The point is that metaphyseal posits cannot be more than purported truths in that they fail to be subject to demonstration. — Janus

This would have the potential to be a fruitful conversation if you knew what you meant by your terms, but I don't think you know what you mean by either "metaphysical" or "demonstration." By "metaphysical" you seem to mean, "Stuff I don't think can be demonstrated," and by "demonstrated," you seem to mean, "intersubjectively agreed upon." This is basically a less coherent version of the equally circular, Rawlsian notion of "public reason."

And you think Heidegger and Husserl limit themselves to what experiences seem like?

The point here is that you called phenomenology "quasi-empirical," and then you said that mysticism is a variety of phenomenology. I am wondering if you therefore deem mysticism quasi-empirical. — Leontiskos

They may have indulged in metaphysics. Heidegger accused Husserl of just that and then could arguably be said to have done the same. The original point of the epoché was to "return to the things", the actual experiences, and study those while bracketing metaphysical questions. I see that as the valuable part of phenomenology.

That doesn't mean I don't think metaphysical ideas can be interesting, or that the creation of elaborate metaphysical systems should not be admired in the kind of way one might admire great works of art, music and literature.

Would it be inappropriate bias to object to slavery as a matter of law? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No it wouldn't because there can be no purely rational justification for treating someone as a slave. Power and authority are not purely (as opposed to practically) rational justifications but are tools of the biased.

If you think metaphysical claims can be demonstrated to be true then show how, or admit you are wrong.

Power and authority are not purely (as opposed to practically) rational justifications but are tools of the biased.

So all government is the "tools of the biased"? And the authority of parents over their children? Or officers over their enlisted men, deans over their professors, or bishops over their priests and parishioners?

That seems pretty all-encompassing. Is anarchism the only way to escape "bias?"

Authority is justifiable (when it is) for practical reasons in my view. The important point in relation to the conversation at hand is that there are no metaphysical authorities.

No it wouldn't because there can be no purely rational justification for treating someone as a slave

Is there any purely rational justification for not doing it? Or not raping? Based on your standards, I would think not.

The important point in relation to the conversation at hand is that there are no metaphysical authorities

But there are. The Pope for instance. And there is practical justification for this.

That point is sort of ancillary though. Your standards make the whole of political theory "bias," and seemingly ethics and large parts of the study of history as well. Aside from being eyebrow raising, the fact that "bias" applies to so much seems to make the term mean little.

If the whole of political life is already mere bias, then I can hardly see how you can maintain your objection to religion being involved in politics on account of it also being biased.

Is there any purely rational justification for not doing it? Or not raping? Based on your standards, I would think not. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The default is not to do it, obviously. The logic of living in community precludes treating others merely as means.

But there are. The Pope for instance. And there is practical justification for this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There might be practical justification for treating the pope as head of the church―it certainly doesn't follow that his word is the infallible word of God. There is also no justification, practical or otherwise, for excluding women from the role.

Ethics can be based on absence of bias―that is there is no purely rational justification for treating others any differently than one would expect oneself to be treated. There may be practical reasons for according special privileges to some people, but certainly no purely rational justification for doing so.

You seem to be endeavoring to dismiss my argument by egregious extension. I would hope to see better argumentation from you.

In any case that my position entails that all political theory, ethics and even history is mere bias has not been argued but merely asserted. Give it a go if you can be bothered.

But I did wonder about feelings like the feeling of falling, or the feeling of an insect crawling up your arm, or feeling sick (nausea) or dizzy. "Feeling" seems to cover a multitude of sins, some of which count as emotions. — Ludwig V

I can agree on that. To my understanding too “feeling” has a wider meaning than “emotion”. And while emotions are feelings, not all feelings are emotions. That’s why I’m reluctant to accept the equation between feelings and emotions you attributed to me.

Feeling confident is certainly something we say, and you seem to recognize that it is not the same kind of feeling as feeling angry or happy when you call them epistemic. I don't have any intuitive understanding of that category, so I feel somewhat at sea. — Ludwig V

“epistemic” refers to the fact that the “confidence” we feel is about holding something to be the case. In the religious context, people believe in things like Gods, angels, demons, souls, Afterlife, miracles.
In more ordinary contexts, our epistemic confidence is solicited or challenged by other peoples’ behaviour wrt our expectations about their behavior. But, as I said, in my first post epistemic confidence may concern also our own sensory or intellectual capabilities: e.g. we can grow skeptical about our sensory capacity once we understand that they can also mislead us (see, optical illusions or the distortions of our perceptual apparatus with substance abuse). And this is one of the main reasons why talking about religious faith as an epistemic emotion is just a starting point.

Oh, and by the way, when I draw a conclusion from a conclusive argument, is that also a feeling? — Ludwig V

I’m inclined to say that drawing conclusions from certain premises is a rule based intellectual activity. We can feel more or less confident in performing such an activity. So one thing is what we do (drawing conclusions from premises) another how confident we feel about it. We can draw a conclusion from certain premises, and doubt we have been performing this intellectual task successfully.

