Sure, but that doesn't give epistemic license to fill the gap arbitrarily or with wishful thinking. — Relativist

To label philosophical spirituality as “wishful thinking” is to close off inquiry too quickly. These aren’t arbitrary insertions into an explanatory gap—they’re attempts to interpret the nature of that gap itself. The history of philosophy is filled with thinkers grappling rigorously with the limits of physical explanation—not because they didn’t understand science, but because they recognized that experience, meaning, and subjectivity resist reduction.

So if there's something “wishful” here, it's perhaps the wish that the scientific method could explain everything, when it was never designed to do that.

If you agree that methodological naturalism is the appropriate paradigm for the advance of science, where should the negative fact enter into my metaphysical musings? — Relativist

Methodological naturalism isn’t metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to apply the methods of science to the questions of philosophy. That is basically all that Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’ is saying: that the physical sciences must by design exclude a fundamental dimension of existence - the nature of being.

How should I revise my personal views on the (meta)nature of mind? Alternatives to physicalism also have explanatory gaps (e.g. the mind-body interaction problem of dualism). — Relativist

You're quite right that dualism has its own explanatory gaps—especially regarding mind-body interaction. But physicalism's own explanatory impasse around consciousness, intentionality, and meaning suggests that we shouldn't treat it as the default view merely because it's scientifically adjacent.

As for how to revise your views: simply remain open. You don't have to adopt dualism to explore non-physicalist possibilities. There are entire traditions—phenomenology, idealism, panpsychism, even non-dualist metaphysics from Eastern thought—that approach mind as primary or irreducible, without falling into obscurantism or dualism.

None of these views are without their own puzzles, but they start from a different intuition: that experience isn't something that emerges from matter, but rather something intrinsic to reality—or at least not alien to it. Even just entertaining that possibility might open new questions that physicalism can't easily ask.

Following that thread has lead me to the view that the sense of separateness, of otherness to the world, which characterises so much of modern thought, is really a form of consciousness. Thomas Nagel, in particular, puts the case in his 2012 book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. In a précis of his book, he says

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.*

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.

*This is plainly a reference to the same issue that David Chalmers describes in his Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, which also mentions Nagel's oft-quoted 1974 paper What is it like to be a Bat?

a basic assumption of both science and philosophy: that the world is in some sense rational,
— Wayfarer

IMO, that's an unwarranted assumption. We can makes sense of the portions of reality we perceive and infer. That is not necessarily the whole of reality. I also argue that quantum mechanics isn't wholly intelligible. Rather, we grasp at it. Consider interpretations: every one of them is possible- what are we to do with that fact? I'm not a proponent of the Many-Worlds interpretation, but it's possibly true- and if so, it has significant metaphysical implications- more specific implications than the negative fact we're discussing. — Relativist

Well, to start with, I think any philosophy that declares a fortiori that the world is irrational effectively undermines itself. If reality is, at bottom, unintelligible, then all attempts at understanding—including scientific attempts—are undermined from the outset. That doesn’t mean we can grasp everything, but it does mean that the act of inquiry assumes a basic trust in the rational structure of reality.

As for quantum theory, it may well be telling us something not just about particles, but about the limits of a purely material ontology. That matter should turn out to be elusive and probabilistic rather than solid and mechanistic would not have surprised a Platonist (indeed Werner Heisenberg was a lifelong Platonist). There are many competing interpretations, of course, but several do allow for idealist or participatory readings, where observation plays an essential role. In my essay on the subject, I defend QBism (quantum baynsianism) in which the subjective act of observation is fundamental.

To label philosophical spirituality as “wishful thinking” is to close off inquiry too quickly. These aren’t arbitrary insertions into an explanatory gap—they’re attempts to interpret the nature of that gap itself. — Wayfarer

I did not suggest closing off inquiry. Rather, I value truth-seeking, and truth-seeking requires objectivity. Wishful thinking about an afterlife is seductive, not an objective path to truth.

If you agree that methodological naturalism is the appropriate paradigm for the advance of science, where should the negative fact enter into my metaphysical musings?
— Relativist

Methodological naturalism isn’t metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to apply the methods of science to the questions of philosophy. That is basically all that Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’ is saying: that the physical sciences must by design exclude a fundamental dimension of existence - the nature of being. — Wayfarer

I chose my words carefully, and am highlighting the fact that the "problem of consciousness" only entails the negative fact: consciousness is not entirely physical. I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap.

You're quite right that dualism has its own explanatory gaps—especially regarding mind-body interaction. But physicalism's own explanatory impasse around consciousness, intentionality, and meaning suggests that we shouldn't treat it as the default view merely because it's scientifically adjacent. — Wayfarer

Why ISN'T it the appropriate default view for me? Physicalism is consistent with much of mental activity and it explains a lot. You repeatedly point out (and I have accepted) that it can't be the whole truth, but you haven't proposed what more complete truth I ought to embrace. Pointing to the wide space of possibilities, that is entailed by the negative fact, is neither informative nor useful to me. You said "remain open". I am open to differences of opinion. I won't argue "you're wrong because it's contrary to physicalist dogma". I'm not trying to convince anyone to change their view, I'm just trying to decide whether or not I should change mine. Highlighting the negative fact, and the space of possibilities it opens, doesn't give me a reason to change my view of treating a physicalist account (of anything) as the appropriate default for a reductive account. I remind you, this is not some act of faith - it is just the framework I base my philosophical analyses on, and I don't apply it to human behavior or aesthetics.

...So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone...

I have never denied that. Hurricanes.

I think any philosophy that declares a fortiori that the world is irrational unintelligible effectively undermines itself. If reality is, at bottom, unintelligible, — Wayfarer

I disagree, and that's because it is not the WORLD that is rational (or not), it is people.

As for quantum theory, it may well be telling us something not just about particles, but about the limits of a purely material ontology. — Wayfarer

It's not telling us anything other than that there's a set of possibilities, none of which would be inconsistent with materialism (by definition).

I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap. — Relativist

And I have repeatedly pointed out that in this ‘explanatory gap’ dwells the very self that is seeking to understand. And that deferring every question to science only perpetuates the ignoring of that. And when I do point it out, you deflect some more by framing it as a speculative question. When in reality the real question of philosophy is ‘know thyself’’

Nothing further to add.

