve an end you desire, without having rational grounds for that assertion. It is wishful thinking. We have to try to get that horse in front of the cart if we want to do philosophy.

, through a sort of neat accounting trick, we have decided that the slaves mining metals for Westerner's phones, the child laborer who sewed their clothes in a sweltering Dhaka factory, or the migrant workers who picked their food out in the fields, are each not "part of the Westerner's society. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A valid point. Still, if the Rawlsian lottery were extended to the entire Earth, I'd still pick the year 2025. I think I'd have by far the best shot at a decent life. Remember, odds are I'd be born a woman. Up till, generously, 100 years ago, that would have been a kind of chattel slavery, with death in childbirth all too likely.

Eagleton published an hilariously scathing review, Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching - from which I quote below. — Wayfarer

I remember reading this article. It sounded plausible, but since I don't actually know what sort of picture of God Dawkins portrays (the parts I read concerned religion), I couldn't actually judge it. I remember Eagleton from his works about literary criticism. Was a good read.

If someone tells me they believe in the God of Moses, the burning bush, and the ark with all the animals, that's a very different conception compared to someone who talks about the God of classical theism. The former, most priests and vicars don't believe in. — Tom Storm

Ah, gotcha. I didn't think of it like that. It's true that I don't believe in cartoon God either, but seeing as nobody around me does, that's not really what my atheism dismisses. I guess what I primarily stand apart from is the Roman Catholic God (with a pinch of evangelism thrown in). I didn't know Biblical literalism was such a big deal in America until I came online. It was quite a surprise.

That said, I totally understand if you or others have no interest in it. I’m simply interested in what others believe and why. — Tom Storm

That's actually me, too; otherwise I wouldn't be in these sort of threads at all. But it's a second-hand interest: I'm interested in believers, not God. I guess there's a derived intellectual curiosity that does make me interested in God, too, but not in a practically relevant way.

I sort of have misgivings about this: as if I'm putting myself above others and play arm-chair psychiatrist. I don't think that's quite it, but I do worry from time to time. In any case, even if I do, it's a two-way road: I look back at myself, too.

For example:

However, at the very least, the phenomenon of a "crisis of meaning" seems to cause many people very real mental anguish... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That, for example, is very true. There are threads on this site about this. It's something I have trouble understanding, something I'm curious about, but it's also something I'd be sort of afraid to ask about when it's acute: when people worry, they don't really want to be... specimen? And in any case I feel there's a gulf here that's very hard to bridge with language, as words can't activate meaning that's not there. You just sort of blunder about until something clicks.

I think we need to pose C. S. Lewis's question: Is it conscious? — J

Not ‘it’. That is what the (regrettably gender-specific) ‘He’ is intended to convey.

no doubt some will argue that the word of disenchanted rationalism and modernity has allowed us to retreat into crude things like money in place of spiritual riches — Tom Storm

I wonder if the quest for (or fantasy of) interstellar travel is a sublimated longing for Heaven.

Still, if the Rawlsian lottery were extended to the entire Earth, I'd still pick the year 2025 — J

Presumably being born into middle-class society in the developed world would have some bearing on that. Being born into Gaza might be a different matter.

I think we need to pose C. S. Lewis's question: Is it conscious?
— J

Not ‘it’. That is what the (regrettably gender-specific) ‘He’ is intended to convey. — Wayfarer

Fine. I used "it" to avoid gender also, but it sounds like this definition of God is intended to describe a conscious being -- a person, for lack of a better term.

Still, if the Rawlsian lottery were extended to the entire Earth, I'd still pick the year 2025
— J

Presumably being born into middle-class society in the developed world would have some bearing on that. Being born into Gaza might be a different matter. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the lottery doesn't allow that kind of choice. We're supposed to calculate the overall odds of winding up in a life-enhancing situation, given everything we know about planetary conditions everywhere. And even so, I think I have better shot in 2025 than at any other time.

it sounds like this definition of God is intended to describe a conscious being -- a person, for lack of a better term. — J

‘Theistic personalism’ is another fraught topic in theology, as I understand it. It is different from classical theism, in that it views deity in somewhat humanist or anthropomorphic terms. Hart and Feser both defend classical theism, whereas evangelicals (Craig and others) tend more towards personalism. My feeing is that deity is ‘personal’ only insofar as not being not an ‘it’ or an impersonal force or mere principle

Consider this passage from D T Suzuki’s (rather theosophical) interpretation of the Buddhist dharmakaya (‘the body of the law’) which whilst not theistic preserves the sense I’m describing.

The Dharmakaya is a soul, a willing and knowing being, one that is will and intelligence, thought and action. It is not an abstract metaphysical principle like Suchness, but it is a living spirit that manifests in nature as well as in thought. Buddhists ascribe to the Dharmakaya innumerable merits and virtues and an absolute perfect intelligence, and make it an inexhaustible fountainhead of love and compassion. (from Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism as reprinted in Mahayana Buddhism by Beatrice Lane Suzuki, New York, McMillan, 1972, pg. 59)