You seem to be endeavoring to dismiss my argument by egregious extension

Showing that an argument terminates in absurdity is sort of a classic, hardly bad argument.

You're hanging a lot on "default' here. There is no reason not to have slaves, no reason not to exclude women, but we should tend towards the "default" because...? That doesn't seem very strong at all. Why is the default preferable If it is also just bias?

Second, if all of ethics is merely bias, I can hardly be acting "badly" by ignoring the default. I am merely choosing one bias over another. Why is that wrong? Is it irrational to not always prefer the default to anything else?

Plus, if not having slaves is also mere bias, but is the "default," why did slave taking seemingly exist in all human societies? If not raping is the default, why does rape exist throughout human history? If war were not the default, why has it existed throughout human history, or even in chimpanzee societies?

It looks to me like you have rendered all sorts of things mere "bias" through poor criteria, and now you are trying to bring back all you'd like through new terms.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

If the symbol "→" unequivocally expresses a logic implication, then it expresses a truth function (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_function), where the truth of the implication must be assessed wrt the truth of S and P in a certain way (i.e. according to the truth table for the logic implication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_conditional#Truth_table). For that reason it doesn't make any sense to say "It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is" because if one talks unequivocally about "logic implication" then the kind of thing S must be is already constrained by definition: S and P must be something capable of being true or false. So S can not be whatever kind of thing, since there are things that are not true or false like a stone. That's also why it doesn't make any sense to infer the truth-aptness of S from P based on a supposed logic implication between S and P. S and P must be truth-apt for an implication between them to make sense, we do not need to suppose P to be truth-apt nor to infer S truth-aptness from P truth-aptness through the implication.
Your claim sounds as silly as claiming "suppose the arithmetic sum x + y = z, and that x and y are numbers. The result of that sum is that z is a number, no matter what kind of thing z is"

Good, but what is the premise of your point here? It is that, "No one would ever say that S implies P and yet S is not truth-apt." But we have folks doing that all the time on TPF, including within this thread. We regularly see folks who respond in this way: "Why do you hold P?" "Because of S, but S is not truth-apt." One of the examples I pointed to was an entire thread arguing for that idea.

Would it be inappropriate bias to object to slavery as a matter of law? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If the whole of political life is already mere bias, then I can hardly see how you can maintain your objection to religion being involved in politics on account of it also being biased. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why is the default preferable If it is also just bias? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great points. :up:
What you describe as "default" I have previously described as @Janus's exclusive reliance on "burden of proof" claims. His one and only argument, at bottom, is, "They have the burden of proof, not me."

I seems pretty clear that @Janus embraces irrationality when confronted with these problems. This is a broader problem, in that, on TPF, discussions of ethics or politics or metaphysics are usually wholesale irrational. The current state of philosophy is incapable of addressing such topics in a rational manner. That's why the threads on logic or mathematics or reference are so popular: because they represent that small slice of reality where the Western mind can still manage to engage in rational thought. Asking someone like @Janus to consistently apply his theory to laws against slavery results in an endless circle of non sequitur responses, or in other cases, brazen equivocation.

Note though that if you ask Rawls why religion must be excluded from the public sphere, you will get the same sort of fumbling incoherence. This sort of incoherence is part and parcel of our epoch, and has been imbibed deeply by the post-WWII generation. The younger generations are so appalled by this sort of irrationality that I fear we will see a strong pendulum swing.

Good, but what is the premise of your point here? It is that, "No one would ever say that S implies P and yet S is not truth-apt." But we have folks doing that all the time on TPF, including within this thread. — Leontiskos

My comment to your quote is clearly premised with “If the symbol '→' unequivocally expresses a logic implication”. So my or your opinion about what people say or said in this forum or outside is irrelevant. And even if it mattered, I would tell them the same I said to you about logic implications.

We regularly see folks who respond in this way: "Why do you hold P?" "Because of S, but S is not truth-apt." — Leontiskos

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. And if S is not truth-apt then it doesn’t make any sense to claim that there is a logic implication between S and P.

One of the examples I pointed to was an entire thread arguing for that idea. — Leontiskos

I’m not sure what you are referring to. Can you quote the claims which triggered that comment of yours I quoted in my first post?

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. — neomac

Yes, it does, in precisely the way that is required for the relation I have pointed out. If someone holds proposition P because of S, then S is truth-apt. It doesn't matter if, for instance, S is one conjunct within a conjunctive antecedent (i.e. if S is only jointly sufficient along with other conjuncts).

Can you quote the claims which triggered that comment of yours I quoted in my first post? — neomac

Why insert yourself into a conversation if you do not understand the context?

