• Wayfarer
    23.5k
    @Banno pointed me to a recent OP by British philosopher Raymond Tallis, on the Philosophy Now site (thanks!) commenting on Johnson's 'refutation from the stone', to which this famous exclamation is a reference. It is Samuel Johnson's supposed refutation of Bishop George Berkeley's idealist (or immaterialist) philosophy. (The OP appears to be not paywalled (although there's a limit to free reads on their site) so readers can peruse it at their leisure. But as I want to offer a critique of Tallis' critique it is probably advisable to have a look at it first.)

    After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus!" — James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson

    This is nowadays taught as an example of an informal fallacy ('argumentum ad lapidem'), on the basis that it does not satisfactorily come to terms with the theory it is intended to refute, but rather merely amounts to an assertion or a claim that the argument it opposes is obviously absurd.

    In order to assess this, it is necessary to recall what Johnson was so indignant about. Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) is known in the history of philosophy as an empiricist, but also as an idealist. Coining the famous aphorism 'esse est percipe', Berkeley denied that matter was an independently-existing substance (in the philosophical sense, as the bearer of attributes.) It may seem puzzling to be both empiricist and idealist, but Berkeley had seized upon the principle articulated by other empiricists, Locke and Hume, that all knowledge is acquired by way of sensory impressions.

    In Berkeley's philosophy, 'there are only two kinds of things: spirits and ideas. Spirits are simple, active beings which produce and perceive ideas; ideas are passive beings which are produced and perceived' 1. His concept of 'spirit' seems something like the abstract form of 'the conscious subject' or 'observing mind' (bearing in mind that for Berkeley, the mind of God was an omnipresent observer), and his concept of 'idea' is close to the concept of 'sense-object' or 'phenomenal object'.

    It's important to note that while Berkeley denied the existence of matter as a metaphysical substance - again, recalling the philosophical, as distinct from everyday, use of that term - he did not deny the existence of physical objects such as apples or mountains, saying "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it." (Principles #35). Berkeley’s idealism is often misinterpreted as denying the reality of objects, but his point is that their reality consists in being perceived, either by finite minds or the divine mind, ensuring coherence and continuity in the world.2

    On reading Tallis' analysis, my initial reaction was that it is based on a rather shallow interpretation of what Berkeley intends by 'perception'. I think one could respond to Tallis by saying that idealism understands that cognition comprises many layers, not all of which are conscious or the same as my perception of an object (although admittedly, this might not be something Berkeley makes explicit.) For Berkeley, perception encompasses the whole experience of the world as presented to the mind. In this sense, perception is not just the reception of sensory data but relies on a divinely mediated intelligibility that underpins the coherence of the experienced world.

    Tallis gives the example of the lymphatic system, which we, as subjects, are unaware of, but without which we would surely perish. The same can be said for many para-sympathetic and unconscious metabolic and cognitive processes that underpin our cognitive abilities. He points out that these are not available to conscious perception and raises the question of how they continue to exist "unperceived," as it were. All well and good—but need they be consciously perceived in Berkeley’s view? Tallis’ focus on the layers of material complexity underpinning Johnson’s body and the composition of the stone presumes that the existence of these unperceived levels reinforces the independence of material objects and organic processes from perception. However, each of these layers—the lymphatic and cognitive systems, on the one side, and the stone’s chemical composition and physical characteristics, on the other—are only known to us through conceptual and perceptual frameworks, including scientific theories, which we bring to bear in understanding them. In other words, these layers are not directly available in the act of perceiving the stone, but if we include them in our consideration of the act of knowing, they are themselves presented to us as what Berkeley would call "ideas."

    Likewise, when we analyze the stone, breaking it down into its molecular structure, atomic composition, or even quantum fields, what we uncover are not "things-in-themselves" ( a material substance in Berkeley's terms) but rather representations within our scientific and perceptual models. For Berkeley, what we encounter are representations all the way down—not of an independent material substance, but of ideas structured and sustained by mind. The layers of analysis Tallis invokes ultimately reinforce this view rather than refuting it, as such representations are deeply tied to our cognitive capacities, conceptual schemas, and observational tools (This level of analysis is admittedly more sophisticated than anything Berkeley offered, but it is still consonant with his overall philosophy, although made much more explicit in the later forms of idealism such as Kant's and Schopenhauer's). Similarly, when we analyze the body's systems, we don’t directly access 'the body as it is' but only the intelligible structure as it appears through layers of interpretation. In this way, both the stone and Johnson’s body remain phenomena structured and experienced within the bounds of perception and thought.

