Forgive me. I get your drift. However ways of life, unlike propositions about them, are not true or false. But they can be validated by or founded on facts which are articulated by propositions; those propositions need to be true if they are to do their job. — Ludwig V

I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. Ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated.

In one way, you are quite right. However, I am puzzled why there appears to be no end to the argument about the existence of God and inclined to think that the possibility of such an argument is an illusion. — Ludwig V

"God exists," is a proposition, and there is no "the" argument for it. There are lots of different arguments for and against the existence of God.

But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument.

Wittgenstein articulates the concept of "hinge" propositions — Ludwig V

I think hinge propositions are another example of the confusion I outlined, insofar as they involve the claim that non-truth-apt axioms entail truth-apt propositions.

and then there's Presuppositional apologetics - Wikipedia — Ludwig V

Another example of the confusion, in my opinion.

All I'm saying here is that there are alternatives to hammering round the ancient necessary proofs and empirical arguments. — Ludwig V

My point is that no "way of life," "hinge proposition," or, "presupposition(alism)" is immune to propositions and facts. I would say that the erection of such immunity is based on the confusion that I outlined <here>.

A lot of this goes back to what I said about the relation between the true and the good, for ways of life are predicated primarily upon goodness and yet are not separate from considerations of truth.

I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. Ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. — Leontiskos

I agree that ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. For me, at least, that was the significance of accept Hadot' remark.

But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument. — Leontiskos

Thatl would be a bad argument. So, could I ask what arguments you propose as evidence that God exists?

I think hinge propositions are another example of the confusion I outlined, insofar as they involve the claim that non-truth-apt axioms entail truth-apt propositions. — Leontiskos

Hinge propositions are not non-truth-apt. They are true, in such a way that whatever else gets questioned in the debate, they are protected from reputation. "God exists" is a good example - unless you can tell me what arguments you would accept as evidence that God does not exist.
Axioms are also not non-truth-apt. They are stipulated (assumed) to be true. Presuppositions, in that theory, are simply adopted as true in something of the same way.
Ways of life, on the other hand, in Wittgenstein's use of the term, are the foundations of language and are the basis of our understanding of truth and falsity, so not truth-apt, any more than practices are. Practices are just our way of doing things; they include the ways in which we establish truth and falsity. In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos

The question will always be, then, whether P is really truth-apt and not false.

I agree that ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. For me, at least, that was the significance of accept Hadot' remark. — Ludwig V

Okay, great.

The question will always be, then, whether P is really truth-apt and not false. — Ludwig V

Well if something is false then it is truth-apt, so this makes me think that you don't understand what "truth-apt" means.

If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt.

Hinge propositions are not non-truth-apt. They are true, in such a way that whatever else gets questioned in the debate, they are protected from reputation. — Ludwig V

I don't know what "being protected from reputation" means, but the point is that truth-apt things are open to scrutiny.

Ways of life, on the other hand, in Wittgenstein's use of the term, are the foundations of language and are the basis of our understanding of truth and falsity, so not truth-apt, any more than practices are. Practices are just our way of doing things; they include the ways in which we establish truth and falsity. In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication. — Ludwig V

I suppose I just stand by what I already said. If Wittgenstein thinks his "ways of life" are not truth-apt and yet entail true or false propositions, then he is in a pickle.

Thatl would be a bad argument. — Ludwig V

It's the argument at the bottom of Wittgenstein's and everyone else's strange claims about the fundamentals being non-truth-apt.

So, could I ask what arguments you propose as evidence that God exists? — Ludwig V

I don't usually engage that question in these contexts, as the inquirer is just looking for something to try to debunk. I'm also not sure what it has to do with this conversation, especially given that you said my point about relativism, "Would be a bad argument."

So I would say, it is the being, working with the personality who wrestles with the ego. — Punshhh

I have a problem with any theory that divides the person/self into separate elements like this. When we do the wrong thing, we are usually anxious to shift the blame away from ourselves. One of the tactics is to attribute the agency to something that is not us (not our selves). I didn't do that, my appetites did it. I don't want to say that it is never appropriate to think in this way, but I do want to say that it is sometimes inappropriate to think in this way. We find addictions very hard to classify, with some people seeing the addiction that is not the person, but which takes over control of the person, and other people thinking that it is just the result of a "weak will" - as if going to some sort of gym would sort the problem out.

A tipping point is reached beyond which there is a strength of feeling and knowledge that one is living a gooder life and yet not feeling the lesser for it, but the more for it. Again a tipping point is reached beyond which one can grab hold of and tether the ego. — Punshhh

Yet you seem to be able to tell this story without the help of the analysis, until the very last moment, when you revert to the "ego", and I want to say that it is your ego that took you through the process of training that allows you to grab hold of the ego and tether it (yourself). I have no idea what a Zen master would say about this story, but I say that the point is that you have not tethered yourself, but set yourself free. Or rather, you were taking the process as a process of tethering, but now you can see it as a process of freeing yourself. Life in the wild, we might say, is not freedom; it is suffering. But No, it is both. The paradoxes are endless. That, no doubt, is where the Zen master comes in.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos

If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos

If P is not truth-apt, then S need not be truth-apt; but then S might be truth-apt. So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt. The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not.

I don't know what "being protected from reputation" means, but the point is that truth-apt things are open to scrutiny. — Leontiskos

That's a typo. I mean "protected from reFutation". To illustrate what I mean, let me sketch an argument in which this protection occurs. The point here is not whether the argument as stated is a good one, but just to illustrate what I mean by "protected from refutation". Suppose someone asserts that God always answers prayers. A possible reply might be "But yesterday you were praying for fine weather to-day and look, it's raining." The protective answer is "But sometimes the answer is No."

