Knowledge held by a third party. So, the subject isn't involved in that knowledge-having. — AmadeusD

Even in my original scenario the knowledge that the video is a deepfake is shared by both parties. That was the whole premise of the multiple-question format:

We could think of a very simple example.

"Trump dyed his hair brown!"
"Why do you say that?"
"Because I saw it on the news, from *this video*."
"That video is a deepfake."
"Oh, okay. I guess _____"

Here are two options for the blank ("_____"):

A. Trump did not dye his hair brown
B. I have no good reason to believe that Trump dyed his hair brown — Leontiskos

I also said it explicitly:

The idea is that you convince the person who had held to R that R is false. — Leontiskos

-

Maybe you don't, and that's the issue. If something crucial has been missed by me, I would assume it was something around this. That the subject has had this evidence given to falsify the state of affairs. And that's fine, it's not likely they would continue to believe the falsified state of affairs. This does not entail that they had a false belief (to me). They had a true belief, in a false state of affairs — AmadeusD

You are saying, "They had a true belief, in a false state of affairs." Can you give me the example where this claim would hold? Presumably you are not just saying, "They truly/really believed something false."

If you falsify the state of affairs, but hte person remains steadfast in a belief due to reasonable standards of evidence then the belief is 'true' and the state of affairs false. — AmadeusD

If I understand this, then I think we should say that the belief is justified but false.

Hence "Gettierrrrr (with bells and whistles)". — AmadeusD

The Gettier case is one where the conditions for justified true belief (JTB) are satisfied and yet knowledge does not obtain. What we are talking about here is a case where one sees that the reasons for their belief are false, and nevertheless the belief itself (and the proposition, if you like), remains undecided.

---

OK then, I agree that you respectfully disagree. :wink: — Janus

Only a moron such as yourself would agree with such nonsense. :rage:

Only an idiot such as yourself would agree with such nonsense — Leontiskos

Only a fool such as yourself would think that I was serious. (Don't imagine for a moment that I am being serious here or that I imagined you were being serious either, or your foolishness will be exponentially increased).

I can't understand 'true belief' in light of a bollocks set of evidence (for instance). — AmadeusD

Right, I get that―such "true beliefs" are just a matter of dumb luck. Let's not get into the gutter with the gettier mess as to whether they may be justified.

Only a fool such as yourself would think that I was serious. (Don't imagine for a moment that I am being serious here or that I imagined you were being serious either, or your foolishness will be exponentially increased). — Janus

Then drink if you dare! And we will see who's who!

That's funny, but I choose not to drink regardless as I have not yet developed enough immunity.

Coward.

:lol:

"You know me, sir!"

Even in my original scenario the knowledge that the video is a deepfake is shared by both parties. — Leontiskos

This is misleading. The example showed a third party falsifying the subjects belief on the basis of the facts by persuading the subject of their truth. But two different things are going on there, as noted so I think its a little misleading to simply state tha hte facts themselves are what brought S to change their belief (or, should have).

I also said it explicitly: — Leontiskos

What you said here is exactly why the above. S wasn't convinced by their own encounter with the facts (though, that probably rarely happens in such a closed type of scenario - I did note that its only hte logical situation that matters there, not that no one would likely hold on the belief).

Presumably you are not just saying, "They truly/really believed something false." — Leontiskos

Why would you presume that? That is exactly what this entire exchange has been trying to set up. I have to say, this is.... really weird lol.

If I understand this, then I think we should say that the belief is justified but false. — Leontiskos

Yep, I can tell. Have been able too for a while now. That's why I said this:

Maybe you don't, and that's the issue. If something crucial has been missed by me, I would assume it was something around this. — AmadeusD

The semantic schema is wrong, on my view. But that can't be any kind of objective claim, so sleeping dogs can lie. I don't think we're disagreeing on much here.

What we are talking about here is a case where one sees that the reasons for their belief are false, and nevertheless the belief itself (and the proposition, if you like), remains undecided. — Leontiskos

This doesn't seem to change anything?? That's what was set up in at least one of my run-throughts of hte possible scenarios.