    Elsewhere, Raymond Tallis is a staunch critic of philosophical materialism, for instance in his books such as Aping Mankind. While he is not defending materialism here, his depiction of idealism seems to fall back on assumptions about material reality that he critiques in other contexts.

    So does Tallis’ argument effectively challenge Berkeley’s idealism, or does it reveal a deeper reliance on the very conceptual frameworks that idealism critiques? And how might more recent developments in philosophy and science, such as quantum mechanics and cognitive science, have bearing on this debate?

    -----

    1 Bettcher T. M: Berkeley: A Guide for the Perplexed, Continuum Publishing, 2008. p. 14.

    2 There are good updated translations of Berkeley's writings presented on the Early Modern Texts website.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    This is nowadays taught as an example of an informal fallacy ('argumentum ad lapidem')Wayfarer

    I have never heard it taught that way. It seems like an erroneous reading. Here is what Wikipedia says:

    Appeal to the stone, also known as argumentum ad lapidem, is a logical fallacy that dismisses an argument as untrue or absurd. The dismissal is made by stating or reiterating that the argument is absurd, without providing further argumentation.Wikipedia

    I don't think it's hard to see that Johnson is not doing this. He is not saying, "You're wrong because you're wrong." In fact he is giving an argument, not begging the question. What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question.

    What is his argument?

    1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
    2. But it did happen.
    3. Therefore, Berkeley is wrong.

    Note that this is perfectly valid. You are merely disputing premise (1).

    Further, how does one dispute premise (1) without themselves begging the question? They must explicate Berkeley's theory at least to the extent that a rejection of (1) is understood not to be an ad hoc rejection. That is, the listener has to come away saying, "Ah, I see what Berkeley was saying, why he was saying it, and why it does not entail (1)." That's basically the question: supposing Johnson's first premise is false, then what does follow from Berkeley's "idealism"?

    (I've read the article, but I want to revisit Berkeley before I would comment on it.)
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    I don't think it's hard to see that Johnson is not doing this.Leontiskos

    Johnson's exclamation is the historical origin of the expression 'argumentum ad lapidem'.

    What is his argument?

    If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
    But it did happen.
    Therefore, Berkeley is wrong.
    Leontiskos

    But it's equally the case that Johnson misunderstands Berkeley. Johnson is intending to demonstrate that Berkeley's argument entails that the stone does not really exist, but Berkeley doesn't make such a claim. Berkeley himself acknowledges that 'I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.' His argument is not that stones, and feet, do not exist, but that there is no material substance apart from and separate to the manifold impressions that the stone makes on our sensory organs (including the sense of touch).

    The composition and nature of the stone is a matter for physical chemistry and physics. And it is nowadays well known that minute analysis of the stone reveals ever-smaller components or particles from which it is composed, until the sub-atomic level is reached, at which point the nature of the so-called components of matter, if that is what 'material substance' is supposed to comprise, becomes quite ambiguous. In fact modern sub-atomic physics has not done much to support the kind of 'argument' that Johnson is proposing.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    But it's equally the case that Johnson misunderstands Berkeley. Johnson is intending to demonstrate that Berkeley's argument entails that the stone does not really exist, but Berkeley doesn't make such a claim.Wayfarer

    And therefore:

    What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question.Leontiskos

    I clarify this because you have accused others (including myself) of the so-called "argumentum ad lapidem," and so it is worth recognizing that it is not the informal fallacy of begging the question (which is what the Wikipedia writer is really claiming). Both are informal fallacies, but one requires a response/clarification and one does not.

    Ignoratio Elenchi

    Johnson's exclamation is the historical origin of the expression 'argumentum ad lapidem'.Wayfarer

    If Wikipedia says that Johnson was begging the question, then I say that Wikipedia is wrong. It happens.
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    Johnson’s claim is demonstrably ‘an appeal to the stone’, hence the description. I’d rather not be accused of making accusations, but I will sometimes point out that it is common for arguments against idealism to rely on similar objections.

    Also I think there are grounds on which Berkeley can be criticized, I certainly don’t regard him as having the last word on the subject. I’m specifically taking issue with Tallis’ argument.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    I’d rather not be accused of making accusationsWayfarer

    Well <here> is the accusation I had in mind, and I pointed out the same error in two subsequent posts, here and here.