I suppose I just stand by what I already said. If Wittgenstein thinks his "ways of life" are not truth-apt and yet entail true or false propositions, then he is in a pickle. — Leontiskos

No, that's not what Wittgenstein thinks. His discussion of ways of life and practices is not extensive; it's little more than a series of hints. But the foundations of language cannot possibly entail true or false propositions; if they did, they would already be language and therefore not the foundations of language.

As an illustration, consider the foundations of mathematics. Some people are inclined to think that the foundations of arithmetic, at least, are the practice of counting. This practice entails no arithmetical truths whatever, but it does make it possible to work arithmetical truths out. (We could go further and think that the practice of counting has foundations in our practice, in language, of distinguishing one apple from the next one and recognizing that there is more than one wasp eating the second one.) All of this is sketching, of course.

As Wittgenstein is worrying about the foundations of rationality, there is a much quoted moment when he comes to the end of the justifications that he can offer and exclaims "But this is what I do!". An example of this point in argumentation is concluding that, since S implies P and S is true, P is true. There is no more to be said. Anyone who can't see that needs education, not more argumentation. (Charles Dodgson somewhat anticipated Wittgenstein here by writing a dialogue in which the tortoise refuses to conclude that Achilles won the race and Achilles sets out to convince him. It doesn't work.)

I don't usually engage that question in these contexts, as the inquirer is just looking for something to try to debunk. I'm also not sure what it has to do with this conversation, especially given that you said my point about relativism, "Would be a bad argument." — Leontiskos

That seems a very sound policy. I was looking for examples that would show what I was trying to assert. I was not looking to engage in those arguments. I've outlined a couple of arguments above, and I hope they help.

But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument. — Leontiskos

When I said that's a bad argument, I was agreeing with what I thought was your point - that the conclusion does not follow from the premiss. I don't know whether you think that "God exists" is an empirical statement or not, but I think it very unlikely that there is any empirical fact that would persuade you to abandon that claim. Equally there is for me no empirical statement that would persuade me to accept that God does indeed exist. Hence, I do not believe that "God exists" is an empirical claim.

I have a problem with any theory that divides the person/self into separate elements like this.

Yes, I can see that*. I will continue by addressing the attributes attributed to the ego and the role it plays in a person’s behaviour. Rather than making distinctions in the make up of the self(forgive me if I do so by mistake and please do point it out).
What the Zen master is getting at is that by tethering the ox to the post, one is controlling things like blind passion, envy, greed etc and the psychological tendencies to inflate a sense of self importance, status in social grouping, for example. Or to feel a victim, when you are not, but you are in denial of poor behaviour to someone etc. (this can be a long list, with a lot of detail). These tendencies in human behaviour act as stumbling blocks and hurdles in the practice of stilling the mind and quelling emotions.
What I’m getting at is that a person is able to self reflect and carry out a restructuring of the psychological make up of themselves. Even the emotional make up, although, this is very difficult and usually accommodation is made for this in the practice. Also that in the spiritual scenario, to rebuild the self in the image of, and guidance of a deity. Hence the goal of enlightenment etc.

Yet you seem to be able to tell this story without the help of the analysis, until the very last moment, when you revert to the "ego", and I want to say that it is your ego that took you through the process of training that allows you to grab hold of the ego and tether it (yourself).

I would place this in the context of an internal process within the self, which does not necessarily require a thorough analysis. There are checks and balances and analysis going on, but in a personal form and language. When you say “ego”, presumably you are referring the the thinking person, the mind. The mind and thinking might be able to convey the process, but the practice of the process may include, emotions (the endocrine system) and the body (the animal, the primate, which we are).

I have no idea what a Zen master would say about this story, but I say that the point is that you have not tethered yourself, but set yourself free. Or rather, you were taking the process as a process of tethering, but now you can see it as a process of freeing yourself.

It is a process which includes control, restriction etc, in order to free, through crisis. Or another way to see it, would be a way of getting out of a rut.

* I come to this with a history of seeing the self as made up of different parts. Sometimes 3, sometimes 5, or 7, or 12. So will find it difficult to go into detail without referring to this.

So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt. — Ludwig V

Well I never said that. The problem here is that implication doesn't make sense among non-truth-apt things, but that's a separate issue.

The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not. — Ludwig V

How is that supposed to be "trouble"? Try presenting an argument to the effect that, "We might disagree about whether P is truth-apt, therefore Leontiskos' claim is false."

But the foundations of language cannot possibly entail true or false propositions; — Ludwig V

...concluding that, since S implies P and S is true, P is true — Ludwig V

These two claims contradict one another. One moment you say that S cannot entail true or false propositions, and the next moment you say that S implies P and P is true. This is a good example of the problem with Wittgenstein's approach.

The point here is that when Wittgenstein says, "But this is what I do!," he is trying to excuse himself from argument and thus presupposing that "what he does" is inevitable and therefore not arguable or truth-apt. I would say that better philosophers don't make such an excuse. Aristotle will wrestle with the principle of non-contradiction, for example, in Metaphysics IV. He won't make an excuse and abandon the obvious fact that where S implies P and P is truth-apt, so too is S.

...when he comes to the end of the justifications that he can offer and exclaims "But this is what I do!". — Ludwig V

See my post <here>.

To be honest, I don't think Wittgenstein is a very good philosopher, and I don't have much interest in discussing him or exegeting him. Of course if you think he makes a good point you can introduce that same point in your own words, but appeals to his name will be ineffective for me. I have no regard for his name, and these topics help explain why.