A believes x.
B presents evidence against A's belief (not against x).
A no longer believes x, as it has been falsified by B.
whether x obtains is undecided.

Yeah? If "yeah", then we're not disagreeing. I just add this to explain my discomfort with how this has been run by yourself:

I can't understand 'true belief' in light of a bollocks set of evidence (for instance). — AmadeusD

This to say if:
A believes x, and
C (an audience, let's say) has direct, incontrovertible evidence that x obtains
but A is drawn away from their belief by B's evidence against the belief in x (not x)

A doesn't then magically hasn't let go of a 'true belief'. They have let go of an erroneous (false) belief in something true. I can't see that htis is problematic other than disagreeing on terms.

Let's not get into the gutter with the gettier mess as to whether they may be justified. — Janus

I guess in that example justification isn't open to S anyway, so that's fine hahaha.

This is misleading. The example showed a third party falsifying the subjects belief on the basis of the facts by persuading the subject of their truth. But two different things are going on there, as noted so I think its a little misleading to simply state tha hte facts themselves are what brought S to change their belief (or, should have). — AmadeusD

The third party helped the person see the fact that the video was a deepfake, and the whole scenario I set up was premised on this shared knowledge of the state of affairs (about the deepfake). I don't see how that is misleading. You said, "So, the subject isn't involved in that knowledge-having." But he is. The possession of that knowledge is precisely what produces the two options I provided in the multiple choice question. If he didn't possess that knowledge then those two options would make no sense.

Presumably you are not just saying, "They truly/really believed something false." — Leontiskos

Why would you presume that? That is exactly what this entire exchange has been trying to set up. — AmadeusD

Because it strikes me as uncontroversial and even vacuous. "They truly/really believed something that was false." It's like saying, "They were not lying when they said that Trump dyed his hair." Of course not. Not everyone who is mistaken is lying. Did you think that I held such a thing?

A five-part exchange:

If you falsify the state of affairs, but hte person remains steadfast in a belief due to reasonable standards of evidence then the belief is 'true' and the state of affairs false. — AmadeusD

If I understand this, then I think we should say that the belief is justified but false. — Leontiskos

Yep, I can tell. Have been able too for a while now. That's why I said this: — AmadeusD

Maybe you don't, and that's the issue. If something crucial has been missed by me, I would assume it was something around this. — AmadeusD

The semantic schema is wrong, on my view. But that can't be any kind of objective claim, so sleeping dogs can lie. I don't think we're disagreeing on much here. — AmadeusD

I am going to press this, because I don't find your view at all plausible.

Consider the person before it was pointed out to him that the video is a deepfake. I want to say, "At that point his belief was justified but false." You apparently want to say, "At that point his belief was true but the state of affairs was false." Do you really think we should describe his belief as "true" rather than "justified but false"? For example, in the JTB schema is the assigning of a belief as 'true' compatible with the "state of affairs" being false? Does the fellow at that point in time have JTB? On your view he must, unless you think his belief is not justified.

A believes x.
B presents evidence against A's belief (not against x). — AmadeusD

How does B present evidence against A's belief without presenting evidence against x, given that A's belief is precisely x? Do you see how my scenario included a separate reason for belief, and why the separation of that reason is necessary?

A believes x, and
C (an audience, let's say) has direct, incontrovertible evidence that x obtains
but A is drawn away from their belief by B's evidence against the belief in x (not x) — AmadeusD

My criticism of your former scenario would have to be addressed before looking at this, because it relies on the same idea.

I guess in that example justification isn't open to S anyway, so that's fine hahaha. — AmadeusD

Why wouldn't justification be open to S? For the last few pages I have been presenting scenarios where justification is crucial, given that we are talking about reasons for belief. Maybe reread this post.

I don't see how that is misleading. — Leontiskos

Yeah. I'm unsure what to do about that. It seems (even on this description) that my take was accurate. So be it!

