• substantivalism
    311
    Extension and temporality are pure intuitions. We get them from our experience of the world; or more accurately they are the forms of our experience.

    You are asking of me, e.g., what does it mean to exist? Well, its a pure intuition. There’s nothing more I can say; nor can you.
    Bob Ross
    Again, there you are not giving any information on the kind of language you use and whether it could influencing your conception.

    You have to use a language to talk about these "pure intuitions" and the second you use that language there is no definite answer that it hasn't already polluted the notion you are trying to explain. So are the conundrums and properties a facet of taking a metaphor too far or are they meaningfully distinct.

    We might be able to say some things about how space and time behave scientifically; but not what they are themselves. Space and time are the a priori intuitions of the sensory data (manifold) of our outer and (some of our) inner senses; and there may be a space and time akin to these a priori modes of intuition which may or may not behave similarly (e.g., Einstein’s special relativity). Our brain represents things which occur in a multiplicity as in space (whether that be material [e.g., my hand] or immaterial [e.g., the feeling of pain in my hand]); and it represents things which change in time (which may or may not include space—e.g., thinking). It is impossible for me to speak of anything without referencing spatiality and temporality because they are pure intuitions a priori in our brains—viz., they are so integral to the human understanding—but it is important to distinguish space and time proper (in the sense of the forms of the understanding) from conceptual space and time: the latter can be used to talk analogically about things which may not be in the former (e.g., Platonic forms, God, a non-spatiotemporal “particle”, etc.).Bob Ross
    If you are to separate conceptual space/time from the understanding you need to understand that split but before that you need to state what metaphors you use. Which is why analogue models in physics have interpretation conditions on what things matter (positive part of the analogy), what things are irrelevant (neutral analogy), and what things intentionally mislead/misconstrue (negative analogy).

    You don't have a pure language to talk about your "pure intuitions" ergo you don't know where your language misleads and the actual "pure intuitions" begin. You have failed again and again to mark clearly that line or at least attempt to.

    You literally cannot describe space and time without using them in language. That’s a waste of time to try and avoid.Bob Ross

    No, spatialized language is the notion of the space metaphor to talk about time. Course, that isn't the only way we talk about time but it has been blamed for enforcing simple philosophical confusions. Bergson and Whitehead thought as much along with in more current times the philosophical perspective of Milic Capek. Who is of the opinion that that the last vestige of Classical thinking to be abandoned for the revolutionary special relativity or quantum theory in a different choice of language.

    One that makes use of non-spatialized language for time but also makes use of other senses other than the visual or mental imagery. One such approach was to use analogies to lived experience and music rather than the psychologically misleading as well as prevalent spatial notions regarding the past as 'behind us' or the future as 'coming towards us'.

    What “substance metaphor”???Bob Ross

    It's a common thing to do, in language, to talk about people having abstractions as if they are themselves substances. Such as, "You have so much love!" Love is an abstract concept here that is treated as a thing that can we have so and so much of. Properties work this way and you even do this with the concept of '2' treating it line with a material analogy acting as if it is a thing 'that has parts'. This shouldn't be the only language one can use to talk about numbers and to presume so is to abandon any other creatively unique direction.

    Especially since the fact that the number '2' is itself mean't to be fairly abstract then it should be seen as being multifaceted in the possible analogies one can use to talk about it. However, those might be mutually inconsistent to each other in certain respects and the boundary of what we take 'seriously' from them becomes rather significant but disagreeable.

    That’s called in inductive case against an absolutely simple being; and it holds no weight against the argument from composition because it demonstrates the need for its existence. Your argument only works as a probabilistic-style argument IF we have no good reasons to believe a simple being exists. All you are saying is “well, we haven’t had any good reasons to believe there are black swans, so we shouldn’t”. Ok. But now we know there are black swans….Bob Ross
    No, it casts doubt on the concept itself having any real counter part as I would presume that philosophy doesn't always have to accept that when something is conceptually possible that it is therefore metaphysically possible or physically possible.

    That is a jump that requires philosophical work to connect the different notions of possibility. Work you have not committed yourself too. Work that requires showcasing where conceptual notions can be transcendental to mere playful philosophical thought experiments into being ascribed some deep referential status.
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    Hey Bob, what do you think of the SEP entry on Divine Simplicity? Courtesy of .
  • Relativist
    2.8k
    Your view is a form of necessitarianism,Bob Ross
    You're equivocating. You had responded to my example in which I treated the result quantum collapse as actually contingent (and I STIPULATED it as such in the example) by asserting:

    "If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise".