I chose my words carefully, and am highlighting the fact that the "problem of consciousness" only entails the negative fact: consciousness is not entirely physical. I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap. — Relativist

If Consciousness was entirely physical*1, there would be no need for Philosophy*2. But even scientific Physics is not entirely physical*3, in the sense of tangible, material, or concrete. Newtonian physics was presumed to be about "things" perceived through the senses. Until he was forced by mathematical reasoning to posit a strange invisible force that acts at a distance*4, and can only be detected by it's effects on matter. Ironically, his belief in the biblical God should have prepared him to accept such magical powers.

Centuries later, Einstein re-defined Newton's mathematical Gravity as the abstract geometry of space-time. And Quantum Physics extended the abstraction of the material world with its notions of statistical existence (probabilistic particles), and with mathematical definitions of abstract Fields*3 underlying the material world. Yet, such abstract ideas*5 have eroded our former confidence (uncertainty principle) in the substantial materiality of the natural world.

As I learned about the emerging abstraction of Physics, I began to see that the Causal Forces that act in the material world are more Mental than Material. For example, we now define Energy, not as a material object or substance, but as the Potential, or Ability, or Capacity to cause material change. We measure Energy, not by what it is, but by what it does : its effects, not its substance. I could go on, but these examples should suffice to illustrate that modern Science has encountered aspects of reality that are "not entirely physical", and can only be analyzed mathematically (mentally ; rationally ; theoretically ; philosophically).

Therefore, the need to treat Consciousness, not as a "negative fact", but as more like an invisible Force, or causal Energy, or space-time Field, should come as no surprise. I won't go further in this post. But my thesis & blog treat Consciousness and Life as philosophical subjects, not scientific objects of study. :nerd:


*1. Physical :
relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete.
___ Oxford Dictionary
Meta-Physical : conceived via mental reasoning instead of the physical senses.

*2. The idea that consciousness is not entirely physical, often called non-physicalism or dualism, is a viewpoint that suggests consciousness is separate from or irreducible to physical matter and processes. This perspective is supported by arguments such as the "explanatory gap" (the difficulty in explaining subjective experience from physical descriptions) and the qualia argument (the unique, subjective nature of conscious experience)
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=consciousness+is+not+entirely+physical

*3. In quantum field theory, the quantum field is considered fundamental and not composed of anything physical ; rather, it's the foundation upon which particles and forces emerge. It's often described as an immaterial realm of energy, light, and information, existing as frequency, and giving rise to what we perceive as matter
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=quantum+field+immaterial

*4. Newton's theory of gravity describes a force that acts at a distance, meaning objects exert a gravitational pull on each other without needing to be in contact. This concept, where gravity acts instantaneously across vast distances, troubled Newton himself, as he considered it a philosophical "absurdity". Despite his reservations, his mathematical formulation of gravity accurately predicted planetary motion and other phenomena, leading him to accept it as a working model.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=newton+gravity+action+at+a+distance

*5. What does it mean to be abstract? :
having no reference to material objects or specific examples; not concrete.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/abstract

I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap.
— Relativist

And I have repeatedly pointed out that in this ‘explanatory gap’ dwells the very self that is seeking to understand. — Wayfarer

But "the self" is a mystery before we consider its grounding and a mystery even after we acknowledge there's something immaterial.

deferring every question to science only perpetuates the ignoring of that. — Wayfarer

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science. Your objection would be apt for Stephen Hawking, not for me.

* even if that ground includes some unknown immaterial aspect.

If Consciousness was entirely physical*1, there would be no need for Philosophy — Gnomon

That would only be true if we had perfect and complete knowledge of how to reduce everything to fundamental physics, and the capacity to compute human behavior on this basis.

Science has encountered aspects of reality that are "not entirely physical", and can only be analyzed mathematically (mentally ; rationally ; theoretically ; philosophically). — Gnomon

Modern physicalism has no problen dealing with the things you refer to as "not entirely physical". For example, energy is a property that things have. Properties are not objects, per say, but they are aspects of the way physical things are.

Therefore, the need to treat Consciousness, not as a "negative fact", but as more like an invisible Force, or causal Energy, or space-time Field, should come as no surprise. I won't go further in this post. But my thesis & blog treat Consciousness and Life as philosophical subjects, not scientific objects of study. — Gnomon

The negative fact I referred to is "not (entirely) physical." I simply disagree with jumping to any conclusion based solely on this negative fact. Negative facts only entail possibilities - a wealth of them. If you wish to create some hypothetical framework, that's your business, but I won't find it compelling without some justification for giving it some credibility.

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science. — Relativist

That is exactly what David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett do. Where do you differ from them on that score?

Another point I’ve noticed: that you label a very wide range of philosophies ‘speculative’. You’re inclined to say that, even if physicalism is incomplete, anything other than physicalism is ‘speculative’, simply 'an excuse' to engage in 'wishful thinking'. But isn't it possible that this might be because you’re not willing to entertain any philosophy other than physicalism? That it's a convenient way not to have to engage with anything other than physicalism - label it ‘speculative'? And how is that not also 'wishful thinking'?

As for the 'unknown immaterial ground' - what if that 'unknown immaterial ground' is simply thought itself? I know what David Armstrong's answer to that would be: thoughts are brain-states, configurations of neurochemicals, in line with his view that everything about the mind can be explained in terms of physics and chemistry:

What does modern science have to say about the nature of man? There are, of course, all sorts of disagreements and divergencies in the views of individual scientists. But I think it is true to say that one view is steadily gaining ground, so that it bids fair to become established scientific doctrine. This is the view that we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms. — The Nature of Mind, D M Armstrong

(Notice also the claim to authority inherent in it becoming 'established scientific doctrine'. The triumphal flourish: 'It's true, because science says it is!')

So, what is the matter with the claim that thoughts are brain-states? Consider Edmund Husserl's criticism of naturalism:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge... — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p143

This is not speculative but analytic: naturalism and physicalism ignore the foundational, disclosive role of consciousness at the basis of scientific theorising. Even to develop a theory of how the brain generates or forms or causes the content of thought relies on those conscious actions. And you can't see those activities from the outside - you will never see a true proposition in the data of neuroscience, only images that the expert will need to interpret, in order to judge.