That seems a very sound policy. I was looking for examples that would show what I was trying to assert. — Ludwig V

Where does your desire for an argument for God's existence go? As far as I'm concerned, wherever it goes, it supports my point. Suppose I present an argument and it is convincing. In that case an atheistic way of life will be falsified (or invalidated) by the propositional truth. Or suppose I present an argument and it is unconvincing. In that case a theistic way of life will be less plausible given the propositional truth. Either way the propositional outcome will bear on ways of life.

When I said that's a bad argument, I was agreeing with what I thought was your point - that the conclusion does not follow from the premiss. — Ludwig V

I don't think the argument is wholesale invalid. The idea behind it is that intractable disagreement among intelligent persons can signify a more fundamental problem (and that this problem could be related to what is or is not truth-apt). There is a rationale to the idea, even if I think it is wrong in this case.

I don't know whether you think that "God exists" is an empirical statement or not, but I think it very unlikely that there is any empirical fact that would persuade you to abandon that claim. Equally there is for me no empirical statement that would persuade me to accept that God does indeed exist. Hence, I do not believe that "God exists" is an empirical claim. — Ludwig V

I think beliefs of this kind are falsifiable, and empirically so. Of course, it is obviously easier to falsify a negative existence-claim than a positive existence-claim. What is generally overlooked in this thread is that people change their minds all the time on the question of God, and they often do so when presented with arguments or when faced with empirical considerations (miracles, suffering, psychological insights, etc.). If the theories being proffered by atheists and agnostics within this thread were sound, then no one would ever change their mind about religious propositions. The theories are therefore empirically inadequate given the way people often change their mind with regard to religious propositions (and faith propositions more generally).

If the atheist says, "I believe God does not exist, and nothing will ever convince me otherwise," then I would say they are just being stubborn and irrational. If there is nothing that would convince him otherwise, then he is not taking the question seriously.


P.S. I think you need to address this in order to ensure that our whole conversation is not based on a misunderstanding:

Well if something is false then it is truth-apt, so this makes me think that you don't understand what "truth-apt" means. — Leontiskos

So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt.
— Ludwig V
Well I never said that. The problem here is that implication doesn't make sense among non-truth-apt things, but that's a separate issue. — Leontiskos

Not in so many words, but you did say this:-

If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos

and I think that what I said follows from that.

The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not.
— Ludwig V
How is that supposed to be "trouble"? Try presenting an argument to the effect that, "We might disagree about whether P is truth-apt, therefore Leontiskos' claim is false." — Leontiskos

It is trouble because you have to covince me that "God exists" is truth-apt before I'll be convinced by your argument.

These two claims contradict one another. One moment you say that S cannot entail true or false propositions, and the next moment you say that S implies P and P is true. This is a good example of the problem with Wittgenstein's approach. — Leontiskos

Yes, you are right. I carelessly continued using S without remembering that you had already assigned a value to it. I should have used a different variable, such as T. I'm sorry.

He won't make an excuse and abandon the obvious fact that where S implies P and P is truth-apt, so too is S. — Leontiskos

Why on earth do you suppose he abandons that?

Of course if you think he makes a good point you can introduce that same point in your own words, but appeals to his name will be ineffective for me. I have no regard for his name, and these topics help explain why. — Leontiskos

Thank you for clearing that up. I mention his name because I had the impression that it is courteous to identify the source of other people's arguments when deploying them and because it saves time if you accept the argument. If you don't, then we may have to do this the hard way.

I don't think the argument is wholesale invalid. The idea behind it is that intractable disagreement among intelligent persons can signify a more fundamental problem (and that this problem could be related to what is or is not truth-apt). There is a rationale to the idea, even if I think it is wrong in this case. — Leontiskos

That is indeed a more nuanced understanding. But now I need to ask why you think it is wrong in this case.

As far as I'm concerned, wherever it goes, it supports my point. Suppose I present an argument and it is convincing. In that case an atheistic way of life will be falsified (or invalidated) by the propositional truth. Or suppose I present an argument and it is unconvincing. In that case a theistic way of life will be less plausible given the propositional truth. Either way the propositional outcome will bear on ways of life. — Leontiskos

That would be correct if "God exists" is true-or-false, like "Unicorns exist". You seem to think that it is. I think that it isn't. Until that is sorted out, your schema above does not apply. I believe that "God exists" is comparable, not to "Unicorns exist" but to "Matter exists" or "Consciousness is an illusion".

The theories are therefore empirically inadequate given the way people often change their mind with regard to religious propositions (and faith propositions more generally). — Leontiskos

I'm speechless. What on earth does that have to do with it?

If the atheist says, "I believe God does not exist, and nothing will ever convince me otherwise," then I would say they are just being stubborn and irrational. If there is nothing that would convince him otherwise, then he is not taking the question seriously. — Leontiskos

How would you prove that? Only by begging the question.
Incidentally, I could reply in kind - "If the theist says, "I believe God does exist, and nothing will ever convince me otherwise," then I would say they are just being stubborn and irrational. If there is nothing that would convince him otherwise, then he is not taking the question seriously." But that would be disrepectful. I take you more seriously than that.

P.S. I think you need to address this in order to ensure that our whole conversation is not based on a misunderstanding:
Well if something is false then it is truth-apt, so this makes me think that you don't understand what "truth-apt" means.
— Leontiskos — Leontiskos

Yes, you are right, of course. I wrote that passage badly, without explaining myself. It doesn't matter, so I withdraw the claim.

What I’m getting at is that a person is able to self reflect and carry out a restructuring of the psychological make up of themselves. — Punshhh

Yes, that is clearly true. The question is, what more can we usefully say?

