Again, there you are not giving any information on the kind of language you use and whether it could influencing your conception.Extension and temporality are pure intuitions. We get them from our experience of the world; or more accurately they are the forms of our experience.
You are asking of me, e.g., what does it mean to exist? Well, its a pure intuition. There’s nothing more I can say; nor can you. — Bob Ross
If you are to separate conceptual space/time from the understanding you need to understand that split but before that you need to state what metaphors you use. Which is why analogue models in physics have interpretation conditions on what things matter (positive part of the analogy), what things are irrelevant (neutral analogy), and what things intentionally mislead/misconstrue (negative analogy).We might be able to say some things about how space and time behave scientifically; but not what they are themselves. Space and time are the a priori intuitions of the sensory data (manifold) of our outer and (some of our) inner senses; and there may be a space and time akin to these a priori modes of intuition which may or may not behave similarly (e.g., Einstein’s special relativity). Our brain represents things which occur in a multiplicity as in space (whether that be material [e.g., my hand] or immaterial [e.g., the feeling of pain in my hand]); and it represents things which change in time (which may or may not include space—e.g., thinking). It is impossible for me to speak of anything without referencing spatiality and temporality because they are pure intuitions a priori in our brains—viz., they are so integral to the human understanding—but it is important to distinguish space and time proper (in the sense of the forms of the understanding) from conceptual space and time: the latter can be used to talk analogically about things which may not be in the former (e.g., Platonic forms, God, a non-spatiotemporal “particle”, etc.). — Bob Ross
You literally cannot describe space and time without using them in language. That’s a waste of time to try and avoid. — Bob Ross
What “substance metaphor”??? — Bob Ross
No, it casts doubt on the concept itself having any real counter part as I would presume that philosophy doesn't always have to accept that when something is conceptually possible that it is therefore metaphysically possible or physically possible.That’s called in inductive case against an absolutely simple being; and it holds no weight against the argument from composition because it demonstrates the need for its existence. Your argument only works as a probabilistic-style argument IF we have no good reasons to believe a simple being exists. All you are saying is “well, we haven’t had any good reasons to believe there are black swans, so we shouldn’t”. Ok. But now we know there are black swans…. — Bob Ross
You're equivocating. You had responded to my example in which I treated the result quantum collapse as actually contingent (and I STIPULATED it as such in the example) by asserting:Your view is a form of necessitarianism, — Bob Ross
It's not "charitable" to make an assertion that simply contradicts what I've said, especially in light of the fact that I linked you to Yablo's paper in which he demonstrates the disconnect between conceivability and metaphysical possibility.I was charitably interpreting your idea of a “non-actual possibility”: like I stated before, possibility is coherence of a thing with a mode of thought (e.g., metaphysics, physics, logic, etc.). — Bob Ross
That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it. My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach. That such essences exist is metaphysical dogma, not something that can be demonstrated to exist. My view is that object identity is consistent with identity of the indiscernibles:composition is a kind of causality — Bob Ross
Just as, in particle physics, the technique of observation modifies what is observed, philosophic expression runs the serious risk of altering what is expressed because the distortion which the medium introduces into the message.
This is to say, therefore, that every proposition implies a metaphysics, that syntax, grammatical structure, and the like are disguised metaphysical assertions. Granted: the metaphysics is naive, explicated, and uncriticized; but it is nevertheless a metaphysics. Until that metaphysics is explicated, no proposition can be fully determinate. But the explication can be done only propositionally-and the vicious circle closes, leaving language by its very nature indeterminate, and a precise metaphysical language impossible. The philosopher must therefore maintain a thoroughgoing distrust of any linguistic formulation.
↪Arcane Sandwich, Bob Ross, I've no more to add than I did at ↪Banno, the contents of which I believe remains unaddressed — Banno
Not sure why you tagged me here, Banno. — Arcane Sandwich
Courtesy of ↪Banno. — Arcane Sandwich
No, spatialized language is the notion of the space metaphor to talk about time
It's a common thing to do, in language, to talk about people having abstractions as if they are themselves substances. Such as, "You have so much love!" Love is an abstract concept here that is treated as a thing that can we have so and so much of.
Apply the label "necessitarianism" to my view if you like
You apparently believe contingency is the default: if necessity isn't proved (or accounted for), contingency should be assumed. I believe the converse: if contingency can't be proved (or accounted for), then necessity should be the default
That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it
My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach
Without contingent properties, your argument from composition fails. That's because an object's constituents are an identity to the object itself.