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p143

Would you describe Husserl as a secular philosopher who avoided metaphysical and spiritual claims altogether, or as someone who bracketed such matters without affirming or denying them?

Husserl deliberately brackets metaphysical and spiritual claims in the context of the practice of epochē —the suspension of judgment about the existence or non-existence of the external world. This does not mean he denies such claims, but rather that phenomenological analysis proceeds without them, focusing instead on the structures of experience and the intentional acts of consciousness. In that way, he’s not a metaphysician in the traditional sense, and certainly not a “spiritual” philosopher in any confessional or mystical way. But—and this is important—his work touches on the metaphysical at the deepest level, especially in the Crisis, where he discusses the forgotten origins of science in the life-world and argues for a kind of transcendental grounding of meaning and rationality. Meta-metaphysical, if you like.

There’s also a strong Platonic or idealist undercurrent in Husserl’s later thought—his notion of eidetic reduction suggests that essences are real and perceptible to intuition, and not merely empirical generalizations. So while he doesn't affirm metaphysical or spiritual doctrines, his work provides a space for them.

In the context of the discussion with @Relativist, I'm trying to avoid arguing on the basis of 'the spiritual', as that is seen as being the natural opponent of 'the physical'. But that, again, is the shadow of Cartesian dualism, the very divisions of mind and matter, spiritual and physical, that Husserl is careful to avoid, and that I wish to avoid also.

There’s also a strong Platonic or idealist undercurrent in Husserl’s later thought—his notion of eidetic reduction suggests that essences are real and perceptible to intuition, and not merely empirical generalizations. So while he doesn't affirm metaphysical or spiritual doctrines, his work provides a space for them. — Wayfarer

Yes, this would seem to be the case... although maybe it's others who, rather eagerly, seek to fill this space.

I wounder what @Joshs would observe here.

But—and this is important—his work touches on the metaphysical at the deepest level, especially in the Crisis, where he discusses the forgotten origins of science in the life-world and argues for a kind of transcendental grounding of meaning and rationality. Meta-metaphysical, if you like. — Wayfarer

Nice term. He's not doing metaphysics as such, but commenting on the space where they may take place.

A clearing, as one of his successors would call it.

[N]aturalism and physicalism ignore the foundational, disclosive role of consciousness at the basis of scientific theorising. — Wayfarer

This is so because "consciousness" (qualia, intention, feeling, or other folk-percepts), in contrast to observation, on occasion might be a consequence but is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition (or operational requirement) of "scientific theorizing". And given the absence of a testable explanatory model of "consciousness", your criticism is empty.

[T]he real question of philosophy is ‘know thyself’’ — Wayfarer

Not a "question of philosophy" but a Delphic reminder of practical living that one needs to understand one's limitations (in order to avoid hubris)

Cite a single non-idealist philosopher who says 'the material world is the whole story'.
— 180 Proof

Thomas Hobbes (d.1679) – Argued that all phenomena, including thought, are explicable in terms of matter in motion. Leviathan opens with: “The universe is corporeal; all that is real is body.” — Wayfarer

Hobbes' "whole story " is epistemic (re: he's (mostly) a scientific materialist as per his De Corpore (chap. 6)), not metaphysical; rejection of Cartesian dualism (or immaterialism) =/= "the whole story" but, instead, it is how Hobbes finds a part of "the story" that includes – constitutes-informs – its scientific reading.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes/#4

Julien Offray de La Mettrie (d. 1751) – In L’Homme Machine, he argues that humans are essentially sophisticated machines, governed entirely by physical processes.

... as opposed to "governed by" (e.g.)
:sparkle: astrological forces :pray: ... Rejection of Cartesian dualism (or immaterialism) =/= "the whole story".

Baron d’Holbach (d. 1789) – In The System of Nature, he writes: “Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it... his ideas are the necessary effect of the impressions he receives.” That’s full-blown deterministic materialism.

Again, an epistemic paradigm rather than an ontological deduction. All d'Holbach is saying, it seems to me, is that whatever else (e.g. im-material) might be going on, we do not observe anything other than this nomological state of affairs. For him it is not "the whole story" but simply, pragmatically, materialism (of the 18th century) was the only self-consistent and testable "story" worth telling at the time.

Ludwig Büchner (d.1899) – In Force and Matter, he argues that all spiritual phenomena are explicable through matter and force.

Whether of not there are "spiritual phenomena" is irrelevant to Dr. Büchner who is NOT a metaphysical "the whole story" materialist but a scientific materialist.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_B%C3%BCchner

more context:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism_controversy

J. J. C. Smart (d. 2012) – A champion of the mind-brain identity theory: mental states just are brain states.

Invoking Occam's Razor, Smart's physicalism amounts to an explicit rejection of Cartesian dualism; for him physicalist explanations are not "the whole story" but suffice for understanding the physical world and its constituents such as functioning human brains. Btw, Smart's explicit metaphysics concerns perdurantism rather than ("reality is nothing but matter") materialism.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdurantism

David Armstrong (d.2014) – Argued that mental states are physical states with a certain functional role.

Rejection of Cartesian dualism (or immaterialism) =/= "the whole story". Despite academic labels or publication titles, Armstrong is a physicalist-functionalist (and more broadly a scientific realist); in the context of his work on "mind", as I understand it, the use of "material" (re: materialism) is synonymous with embodied. AFAIK, Armstrong's "the whole story" metaphysics consists in 'only instantiated Platonic universals exist' (like e.g. laws of nature, embodied minds, truthmakers, etc).

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Malet_Armstrong#Philosophy

Paul Churchland (b. 1942) & Patricia Churchland (b. 1943) – Advocates of eliminative materialism, which holds that beliefs, desires, and intentions as ordinarily understood don’t really exist; they’re just folk-psychological illusions awaiting replacement by neuroscience.

Rejection of Cartesian dualism (or immaterialism) =/= "the whole story". Their eliminatism is an epistemology (i.e. scientific materialism), not a (nothing but matter) metaphysics.