Well, I would first say that something which is truth-apt is not necessarily empirical. "3 > 1" is truth-apt, but not empirical, for example. But I would agree that a proposition which is truth-apt is true or false (or else capable of being true or false). — Leontiskos

Yes, I hoped you would want to add propositions like that. Do we call them necessary or analytic? Or both?

Well I think <this post> of mine is the thing we have primarily been focused on. The key idea: — Leontiskos

I don't think this is a key idea at all. It goes nowhere.
It is statements or propositions that substitute for the variables in a formula like that. You cannot substitute the Eiffel Tower for either S or P. But ways of life and practices are about what you have to know - be capable of doing - before you can make a statement, never mind draw an inference from it.
It looks like you want to substitute the Christian way of life for S and God's existence for P. Or is it the other way round? Never mind. The question that matters here is how we determine whether God exists. Until we can agree on that, there is no way an agreed conclusion can be achieved.
There is also an uncomfortable dilemma in the background. If S implies P, then we may want to establish wether S is true. Suppose we find an argument, with premisses R that implies S. Then R implies S and S implies P. It looks as if an infinite regress is looming here, with the uncomfortable result that nothing can ever be proven. The alternative is to find a starting-point. What might that be? That's what talk of ways of life and practices is about.

You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our way of life (S). — Leontiskos

Yes. That was a pragmatic decision. But it's scope is limited. The idea that a fact about the world might persuade to wholesale change in our way of life misunderstands what a way of life is. But amending or revision does not seem impossible to me, though I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say about the idea.

I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions." — Leontiskos

Yes. Subject to the restriction that propositions emerge from ways of life via practices, so the changes will be changes of detail.
But it is worth remembering how much Christianity has changed in the last three hundred years. The church thought that Galilean physics was heresy, but seems to have managed to swallow it in the years since then. Evolutionary theory was thought to flatly contradict the Bible, but many Christians (but, yes, not all - far from it) have managed to swallow that as well. I'm sure you can think of other examples.

Yes, I hoped you would want to add propositions like that. Do we call them necessary or analytic? Or both? — Ludwig V

I don't follow your disjunctive syllogisms here. You said:

because it is said in philosophy that all claims of existence must be empirical. The alternative (unless all religious beliefs are pseudo-propositions) is that they are analytic or meaningless. Neither of which really make much sense. However, empirical or analytic are not the only options. — Ludwig V

"All philosophical existence-claims must be empirical. The alternative is that they would be analytic or meaningless, which is not right. But empirical or analytic are not the only options."

I don't follow any of that. And now you are saying, "'3 > 1' is not empirical, therefore it must be necessary [inclusive or] analytic."

Yes. I don't think this is a key idea at all. It goes nowhere. — Ludwig V

Why?

First, it is statements or propositions that substitute for the variables in a formula like that. You cannot substitute the Eiffel Tower for either S or P. But ways of life and practices are about what you have to know - be capable of doing - before you can make a statement, never mind draw an inference from it. — Ludwig V

If that's how you define a "way of life," then apparently there is no way of life that implies any proposition. But in that case, what are you supposed to be disagreeing with? Nevertheless, Wittgenstein would never say, "It's just what I do," about a way of life understood in that sense.

Apparently you are trying to say, "Yes Leontiskos, I agree with you. And I don't think ways of life ever imply propositions."

It looks like you want to substitute the Christian way of life for S and God's existence for P. Or is it the other way round? Never mind. — Ludwig V

Sure, if you like. Here is an atheist argument:

1. [Christian way of life] → God exists
2. God does not exist
3. Therefore, the Christian way of life is false or invalid

That's a perfectly valid argument, and the Christian can't say, "Oh, but ways of life are not truth-apt, so your argument is illegal. My way of life is, 'protected from refutation.' "

Yes. That was a pragmatic decision. But it's scope is limited. The idea that a fact about the world might persuade to wholesale change in our way of life misunderstands what a way of life is. But amending or revision does not seem impossible to me, though I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say about the idea. — Ludwig V

Why would anyone amend or change their way of life, on your view? Isn't it precisely because the way of life is undermined in whole or in part by something they come to understand? Do you have any principled way of "limiting the scope" of the idea that P can invalidate S?

Subject to the restriction that propositions emerge from ways of life via practices, so the changes will be changes of detail.
But it is worth remembering how much Christianity has changed in the last three hundred years. — Ludwig V

They can be changed in part or in whole. New discoveries can lead to modification of ways of life or full-scale refutation of ways of life. When Darwin wrote his book some Christians modified their Christianity and others abandoned their Christianity (while others were uninterested altogether). There was no "limited scope" preventing the wholesale abandonment.

I think what a lot of people are stuck on is "undecidability," so to speak.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

You want to say, "Ah, but there are cases where S and P are both undecidable, even if they are truth-apt." You seem to think this is one of those cases: <[Christian way of life] → God exists>.