    I think it is important to understand that Johnson is not begging the question, but the point is made and I'll leave it there.
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    Right. I said

    Your arguments against, I'm afraid, really are just re-statements of Samuel Johnson's 'appeal to the stone' - even down to your choice of representative object!Wayfarer

    I didn't mean it an accusation, but as counter-argument. Anyway, I revisited your objections in this more recent post (and the one immediately after with the supporting quote from Schopenhauer.)
  • Philosophim
    2.8k
    You might be giving Berkeley a little more credit here than he deserves. "When Berkeley (1685-1753) was questioned as to how objects could continue to be when no-one was perceiving them, he claimed they were still in the mind of God." Berkely still requires that something 'observe' what exists for it to exist. Which of course runs into major problems when you ask, "So uh...how does God exist?" A common fallacy of, "Everything must follow the rule except this one exception that I need to make the rule work"

    He points out that these are not available to conscious perception and raises the question of how they continue to exist "unperceived," as it were. All well and good—but need they be consciously perceived in Berkeley’s view?Wayfarer

    Conscious or unconscious I don't think is relevant as long as they are held within a mind. I think Berkeley is clear about that. It doesn't have to be perceived by us per say, but something like God. Thus humanity could be completely ignorant of any science and it still exist.

    Similarly, when we analyze the body's systems, we don’t directly access 'the body as it is' but only the intelligible structure as it appears through layers of interpretation. In this way, both the stone and Johnson’s body remain phenomena structured and experienced within the bounds of perception and thought.Wayfarer

    This is a fantastic analysis of knowledge vs truth. But is Berkeley really saying that? Perhaps Berkeley flirted with this a bit like so many do, but ultimately didn't fully realize it as he had to rely on God for his philosophy to work. This is of course based on the information presented here and in the article. If you can find a part of Berkeley's work where he doesn't ultimately rely on God when a human cannot perceive what exists, feel free to post it.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.5k
    What is his argument?

    1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
    2. But it did happen.
    3. Therefore, Berkeley is wrong.
    Leontiskos

    I think the issue is that premise #1 is wrong, false for the reason explained by Wayfarer. Since that premise is false, and obviously just intentionally designed to produce the conclusion desired, it is a matter of begging the question.

    You might be giving Berkeley a little more credit here than he deserves. "When Berkeley (1685-1753) was questioned as to how objects could continue to be when no-one was perceiving them, he claimed they were still in the mind of God." Berkely still requires that something 'observe' what exists for it to exist.Philosophim

    I think this is the real issue. "Matter" is a concept developed by Aristotle to account for the observed temporal continuity of bodies, objects, which are actively changing. Both Hume and Newton take this temporal continuity for granted, as "inertia", but they assign it to the temporal extension of the activity, the motion, rather than assigning it to a substantial body or object, as Aristotle did.

    As Berkely shows, the concept of "matter" is unnecessary, so the assumption of an underlying continuous body, or object is likewise unnecessary. Furthermore, it is impossible that "matter" by its proper conception, has properties, because properties are formal. This allows that whatever is referred to by "inertia", cannot be a property of matter, but it can effectively replace the concept of "matter", to account for the observed temporal continuity. As a result, temporal continuity is no longer restricted to bodies or objects, but is allowed to be a feature of motion itself. Motion itself is "the object", with the property of temporal continuity, and there is no need to assume a body which is moving, thereby enabling the concept of "energy" as an existent thing.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    So does Tallis’ argument effectively challenge Berkeley’s idealismWayfarer

    I think it's at least reasonable. He seems to be saying that we know matter exists in the first place because of our experience of our body, and it is the interaction of Johnson's material body with the object of the rock that secures the conclusion that the rock is material. I said something similar to Tallis' premise recently:

    I think the question is whether sense of self is direct or indirect. If it were direct, then it would seem that there is nothing I would not know about myself. I would be fully transparent to myself. If it is indirect, then self-consciousness is not always present.Leontiskos

    Experience of our bodies shows us that there are existing things which are important and yet are not perceived:

    My own body, however, delivers more to justify the intuition that it has a being that goes beyond perception.

    For a start, the extent to which I experientially access my own body is very limited, and variable. Many of my organs, and most of the processes that take place in them, are hidden from me; and yet they are the continuous necessary conditions of my being alive and perceiving anything. I don’t know about you, but my lymphatic system has given me no notice of its essential existence over the many years of my life, but I wouldn’t be without it. More to the point, there is the necessary, if implicit, role of parts of my body of which I am unaware, or only patchily aware, when I perform ordinary actions.
    Tallis

    • If my lymphatic system did not exist, then I would not exist.
    • But I do exist.
    • Therefore, my lymphatic system exists.
    • But my lymphatic system is not generally perceived.
    • Therefore, unperceived things exist (i.e. matter).