I would place this in the context of an internal process within the self, which does not necessarily require a thorough analysis. — Punshhh

There's two more difficult terms. Sometimes the self is me, not a part of me. Sometimes not. Equivalent to the ego or not? But then, we do want to talk about processes going on "within" the person (as opposed to the body). Sometimes they are conscious and sometimes not. But there doesn't seem to be any agreement how this can be done. (In one way, ordinary language sets our starting-point, but it seems too limited for what we want to do.)

When you say “ego”, presumably you are referring the the thinking person, the mind. — Punshhh

I would like to treat "ego", "self", "mind" as all equivalent to "person" - unless and until a more detailed and more objective framework can be developed.

Yes, that is clearly true. The question is, what more can we usefully say?

There is plenty, but whether it is useful, or not depends to a large part on who we are saying it to and whether they think it is useful.
We can say that it might make someone more constructive and cooperative in their and their family, friends and associates’s lives. It might make the life of the person more peaceful and enjoyable. It could result in the restoration and care of the ecosystem, locally, or globally. It might further their progress towards their liberation from material incarnation. And in the long term, contribute to humanity finding it’s rightful place as the custodian of the ecosystem of the planet and all that would entail.

Sometimes they are conscious and sometimes not. But there doesn't seem to be any agreement how this can be done. (In one way, ordinary language sets our starting-point, but it seems too limited for what we want to do.)

Yes, I know, which is a part of the reason I went elsewhere to do this. There is a language and literature which does this in Eastern philosophy. But translating this into a Western narrative is not easy, Theosophy has tried, but this has not been adopted by Western academics as far as I know.

I would like to treat "ego", "self", "mind" as all equivalent to "person" - unless and until a more detailed and more objective framework can be developed.

Well I can try.

1) is faith an emotion or a thought? What if it is neither — Gregory

I think concepts (including “faith”) need to be contextualised wrt their actual and scoped usage for better understanding and communication. Then one can abstract from some specific aspects to better identify similarities among different usages.
For example “faith” in ordinary contexts has different meaning from “faith” in religious sense. And its meaning may lean toward one direction or the other depending on what is contextually contrasted to: in the Western tradition, the meaning of the religious notion of “faith” has been contrasted to philosophical rationality and science.
If I wanted to abstract from more specific usages, I would say, as a starting point, that trust is an “epistemic emotion”: “emotion” because it has to do with “how I feel about something” and “epistemic” because faith is about “beliefs” (e.g. God exists, Jesus has both a devine and human nature, God is a trinity, etc.). This starting point seems to fit well with ordinary and religious usage. But I say it’s a starting point, for two main reasons:
- Epistemic feelings can concern also our senses and mental calculations. “Faith” seems more related to what somebody else communicated (a friend, a politician, a prophet, the holy book, etc.) or proved through deeds.
- In religious contexts, faith is also related to some normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts) by which we assess how virtuous and/or meaningful one life is. And also in ordinary usage, "faith" conveys some sort of informal engagement by which we assess people reliance, especially under test.

“emotion” because it has to do with “how I feel about something” and “epistemic” because faith is about “beliefs” (e.g. God exists, Jesus has both a devine and human nature, God is a trinity, etc.). — neomac

I think your view is being skewed by the religious use of faith - which does seem to be about beliefs. I agree that one can be faithful to one's beliefs (or principles). But if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves - different behaviour in each case, as required by the relationship in each case. "Faithful picture" or "account" are different, but obviously not about any beliefs.
But I think the religious use of faith is more complicated than it seems. In the Christian faith, the creed and signing up to it are very important. In other faiths, beliefs are less important. What matters most is behaviour - behaving according to the moral code, taking part in the liturgy and so on. Religion is only part about belief and only about belief as part of a whole way of life. Acccepting a religion is accepting the obligation to live according to those rules.
Does faith involve emotion? Yes, I would agree that it does.

Not in so many words, but you did say this:- — Ludwig V

If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos

and I think that what I said follows from that. — Ludwig V

My original claim was, "If P is truth-apt, then S is truth-apt." You responded by effectively saying, "But the question is whether P is truth-apt." My response about "need not be" has to do with the fact that you are subtly committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent. When someone denies the antecedent the correct response is, "Both the consequent and the negation of the consequent need not follow." Saying, "It need not follow when you deny the antecedent," does not positively entail anything about the possibility of the consequent.

Furthermore, the idea that P may not be truth-apt has nothing to do with my original claim, and it tells us nothing about S given that original claim. You want to discuss the proposition, "If P is not truth-apt, then S is possibly truth-apt." The problem is that there are different modalities at play, but given that such a proposition seems irrelevant to my thesis, I don't see any use in pursuing it. My original claim has everything to do with the cases in which everyone agrees that P is truth-apt.

I should have used a different variable, such as T. I'm sorry. — Ludwig V

Yes, you are right, of course. I wrote that passage badly, without explaining myself. It doesn't matter, so I withdraw the claim. — Ludwig V

Okay, thanks. I appreciate that. :up:

Listen, this conversation is getting long and unwieldy. Rather than answering the whole bevvy of issues you are now raising, why don't you just point me to two of them that you deem most central, and I will answer those.