I grant you that if P is undecidable then S will not be falsified by P. Note that in that case what I say still holds, it's just that no modus tollens is practically possible.

In a practical sense I am thinking of P's which are decidable, and I think that all substantial ways of life will imply P's which are commonly recognized to be decidable. So if our age thinks God's existence is undecidable, then a better P for the Christian way of life would be historical, political, or ethical propositions which are thought to be decidable. The Christian way of life implies all sorts of propositions like that. In fact I would say that if a way of life lacks all such implications, then it is altogether otiose.

You are nothing more than a sophist just like Leon. I'm done with you and him. Good luck with your search for confirmation of your biases.

Faith is a virtue signal.

- You are literally pitiful. The depth at which your head is buried in the sand is unprecedented.

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. — neomac

Yes, it does, in precisely the way that is required for the relation I have pointed out. If someone holds proposition P because of S, then S is truth-apt. It doesn't matter if, for instance, S is one conjunct within a conjunctive antecedent (i.e. if S is only jointly sufficient along with other conjuncts). — Leontiskos

Focus, I’m talking about logic implications because you seemed to talk about logic implications in that quote while using the symbol "→". That was clearly stated as a premise in my first comment. If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, not even between their descriptions (if S = “I believe that an apple is on the table” and P = “I experience an apple on the table”, then “S → P” can be false, because S can be true while P false). The relation between belief and experience could be understood in causal terms or rule-based terms.
So either you are confused about what logic implications are, then my comment wasn't out of place. Or you are not confused, then you could have simply said: "no I'm not talking about logic implications" instead of coming back with a pointless rebuttal wrt my comment.

Why insert yourself into a conversation if you do not understand the context? — Leontiskos

Oh, you mean that if I understood the context of the conversation, I would have said something different about logic implications? Why do you answer me if you do not understand my comments to your quotes?
Claims of yours like the one I quoted may contribute to make the context of your conversation hardly intelligible. In fact, even after reading the post you pointed out I didn’t get what you were referring to in your quote.

So if our age thinks God's existence is undecidable, then a better P for the Christian way of life would be historical, political, or ethical propositions which are thought to be decidable. — Leontiskos

That's an interesting thought. Do you have an example?

I don't follow any of that. And now you are saying, "'3 > 1' is not empirical, therefore it must be necessary [inclusive or] analytic." — Leontiskos

I'm sorry I made a mistake. I was trying to do your work for you. I should have just asked the question. Given that "3>1" is not empirical (even though it is truth-apt), how do you classify it?
I may be wrong, but I am unclear whether truth-apt (meaning true-or-false) is really applicable to propositions that are true in all possible worlds. Perhaps you can clarify that for me?

That's a perfectly valid argument, and the Christian can't say, "Oh, but ways of life are not truth-apt, so your argument is illegal. My way of life is, 'protected from refutation.' " — Leontiskos

I agree that remark would not help their case. One cannot just announce that a proposition is protected from refutation. One protects a proposition from refutation by the moves one makes in the argument. In the case you give, I would expect the Christian to reject the second premiss "God does not exist".

Nowhere have I claimed that material implication exhausts the point I am making, and therefore your point about material implication does not actually count as an objection to my thesis. — Leontiskos

I'm sorry. I was under the impression that when a philosopher uses the arrow of implication, by convention they are talking about material implication. But you are right, modus tollens etc. are much older than Frege's logic.

Here it seems that you are conceding my point. You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our (S). — Leontiskos

St. Paul might be a good example. But here's a puzzle. I've got very confused about whether it is the Christian way of life that demonstrates the existence of God or God that demonstrates the Christian way of life. Perhaps even both?
But the point here is that although St. Paul did radically change his way of life, he still managed to live in the same world as the rest of us, so did not abandon large parts of the way of life he was living before his conversion.
The critical role for standard philosophy of ways of life is that they establish and enable our practices, including our ability to formulate propositions, evaluate them and so forth (and I include making judgements of value in this). St. Paul may have modified his beliefs, but the fundamental abilities were not touched. They were differently applied.

I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions." — Leontiskos

As we get deeper into this, it is necessary to question your use of "validate" here. Ways of life do not, in themselves, validate anything. They are the foundation on which we build our practices of validating things. They establish or enable those practices.
I don't question our ability to evaluate how we live and to identify room for improvement. But that ability presupposes the existence of ways of life and at least a continuity in our modification of them.

Here it seems that you are conceding my point. — Leontiskos

Partly, yes. But now I'm modifying that concession by insisting that part of the role of ways of life is beyond validation, because it is the foundation on which our practices of validation are built. (Believe it or not, this is new territory to me, and I'm thinking on my feet. So things may change.)