    And if Berkeley says that God constantly perceives Tallis' lymphatic system, Tallis might ask whether that sort of reliance on God constitutes a falsifiable claim.

    Most of this seems to depend on just what definition of 'matter' we place in Berkeley's mouth.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    and obviously just intentionally designed to produce the conclusion desiredMetaphysician Undercover

    I don't grant your imputation of specious motive.
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    Which of course runs into major problems when you ask, "So uh...how does God exist?" A common fallacy of, "Everything must follow the rule except this one exception that I need to make the rule work"Philosophim

    I think it's extremely hard to fathom the sense in which God exists. I don't want to drag the thread into the direction of theology, except to say that God does not exist in the same sense that objects do.

    Reveal
    (In neoplatonic philosophy, which provided the philosophical framework for later theology, the ground of existence is not itself something that exists. The ultimate source or ground of being transcends existence, beyond coming to be and passing away, prior to and more fundamental than discrete existential categories subjects. This is expressed by the Neoplatonic "One", the ineffable, unqualified source from which all existence emanates, but which cannot be directly characterized as something that exists. See 'God does not Exist'. )

    But is Berkeley really saying that?Philosophim

    Fair point! As I acknowledged in the OP:

    This level of analysis is admittedly more sophisticated than anything Berkeley offered, but it is still consonant with his overall philosophyWayfarer

    But, now you mention it, and as I've brought Berkeley up, I will spend some time perusing the excellent translations in Early Modern Texts to see if I can find more support for my argument (although not today, regrettably, domestic duties call.)
    if Berkeley says that God constantly perceives Tallis' lymphatic system, Tallis might ask whether that sort of reliance on God constitutes a falsifiable claim.Leontiskos

    You should know better than to confuse the metaphysical with the empirical. The point of the principle of falsifiability was to be able to distinguish metaphysical from empirical claims, but it does not aim to falsify metaphysics. In other words, a metaphysical posit is not challenged by its not being falsifiable.

    Most of this seems to depend on just what definition of 'matter' we place in Berkeley's mouth.Leontiskos

    Berkeley's definition is material substance, but 'substance' here in the philosophical sense of 'the bearer of attributes', not a 'particular kind of matter with uniform properties' (which is the usual meaning). Berkeley rejected the commonsense notion of matter as an independently existing substance with intrinsic properties, instead saying that what we consider to be matter is in reality a collection or an aggregate of sensory experiences and perceptions. Objects are aggregates of sensible qualities like color, shape, hardness, and texture, which only exist when they are being perceived by an observer. His system fills in the obvious lacuna in that account by positing the Divine Intellect as a universal observer.

    You’re right that much of our own minds and bodies remains unperceived from our subjective perspective. But when we turn our attention to these unperceived attributes—whether mental or physical—they are thereby brought into the realm of perception and cognition. I think this points to a broader idealist insight (perhaps more up-to-date than Berkeley himself articulated): that what we know of the world is always mediated by mind, whether it’s directly or only potentially perceived. While Berkeley’s account may not fully address these layers of cognition, his core claim—that existence is tied to being perceived or perceivable—remains cogent.

    (That's all for today I'm afd till tomorrow, but thank you for your comments.)
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    You should know better than to confuse the metaphysical with the empirical. The point of the principle of falsifiability was to be able to distinguish metaphysical from empirical claims, but it does not aim to falsify metaphysics. In other words, a metaphysical posit is not challenged by its not being falsifiable.Wayfarer

    No, I don't think that's right at all. The same principle holds in metaphysics, or more generally, in argument of any kind. It's called the principle of sufficient reason. If there is no possibility of refuting Berkeley's claim, then it transgresses the principle of sufficient reason (for in that case Berkeley has no reason to assert it). Falsifiability is not limited to empirical matters; it's just that in non-empirical matters the falsification takes a non-empirical form.

    You’re right that much of our own minds and bodies remains unperceived from our subjective perspective. But when we turn our attention to these unperceived attributes—whether mental or physical—they are thereby brought into the realm of perception and cognition.Wayfarer

    Sure, but Tallis' point stands. The lymphatic system continues to sustain us, perceived or unperceived. Tallis would not disagree that perceptible objects can be perceived at one time and unperceived at another.

    The reason Johnson's argument is curious at all is because Berkeley's claim that matter does not exist is so implausible. Or in other words: Berkeley has the burden of proof. If he didn't, then Johnson's action would not attract as much attention as it has.