Daniel Dennett (d. 2024) – A leading proponent of functionalist materialism, famously dismissive of qualia and any notion of non-physical mind. See: Consciousness Explained (1991).

A pragmatic form of the Churchlands' eliminativism – epistemic (i.e. scientific), not a (nothing but matter) metaphysics.

Alex Rosenberg (b. 1946) – Author of The Atheist’s Guide to Reality, where he asserts that physics is all there is, and that even meaning and morality are illusions.

Well, Wayf, the illusions (i.e. things not as they appear to be) do exist ... Read Rosenberg's book: it's a scientistic polemic (almost a parody) and not a well-argued thesis. :smirk:

But my thesis & blog treat Consciousness and Life as philosophical subjects, not scientific objects of study. — Gnomon

... explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap. — Relativist

IME, philosophy that does not address (i.e. make explicit or clarify) how things are and instead (unsoundly) asserts how things might (or ought to) be "... explains nothing ... is cheap".

This is so because "consciousness" (qualia, intention, feeling, or other folk-percepts), in contrast to observation, on occasion might be a consequence but is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition (or operational requirement) of "scientific theorizing". — 180 Proof

You're not seeing the point. The passage is not a 'theory about consciousness'. Read it again:

Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p143

How can they not be dependent on conscious acts? They all rely on reasoning, rational inference, calculation and judgement.

As to why this can't be understood from 'within the natural outlook', this is because consciousness (or simply 'the mind') never appears as an object for the natural sciences: 'Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place.' It is more accurate to say that the world appears in the mind, than that the mind appears in the world.

If Consciousness was entirely physical*1, there would be no need for Philosophy — Gnomon
That would only be true if we had perfect and complete knowledge of how to reduce everything to fundamental physics, and the capacity to compute human behavior on this basis. — Relativist

So, you agree that incomplete empirical Physics*1 leaves something to be desired, that theoretical Philosophy can explore : perhaps a Theory of Everything? Theories are not about Actualities, but about Possibilities. Yes? :smile:

*1. Yes, physics is generally considered incomplete. Current theories, like the Standard Model, have limitations and don't fully explain phenomena like gravity at the quantum level, dark matter, and dark energy. Furthermore, even with a complete theory of everything, complexity in emergent systems like the human brain would still pose significant challenges
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=is+physics+incomplete

Modern physicalism has no problen dealing with the things you refer to as "not entirely physical". For example, energy is a property that things have. Properties are not objects, per say, but they are aspects of the way physical things are. — Relativist

Yes. But Properties are known by inference, not by observation. And Qualities cannot be dissected into fundamental atoms. Science is based on sensory observation, followed by philosophical Deduction, Induction & Abduction. When scientists study immaterial "aspects" of nature, they are doing philosophy. Yes? :smile:

The negative fact I referred to is "not (entirely) physical." I simply disagree with jumping to any conclusion based solely on this negative fact. Negative facts only entail possibilities - a wealth of them. If you wish to create some hypothetical framework, that's your business, but I won't find it compelling without some justification for giving it some credibility. — Relativist

Bertrand Russell "argued that negative facts are necessary to explain why true negative propositions are true"*2. But you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. Is that because you can't put a statistical Probability under a microscope, to study its structure? Are you fearful of Uncertainty? Were Einstein's ground-breaking theoretical discoveries based on hard facts, or on anomalies that puzzled expert scientists? Was the bending of light by gravity a known fact, or a mere hypothetical possibility? Do you prefer observational Science to theoretical Philosophy, because of the superiority of verified Fact over possible Explanation?

Do you assume, just because my worldview is different from yours, that I am "just making sh*t up". Obviously, you haven't looked at the scientific "justification" --- primarily Quantum Physics & Information Theory --- that I present "for giving it some credibility". I don't quote scripture to account for my unorthodox worldview. I almost exclusively quote credible credentialed scientists. And I give links, so you can satisfy yourself that they should know what they are talking about.

So in my thesis, I "jumped to a conclusion" based, not on "negative facts", but on scientific anomalies, that open the door for philosophical explanation. And my conclusions are always tentative, subject to new evidence. That's why, as an amateur, I post on this forum, dedicated to criticism of speculations & conjectures. :cool:

*2. The existence and nature of negative facts have been debated in philosophy. Some philosophers, like Russell, have argued that negative facts are necessary to explain why true negative propositions are true.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=negative+fact

PS___ You didn't say which "negative fact" I was using as a quicksand ground from which to "jump to a {unwarranted??} conclusion". So, my comments here are generalized. If you want a more warranted reply, you need to specify the unverified Possibility that I leaped from to a Conclusion you don't agree with. In the OP, the conclusion was "God" as the "ultimate reality", and the "grounds" were philosophical arguments, not scientific possibilities.

There’s also a strong Platonic or idealist undercurrent in Husserl’s later thought—his notion of eidetic reduction suggests that essences are real and perceptible to intuition, and not merely empirical generalizations. So while he doesn't affirm metaphysical or spiritual doctrines, his work provides a space for them.
— Wayfarer

Yes, this would seem to be the case... although maybe it's others who, rather eagerly, seek to fill this space.

I wounder what Joshs would observe here — Tom Storm

I’m not sure how much of a space Husserl provides for metaphysical and spiritual doctrines. He is very clear that what one uncovers at the end of a long chain of eidetic reductions is the irreducible essence of the living present. There is no room here to insert a spiritual content since the only content of the living present is its structure as pure self-affection. Not the presence to self of a feeling or knowing substance, not an ethical vector but idealization in its barest form, as the immediacy of the voice that hears itself in the exact same moment of its speaking. Any particular substantive sense we attempt to assign to what is within the living present will always be a higher order constituted product, merely subjectively relative and i. need of bracketing and reduction, with no metaphysical justification in itself. This runs counter to the aims of religious forms of phenomenology.

Cool. Thank you.

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science.
— Relativist

That is exactly what David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett do. Where do you differ from them on that score? — Wayfarer

Where did Armstrong say that all questions should be deferred to science? He was a reductionist, and believed that all substance and function was reducible to physics (physical substance and laws), but I don't think he ever suggested the human condition is best analyzed from the bottom up.