If having many interpretations means there is no fact of the matter, then there can be no truth for indecisive murder cases either, since interpretations vary. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In some cases, like the puzzle pictures, more than one interpretation is applicable and there is no fact of the matter that will decide the issue. In those cases, it would not be wrong to say that both interpretations are true, though I would add "in a modified sense of the word". But one could also say that both interpretations are correct or satisfactory or valid. I think that accurately reflects the facts of the matter.
But in other cases, like your indecisive murder case, there is an assumption that somewhere there is a fact of the matter that will arbitrate between competing interpretations; after all the person in the dock either did, or not did not, kill the victim. (Actually, in some cases, that assumption may be false. It is not impossible for more than one person to share the guilt, and the law has devised various ways of coping with those situations.)

Truth is not a matter of interpretation―if something is true it is simply true. Beliefs are matters of interpretation. Don't conflate belief with truth and much confusion will clear up for you. — Janus

I agree with you that truth and interpretation do not sit easily together. In puzzle picture cases, I agree that it is not satisfactory to simply say that the interpretation of the picture as that of a rabbit is true, or that the interpretation as a duck is true. For me, the truth of the matter is that the picture can be interpreted both ways and even, possibly, as a collection of marks on paper.

If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, — neomac

I agree with you. It's a complicated issue.

If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, not even between their descriptions (if S = “I believe that an apple is on the table” and P = “I experience an apple on the table”, then “S → P” can be false, because S can be true while P false). — neomac

Reasons given for truth or true belief are logical implications. "There is an apple on the table because I see it" - <See → exists>. The implication need not be infallible or necessary, so it matters not that it "could be false." Belief is always implicit in truth-claims and logic claims. No one says, "S → P, but I don't believe S → P."

If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, — neomac

If you believe that your vision of the apple implies its existence, then you believe the logical implication. Of course believing something does not eo ipso make it true, but there are no truth-claims apart from beliefs.

Reasons given for truth or true belief are logical implications. "There is an apple on the table because I see it" - <See → exists>. The implication need not be infallible or necessary, so it matters not that it "could be false." — Leontiskos

We should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications, because reasons to believe have to do with the actual formation of our beliefs, their genesis.
We should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications, as much as we should not confuse an arithmetic sum with calculating an arithmetic sum or a deduction from certain premises through logic operations like logic implications with logic implications.
The process by which we derive certain beliefs from a certain informational source can be understood in causal terms or as rule-based cognitive activity.

The implication need not be infallible or necessary — Leontiskos

I have no idea what "fallible logic implication" means. Either the logic implication holds or it doesn't. Our beliefs can be said to be "fallible" not logic implications. Logic implication is a function which applies or not. If it does not apply, then there is no logic implication. On the other side, we can succeed in processing a logic implication or we can fail it.

If you believe that your vision of the apple implies its existence, then you believe the logical implication. — Leontiskos

Focus, you have moved from describing a genetic relation between belief and their reasons as a logic implication (which I’m questioning) to a belief on a logic implication. Sure, if I believe in a logic implication, then I believe in a logic implication. So what? That’s not the point.

You seem to think that there are truth-claims apart from beliefs. If I question P and someone says that P is justified on account of S (or that P is true because of S), then we have a putative logical implication between S and P. This shouldn't be as hard as you are making it.

You seem to think that the person is not asserting a logical implication between S and P, but I really don't follow your reasoning. If some onlooker said, "They don't believe P because of S; rather, they believe P because of T," then we would have to talk about beliefs, causality, and all of the other tangents you want to bring in. But there is no need, because we are talking about people who are claiming justification for their own beliefs, and that's what logic always is. There is no such thing as logic apart from minds and beliefs.

I'm sorry I made a mistake. I was trying to do your work for you. I should have just asked the question. Given that "3>1" is not empirical (even though it is truth-apt), how do you classify it? — Ludwig V

A few posts ago I wanted to clean up the conversation because you had created so many different tangents, and now I fear the same thing is happening. You claimed that what is truth-apt is empirical, I pointed out a counterexample, and you seemed to agree. But now you want to go on another tangent, this time about how exactly we should classify mathematical propositions. Why the tangent? What purpose of ours does it serve to answer such classification questions? I simply cannot afford so many new tangents every few posts.

Summarizing, I said this:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

You have offered what I see as two basic responses. Your first response was that there are some things that do not imply any propositions, and you gave the example of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. My response is that if we cannot suppose that S → P then there is no objection to my claim, but that this only holds for some S's.

Your second response is something like the idea that, entirely apart from the question of truth-aptness, there are some P's which are not decidable, and those P's will not be sufficient to falsify S. My response is to concede the point, but yet claim that this only holds for some P's. So we are running into Square of Opposition difficulties:

• Leontiskos: Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is.
• Ludwig V: Some S's do not imply any P.
• Leontiskos: That is not sufficient. Unless all S's do not imply any P, my point will hold for those S's which do imply some P. Do you hold that all S's do not imply any P?
• ...
• Ludwig V: Some implied P's are undecidable.
• Leontiskos: That is not sufficient. Unless all implied P's are undecidable, my point will hold for those P's which are decidable. Do you hold that all implied P's are undecidable?