"So, the subject isn't involved in that knowledge-having." But he is. — Leontiskos

Not really, no. What you set up was a situation with B brings to A something such that they now know that the video was fake (so, their belief can be considered falsified). But if Trump actually had dyed his hair, aside from this video fiasco, then the state of affairs hasn't be falsified if the belief is restricted to the result, not the process. You could even go as far as to say that A's belief in this video has now been falsified. There may be another, real, video of the same thing happening. All I've set up here, is that you can falsify a belief without falsifying hte state of affairs in the belief, and vice verse. I seriously cannot see anything in any of this exchange which has anything to say about that, other than a claim that evidence against x is also evidence against any given belief in x, which it plainly isn't. Is there something else going on? If not, we're probably talking in circles now.

If he didn't possess that knowledge then those two options would make no sense. — Leontiskos

It isn't 'knowledge'. On your, or my description. This is misleading.

Because it strikes me as uncontroversial and even vacuous. — Leontiskos

If that were the case, I wouldn't have needed to say the bold above, I think. I have now several times tried to boil this down to a disagreement in terms: Someone can have their belief falsified, but not disbelieve the content of that belief. Someone can believe x, even when there exists incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. You're right - these are somewhat vacuuous. I somewhat noted this earlier, and tried to boil it down. Here we are - you seem to be very nearly getting it in the next part of your reply. Let's see,...

Do you really think we should describe his belief as "true" rather than "justified but false"? — Leontiskos

Yes. For reasons I've put forward, but again, this just illustrates exactly what my above is somewhat impatient about: You don't like the sentence I use to describe what's happening for A - I don't like yours/ I don't think we're saying something different from one another. I would only note I don't think it can rightly be called 'implausible' to use words in various ways.

in the JTB schema — Leontiskos

I don't particularly think the JTB schema is a great one, and this would be a bit of a modification to it representing perhaps a second track of assessment in belief v knowledge. It is only hte belief part I'm concerned with at this stage. The 'knowledge' part can remain in the air. It just doesn't make me at all intuitively uncomfortable to say belief in a false state of affairs can be called true belief (this, i suppose, in contrast to 'belief in something true' which would make some of what we're saying redundant).

Does the fellow at that point in time have JTB? On your view he must, — Leontiskos

No, and No. As above. My view doesn't run with JTB particularly squarely, here.

How does B present evidence against A's belief without presenting evidence against x — Leontiskos

Really? You can't understand having the reasons for your belief removed, without necessarily having hte state of affairs affected? Gettier cases are prime examples. If after passing the field with the sheep statue (which had a real sheep behind it), you are then later told it was statue, your 'knowledge' doesn't change but the reasons for at least thinking you have it have changed. There was a sheep in the field. But you would have considered it false unless also told "but there was a real sheep behind the statue". The point here being completed different reasons result in the same 'knowledge' despite one being 'false' on that account. Conversely, you could convince someone the source of their information, on good grounds, is shoddy enough to reject the belief. This wouldn't touch whether or not the state obtained. Yes? This doesn't seem at all controversial to me. I do note why someone would have an issue with calling, in that reverse scenario, a belief for good reason, in a false state of affairs a 'true belief'. I don't, and think it works well.

Good evidence that proves either erroneous or deceptive would justify a belief in a false state of affairs. In the scenario where hte evidence is bollocks, justification is not open.

All I've set up here, is that you can falsify a belief without falsifying hte state of affairs in the belief, and vice verse. — AmadeusD

I agree that one can "falsify" a belief (the whole question is about whether that is the correct word) without falsifying the proposition/belief. Namely, one can show that a belief is unjustified without showing that it is false.

But if Trump actually had dyed his hair, aside from this video fiasco, then the state of affairs hasn't be falsified if the belief is restricted to the result, not the process. You could even go as far as to say that A's belief in this video has now been falsified. — AmadeusD

I could simplify that first sentence and just say that the state of affairs hasn't been falsified. It doesn't matter whether Trump actually had dyed his hair, nor whether the belief is restricted to the result. Either way the "state of affairs" has not been falsified.