Irrespective of what Armstrong or Dennett believed, I believe bottom-up analysis is a practical (if not actual) impossibility- even if reductive physicalism is true. Rather, functional-level analysis is appropriate. Most of the science of Chemistry is practiced at a functional level of chemical bonds between atoms - rather than at the (exceedingly complex) level of quantum mechanics. Biology is best analyzed at the level of functioning organisms. In general, functional truths can be established without needing to consider how, or if, it reduces to quarks.

Similarly, everything about the human condition is best analyzed and contemplated at the "functional" level (an unfortunately cold term for beauty, love, hate, good, evil, wishes, hopes, dreams, fears...). So while we could debate whether or not these things are reducible to quantum field theory, it rarely matters - because we all agree these aspects of humanity are real and worthy of in-depth analysis.

Another point I’ve noticed: that you label a very wide range of philosophies ‘speculative’. You’re inclined to say that, even if physicalism is incomplete, anything other than physicalism is ‘speculative’, simply 'an excuse' to engage in 'wishful thinking'. But isn't it possible that this might be because you’re not willing to entertain any philosophy other than physicalism? That it's a convenient way not to have to engage with anything other than physicalism - label it ‘speculative'? And how is that not also 'wishful thinking'? — Wayfarer

Philosophy necessarily begins with speculation, but a speculation presented to another person is only a bare possibility if there's no additional reason (a justification) to accept it (*edit: I discuss "bare possibility" in my reply to Gnomon, which is below this one). This is a point I've brought up repeatedly: why accept one possibility over another? Re: wishful thinking- it's is a form of bias- not a good reason to accept a possibility, so I'm inclined to dismiss this as a justification to raise a possibility above the status of being "bare".

I try to be consistent with my epistemology. So I consider what's wrong with conspiracy theories: they start with a biased speculation (one that is possible), and then interpret facts on that basis, and treat those interpretations as supporting evidence. Contrary evidence is ignored or rationalized. It is a corrupted version of inference to the best explanation. This is bad epistemology in any context.

In this light, I have argued tha physicalism is a proper inference to the best explanation. 1) it's consistent with all uncontroversial facts of the world; 2) it is parsimonious- it depends on the fewest assumptions. I've brought this up several times- and (contrary to your charge) expressed a willingness to entertain other possibilities. You haven't identified one. You've merely pointed to the negative fact (the explanatory gap in physicalist theory of mind), which does no more than entail a wide space of possibilities. I've said this repeatedly, but you haven't appreciated the significance, which is that possibility alone is useless.

As for the 'unknown immaterial ground' - what if that 'unknown immaterial ground' is simply thought itself? — Wayfarer

Why should I believe that? Why do you believe this to be more than a bare possibility? Thinking is a process - a process that humans engage in. Referring to a "thought" as an object seems like treating a "run" (the process of running) as an object. There's no run unless there's a runner, and there's no thought unless there's a thinker. This is what seems to be the case, so explain how your alternative makes sense.

(Notice also the claim to authority inherent in it becoming 'established scientific doctrine'. The triumphal flourish: 'It's true, because science says it is!') — Wayfarer

Facts established by science have strong epistemological support. It BEGINS as a speculation- an inference to best explanation (in the opinion of the formulator) of empirical evidence. But then It has been subjected to verification testing, sometimes falsified and revised. So why shouldn't more credence be given to established science than (say) the untestable speculation that thoughts are objects? I don't see any reason for your negativity on his (conditional) comment. It might make more sense to be skeptical of his optimistic forecast that this will occur.

This is not speculative but analytic: naturalism and physicalism ignore the foundational, disclosive role of consciousness at the basis of scientific theorising. — Wayfarer

Physicalism doesn't START with the role of consciousness, but it doesn't ignore it. It accounts for consciousness, even if imperfectly.

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all
...

Nothing in the quote constitutes an explanation of what conscious acts are. Asserting consciousness is foundational explains nothing. Rather, it's an assertion that its existence is brute fact

Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place.

I'll rephrase this to: consciousness is precisely the reason why we would perceive a world, and why we perceive it as we do. If that's what he meant, it's tautologically true - because our perceptions, our rationality and our capacity to understand are aspects of our consciousness.

"the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness...." The world itself is unaffected by our knowledge of it. Knowledge entails meaning; the capacity for knowledge is an aspect of our consciousness.

The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness...because conceiving is something that conscious minds DO, and that's all it is.

consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role... foundational to knowledge not to reality itself.

Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one
The case has been made that consciousness is foundational to knowledge, but that doesn't seem paticularly inciteful for the reasons I described.

It seems that Husserl's theory takes consciousness for granted, just as physicalism does. He suggests that consciousness is unanalyzable - a brute fact. That's not explaining anything. Physicalism (in conjunction with neuroscience) attempts to analyze consciousness and explain it. You focus on the gap in that explanation, while implying Husserl's theory is a worthy competitor (or perhaps you think it superior) in spite of it explaining nothing. Rather, it raises even more questions that it can't answer.

Any particular substantive sense we attempt to assign to what is within the living present will always be a higher order constituted product, merely subjectively relative and i. need of bracketing and reduction, with no metaphysical justification in itself

This is where I suspected metaphysics would end up (not having read it sufficiently myself). Rather like the mystic, standing beside the door of the unknown. Unable to proceed any further, hence the appeal (from the mystic) for guidance from the other side of that door. Where is the equivalent appeal from the Metaphysician, I wonder? To AI perhaps.

As I read that back, I read Hal, of 2001 A Space Odyssey, rather than AI. A fitting metaphor, I think.

It seems that Husserl's theory takes consciousness for granted, just as physicalism does. He suggests that consciousness is unanalyzable - a brute fact. That's not explaining anything. Physicalism (in conjunction with neuroscience) attempts to analyze consciousness and explain it. You focus on the gap in that explanation, while implying Husserl's theory is a worthy competitor (or perhaps you think it superior) in spite of it explaining nothing. Rather, it raises even more questions that it can't answer — Relativist

Wayfarer is trying to give a taste of Husserl’s view of the relation between consciousness and the physical. Given that the OP topic isnt about Husserl, this isn’t the place to flesh out what Husserl meant by consciousness, but I can assure you he doesn’t simply take it for granted. He wrote thousands of pages explicating what it is, what it does and why it is fundamental to the understanding of concepts like the natural and the physical.