• Here is a series
• That series has some prime item on which it is based
• And this we call god.
…
And the last step is a puzzle, Aquinas' "And this we all call god"
So taking an example from the SEP article, in order to say that ‘Whatever thinks exists’ we already have supposed that there is something that thinks, that the domain of thinking things is not empty
The first is that formal logic is just incapable of displaying the structure of such existential arguments.
The cosmological argument hinges on the premise that there is something rather than nothing, the non-emptiness of the domain of being
There's also the more obvious problem that god is both simple and yet has parts - will, intelligence, and so on. The quick retort is that these are all one, that god's will, intelligence and so on are all the very same. That's quite a stretch, since for the purposes of the argument they are each separated out. Faith is a powerful force. Yet if one begins with a contradiction, anything is provable.
It's a common enough notion. It's linguistics such as book linked or here, by psychologists, and of course philosophers who really just point out this usage while choosing not to partake in it such as process philosophers. Its a prominent and cross-cultural notion of time that in fact even changes culture to culture apparently.I don’t think time can be described through space, but I am open to hearing why you think this. — Bob Ross
It's irrelevant to whether its realism or anti-realism. Either you are committed to a problem of reification or ascribing incorrect language/metaphysics/physical terms to talk about something which is itself not physical therefore more a language error regarding a mixing of categories or an ontological category mistake.1. This is only a reification fallacy if anti-realism with respect to the topic is true. E.g., the number 2 is not real IFF mathematical anti-realism is true; and same with love. — Bob Ross
You'd need to actually make explicit the kinds of metaphors/language you are using regarding emergentism so as to not make this decay immediately into reductionism.2. Assuming things like, e.g., love are not real but exist as emergent-phenomenal processes of our organism, these still have parts. E.g., love is a feeling of strong intimacy, attraction, etc. for another and is composed, at a minimum, of a strong connection between a donor and recipient and all which is subject to time (viz., loving through time). — Bob Ross
Is that because you want them to be substances or is that only a lazy choice of language that talks about them in substantial manners? Clearly, that isn't the only language one can use unless you want to argue such a point nor would it have them remain true independent substances but something new language is required for (emergentism) or a completely new category with incommensurable language to accompany it.3. When I was talking about space and time as substances, I meant it in the realist sense; so that is not a reification fallacy. I was speaking of what it would look like if one believes they are substances. — Bob Ross
No, I didn't. Here's what I said:Sorry, I don’t understand what you are saying then. You seem to keep flip-flopping. First you mentioned that everything exists necessarily such that there is no way they could have failed to exist — Bob Ross
You correctly noted that I should have said "causal determination", but my meaning is clear. I'm insisting on two things:Concrete example:suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. — Relativist
That's part of it. Also: composition is identity, and contingency implies non-actual possibilities (metaphysically possible).Here’s what I am thinking you are attempting to convey, and correct me if I am wrong: saying that a thing could have failed to exist if its parts did not get so arranged (or did not exist) does not demonstrate that it could have failed to exist because it may be the case that there were no other causal possibilities such that it would not have existed. Is that right? — Bob Ross
A table is composed of its parts. Contingency implies something that could have been different. What is it that could have been different?In my sense of the term, a table is contingent upon its parts; — Bob Ross
The chair IS the arrangement of parts. So it's equivalent to saying "the chair would not exist if the chair did not exist".I think you can agree that that particular chair would not exist if its legs, the wood it is made out of, etc. did not exist — Bob Ross
I have no problem with this definition, because "the nature of things" means that it's consistent with whatever metaphysical framework is true; in practice, we treat our own metaphysical framework as true.Metaphysical possibility is such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate the nature of things; — Bob Ross
Contingency implies something that could have been different. Suppose necessary object A deterministically causes B. B therefore exists necessarily. What is it that could have been different?contingency is the dependence of one thing on another for its existence; and necessity is the independence of a thing on any other things for its existence. — Bob Ross
The Aristotelean paradigm. The modern physics paradigm is more straightforward, and it omits nothing. Labelling an object's composition its "cause" makes the word "cause" less precise and more ambiguous.Causality is traditionally and widely accepted as explanations of why a thing is the way it is. What you are probably thinking of is physical or material causality. — Bob Ross
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.