After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus!" — James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson
This is nowadays taught as an example of an informal fallacy ('argumentum ad lapidem') — Wayfarer
Appeal to the stone, also known as argumentum ad lapidem, is a logical fallacy that dismisses an argument as untrue or absurd. The dismissal is made by stating or reiterating that the argument is absurd, without providing further argumentation. — Wikipedia
I don't think it's hard to see that Johnson is not doing this. — Leontiskos
What is his argument?
If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
But it did happen.
Therefore, Berkeley is wrong. — Leontiskos
But it's equally the case that Johnson misunderstands Berkeley. Johnson is intending to demonstrate that Berkeley's argument entails that the stone does not really exist, but Berkeley doesn't make such a claim. — Wayfarer
What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question. — Leontiskos
Johnson's exclamation is the historical origin of the expression 'argumentum ad lapidem'. — Wayfarer
I’d rather not be accused of making accusations — Wayfarer
Your arguments against, I'm afraid, really are just re-statements of Samuel Johnson's 'appeal to the stone' - even down to your choice of representative object! — Wayfarer
He points out that these are not available to conscious perception and raises the question of how they continue to exist "unperceived," as it were. All well and good—but need they be consciously perceived in Berkeley’s view? — Wayfarer
Similarly, when we analyze the body's systems, we don’t directly access 'the body as it is' but only the intelligible structure as it appears through layers of interpretation. In this way, both the stone and Johnson’s body remain phenomena structured and experienced within the bounds of perception and thought. — Wayfarer
What is his argument?
1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
2. But it did happen.
3. Therefore, Berkeley is wrong. — Leontiskos
You might be giving Berkeley a little more credit here than he deserves. "When Berkeley (1685-1753) was questioned as to how objects could continue to be when no-one was perceiving them, he claimed they were still in the mind of God." Berkely still requires that something 'observe' what exists for it to exist. — Philosophim
So does Tallis’ argument effectively challenge Berkeley’s idealism — Wayfarer
I think the question is whether sense of self is direct or indirect. If it were direct, then it would seem that there is nothing I would not know about myself. I would be fully transparent to myself. If it is indirect, then self-consciousness is not always present. — Leontiskos
My own body, however, delivers more to justify the intuition that it has a being that goes beyond perception.
For a start, the extent to which I experientially access my own body is very limited, and variable. Many of my organs, and most of the processes that take place in them, are hidden from me; and yet they are the continuous necessary conditions of my being alive and perceiving anything. I don’t know about you, but my lymphatic system has given me no notice of its essential existence over the many years of my life, but I wouldn’t be without it. More to the point, there is the necessary, if implicit, role of parts of my body of which I am unaware, or only patchily aware, when I perform ordinary actions. — Tallis
and obviously just intentionally designed to produce the conclusion desired — Metaphysician Undercover
Which of course runs into major problems when you ask, "So uh...how does God exist?" A common fallacy of, "Everything must follow the rule except this one exception that I need to make the rule work" — Philosophim
But is Berkeley really saying that? — Philosophim
This level of analysis is admittedly more sophisticated than anything Berkeley offered, but it is still consonant with his overall philosophy — Wayfarer
if Berkeley says that God constantly perceives Tallis' lymphatic system, Tallis might ask whether that sort of reliance on God constitutes a falsifiable claim. — Leontiskos
Most of this seems to depend on just what definition of 'matter' we place in Berkeley's mouth. — Leontiskos
You should know better than to confuse the metaphysical with the empirical. The point of the principle of falsifiability was to be able to distinguish metaphysical from empirical claims, but it does not aim to falsify metaphysics. In other words, a metaphysical posit is not challenged by its not being falsifiable. — Wayfarer
You’re right that much of our own minds and bodies remains unperceived from our subjective perspective. But when we turn our attention to these unperceived attributes—whether mental or physical—they are thereby brought into the realm of perception and cognition. — Wayfarer
I don't grant your imputation of specious motive. — Leontiskos
clearly designed for the purpose of that refutation — Metaphysician Undercover
The conclusion "this act refutes Berkeley" is only derived if the very dubious premise (this act will refute Berkeley), which is designed specifically for that purpose, of refuting Berkeley, is accepted. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's called the principle of sufficient reason — Leontiskos
Berkeley's claim that matter does not exist — Leontiskos
When we perceive an object what is it for us? Berkeley suggests that it a collection of all the ideas (perceptions) conveyed to us by our senses. Take an apple: “a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name 'apple'”. If you take away those ideas given by the senses, there is nothing left of the apple, not even its solidity nor the space it takes up.
Given this, why presume there is some external substance that is causing perceptions? If we lose this concept, how does that affect what really exists? It doesn’t affect it at all, says Berkeley: “The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter…Pray what do the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, etc, we have them still”
Instead, Berkeley argues that our talk of existence is purely talk of ideas, or potential ideas: “The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit (or mind) actually does perceive it”. And from this Berkeley argues that the idea of an sensible object that cannot be perceived is incoherent – it is essential to it that it must be possible to perceive it. Thus, all sensible objects are necessarily dependant on minds. — I Refute Him Thus! Misunderstanding Berkeley
Kastrup has no need for a personal god. Mind-at-Large lacks intentionality, isn't a personal being, and doesn’t function as a source of morality or any of the other theological elements one might associate with divinity. — Tom Storm
My formulation of idealism differs from Berkeley's subjective idealism in at least two points: (a) I argue for a single subject, explaining the apparent multiplicity of subjects as a top-down dissociative process. Berkeley never addressed this issue directly, implicitly assuming many subjects; and (b) I argue that the cognition of the non-dissociated aspect of mind-at-large ('God' in Berkeley's formulation) is not human-like, so it experiences the world in a manner incommensurable with human perception (details in this essay). In Berkeley's formulation, God perceives the world just as we do.
Every premise is designed for the purpose of the conclusion, and every premise of a refutation is designed for the purpose of the refutation. Perhaps you are the one begging the question, here. — Leontiskos
That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusion — Leontiskos
You are neglecting a key point, the need to have truthful premises, in order for the conclusion to be sound. — Metaphysician Undercover
Designing your premise for the purpose of producing a specific conclusion with disregard for the truth or falsity — Metaphysician Undercover
IMO, the more appropriate criticism of Berkeley is that his philosophy is shallow — Count Timothy von Icarus
Now granted, the critique of subsistent "matter" taken alone is stronger, but I feel like there are a lot of people who do this better. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And Johnson thinks it is true, as does Tallis. If you think it is false then what you need to do is argue against it, not cry "fallacy!" Note that you haven't managed to address Tallis' argument at all, and Tallis is defending (1). — Leontiskos
Again, you are just imputing specious motives to Johnson. I see no reason to impute such motives, and that sort of psychologism/mind reading is bad philosophy. If you have an argument, offer it. If all you are going to do is say, "I did some mind-reading and found a bad motive," then you're not doing philosophy. — Leontiskos
To me, thinking that such a premise is true, just demonstrates a lack of understanding of Berkeley, — Metaphysician Undercover
What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question. — Leontiskos
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