The difficulty with your position as I see it, is that it posits the falsification of "states of affairs" apart from the falsification of beliefs. I don't think there is ever a state of affairs that is falsified, except for when a belief is simultaneously falsified. Humans cannot access "states of affairs" without beliefs, and since falsification is a human act, therefore there is no falsification of a state of affairs without a falsification of beliefs. Humans never hold that something is false while not believing that it is false.

Someone can have their belief falsified, but not disbelieve the content of that belief. Someone can believe x, even when there exists incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. You're right - these are somewhat vacuuous. I somewhat noted this earlier, and tried to boil it down. Here we are - you seem to be very nearly getting it in the next part of your reply. Let's see,... — AmadeusD

Okay...

Yes. For reasons I've put forward, but again, this just illustrates exactly what my above is somewhat impatient about: You don't like the sentence I use to describe what's happening for A - I don't like yours/ I don't think we're saying something different from one another. I would only note I don't think it can rightly be called 'implausible' to use words in various ways. — AmadeusD

Here is what I said before that:

Consider the person before it was pointed out to him that the video is a deepfake. I want to say, "At that point his belief was justified but false." You apparently want to say, "At that point his belief was true but the state of affairs was false." Do you really think we should describe his belief as "true" rather than "justified but false"? — Leontiskos

Why would we call his belief "true"? And which belief do you want to call "true"? Here is the exchange:

"Trump dyed his hair brown!"
"Why do you say that?"
"Because I saw it on the news, from *this video*."
"That video is a deepfake."
"Oh, okay. I guess _____" — Leontiskos

I don't see the first speaker saying anything true here (except perhaps that he saw a video, but that is not a distinct premise - the premise involves the veracity of the video).

I don't particularly think the JTB schema is a great one — AmadeusD

Me neither, but the "truth" part doesn't strike me as controversial.

It just doesn't make me at all intuitively uncomfortable to say belief in a false state of affairs can be called true belief (this, i suppose, in contrast to 'belief in something true' which would make some of what we're saying redundant). — AmadeusD

I think belief in a false proposition should not be called true. Take a false proposition, "2+2=5." Curt says, "I believe that proposition." You say that Curt's belief is true. How so? It doesn't seem strange to you to say that Curt's belief that 2+2=5 is true?

Really? You can't understand having the reasons for your belief removed, without necessarily having hte state of affairs affected? — AmadeusD

That's the whole thing I've been at pains to demonstrate, for example in <this post>. But the point is:

Do you see how my scenario included a separate reason for belief, and why the separation of that reason is necessary? — Leontiskos

-

Gettier cases are prime examples. If after passing the field with the sheep statue (which had a real sheep behind it), you are then later told it was statue, your 'knowledge' doesn't change but the reasons for at least thinking you have it have changed. There was a sheep in the field. But you would have considered it false unless also told "but there was a real sheep behind the statue". The point here being completed different reasons result in the same 'knowledge' despite one being 'false' on that account. — AmadeusD

Here is what I said about the Gettier case, and I stand by it:

The Gettier case is one where the conditions for justified true belief (JTB) are satisfied and yet knowledge does not obtain. What we are talking about here is a case where one sees that the reasons for their belief are false, and nevertheless the belief itself (and the proposition, if you like), remains undecided. — Leontiskos

The difficulty with your position as I see it, is that it posits the falsification of "states of affairs" apart from the falsification of beliefs. — Leontiskos

As I see it, this is both not a difficulty, and in fact, the crux of our disagreement (such as it is.. It's increasingly clear (to/for me, anyway) we do not disagree about what's actually happening in these scenarios).