    I really don't know Berkeley well enough to say how he would interact with Tallis, but Tallis' paper is somewhat interesting.
  • Manuel
    4.2k
    I think Tallis is awesome, probably my favorite contemporary philosopher actually. But as with anything, he has good stuff and less good stuff.

    What's kind of surprising in many of these conversations is that people don't bother to spell out what they mean when they say "materialism", "immaterialism", "Idealism", "mentalism", "neutral monism", etc.

    He simply assumes people will know what he means. I can only surmise that he thinks that "materialism" implies solidity. Why is this so self-evident given how much more sophisticated out understanding of matter is.

    And as others have pointed out, that something is solid does not imply anything about the ontological status of the object.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.5k
    I don't grant your imputation of specious motive.Leontiskos

    Why not? The motive of refutation is obvious, even explicit, "I refute it thus". And the premise you stated "1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen." is arguably false, and clearly designed for the purpose of that refutation. It looks like a very clear cut example of begging the question to me.

    The conclusion "this act refutes Berkeley" is only derived if the very dubious premise (this act will refute Berkeley), which is designed specifically for that purpose, of refuting Berkeley, is accepted. One could not imagine a better example of begging the question.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    clearly designed for the purpose of that refutationMetaphysician Undercover

    Every premise is designed for the purpose of the conclusion, and every premise of a refutation is designed for the purpose of the refutation. Perhaps you are the one begging the question, here.

    The conclusion "this act refutes Berkeley" is only derived if the very dubious premise (this act will refute Berkeley), which is designed specifically for that purpose, of refuting Berkeley, is accepted.Metaphysician Undercover

    That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusion. This whole thread is a testament to the fact that it is not dubious, for the precise point of Tallis' paper is to show that it is not even an ignoratio elenchus, much less a begging of the question. "In what follows, I want to persuade you that the stone-kicking may deliver more than may be apparent at first sight."
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    It's called the principle of sufficient reasonLeontiskos

    Completely different to the principle of falsifiability, you’re shifting the goal posts.

    Berkeley's claim that matter does not existLeontiskos

    But you're misinterpreting Berkeley in exactly the same way Johnson did, which is why Johnson's response was a fallacy. Berkeley does not deny the existence of objects - that has already been shown. Kick a rock, and it hurts your foot. Picked up and thrown, a stone will break a window. No contest! What Berkeley is denying is the reality of a material substance, of 'matter' as an abstraction that is separate from the experiential qualities of objects.

    For Berkeley, the reality of objects consists entirely in their experiential qualities—what is seen, touched, or otherwise perceived. The notion of 'matter' as an abstraction existing independently of those qualities adds nothing to our understanding and, in his view, is incoherent.

    When we perceive an object what is it for us? Berkeley suggests that it a collection of all the ideas (perceptions) conveyed to us by our senses. Take an apple: “a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name 'apple'”. If you take away those ideas given by the senses, there is nothing left of the apple, not even its solidity nor the space it takes up.

    Given this, why presume there is some external substance that is causing perceptions? If we lose this concept, how does that affect what really exists? It doesn’t affect it at all, says Berkeley: “The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter…Pray what do the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, etc, we have them still”

    Instead, Berkeley argues that our talk of existence is purely talk of ideas, or potential ideas: “The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit (or mind) actually does perceive it”. And from this Berkeley argues that the idea of an sensible object that cannot be perceived is incoherent – it is essential to it that it must be possible to perceive it. Thus, all sensible objects are necessarily dependant on minds.
    I Refute Him Thus! Misunderstanding Berkeley

    The Meaning of 'Substance' in Berkeley

    As mentioned in the original post, here we're dealing with claims about substance in the philosophical, not everyday, sense. This is derived from Aristotle's metaphysics, via the Latin translation of the Greek 'ousia'. But Aristotle doesn’t treat matter (hyle) as a substance in its own right. For Aristotle, matter is pure potentiality (dynamis)— a potential something that is not yet actualized. On its own, matter is indeterminate and without form. Form (eidos) is what actualizes matter, giving it structure, purpose, and identity. It is through form that matter becomes a substance—a unified entity that can exist and be identified. So the idea of a 'material substance' would be equally incompatible with Aristotelian metaphysics (and this is so, even while acknowledging that Berkeley, with his rejection of universals, was far from Aristotelian.)