That's an interesting thought. Do you have an example? — Ludwig V

An example of a decidable P which follows from your chosen example of the Christian way of life would be, "Creation is good," or, "Care for the widow and orphan," or, "Do not commit abortion (or else exposure of infants)," or, "Jesus was resurrected from the dead."

Again:

In fact I would say that if a way of life lacks all such implications, then it is altogether otiose. — Leontiskos

A way of life which implies nothing at all hardly seems to count as a way of life.

I agree that remark would not help their case. One cannot just announce that a proposition is protected from refutation. One protects a proposition from refutation by the moves one makes in the argument. In the case you give, I would expect the Christian to reject the second premiss "God does not exist". — Ludwig V

But if they must engage in argument to protect P from refutation, then P has already been taken to be truth-apt and decidable. We were talking about a priori ways to protect P from refutation, such as denying its truth-aptness or its decidability.

I'm sorry. I was under the impression that when a philosopher uses the arrow of implication, by convention they are talking about material implication. But you are right, modus tollens etc. are much older than Frege's logic. — Ludwig V

Okay, then we understand each other.

St. Paul might be a good example.

...

But the point here is that although St. Paul did radically change his way of life, he still managed to live in the same world as the rest of us, so did not abandon large parts of the way of life he was living before his conversion.
The critical role for standard philosophy of ways of life is that they establish and enable our practices, including our ability to formulate propositions, evaluate them and so forth (and I include making judgements of value in this). St. Paul may have modified his beliefs, but the fundamental abilities were not touched. They were differently applied. — Ludwig V

We could simplify the story and categories a bit and just say that St. Paul encountered something which caused him to decide to abandon Judaism and embrace Christianity. Your objection is something like, "Ah, but Judaism and Christianity have a lot in common, therefore he did not abandon his way of life; he just modified it."

You're still claiming that, "The scope [of changes to one's way of life] is limited." Well, what limits it, and why? What counts as an abandonment and what counts as a change, and why can humans only change but never abandon their way of life? All of that looks rather arbitrary to me.

And what if we look again at your chosen example, the Christian way of life? People obviously abandon the Christian way of life, so it sure looks like abandonment of things that you deem ways of life is possible.

I've got very confused about whether it is the Christian way of life that demonstrates the existence of God or God that demonstrates the Christian way of life. Perhaps even both? — Ludwig V

Implication can be two-way, even though the various reasons will be chronologically limited.

As we get deeper into this, it is necessary to question your use of "validate" here. Ways of life do not, in themselves, validate anything. They are the foundation on which we build our practices of validating things. — Ludwig V

What is happening is that you are equivocating on "ways of life." The equivocation was present even when you were talking about Wittgenstein, for even there you referred to both non-justificatory schemas and justificatory schemas as ways of life. But your chosen example of the Christian way of life certainly does validate certain propositions.

Here is the place where you spoke about justificatory schemas:

As Wittgenstein is worrying about the foundations of rationality, there is a much quoted moment when he comes to the end of the justifications that he can offer and exclaims "But this is what I do!". An example of this point in argumentation is concluding that, since S implies P and S is true, P is true. There is no more to be said. — Ludwig V

Obviously, given what you say here, S implies or "validates" P.

But all of this goes back to the some/all problem. Do you really think that all S's imply no propositions?

(Believe it or not, this is new territory to me, and I'm thinking on my feet. So things may change.) — Ludwig V

Okay, thanks for letting me know.

If I question P and someone says that P is justified on account of S (or that P is true because of S), then we have a putative logical implication between S and P. This shouldn't be as hard as you are making it. — Leontiskos

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand?
A justification can be understood as a rule based cognitive process by which we derive certain beliefs from some source of information. Logic implication is one of such rules. One thing is the rule another how we process it. You have to compare a logic implication with an arithmetic sum. Arithmetic sums apply to numeric values as much as logic implications apply to truth values. Still we can fail to process them correctly. That “2 + 3” “putatively” equals “23” to me, means that I failed to apply the arithmetic sum between 2 and 3. Namely, 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum 2+3. Is that hard to understand?

You seem to think that the person is not asserting a logical implication between S and P, but I really don't follow your reasoning. — Leontiskos

I have no problems with people asserting logic implications, I’m simply claiming that you can not conflate logic implications with inferences based on logic implications, nor conflate justifications and reasons to believe with logic implications. Logic implications are like rules, that we can successfully apply or fail to apply. Logic implication and arithmetic sum can not be meaningfully claimed to be fallible. What is fallible is our processing of logic implications and arithmetic sums.