I think your view is being skewed by the religious use of faith - which does seem to be about beliefs. I agree that one can be faithful to one's beliefs (or principles). But if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves - different behaviour in each case, as required by the relationship in each case. "Faithful picture" or "account" are different, but obviously not about any beliefs. — Ludwig V

In my post, I already agreed upon the fact that the meaning of “faith” must be determined in the various contexts of their usage. Still, if the task is to identify some commonalities between some (not necessarily all) various usages, then one has to make some effort to abstract from a fine-grained analysis of each specific usage.
Besides, I also warned that my idea that “faith” is some sort of epistemic emotion was just a starting point in need of further elaboration, like the one you suggest: In religious contexts, faith is also related to some normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts) by which we assess how virtuous and/or meaningful one life is. And also in ordinary usage, "faith" conveys some sort of informal engagement by which we assess people reliance, especially under test . So yes the behavioural dimension is also worth mentioning.
Still, what I would disagree with you on is the following claim: if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves. Indeed, your putative counter-examples seem to be very much compatible with what I wrote. Beliefs do not need to be about what exists, their identity or properties, beliefs can also be about how people behave. For instance, when we talk about a faithful friend, parent, dog we are referring to the fact that these friend, parent, dog will act in ways we would expect (and approve of) from friends, parents, dogs based on passed behaviour. It is precisely because friends, parents, and dogs behaved in ways we approved of in the past, that we can believe they will do it again, and rely on it in our life (maybe even under daring circumstances).
"Faithful picture" or "account" refers to idea that certain representations won't betray expectations based on them, they can be trusted, I’m tempted to add "as men can be" (because those expressions can sound as a personification or a metonym).
By the way, I’m inclined to say that faith in an ordinary (non-religious) sense looks more synonymous of “trust” than faith in a religious sense (rhetorical nuances aside, i.e. “to have faith in” sounds more solemn or stronger than “to trust”), as if the religious understanding of faith is richer than that of trust.

But I think the religious use of faith is more complicated than it seems. In the Christian faith, the creed and signing up to it are very important. In other faiths, beliefs are less important. What matters most is behaviour - behaving according to the moral code, taking part in the liturgy and so on. Religion is only part about belief and only about belief as part of a whole way of life. — Ludwig V

Again I agree on that the religious notion of "faith" has a complex semantic and that involves behaviour. I also readily referred to it in my post with the expression “normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts)”. But the idea that “beliefs are less important” in faith (at least, in other religions compared to Christianity) sounds rather a misleading objection to me. “Rituals” and “pious acts” concern people’s behaviour, what people say or do in certain circumstances. And behaviour, what people say or do, can be performed without having appropriate inspiring beliefs or, even, theologically elaborated or critically scrutinized beliefs, or even a satisfactory grasp of what it is believed (religious people can believe in mysterious things like the holy trinity, Jesus' dual nature, miracles, etc.). So yes, in some of these senses belief in religious faith can be said to be "less important" than behavior. The point however is that also in the religious contexts behaviour, especially in the long run or under daring circumstances, is typically taken as an indicator of the strength/authenticity of one’s religious beliefs. Indeed, if people would perform rituals and pious acts without believing at all in the creed that inspired them, maybe due to peer pressure or out of irreligious interests, I doubt we would take them as a the paradigmatic example of religious faith. Prophets, saints and martyrs… they are.
On the other side, the difference between Christianity and other religions you are pointing at may even lead us to not consider those other religions as religions if the element of faith in some supernatural/sacred world is remarkably lacking (e.g. Buddhism is considered by some more as a philosophy than a religion).

Beliefs do not need to be about what exists, their identity or properties, beliefs can also be about how people behave. — neomac

Well, I was thinking that beliefs about people name, age, address place of work - neutral facts - don't count for anything like as much as about how they behave with us.

It is precisely because friends, parents, and dogs behaved in ways we approved of in the past, that we can believe they will do it again, and rely on it in our life (maybe even under daring circumstances). — neomac

But to describe these relationships in that bloodless way does not distinguish these personal relationships from business partnerships etc. This is where the idea of faith as involved emotion does have appeal. Friends and family are the people that you love and are committed to; that goes beyond approving of their behaviour - it precisely means that you won't walk away whenever you disapprove of their behaviour. There is a lot of variation here, so I think that all we can say is that commitment when times are rough is at least on the table, and walking away will need justification.

But we do seem to be broadly in agreement. Faith is a complicated business and escapes from many of the formulas that people suggest.

Listen, this conversation is getting long and unwieldy. Rather than answering the whole bevvy of issues you are now raising, why don't you just point me to two of them that you deem most central, and I will answer those. — Leontiskos

It certainly is. I'll do my best.

The intellectually honest naysayer needs to start admitting that they don't think religious claims are truth-apt. They can't have it both ways: — Leontiskos

This is the remark that I responded to. I took truth-apt to mean true-or-false, (i.e. empirical) and responded because I do think they are not true-or-false. We've discussed some of the reasons for that. I admit it may seem counter-intuitive, because it is said in philosophy that all claims of existence must be empirical. The alternative (unless all religious beliefs are pseudo-propositions) is that they are analytic or meaningless. Neither of which really make much sense. However, empirical or analytic are not the only options. Wittgenstein has richer resources. (I realize you won't like them.)

1. Hinge propositions are not non-truth-apt. They are true, in such a way that whatever else gets questioned in the debate, they are protected from refutation. "God exists" is a good example.
2. I think I've mentioned Wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing as" and this seems to me a really useful way of understanding what it going on here. A believer interprets the world in a different way from the unbeliever, seeing it as meaningful where an unbeliever sees it as meaningless - and finds meaning in it in a different way.
I know you don't like quotations but I don't want to waste your time, so let me make it clear that I know that you don't like Wittgenstein and I expect you to criticise this idea - and I will defend it as best I can. As a starting-point, the suggestion is that philosophical theories about the world are like interpretations of a picture. Which leaves all sorts of questions unanswered, but at least gives some understanding of the problem.