    Apply the label "necessitarianism" to my view if you like, but don't draw inferences based on the label. I absolutely believe there MAY BE contingency in the world, and that quantum collapse MAY HAVE a contingent outcome. This view fits the axiom of contingency I gave you.


    I was charitably interpreting your idea of a “non-actual possibility”: like I stated before, possibility is coherence of a thing with a mode of thought (e.g., metaphysics, physics, logic, etc.).Bob Ross
    It's not "charitable" to make an assertion that simply contradicts what I've said, especially in light of the fact that I linked you to Yablo's paper in which he demonstrates the disconnect between conceivability and metaphysical possibility.

    You apparently believe contingency is the default: if necessity isn't proved (or accounted for), contingency should be assumed. I believe the converse: if contingency can't be proved (or accounted for), then necessity should be the default. I justify my view on the basis that laws of nature exist and that they entail a necessitation. If quantum collapse has a truly indeterminate outcome, it's still a necessitation in that it necessitates a well-defined probability distribution of possible outcomes (David Armstrong refers to this as "probabilistic determinism"). What's your basis? Can you undercut mine?


    composition is a kind of causalityBob Ross
    That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it. My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach. That such essences exist is metaphysical dogma, not something that can be demonstrated to exist. My view is that object identity is consistent with identity of the indiscernibles:

    A = B iff both have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational).

    Without contingent properties, your argument from composition fails. That's because an object's constituents are an identity to the object itself.
  • substantivalism
    311
    As an article I found on JSTOR talking about the language problems of process philosophy says,

    Just as, in particle physics, the technique of observation modifies what is observed, philosophic expression runs the serious risk of altering what is expressed because the distortion which the medium introduces into the message.

    For whitehead it would be a conceptual and reality based holistic inseparability but we can reduce the heavy poetic force of this down to looking back carefully at your metaphors. If we aren't defining our terms or even if we do so with the utmost precision to suit any rationalist our figures of speech are not silent actors.

    Your language misleads you astray because it does so by its own hidden intentions,

    This is to say, therefore, that every proposition implies a metaphysics, that syntax, grammatical structure, and the like are disguised metaphysical assertions. Granted: the metaphysics is naive, explicated, and uncriticized; but it is nevertheless a metaphysics. Until that metaphysics is explicated, no proposition can be fully determinate. But the explication can be done only propositionally-and the vicious circle closes, leaving language by its very nature indeterminate, and a precise metaphysical language impossible. The philosopher must therefore maintain a thoroughgoing distrust of any linguistic formulation.
  • Banno
    26.1k
    , @Bob Ross, I've no more to add than I did at , the contents of which I believe remains unaddressed.
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    ↪Arcane Sandwich, Bob Ross, I've no more to add than I did at ↪Banno, the contents of which I believe remains unaddressedBanno

    Not sure why you tagged me here, Banno. I don't think I can address the contents of the post that you linked, it sounds to me that you wanted Bob's reply to that, not my reply.

    Be that as it may, I suppose I could ask you: if it makes sense to talk about Divine Simplicity, then (by parity of reasoning) does it make sense to talk about Divine Complexity? If you say "no", then your dispute here is with Bob, not with me. If you say "yes", then you might have found something worth arguing about with me. But that would be Off-Topic here, since Bob's argument is for the simplicity of God, instead of being an argument for the complexity of God.

    If you feel like this is something worth discussing with me, then I invite you to start a Thread about it. We could even have a one-to-one debate, if you prefer that format.

    Salam alaikum, mate.
    -A. Sandwich
  • Banno
    26.1k
    Not sure why you tagged me here, Banno.Arcane Sandwich

    Only becasue you tagged me.
    Courtesy of ↪Banno.Arcane Sandwich
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    Yeah, but it's like, why wouldn't I? I've never read the SEP entry on Divine Simplicity before you referenced it, so why wouldn't I give credit where credit is due?
  • Relativist
    2.8k
    I'll weigh in, starting with this quote from the article:

    "What could motivate such a strange and seemingly incoherent doctrine?"