Humans cannot access "states of affairs" without beliefs, — Leontiskos

Disagreed (unless you mean prior beliefs, enabling us to 'trust' our apprehension of a state of affairs... but that itself, is a state of affairs as Sam Harris has quite well demonstrated with his talk about the inarguable nature of consciousness). So maybe there's a deeper disagreement :)

I think belief in a false proposition should not be called true. Take a false proposition, "2+2=5." Curt says, "I believe that proposition." You say that Curt's belief is true. How so? It doesn't seem strange to you to say that Curt's belief that 2+2=5 is true? — Leontiskos

This is a good example, but the response wont be satisfying: That example is not apt to the case i/we've put forward. "2+2=5" is a logical truth, so can we set that aside? I don't think it's apt. That said, I'm going to try to at least 'treat' the example, on my view:

I do think its odd. That doesn't make it wrong. Your "How so?" would require that Curt has given me his reasons for believing it, and I cannot find a way to falsify his reasons for belief. As noted, these often have nothing whatsoever to do with the state of affairs. Again, i don't think logical/mathematical props are apt for this problem, but that requirement would be ...required... in any other cases where it is apt. I understand that your view is that the belief should be considered false, as long as the state of affairs doesn't obtain. I don't think that is the best use of these words, myself.

But the point is: — Leontiskos

Weirdly, the exact point I have made (but I guess I'm separating them in the opposite scenario - i.e, state of affairs false=/=belief false). Does this not seem so to you?

Your comments on Gettier are understood, and were never in question. But Gettier cases give us pause to understand how one's reasons come apart from the facts. Someone can have a 'true' belief in the sense I mean, despite the facts not being true. The reverse is also true as I pointed out using the sheep-in-field example.

Disagreed [...]. So maybe there's a deeper disagreement :) — AmadeusD

Okay.

I do think its odd. That doesn't make it wrong. Your "How so?" would require that Curt has given me his reasons for believing it, and I cannot find a way to falsify his reasons for belief. — AmadeusD

Right, so:

we are talking about refuting someone's reason(s) (R) for belief (P). They begin:

R → P
R
∴ P — Leontiskos

If I cannot falsify his reasons (R) then I would say P is not implausible (ceteris paribus). But if I know that P is false (such as in the case of 2+2=5), then presumably I can provide reasons which demonstrate that P is false. In that case the reasons I offer would be in competition with his reasons, R.

In this case where I cannot falsify R, I would say, "Your argument is valid and I don't know how to falsify your premises," but I would not claim that his belief is therefore true. Again, I would say that it is justified.

I understand that your view is that the belief should be considered false, as long as the state of affairs doesn't obtain. I don't think that is the best use of these words, myself. — AmadeusD

If I know the proposition is false then I would call the belief false. But to merely tell him that the belief is false is to beg the question. I must provide him with a reason to believe it is false, and that reason must go beyond merely falsifying his own reasons.

Weirdly, the exact point I have made (but I guess I'm separating them in the opposite scenario - i.e, state of affairs false=/=belief false). Does this not seem so to you? — AmadeusD

I think a belief is true when it matches the state of affairs, and false when it fails to match the state of affairs. I think that's basically what "true" and "false" mean. Generally speaking, a state of affairs is not true or false, but rather existent or non-existent. Or else it is said that a state of affairs either obtains or does not. "True" and "false" pertain to thoughts or beliefs. So if I say that a state of affairs obtains when it in fact does obtain, then what I say is true. If not then what I say is false.

Someone can have a 'true' belief in the sense I mean, despite the facts not being true. — AmadeusD

This also strikes me as strange, namely your idea that some facts are true and some facts are false. I would say that facts, like states of affairs, are not true or false.

Yeah, nothing much to add here. I'll just make explicit what I think is the case as between us again:

This also strikes me as strange, namely your idea that some facts are true and some facts are false. I would say that facts, like states of affairs, are not true or false. — Leontiskos

I may be misusing the word 'fact' here, but it is synonymous with 'state of affairs' for me. If the facts aren't to obtain, but the belief is sound (in the sort of JTB (or adjacent)) sense then I'm happy to call the belief true. I don't feel the need to restrict use of truth to apply to facts only.

- Okay, well I think that's probably as far as we will get for now. Thanks for your thoughts. :up:

More than likely. Thanks for your time - always a very involved, well-explored discussion with you :)