There are further possibilities, but they are not attractive to me;-
3. Axioms are also not non-truth-apt. Nowadays, they are stipulated (assumed) to be true, but it used to be the case that they were thought to be self-evident.
4 Presuppositions, in presuppositionalism, are simply adopted as true - an arbitrary starting-point. I don't quite see how any apologetics could develop from this

We've spoken a good deal about ways of life. Wittgenstein's use of the term, they are the foundations of language and are the basis of our understanding of truth and falsity, so not truth-apt, any more than practices are. Practices are just our way of doing things; they include the ways in which we establish truth and falsity and so provide a bridge between ways of life and language. We learn these as children as part of learning how to negotiate life. They are not themselves true or false but enable us to make statements that are true or false.`
In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication.

The implication of this is to give space to a world in which more than one way of life and one world-view may have at least provisional legitimacy at the same time. For me, that's the way the world is. Wittgenstein writes as if there is only one way of life in the world, and it is shared by all human beings. It is true that all human beings share something of their way of life, but they also differ enormously and I don't think that view holds water.

OK. So where do you want to start?

But to describe these relationships in that bloodless way does not distinguish these personal relationships from business partnerships etc. This is where the idea of faith as involved emotion does have appeal. Friends and family are the people that you love and are committed to; that goes beyond approving of their behaviour - it precisely means that you won't walk away whenever you disapprove of their behaviour. There is a lot of variation here, so I think that all we can say is that commitment when times are rough is at least on the table, and walking away will need justification. — Ludwig V

I’m not sure you understood my proposal. I talked about “faith” in terms of “epistemic emotion” not about the reasons/genesis of such epistemic emotions or the metrics to assess the emotional component of such epistemic emotions or the rhetorical forms in which we can express such epistemic emotions. I can feel more confident about the disposition of business partners to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those I decided not to partner with, as much as I can feel more confident about the disposition of friends or relatives to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those who are not my friends or relatives. In both cases, it’s about how we feel about people’s dispositions to act in certain ways. It doesn’t matter whether what I feel about these people is based on affection or on material interest.
The emotion I’m talking about when talking about faith is epistemic not affective. It’s not the emotions we feel for friends and relatives like love or admiration. I can still be affectively attached to someone and support him/her even if I do not fully trust or have faith in or feel confident in his/her dispositions to act in certain ways in certain circumstances.
Finally, I doubt that ordinary phrases like “faithful friends” typically expresses some commitment on our side when we talk about our friends, as a religious expression of faith would. “Faithuful” in “faithful friends” is a qualification of our friends’ behavior (e.g. to stress the fact that s/he has never disappointed use, even in daring situations) independently from how we react to it.
Most certainly, it offers us a reason to reciprocate their faithfulness, which in turn can be motivated by their informal commitment toward us as we are inclined to assume when talking about “friendship”.

I can feel more confident about the disposition of business partners to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those I decided not to partner with, as much as I can feel more confident about the disposition of friends or relatives to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those who are not my friends or relatives. — neomac

Oh, I see. Emotions = feelings. That's a new one to me.

Oh, I see. Emotions = feelings. — Ludwig V

A part from the fact that what I wrote doesn't presuppose such equation, “emotions" and "feelings" can be legitimately used as synonyms in common usage [1] that is why I didn’t feel the need to delve into their semantic differences. But I can also appreciate more subtle conceptual or psychological analysis. If you feel like providing yours, I can try to be more specific.

[1]
"emotion
noun [ countable-uncountable ]
/ɪˈmoʊʃən/
Add to word list
a feeling or sentiment
émotion [ feminine ]"

source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-french/emotion



Definition of emotion noun from the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary
emotion noun

/ɪˈməʊʃn/

/ɪˈməʊʃn/
[countable, uncountable]

​a strong feeling such as love, fear or anger; the part of a person’s character that consists of feelings
to show/express your emotions
They expressed mixed emotions at the news.
Counselling can teach people to handle negative emotions such as fear and anger.
Fear is a normal human emotion.
This documentary manages to capture the raw emotions of life at the tough end.
Emotions are running high (= people are feeling very excited, angry, etc.).
She showed no emotion at the verdict.
The decision was based on emotion rather than rational thought.
Mary was overcome with emotion.

source: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/emotion?q=emotion

That's a new one to me. — Ludwig V

Besides dictionaries, you can have a look at these entries of the “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”:
The Early Feeling Tradition: Emotions as Feelings
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings

So what of all the thinkers who took mysticism and/or God quite seriously? It's sort of a whose who list from East and West: Plato, Aristotle, Shankara, Plotinus, Augustine, Ghazzali, Aquinas, Proclus, Avicenna, Hegel, etc.

Were they all affected by bias and a lack of intellectual honesty?

But I can also appreciate more subtle conceptual or psychological analysis. If you feel like providing yours, I can try to be more specific. — neomac

I don't have one. But I did wonder about feelings like the feeling of falling, or the feeling of an insect crawling up your arm, or feeling sick (nausea) or dizzy. "Feeling" seems to cover a multitude of sins, some of which count as emotions. Feeling confident is certainly something we say, and you seem to recognize that it is not the same kind of feeling as feeling angry or happy when you call them epistemic. I don't have any intuitive understanding of that category, so I feel somewhat at sea. Oh, and by the way, when I draw a conclusion from a conclusive argument, is that also a feeling?

It certainly is. I'll do my best. — Ludwig V

Okay.