    It's motivated by a desire to rationalize an argument for God's existence. I find it ludicrous to purport to "prove" God's existence based on an assumption that is seemingly incoherent. To be persuasive, the premises should be easy to accept.
  • Arcane Sandwich
    2.2k
    I think that the same could be fairly said of what I have called "Divine Complexity", but I don't want to derail Bob's Thread. If you want to start a Thread on Divine Complexity, be my guest, and I'll discuss it with you, with an open mind. That's all I can promise, nothing more.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    No, spatialized language is the notion of the space metaphor to talk about time

    I don’t think time can be described through space, but I am open to hearing why you think this.

    It's a common thing to do, in language, to talk about people having abstractions as if they are themselves substances. Such as, "You have so much love!" Love is an abstract concept here that is treated as a thing that can we have so and so much of.

    This is good. Here’s a couple things to note:

    1. This is only a reification fallacy if anti-realism with respect to the topic is true. E.g., the number 2 is not real IFF mathematical anti-realism is true; and same with love.

    2. Assuming things like, e.g., love are not real but exist as emergent-phenomenal processes of our organism, these still have parts. E.g., love is a feeling of strong intimacy, attraction, etc. for another and is composed, at a minimum, of a strong connection between a donor and recipient and all which is subject to time (viz., loving through time).

    3. When I was talking about space and time as substances, I meant it in the realist sense; so that is not a reification fallacy. I was speaking of what it would look like if one believes they are substances.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    Apply the label "necessitarianism" to my view if you like

    Sorry, I don’t understand what you are saying then. You seem to keep flip-flopping. First you mentioned that everything exists necessarily such that there is no way they could have failed to exist—which simply is necessitarianism—and then you turn around and say that you do believe that there may be ways that some things could fail to exist.

    Here’s what I am thinking you are attempting to convey, and correct me if I am wrong: saying that a thing could have failed to exist if its parts did not get so arranged (or did not exist) does not demonstrate that it could have failed to exist because it may be the case that there were no other causal possibilities such that it would not have existed. Is that right?

    You apparently believe contingency is the default: if necessity isn't proved (or accounted for), contingency should be assumed. I believe the converse: if contingency can't be proved (or accounted for), then necessity should be the default

    No, I am using them in the traditional sense. The modality of possibility is about a thing not contradicting the mode of thought used to conceive it: this is not the same thing as conceivability. There are three modes of possibility (traditionally): metaphysical, physical, and logical.

    Metaphysical possibility is such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate the nature of things; physical possibility such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate Nature (viz., physics); and logical possibility such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate laws of logic.

    This is not the same as conceivability. E.g., it is physically impossible to jump to the moon but conceivable to jump to the moon; it is metaphysically impossible for H20 not to be water but it is conceivable; it is logically impossible for a != a but it is (to some extent) conceivable.

    Moreover, contingency is the dependence of one thing on another for its existence; and necessity is the independence of a thing on any other things for its existence.

    I think, for you, contingency is the possibility of non-existence for an existent thing (whether it be in the past, present, or future); and necessity is the impossibility of non-existence for an existent thing (ditto). Is that right?

    In my sense of the term, a table is contingent upon its parts; and, if causal determinism or necessitarianism is true, could not have failed to existence.

    My point is that the OP depends on my kind of contingency in terms of what the word refers to in its underlying meaning; and you cannot wipe this away by engaging in a semantic dispute about how to define contingency.

    That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it

    Causality is traditionally and widely accepted as explanations of why a thing is the way it is. What you are probably thinking of is physical or material causality.

    My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach

    That is a fair assessment of the OP, but I don’t think this is true for the subsequent short-hand arguments I gave. It depends solely on the idea that this being depends on its parts to exist even if it could not have failed to exist; no different than how, e.g., platonic forms depend on each other atemporally.

    Even if you don’t think there’s an essence to a, e.g., chair; I think you can agree that that particular chair would not exist if its legs, the wood it is made out of, etc. did not exist and you can also simultaneously agree that the chair, under your view, could not have failed to exist.

    Without contingent properties, your argument from composition fails. That's because an object's constituents are an identity to the object itself.

    No. The chair still depends on its parts to exist even if it could not have failed to exist. The chair does not exist as a brute existence.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I apologize: I was not alerted to your original response because there were no references to me in there (technically).

    • Here is a series
    • That series has some prime item on which it is based
    • And this we call god.