Bertrand Russell "argued that negative facts are necessary to explain why true negative propositions are true"*2. But you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. — Gnomon

Yes he did, but I agree with David Armstrong, that they are superfluous and unparsimonious. The world consists of the things that exist. The truthmaker for a negative proposition is the set of all actual existents. The absence of unicorns from that set is the truthmaker of "unicorns don't exist".

you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. Is that because you can't put a statistical Probability under a microscope, to study its structure? Are you fearful of Uncertainty? — Gnomon

I'm not at all wary of exploring possibilities, and I don't require they be verified (proven). Justification doesn't imply proof. Most of our body of beliefs consist of uncertain facts, and we may have varying levels of certainty. I'm primarily distinguishing propositions that are bare possibilities.

Philosophers often distinguish between different degrees of possibility. A bare possibility sits at the bottom of this hierarchy - it's possible in the most minimal sense, without being plausible, probable, or well-supported. If we applied a numerical probability, it would be infinitesimal.

Example: It's possible the sun will go nova overnight, but I don't take that possibility seriously- so, for all intents and purposes, I'm certain the sun will be there tomorrow, although I acknowledge it's possible in a minimalist sense.

So when, there's a large space of mutually exclusive possibilities, none of which has an iota of support, they are all just bare possibilities. That's what seems to be the case with the negative fact* I'm discussing.

With regard to science: scientists don't explore bare possibilities. They have some reason for exploring some particular possibility - and that means it's more than a bare possibility.

Do you assume, just because my worldview is different from yours, that I am "just making sh*t up". Obviously, you haven't looked at the scientific "justification" --- primarily Quantum Physics & Information Theory --- that I present "for giving it some credibility". — Gnomon

I haven't made that assumption. Rather, I've asked for the justification so I can consider it. The whole point of my discussion with you and @Wayfarer is to hear some justification for treating some specific possibilities (entailed by physicalism's explanatory gap*) as more than a bare possibility. I've been given nothing - and that may be because I haven't been clear on what I'm asking for. I hope I've cleared that up.

______
*

You didn't say which "negative fact" I was using as a quicksand ground from which to "jump to a {unwarranted??} conclusion". — Gnomon

The negative fact that is the topic is: physicalism does not fully account for the nature of consciousness.

Understood. I'm not familiar with his work. I was just responding to what I inferred from Wayfarer's quote - which (I assume) he provided to make HIS point.

The negative fact that is the topic is: physicalism does not fully account for the nature of consciousness. — Relativist

OK. But do you have a Positive Fact that "_____ does fully account for the nature of consciousness". A Materialist worldview might fill-in the blank with something like "Atomic Theory", or Aristotle's "hyle", instead of "morph", as Positive Facts. Yet, in what sense are these theories or views Factual? Are they proven or verified, or are the only open-ended Possibilities?

Do you consider yourself to be a Physicalist*1 or Monistic Materialist, with no immaterial subjective thoughts? If so, then you may view Chalmers' "hard problem"*2 as "superfluous and unparsimonious". What kind of matter are those beliefs, views, attitudes made of? Do you have a theory, or mechanism, to account for how Matter became Conscious, after 14B years of random accidents? :smile:


*1. Physicalism, the view that everything is fundamentally physical, struggles to fully explain consciousness because it struggles to account for the subjective, qualitative experience of consciousness, often referred to as qualia or phenomenal consciousness. While physicalism can describe the physical structures and processes of the brain, it doesn't fully explain how these give rise to the subjective feeling of what it's like to see, hear, or feel pain.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=+physicalism+does+not+fully+account+for+the+nature+of+consciousness.

*2. The "hard problem of consciousness" refers to the challenge of explaining how subjective, qualitative experiences ("what it's like" to have a feeling) arise from physical processes in the brain. It contrasts with "easy problems" of consciousness, which are about explaining cognitive functions and behaviors like attention, memory, and language processing. Essentially, the hard problem asks why and how physical processes give rise to subjective, qualitative experiences like feeling pain or seeing the color red.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=hard+problem
Note --- I am aware that I experience the world from a personal perspective. But I can only infer, rationally, that you have a similar awareness of the non-self world. And It's easy to assert that, given eons of time, random roiling of atoms could possibly develop feelings & sensations. But the hard part, the science part, is to describe "how" that happened. And the philosophy part is to explain "why" consciousness might emerge from a evolutionary process that coasted along for 99% of Time with no signs of Consciousness until the last .001%.

This post was started prior to the post above, but interrupted.

I chose my words carefully, and am highlighting the fact that the "problem of consciousness" only entails the negative fact: consciousness is not entirely physical. I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap. — Relativist

Until you brought it up, I was not familiar with the term "Negative Fact"*1. But the definition below sounds absurd to me. And I don't know anybody who bases a philosophical conclusion on nothing but the Absence*2 of that thing. Maybe their Immaterial Presence explanation*3 just doesn't make sense to your Matter-based Bias. Ideas & Concepts may be absent from Material Reality, but for humans, they are present in Mental Ideality. So, the negative term is useful only for denigrating the very talent that distinguishes humans from animals : reasoning from possibility to probability. That's our way of predicting the future.

To say that "possibility is cheap" disparages the basic assumption of this forum, and of Philosophy in general : that possibility is fertile ground for rational exploration. By the way : you may be familiar only with traditional Dualistic*4 explanations for Consciousness. But my thesis is Monistic. :smile:


*1. In logic and philosophy, the concept of a "negative fact" refers to the possibility of a fact existing due to the absence of something.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=negative+fact+possibility

*2. What Is The Power of Absence?
Terrence Deacon's 2011 book, goes into great detail to create a plausible hypothesis for solving the mystery of how living organisms suddenly emerged on Earth, after billions of years of spatial expansion & material aggregation had managed to build only simple inorganic chemical systems that strictly obeyed the zero-sum 2nd law of Thermodynamics.
https://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page33.html

*3. Some people argue that consciousness is not entirely physical, or that it is not simply reducible to physical processes in the brain. This perspective is often associated with philosophical positions like Dualism, which proposes that the mind and body are separate entities, or with specific arguments like the Knowledge Argument, which suggests that knowing all the physical facts about consciousness doesn't fully capture the subjective experience of it.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=the+negative+fact%3A+consciousness+is+not+entirely+physical.