This is the remark that I responded to. — Ludwig V

Right: so we are dealing with the thesis that religious claims are not truth-apt (or in your case, some religious claims are not truth-apt). I think you are the first person in the thread to admit that you believe such a thing, so that's good progress.

This is the remark that I responded to. I took truth-apt to mean true-or-false, (i.e. empirical) and responded because I do think they are not true-or-false. — Ludwig V

Well, I would first say that something which is truth-apt is not necessarily empirical. "3 > 1" is truth-apt, but not empirical, for example. But I would agree that a proposition which is truth-apt is true or false (or else capable of being true or false).

OK. So where do you want to start? — Ludwig V

Well I think <this post> of mine is the thing we have primarily been focused on. The key idea:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos

One would object to this by saying, "In such-and-such a counterexample, S → P, and P is truth-apt, but nevertheless S is not truth-apt." Do you or Wittgenstein have such a counterexample?

In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication. — Ludwig V

Here it seems that you are conceding my point. You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our way of life (S). Nowhere have I claimed that material implication exhausts the point I am making, and therefore your point about material implication does not actually count as an objection to my thesis. In fact I don't see that it has anything specifically to do with material implication. It has to do with implication and the possibility of modus tollens, which was already inherent in the implication relation long before Frege succeeded in introducing material implication. See also:

I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. — Leontiskos

If you want to say that P can invalidate S rather than that P can falsify S, I won't quibble with that. Are we disagreeing on anything more than that?

I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions."

So what of all the thinkers who took mysticism and/or God quite seriously? It's sort of a whose who list from East and West: Plato, Aristotle, Shankara, Plotinus, Augustine, Ghazzali, Aquinas, Proclus, Avicenna, Hegel, etc.

Were they all affected by bias and a lack of intellectual honesty? — Count Timothy von Icarus

They all have their different interpretations, which rather supports my point―the interpretation is not the experience. I take mystical experiences very seriously myself, having had quite a few of them and I think it is evident that they may be life-altering―I just don't believe they can be used to rationally justify any particular metaphysics or set of religious beliefs.

Logical, mathematical and empirical truths are "one for all", not so much metaphysical "truths".
— Janus

That's nonsense, and evidence for this is the fact that you put 'truths' in scare quotes. You yourself know that you are not talking about truths when you talk about things that are not true for all. — Leontiskos

"Truths" as I intended it translates to "purported truths". That people may imagine metaphysical conjectures to be truths does not mean they are. Some Buddhists believe we will all be reborn, and some Christians believe we will be resurrected―they can't both be true. Some Buddhists say there is no individual soul, some Vedantists say there is an individual soul, and most Christians believe there is an immortal individual soul―they can't all be true.

That's right. I was feeling for the point at which dogma etc. becomes a problem that needs to be addressed by social action. Which is a delicate but important matter. — Ludwig V

I agree it is an important matter. I think religious or political indoctrination of children is immoral and should be illegal. But this is also a delicate matter, and its implementation would be difficult or even impossible in any way that would be generally acceptable.

This seems right to me. I suppose some people might argue that there are intersubjective agreements about metaphysical truths, such as the existence of God or the idea that human beings have a soul. — Tom Storm

While it's true that people may of course agree about metaphysical posits I can't see how those agreements could be well-founded as agreements about empirical and logical posits can be. Even if people agree about metaphysical ideas being true, it is not possible to even accurately compare what they are agreeing about.

"Truths" as I intended it translates to "purported truths". — Janus

Well there's your equivocation. Truth and purported truth are two different things. When you say "truth" and mean "purported truth," you are equivocating in order to try to salvage a bad argument. Everyone knows that purported truths are not the same for all. Nothing notable there.

Have you thought of a reply to <this post> yet?

Well there's your equivocation. Truth and purported truth are two different things. When you say "truth" and mean "purported truth," you are equivocating in order to try to salvage a bad argument. Everyone knows that purported truths are not the same for all. Nothing notable there. — Leontiskos

You're remarkably good at either failing to see the point or at deliberately changing the subject to avoid dealing with what is problematic for your position The point is that metaphyseal posits cannot be more than purported truths in that they fail to be subject to demonstration. That they cannot be more than purported truths was the reason I wrote "metaphysical "truths". Why harp and carp on it when I had already explained that?

I'd say the study of mystical experience as one aspect of human experience is as much a part of phenomenology as the study of any other aspect of human experience.
— Janus

Okay, but doesn't that mean that the study of mystical experience broadly possesses the same sort of "quasi-empirical" nature that you ascribe to phenomenology? To deny this would seem to require that some parts of phenomenology are not quasi-empirical. — Leontiskos

The phenomenological study of mystical experience would consist in investigating the ways in which those experiences seem, just as the phenomenological study of everyday experience consists investigating the ways in which everyday experience seems. Phenomenology is, or least the cogent parts of it are, all about the seeming.

You're remarkably good at either failing to see the point or at deliberately changing the subject to avoid dealing with what is problematic for your position. The point is that metaphyseal posits cannot be more than purported truths in that they fail to be subject to demonstration. That they cannot be more than purported truths was the reason I wrote "metaphysical "truths". Why harp and carp on it when I had already explained that? — Janus

But it has already been pointed out to you in some detail, by multiple persons, that your second sentence here does nothing more than beg the question. People who think metaphysical truths exist also think metaphysical truths are demonstrable. What good is your assertion otherwise? It makes no difference that you say metaphysical truths are not demonstrable, given that you have no argument for your assertion.