If some onlooker said, "They don't believe P because of S; rather, they believe P because of T," then we would have to talk about beliefs, causality, and all of the other tangents you want to bring in. But there is no need, because we are talking about people who are claiming justification for their own beliefs, and that's what logic always is. — Leontiskos

No I’m pointing at a basic categorical mistake you are committing. It’s like you are confusing a rule with the execution of it. It has nothing to do with first-person vs third person reports. A first-person claim that I believe there is an apple on the table because I see an apple on the table, or that my belief that there is an apple on the table implies that I see an apple on the table (or that there is an apple on the table), doesn’t mean that a logic implication holds about what is believed and the source of this information. Stating a logic implication doesn’t make it true. So a “putative” case of logic implication which does not hold is no logic implication. The fact that 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum between 2 and 3 is not matter of first and third person report.

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand? — neomac

If you want to distinguish so strongly between believed logical implications, and other logical implications, then why don't you point me towards a logical implication that is not believed? Because you seem to think that if "the implication is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication." What this means is that in order for there to be a real implication it must not be believed to hold. You will have to point me towards that real implication, the kind that is not believed to hold. Where can I find that?

Stating a logic implication doesn’t make it true. — neomac

So you say:

Namely, 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum 2+3. — neomac

You stated an implication, but that doesn't make it true. So what does make it true?

Note that your focus on "objective implication" is beside the point. Here is my argument:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

We could write this as a conditional, "If S → P and P is truth-apt, then S is also truth-apt." That is "objectively true," if you like. We could adapt it for belief, "If someone believes that S → P and that P is truth-apt, then, logically speaking, they ought to believe that S is also truth-apt." Of course this is redundant, given that whenever we present an argument we are attempting to influence the beliefs of others.

Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that, but I want to specifically highlight the independently-derived truth-aptness of P given my interlocutors and the positions they are holding. In any case it seems that some of them would be tempted to say that if P is undecidable then it is not truth-apt.

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand? — neomac


If you want to distinguish so strongly between believed logical implications, and other logical implications, then why don't you point me towards a logical implication that is not believed? Because you seem to think that if "the implication is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication." What this means is that in order for there to be a real implication it must not be believed to hold. You will have to point me towards that real implication, the kind that is not believed to hold. Where can I find that? — Leontiskos

Our first-person understanding of our own beliefs is that they can be fallible no matter if the content of our belief refers to a fact or a logic implication. So it’s from within our own beliefs that distinction between what is believed and how things are must be maintained. Otherwise just believing that something is true would make it true.
You keep understanding what I’m writing in light of your categorical mistake, not on its own terms. Logic implications are kind of cognitive rules which we can use to process information and can still fail to do so.

You stated an implication, but that doesn't make it true. So what does make it true? — Leontiskos

All the circumstantial conditions (empirical or not) that we take to be relevant to validate that implication. For example, I’m at home and I hear ringing at the door, so I believe that if behind the door there is somebody, then this is my friend which I previously invited at home that day and that time. Then I open the door and see that indeed my friend is there. In this case, I can hold my implication to be true. On the other side, if it’s my neighbor asking me to borrow something from me, then I can hold the implication I believed in false.

Note that your focus on "objective implication" is beside the point. Here is my argument:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos


We could write this as a conditional, "If S → P and P is truth-apt, then S is also truth-apt." That is "objectively true," if you like. We could adapt it for belief, "If someone believes that S → P and that P is truth-apt, then, logically speaking, they ought to believe that S is also truth-apt." Of course this is redundant, given that whenever we present an argument we are attempting to influence the beliefs of others.

Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that, but I want to specifically highlight the independently-derived truth-aptness of P given my interlocutors and the positions they are holding. — Leontiskos

Again, do you read what your write? I already made my objection in my first post against your argument (“Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is”). Then you say “Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that”. But if you agree with my objection that highlighting attempt doesn’t make any sense. What you can do instead is to check if your interlocutor formulates their reasons to believe via logic implications and go from there to review your interlocutors’ claims.
But even in this case we should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications. Indeed, one can use logic implications to convey the idea of a dependency between claims (and that is what you seem to be trying to do with your highlighting). But that doesn’t mean that our reasons to believe are all “claims” over how things are. Experiences are not claims over how things are. Concepts are not claims over how things are. Logic and arithmetic functions are not claims over how things are. Yet experiences, concepts, arithmetic and logic functions are very much part of the reasons why we believe certain things. For example, I believe true that if x is a celibate, then x is not married. What makes it true? The semantics of “celibate”, but “celibate” is a concept not a claim over how things are.
Even the relation between a rule and its execution is a form of dependency that one can render as a logic implication, but it would be totally misleading, actually a categorical mistake, to claim that the relation between rules and their execution is a logic implication. I can claim: If “3+5” expresses an arithmetic sum, then its result is “8”, that doesn’t mean that the relation between the arithmetic sum rule and my actual calculation there is a logic implication, and this time not only because I can fail the arithmetic rule in an attempt to follow it, but also because an arithmetic sum is an arithmetic rule not a claim over how things are, and my mental calculation is a cognitive process not a claim over how things are.