*4. Dualism; Duality :
Descartes’ Dualism argued that the real world was composed of two “substances” : physical spatial Body and metaphysical non-spatial Soul. But modern Science is based on Materialistic Monism. Now Quantum science has theorized that the foundation of reality is non-spatial non-local fields of potential energy, that seem more like Soul than Body. So the Enformationism worldview is both monistic and dualistic. The single “substance” of our world is metaphysical EnFormAction, which is equivalent to all-pervading fields of energy. But all things we know with our physical senses are bodies, that are atomistic in the sense that they can be added & divided.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page12.html

OK. But do you have a Positive Fact that "_____ does fully account for the nature of consciousness". A Materialist worldview might fill-in the blank with something like "Atomic Theory", or Aristotle's "hyle", instead of "morph", as Positive Facts. Yet, in what sense are these theories or views Factual? Are they proven or verified, or are the only open-ended Possibilities? — Gnomon

Fully account? Certainly not, but I have an account that (AFAIK) accounts for more than the alternatives. I'll describe why I accept this as the closest available approximation of the matter.

I take it as a premise that the external world exists and that we have a functionally accurate perception of it (I justify this as being a a properly basic belief: it's innate, and plausibly a consequence of the evolutionary processes that produced us.This is my epistemic foundation).

Science has developed a large body of knowledge about the external world, through quality epistemic process (hypothesis-testing-falsification-revision). The success of physics, in particular, provides good reason to believe that the observable universe is natural and operates in strict accordance with laws of nature. The question remains: does it account for the mind? At the onset of the investigation, I expect that it should - because we're part of the universe, and there's no evidence of anything else existing that is nonphysical or exempt from laws of nature. Exploring further, we know that mental behavior is dependent on the physical: a healthy brain is needed to operate optimally; trauma, disease, hormones, and drugs affect mental activity. Measureable brain activity has been documented to be associated with a variety of mental activities. These facts establish (at minimum) a strong role for the physical brain in mental processes, and this increases my confidence that my going-in assumption is correct.

Guided by introspection, we investigate further - consider aspects of our minds that (at first glance) seem incompatible with matter/laws of nature. Physicalist theory proposes models that account for the functional and behavioral aspects of mind (beliefs,learning, dispositions, the will, perceptions, "mental" causation...). These models don't prove physicalism, but they show that physicalism is logically possible; by failing to falsify physicalism - my going-in assumption that "the mind" is another part of the physical world, albeit with a special complexity.

And yet, there is an explanatory gap: the "hard problem of consciousness" - the nature of the inner, subjective experience. I'm not sure that this falsifies physicalist theory of mind, but it does cast suspicion. And therefore I'm exploring alternatives - but the alternatives still need to account for the very obvious dependencies on the physical I mentioned. It seems to be that this could most simply be accomplished by supplementing a physicalist account with something more (e.g. some sort of ontological emergence). But no one seems to be going in that direction. Rather, they're suggesting starting from scratch - treating the mind (or thoughts) as something fundamental and (it seems) unexplained.

Note --- I am aware that I experience the world from a personal perspective. But I can only infer, rationally, that you have a similar awareness of the non-self world. — Gnomon

Physicalism provides a very good reason to think we have similar "inner-lives": we have a similar physical construction.

philosophy part is to explain "why" consciousness might emerge from a evolutionary process that coasted along for 99% of Time with no signs of Consciousness until the last .001%. — Gnomon

Life itself seems to be low probability - if it were easy, then those biologists engaged in abiogenesis research would have succeeded long ago. But the universe is old, and vast (there's no upper bound on how big the universe actually is). Can life exist without some degree of consciousness? Maybe not. An amoeba becomes "aware" (in a sense) of the presence of nearby nutrients that it proceeds to approach and consume. This process is explainable in terms of receptors on the surface of an amoeba cell. Multicellular organisms would need to replace the unicellular process in order to survive and I would guess this is the evolutionary track that leads to animal consciousness.

Until you brought it up, I was not familiar with the term "Negative Fact"*1. But the definition below sounds absurd to me. And I don't know anybody who bases a philosophical conclusion on nothing but the Absence*2 of that thing. — Gnomon

Let me clarify. Let's define fact as: a true proposition. The issue I was alluding to was: what's the truthmaker for the fact? I'm assuming truthmaker theory of truth: a truthmaker is some component of the world that corresponds to the proposition. So I misled by saying there are no negative facts (it depends on whether one has an ontology of facts, or an ontology of things). There are negative facts (propositions), but not negative THINGS.

If one accepts truthmaker theory (as I do), then one is committed to truthmakers that actually exist in the world - something ontological. What things exist in the world that constitute a truthmaker for "unicorns don't exist."? Answer: the set of things that DO exist, a set that lacks unicorns.

To say that "possibility is cheap" disparages the basic assumption of this forum — Gnomon

It shouldn't. It's a phrase that I borrowed from Christian Apologist William Lane Craig, although others also use the phrase (google "possibility is cheap"). It's just a succinct way of saying that bare possibilities (as I previously defined) are too numerous to give any credence to - so something more is needed, as I described.

Physicalism provides a very good reason to think we have similar "inner-lives": we have a similar physical construction. — Relativist

:up:

The success of physics, in particular, provides good reason to believe that the observable universe is natural and operates in strict accordance with laws of nature. The question remains: does it account for the mind? At the onset of the investigation, I expect that it should - because we're part of the universe, and there's no evidence of anything else existing that is nonphysical or exempt from laws of nature.

Physicalist theory proposes models that account for the functional and behavioral aspects of mind (beliefs,learning, dispositions, the will, perceptions, "mental" causation...). — Relativist

:fire: Ourstanding clarity! – even woo-addled idealists like @Gnomon and @Wayfarer should be able to grasp this and (if they're intellectually honest) reconsider their 'disembodied mind' dogma.