This is very close to your failure to justify an anti-slavery position. By all of your own criteria, "Slavery is wrong," is an unfalsifiable metaphysical position. And yet you hold it all the same, without argument or rationale. So you basically hold "metaphysical" positions when you want to, and you object to others holding "metaphysical" positions when you want to, and there is no rational basis in either case. It's just your will. Whatever you want, regardless of arguments.

The phenomenological study of mystical experience would consist in investigating the ways in which those experiences seem, just as the phenomenological study of everyday experience consists investigating the ways in which everyday experience seems. Phenomenology is, or least the cogent parts of it are, all about the seeming. — Janus

So you think phenomenology limits itself to what experiences seem like? Have you read any phenomenology?

They all have their different interpretations, which rather supports my point

Does it? There are differing interpretations vis-á-vis everything. This seems like an appeal to consensus as truth. But I think it's fairly obvious that this is a poor measure of truth. If having many interpretations means there is no fact of the matter, then there can be no truth for indecisive murder cases either, since interpretations vary. So did no one in particular kill the victim? You virtually always have varying interpretations about the effects of economic policies before they have been implemented. Is there no truth of the matter about what their effects will be? Clearly, this applies as well to all manner of historical analysis and questions of history. And it would apply equally to the whole of ethics and aesthetics.

On the flip side of consensus, earlier you said racism was irrational. Yet there was previously scientific consensus about the superiority of different races in many respects. So too vis-á-vis sex, etc.

People who think metaphysical truths exist also think metaphysical truths are demonstrable. — Leontiskos

They are obviously not demonstrable to the unbiased, not matter how much the biased might beleive them to be.

This is very close to your failure to justify an anti-slavery position. By all of your own criteria, "Slavery is wrong," is an unfalsifiable metaphysical position. And yet you hold it all the same, without argument or rationale. So you basically hold "metaphysical" positions when you want to, and you object to others holding "metaphysical" positions when you want to, and there is no rational basis in either case. It's just your will. Whatever you want, regardless of arguments. — Leontiskos

Your reading skills are truly woeful if you are writing honestly here. I have said many times I hold some positions which are not demonstrable, just because they seem intuitively right to me. I have also said I think it is fine for others to do the same. I have also said that I see no reason to expect others to agree with me about my intuitively held beliefs. The problem is when people conflate such intuitively held beliefs to be absolute truth.

You argue that metaphysical truths are demonstrable and yet you cannot explain how they could be demonstrated. All you do, over and over, is deflect in order to avoid answering that one very hard question.

So you think phenomenology limits itself to what experiences seem like? Have you read any phenomenology? — Leontiskos

:roll: I was interested in phenomenology for many years and took undergraduate units in Heidegger and Husserl. How about you?

This is typical of your style― cast aspersions by asking leading question instead of addressing your interlocutor in good faith. If you disagree that phenomenology consists in reflecting on human experience in order to discover how it appears to us while bracketing metaphysical inferences, then give your account.

I thought I'd give you another chance to discuss things in good faith but if you don't up your game I'll just go back to ignoring you.

There are differing interpretations vis-á-vis everything. This seems like an appeal to consensus as truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Truth is not a matter of interpretation―if something is true it is simply true. Beliefs are matters of interpretation. Don't conflate belief with truth and much confusion will clear up for you.

They are obviously not demonstrable to the unbiased — Janus

:lol:

You may as well just put an exclamation point on the end of your assertion and pretend that you have done something philosophical. Each time I point out the problem you can add an extra exclamation point.

Your reading skills are truly woeful if you are writing honestly here. I have said many time I hold some positions which are not demonstrable, just because they seem intuitively right to me. I have also said I think it is fine for others to do the same. I have also said that I see no reason to expect others to agree with me about my intuitively held beliefs. The problem is when people conflate such intuitively held beliefs to be absolute truth. — Janus

Is the thing that "seems intuitively right to me" truth-apt? Isn't it precisely, "The thing that seems intuitively true to me"? And so the ever-looming question asks what is meant by these strange utterances such as, "Absolute truth." Does it seem intuitively true to you, but not intuitively absolutely true? Are these distinctions really thought to be meaningful?

You argue that metaphysical truths are demonstrable and yet you cannot explain how they could be demonstrated. — Janus

I don't think you even know what a "metaphysical truth" is. It is not a stable category for you. Apparently you think that everything which is "indemonstrable" is "metaphysical." And apparently if we came up with a demonstration for something that previously lacked one, then it would magically transform from a metaphysical claim into a non-metaphysical claim. None of this is principled reasoning, and it is pretty hard to answer your request when you don't even know what you mean by a "metaphysical truth."

A well-accepted metaphysical truth would be the PNC, which Aristotle argues for in Meta IV. And given your remarkably strong reliance on intersubjective agreement, the PNC must be a demonstrable metaphysical truth (since virtually everyone recognizes it).

:roll: I was interested in phenomenology for many years and took undergraduate units in Heidegger and Husserl. How about you? — Janus

And you think Heidegger and Husserl limit themselves to what experiences seem like?

The point here is that you called phenomenology "quasi-empirical," and then you said that mysticism is a variety of phenomenology. I am wondering if you therefore deem mysticism quasi-empirical.

They are obviously not demonstrable to the unbiased, not matter how much the biased might beleive them to be.

Or perhaps not to the biased.

Your reading skills are truly woeful if you are writing honestly here. I have said many time I hold some positions which are not demonstrable, just because they seem intuitively right to me. I have also said I think it is fine for others to do the same. I have also said that I see no reason to expect others to agree with me about my intuitively held beliefs.

Earlier you said non-demonstrable beliefs have absolutely no business in politics. So apparently anti-slavery beliefs should sit out of public life? Would it be inappropriate bias to object to slavery as a matter of law?