Here is another example of confusing way of talking: the concept of ‘’logic implication” implies truth values. But that can’t possibly mean that there is a logic implication between the concept of logic implication and truth values. What it means is that truth values are integral part of the semantics of “logic implication”.

Why the tangent? What purpose of ours does it serve to answer such classification questions? I simply cannot afford so many new tangents every few posts. — Leontiskos

I'm simply considering your idea from various angles. I don't see a problem. Judging from your reference later on, you classify mathematical propositions as a priori. You could have just said so.

You have offered what I see as two basic responses. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure whether I completely accept your characterization. But since we seem to agree that "S implies P" is sometimes valid and sometimes not, depending what we substitute for S and P, I don't think there is any need to pursue that any further.

But if they must engage in argument to protect P from refutation, then P has already been taken to be truth-apt and decidable. — Leontiskos

... unless what is at stake is whether P is truth-apt and decidable.

Implication can be two-way, even though the various reasons will be chronologically limited. — Leontiskos

I think that means you think accept both "God validates the Christian way of life" and "The Christian way of life validates God". I'm not sure what to make of that. Intuitively, neither seems wrong. I don't see what you mean by "the various reasons will be chronologically limited".

An example of a decidable P which follows from your chosen example of the Christian way of life would be, "Creation is good," or, "Care for the widow and orphan," or, "Do not commit abortion (or else exposure of infants)," or, "Jesus was resurrected from the dead." — Leontiskos

"Creation is good" is an evaluation. I expect you are an objectivist about ethics and so would claim that the statement is true. I won't argue with you. But value statements are a distinct category from factual statements such as "God exists", so I don't see how this helps your case.
"Care for the widow and orphan" and "Do not commit abortion or exposure" are not statements of any kind; they are imperatives and not capable of truth or falsity. They don't help your case.
"Jesus was resurrected from the dead" does appear to be truth-apt and, in principle, decidable. But it is not decidable now, so it doesn't help your case.

What is happening is that you are equivocating on "ways of life." The equivocation was present even when you were talking about Wittgenstein, for even there you referred to both non-justificatory schemas and justificatory schemas as ways of life. But your chosen example of the Christian way of life certainly does validate certain propositions. — Leontiskos

I doubt if it is possible to equivocate with a phrase as ill-defined as "way of life". It's almost completely elastic and plastic.

We could simplify the story and categories a bit and just say that St. Paul encountered something which caused him to decide to abandon Judaism and embrace Christianity. Your objection is something like, "Ah, but Judaism and Christianity have a lot in common, therefore he did not abandon his way of life; he just modified it." — Leontiskos

That's not quite what I meant. I meant that he did not abandon his way of life as a human being when he abandoned his way of life as a Jew. He cannot abandon his way of life as a human being without ceasing to be a human being. It is because he did not abandon the human way of life that he could preach the Gospel and be understood.

Judging from your reference later on, you classify mathematical propositions as a priori. — Ludwig V

Not true.

But since we seem to agree that "S implies P" is sometimes valid and sometimes not, depending what we substitute for S and P, I don't think there is any need to pursue that any further. — Ludwig V

No, not at all. My argument was never, "Every S implies every P." This is a strawman.

"Creation is good" is an evaluation. I expect you are an objectivist about ethics and so would claim that the statement is true. I won't argue with you. But value statements are a distinct category from factual statements such as "God exists", so I don't see how this helps your case. — Ludwig V

Is it decidable? That is the question we are asking.

"Care for the widow and orphan" and "Do not commit abortion or exposure" are not statements of any kind; they are imperatives and not capable of truth or falsity. They don't help your case. — Ludwig V

So you are a moral anti-realist? Most people aren't, so for most people these are decidable propositions.

"Jesus was resurrected from the dead" does appear to be truth-apt and, in principle, decidable. But it is not decidable now, so it doesn't help your case. — Ludwig V

"Decidable but not decidable now." Looks like more confusion. There are all sorts of arguments for and against historical events, but apparently you are forced to deny this fact.

I doubt if it is possible to equivocate with a phrase as ill-defined as "way of life". It's almost completely elastic and plastic. — Ludwig V

Why would it be hard to equivocate with a phrase that is "completely elastic and plastic"?

That's not quite what I meant. I meant that he did not abandon his way of life as a human being when he abandoned his way of life as a Jew. He cannot abandon his way of life as a human being without ceasing to be a human being. It is because he did not abandon the human way of life that he could preach the Gospel and be understood. — Ludwig V

And there is no reason I must claim that he abandoned his life as a human being as opposed to his way of life as a Jew. Why would you think that? It's pretty clearly a strawman. If he can abandon his way of life as a Jew, then my thesis is secured. You are falling into the same some/all fallacy here. "He didn't abandon every way of life, therefore he didn't abandon any way of life."