    In essence, Berkeley’s rejection of material substance is a critique of the early modern philosophers (specifically Descartes and Locke) who inherited and transformed Aristotelian metaphysics into the notion of a "material substratum." For Locke, material substance was posited as the "unknown support" underlying sensible qualities, but something inherently beyond perception, and of which we only receive impressions (the basis of Locke's representative realism). For Descartes, matter was res extensa, entirely lacking in intelligence and possessing only spatial extension, all of the functions of intelligence residing in res cogitans, the so-called 'thinking substance'.

    Berkeley attacks these ideas, arguing that a material substance, as conceived by the early moderns, is a metaphysical fiction. We never perceive it directly, nor do we have any coherent idea of what it is. Instead of positing a mysterious "substratum," Berkeley simplifies the metaphysics: reality consists of ideas in minds, and there is no need for an independent material "substance." This is what Berkeley sees as incoherent. And I believe it is!

  • Tom Storm
    9.4k
    Yes - I think of Berkeley as somewhat similar in his conception to the contemporary thinker Bernardo Kastrup. Instead of a God, Kastrup posits a "Mind-at-Large" - an all-encompassing, transpersonal consciousness that serves as the source of reality. All of our experiences and notions of "the real" are participations in this one great mind. This seems to align with Paul Tillich's idea of the "ground of being."

    Of course, not being a clergyman or bound by theological traditions, Kastrup has no need for a personal god. Mind-at-Large lacks intentionality, isn't a personal being, and doesn’t function as a source of morality or any of the other theological elements one might associate with divinity.

    Just out of interest, do you interpret Carl Jung as an idealist in the way Kastrup does? It seems like it could offer a better explanation of the collective unconscious and shared human symbolism; something they never really clarified when I studied Jung.
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    Reveal
    I've always seen Jung as a gnostic, first and foremost (and even before I had studied gnosticism.) His collective unconscious and the archetypal forms are contemporary forms of classical understandings in esoteric philosophy. There have been comparisons between Jung's collective unconscious and the Buddhist Ālayavijñāna, the 'storehouse consciousness' of Yogācāra (mind-only) Buddhism (with which there are many convergences with Berkeley although also differences.)

    As for Kastrup's 'mind at large;' I wrote an essay on Medium about that, although it's unlisted as I'm not entirely happy with it. The salient point that I was concerned with, was the inevitable tendency to objectify the 'mind at large' as some kind of really existing entity, which is a fatal mistake in this matter. It is the tendency towards reification (thing-ifying) which is the most insuperable problem for the modern mindset. The antidote to it can only be the 'way of negation' and of unknowing: we don't and can't see the mind, because we are it, it is never something other to us. (I think this is something which is fundamental in Heidegger, although I'm not a Heidegger scholar.)

    Kastrup has no need for a personal god. Mind-at-Large lacks intentionality, isn't a personal being, and doesn’t function as a source of morality or any of the other theological elements one might associate with divinity.Tom Storm

    I don't know if he would agree with 'it doesn't function as a source of morality'. If you look at his books More than Allegory and Brief Peaks Beyond, as well as his online discussions with Swami Sarvapriyananda from the NY Vedanta Centre, they're suffused with references to mystical spirituality.
  • Tom Storm
    9.4k
    Hmm - I wish I could find the quotes by Kastrup - I'm sure he has written and stated in interviews that mind-at-large is "not metacognitive and is purely instinctive" and that morality is invented by humans to organise their preferred approach to manage power. But how one understands "humans" given what he says about our ontological status is complex.

    This is how he differentiates himself from Berkeley - and it's highly ingenious. It's from his blog dated August 2015.

    My formulation of idealism differs from Berkeley's subjective idealism in at least two points: (a) I argue for a single subject, explaining the apparent multiplicity of subjects as a top-down dissociative process. Berkeley never addressed this issue directly, implicitly assuming many subjects; and (b) I argue that the cognition of the non-dissociated aspect of mind-at-large ('God' in Berkeley's formulation) is not human-like, so it experiences the world in a manner incommensurable with human perception (details in this essay). In Berkeley's formulation, God perceives the world just as we do.

    In other words, we are all dissociated alters of one great mind. We are all expressions of The One - a familiar spiritual axiom.
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    Surely Kastrup’s overall aim is to advocate what he says is the truth of idealism as opposed to the ‘baloney’ of materialism. I can’t see how that doesn’t have ethical implications, if only because of his conviction that the mainstream and influential philosophy of materialism is fallacious. Hence his expressed, if qualified, admiration for Bishop Berkeley.