I take it as a premise that the external world exists and that we have a functionally accurate perception of it (I justify this as being a a properly basic belief: it's innate, and plausibly a consequence of the evolutionary processes that produced us.This is my epistemic foundation. — Relativist

So, you are aware that your "premise" is a Faith instead of a Fact? Most people, including Scientists, intuitively take for granted that their senses render an accurate model of the external world. But ask them to explain how that material reality-to-mind-model process works, and the story gets murky. Yet, philosophers tend to over-think it, and ask how we could verify (justify) that commonsense Belief as a Positive Fact*1.

From 17th century to 20th century, your Real World certainty (faith) would have been seemed justifiable. But since Quantum Physics undermined the sub-atomic foundation of Newton's Physics, Uncertainty has become the watch-word for scientists. Please notice that this response makes no reference to gods, or scriptures, or feelings . . . . just to the modern scientific worldview. :smile:


*1. The central problem in the epistemology of perception is that of explaining how perception could give us knowledge or justified belief about an external world, about things outside of ourselves. This problem has traditionally been viewed in terms of a skeptical argument that purports to show that such knowledge and justification are impossible.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/

*2. Quantum epistemology explores the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics, particularly concerning knowledge, reality, and the limits of what can be known. It grapples with the strange and counterintuitive aspects of quantum theory, like superposition and entanglement, and their impact on our understanding of the physical world and how we can know it
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=quantum+epistemology

*3. The shift from Newtonian physics to quantum mechanics brought notable differences in understanding the universe :
# Determinism versus Indeterminism : Newtonian physics proposed a deterministic universe where future behavior could be predicted with certainty if initial conditions were known. Quantum mechanics introduced indeterminism, suggesting that not all outcomes can be predicted with certainty, with particles existing in states of probability.
# Uncertainty Principle : Unlike classical mechanics, where properties like position and momentum could be measured simultaneously with high precision, the Uncertainty Principle in quantum mechanics sets a fundamental limit on how precisely certain pairs of properties can be simultaneously known. Increasing the precision of measuring one property reduces the precision of measuring its paired property.
# Nature of Reality : Classical physics assumed an objective reality independent of observation, whereas quantum mechanics suggests that observation and measurement can influence the properties of a system. Some interpretations propose that properties may not exist until measured.
# The Uncertainty Principle has philosophical implications, challenging the notion of absolute knowledge and predictability and prompting discussions about reality and causality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophy+newton+certainty+quantum+uncertainty

So, you are aware that your "premise" is a Faith instead of a Fact? Most people, including Scientists, intuitively take for granted that their senses render an accurate model of the external world. But ask them to explain how that material reality-to-mind-model process works, and the story gets murky. Yet, philosophers tend to over-think it, and ask how we could verify (justify) that commonsense Belief as a Positive Fact*1. — Gnomon

No, it's not faith by my definition. It's a properly basic belief*. It's basic, because it's innate- not derived, and not taught. It's properly basic if the world that produced us would tend to produce this belief, which is the case if we are the product of evolutionary forces. It is rational to maintain belief that has not been epistemologically defeated. The bare possibility that the belief is false does not defeat the belief.

This is why I question the rationality of belirving idealism to be true- it seems to depend on denying innate belief solely on the basis that it is possibly false.

Contrast this with faith: it entails a learned belief, not an innate belief, and the tendency is to maintain the belief even if rationality defeaters are presented.
______________
* A "properly basic belief" is a belief that is rational to hold without needing to be inferred from other beliefs or supported by arguments or evidence. It is a foundational concept in epistemology. They serve as a bedrock for other beliefs. They are justified by the circumstances that cause them. Examples: basic perceptual beliefs ("I see a tree in front of me" Memory beliefs ("I ate corn flakes for breakfast this morning")

...your Real World certainty (faith)... — Gnomon

You have misunderstood if you think I feel certain about physicalism, or about anything else. I have discussed degrees of "certainty" - this could alternatively be labelled "degree of confidence" or "epistemic probability".

Quantum Physics undermined the sub-atomic foundation of Newton's Physics, Uncertainty has become the watch-word for scientists. — Gnomon

Watchword? Not sure what you mean by that. There's simply a degree of uncertainty in the outcome of any quantum collapse, but it still entails probabilistic determinism. I don't assume the current so-called laws of physics (Newtonian, or otherwise) are necessarily actual, ontological laws of nature - they are current best guess.

Classical physics assumed an objective reality independent of observation, whereas quantum mechanics suggests that observation and measurement can influence the properties of a system. Some interpretations propose that properties may not exist until measured. — Gnomon

That's a pretty extreme interpretation of QM, based on the Copenhagen interpretation - treating observation as some special interaction. The modern view is that a measurement is just an entaglement between a classical system (or object) and a quantum system. Personally, Idon't see much reason to think minds have some magical impact on quantum systems.

And therefore I'm exploring alternatives - but the alternatives still need to account for the very obvious dependencies on the physical I mentioned. It seems to be that this could most simply be accomplished by supplementing a physicalist account with something more (e.g. some sort of ontological emergence). But no one seems to be going in that direction. Rather, they're suggesting starting from scratch - treating the mind (or thoughts) as something fundamental and (it seems) unexplained.

I haven’t offered anything more in response to yourself because I wasn’t sure what you were asking for. Now that you have asked it, I can respond.
I wouldn’t offer an ontological emergence, in the sense that consciousness (as observed in higher order mammals) emerges from complexity of computation in the brains of animals, or the complexity of nervous systems, or other biological systems. Although I would offer the idea that a rudimentary consciousness emerges from cellular biology, which is the ground for the higher order consciousness we are addressing. As such this consciousness is present in all cellular and multi cellular organisms.
But I do offer an emergence of a unit of complex being, which equates with what is generally referred to as a soul (baggage accepted).

Strictly speaking the physical world could have evolved higher order mammals without this unit, which are not conscious(we don’t know the precise role played by consciousness in the life of higher order mammals and if it is a necessary condition). They could all be entirely unconscious and the world would be identical to the world we live in.

So we have an emergent part of a being which has no physical requirement. But in our ignorance of the truth of reality, we cannot independently observe it, or analyse any necessary role it plays. Any analysis of the physical world doesn’t require it, or identify it.

We are left blind to the reality in the absence of any greater explanation of the reality we find ourselves in.