    Berkeley is in some ways a ‘naive idealist’, but then, he was also the first in the Western world to consciously articulate such a philosophy. I’ve argued before that there’s an historical reason for that: the whole notion of material bodies as being ‘independently real’ was never really considered before the modern period. ‘Creatures’ (meaning anything created) ‘are mere nothings’, said Meister Eckhardt. And that was because they don’t contain their own formative principle, which is bestowed by the Creator. So I’m of the view that the reason idealism starts to appear in this period, was precisely because of the trend towards naturalism, and the idea that the material world possesses its own, independent reality, whereas for the pre-moderns, the world was an expression of the divine will. I'm not *advocating* that view or saying it can be restored, but recognising it as 'meta-philosophical' factor in the discussion.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.5k
    Every premise is designed for the purpose of the conclusion, and every premise of a refutation is designed for the purpose of the refutation. Perhaps you are the one begging the question, here.Leontiskos

    You are neglecting a key point, the need to have truthful premises, in order for the conclusion to be sound. The desire for truth of the premises must take priority over the desire to produce a specific conclusion, or else the conclusion will be unsound, having premises designed just to reach that conclusion with complete disregard for truth. Such an argument would be pointless.

    The premise in question appears to be false, and designed solely for the purpose of producing the desired conclusion, in complete disregard for truth or falsity. Therefore it constitutes "assuming the conclusion", begging the question.

    In honest logical procedure, in contrast with sophistical rhetoric, the premises are designed to represent the truth. And truth of the premises clearly must be given higher priority in the design of the premises, than the desire to produce a specific conclusion, or else the result will be unsound conclusions and in the worst case, begging the question. Designing your premise for the purpose of producing a specific conclusion with disregard for the truth or falsity of the premise is called "assuming the conclusion" or "begging the question": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

    That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusionLeontiskos

    I don't see any point in arguing with you then. You'll just design your premises to produce your desired conclusion, with complete disregard for whether or not the premises are true. What's the point in debating anything with a person who's goal is to produce premises which will logically support a prejudice, with complete disregard for truth or falsity?
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    You are neglecting a key point, the need to have truthful premises, in order for the conclusion to be sound.Metaphysician Undercover

    And Johnson thinks it is true, as does Tallis. If you think it is false then what you need to do is argue against it, not cry "fallacy!" Note that you haven't managed to address Tallis' argument at all, and Tallis is defending (1).

    Designing your premise for the purpose of producing a specific conclusion with disregard for the truth or falsityMetaphysician Undercover

    Again, you are just imputing specious motives to Johnson. I see no reason to impute such motives, and that sort of psychologism/mind reading is bad philosophy. If you have an argument, offer it. If all you are going to do is say, "I did some mind-reading and found a bad motive," then you're not doing philosophy.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.2k


    I think the critique simply misunderstands Berkeley, as does Johnson's reply. The argument from the stone isn't really an informal fallacy so much as a "common misunderstanding of idealism."

    People misread Berkeley and fail to see that his ontology predicts everything to be observably identical to a physicalist ontology.

    IMO, the more appropriate criticism of Berkeley is that his philosophy is shallow. It's more an elaborate critique than an actual philosophy. Sure, it's a fine critique of the absolute necessity of the materialism of his day. The reigning philosophy wasn't conclusive. But in this, it shares a lot in common with arguments from underdetermination. Merely showing that your theory covers as much if the evidence as alternatives doesn't do all that much to move the needle; good philosophy explains the world. Berkeley's idealism cannot be ruled out, but it also doesn't do much to rule itself in. It seems very ad hoc.

    Now granted, the critique of subsistent "matter" taken alone is stronger, but I feel like there are a lot of people who do this better.



    Lots of philosophy involves God. The problem with Berkeley's invocation of God is that it seems much like Anaxagoras' invocation of Nous, an ad hoc way to plug holes.
  • Wayfarer
    23.5k
    IMO, the more appropriate criticism of Berkeley is that his philosophy is shallowCount Timothy von Icarus

    Agree. That's why I described him as a naive idealist, although a bit tongue-in-cheek. But his commitment to nominalism and rejection of universals undermines many other aspects of his philosophy. (I read somewhere that C S Peirce wrote a review of Berkeley which agreed with him in some respects but criticized his nominalism.)

    Now granted, the critique of subsistent "matter" taken alone is stronger, but I feel like there are a lot of people who do this better.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Specifically, those who came along later!
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.5k
    And Johnson thinks it is true, as does Tallis. If you think it is false then what you need to do is argue against it, not cry "fallacy!" Note that you haven't managed to address Tallis' argument at all, and Tallis is defending (1).Leontiskos

    To me, thinking that such a premise is true, just demonstrates a lack of understanding of Berkeley, as Wayfarer has already (very competently, I might add) argued. So there is no need for me to address this as well.

    And it still is begging the question, because no information is given as to why the premise is believed to be true. Your assertion reduces it to the following argument: "If this premise is true, Berkeley is refuted. I believe this premise is true therefore Berkeley is refuted." As you can see, the primary premise " if this premise is true, Berkeley is refuted", is still an instance of begging the question. All you are doing is trying to prove that one argument is not a matter of begging the question, attempting to justify that claim with another argument which is begging the question. Your claim is supposedly justified by an argument which is fallacious, as begging the question. Therefore, if you keep progressing in this way you'll have an infinite regress of arguments which all beg the question, because the claim that each one does not, is supported by an invalid argument (an instance of begging the question).

    Clearly the charge of "begging the question" cannot be avoided in this way. If whenever someone had that charge against them, they could simply be vindicated by saying "but I actually believe that premise is true, rather than simply manufactured to necessitate the conclusion", the fallacy of "begging the question would be impotent.

    Again, you are just imputing specious motives to Johnson. I see no reason to impute such motives, and that sort of psychologism/mind reading is bad philosophy. If you have an argument, offer it. If all you are going to do is say, "I did some mind-reading and found a bad motive," then you're not doing philosophy.Leontiskos

    I believe it's very obvious that Johnson had "specious motives", and you are being ridiculous to assert otherwise. When someone says "I refute you thus", and makes an action which is intended to demonstrate refutation, it's very obvious that the person has the specious motive of creating the illusion that the argument could be refuted by an action, without actually addressing the argument itself.

    Here's an example to consider. Suppose I produce an argument which concludes that you do not have the ability to climb a specific tree. You say "I refute you thus", and you climb that tree. That act does not refute my argument. It provides evidence that there is probably a problem with my argument, somehow, or somewhere, and that my argument ought to be refutable, but actual refutation requires demonstrating that problem.

    This is also the issue with Zeno's paradoxes. We see that the arrow moves, and this is very strong evidence that Zeno's argument ought to be refutable. But the movement of the arrow does not actually refute Zeno's argument, which proves that movement is logically impossible.
  • Mww
    5k
    #34 a “….. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down.

    #34 b “….To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever.

    #37 “….The philosophic, not the vulgar, substance, taken away.--I will be urged that this much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense--for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind--then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

    #33 “…. The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more (1) strong, (2) orderly, and (3) coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also (4) less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance, which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it….”

    #9 “…..The philosophical notion of matter involves a contradiction.--Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call matter. By matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it….”
    (A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec 1, Of the Principles…., 1710, in
    https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4723/4723-h/4723-h.htm)
    —————-


    First…cherry-picked, I know. I picked out what I thought most related to the OP’s query. There’s a veritable plethora of mitigating textual relevance the cherry-picking avoids, hopefully not so much as to show I missed the point completely.

    Johnson, following fellow British empiricist Locke, used the primary qualities of things in order to refute the validity of mere ideas as resemblances of them, re: ideas cannot fracture a toe. But in doing that, insofar as, e.g., solidity in things is necessary for fracturing toes, he did nothing to prove such primary qualities were existents in things, the absence from which it follows, that such primary qualities remain mere ideas in the mind of the mediating perceiver, in accordance with Berkeley’s considered metaphysical thesis, in opposition to Locke.

    If you can’t prove primary perceptible qualities in us are not ideas in an immediate principal perceiver, perhaps it can be argued…….what difference would it make to the human perceiving mind, if they were not? Was the idea of measurable distance implanted in my head as an idea belonging to some sort of prevalent, re: un-constructed, spirit, or does the idea belong to me alone, as a mere distinction in relative spaces?

    Sapere aude anyone?
  • Manuel
    4.2k
    Berkeley sometimes gets a bad rap. I know very little of him, having opted for Locke and Hume instead.

    But if any "idealist" merits some teasing (if this is warranted at all) it would be Arthur Collier. He didn't even have God as a guarantee of stability or existence of external objects.

    The biggest issue here is that, for whatever reason, we have some trouble (at least I do) in understanding how concretely existing things could be solely ideas.

    Seems to me to be the one thing you can't think away from objects in some form or another.
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    To me, thinking that such a premise is true, just demonstrates a lack of understanding of Berkeley,Metaphysician Undercover

    What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question.Leontiskos
  • Leontiskos
    3.8k
    - Very informative post. :up:
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