    And the last step is a puzzle, Aquinas' "And this we all call god"

    This seems to be a straw man. My OP goes into detail why it does not suffice to just identify this simple being as a simple being full-stop. I didn’t just say “and let’s just call this God”.

    So taking an example from the SEP article, in order to say that ‘Whatever thinks exists’ we already have supposed that there is something that thinks, that the domain of thinking things is not empty

    This is a conflation, though. The cogito ergo sum presupposes that something exists and that we can say that the thinker is that being. I don’t buy the argument, but, nevertheless, it is not presupposing that a thinking being exists to prove that a thinking being exists.

    The first is that formal logic is just incapable of displaying the structure of such existential arguments.

    Do you just mean that we must presuppose something exists to prove something else exists?

    The cosmological argument hinges on the premise that there is something rather than nothing, the non-emptiness of the domain of being

    True, but wouldn’t the domain of being have to be non-empty since we exist?

    There's also the more obvious problem that god is both simple and yet has parts - will, intelligence, and so on. The quick retort is that these are all one, that god's will, intelligence and so on are all the very same. That's quite a stretch, since for the purposes of the argument they are each separated out. Faith is a powerful force. Yet if one begins with a contradiction, anything is provable.

    Firstly, I think it is perfectly valid to see it from the outside as a sort of ad hoc rationalization given that there is an absolutely simple being and it has these properties (which are prima facie irreconcilable).

    Secondly, I don’t think it is as incoherent as you might think. Omnipotence is just power which is reducible to pure will; pure will implies intelligence (no matter how rudimentary) and is reducible thereto; pure will is reducible to pure actuality; pure actuality is reducible to pure simplicity; pure simplicity (and actuality) imply immutibility; etc.
  • Bob Ross
    2k


    I think it becomes a requirement from believing that there is a simple being and it must have these properties and having to reconcile that contradiction. I think it ends up becoming more cogent than people let on: the properties we assign God are analogical, and not univocal, equivocation and they do seem to reduce to each other by-at-large. Maybe there's some hiccups with intelligence and pure simplicity, but I think it seems to work fine.
  • substantivalism
    311
    I don’t think time can be described through space, but I am open to hearing why you think this.Bob Ross
    It's a common enough notion. It's linguistics such as book linked or here, by psychologists, and of course philosophers who really just point out this usage while choosing not to partake in it such as process philosophers. Its a prominent and cross-cultural notion of time that in fact even changes culture to culture apparently.

    The notion that the 'past is behind us' and 'future in front of us' while the present 'is here' are using spatialized language to talk about time. Most depictions of presentism, possibilism, futurism, the moving spotlight theory time, thick/thin presentism, and eternalism all use similar metaphors to their extreme of depicting the 'timeline' as a 'line' or even a 'whole block'. Then we talk about or bring up the problem of temporal 'parts and whole's' which comes about by thinking of things as three-dimensional or four-dimensional but as 'temporal objects' nonetheless.

    Just as Minkowski we seem to then treat it as some four-dimensional whole.

    It's using static language to talk about what isn't meant to be static so of course we end up with a problem of change such as Zeno's paradoxes or other similar assortments of conundrums. Such as asking how 'fast' does time progress or where do the static moments of time go when they can fly past the pencil thin present. Invoking some strange conception of reality where the world blinks by like a zoetrope machine ex nihilo.

    1. This is only a reification fallacy if anti-realism with respect to the topic is true. E.g., the number 2 is not real IFF mathematical anti-realism is true; and same with love.Bob Ross
    It's irrelevant to whether its realism or anti-realism. Either you are committed to a problem of reification or ascribing incorrect language/metaphysics/physical terms to talk about something which is itself not physical therefore more a language error regarding a mixing of categories or an ontological category mistake.

    2. Assuming things like, e.g., love are not real but exist as emergent-phenomenal processes of our organism, these still have parts. E.g., love is a feeling of strong intimacy, attraction, etc. for another and is composed, at a minimum, of a strong connection between a donor and recipient and all which is subject to time (viz., loving through time).Bob Ross
    You'd need to actually make explicit the kinds of metaphors/language you are using regarding emergentism so as to not make this decay immediately into reductionism.

    Just as process philosophers have this problem of the interconnectedness of language the emergentists have the problem of also making clear their position in terms that don't commit them to the language of their opposite. The reductivism and eliminativism positions.

    Note that process philosophers can just as easily use spatialized language out of pragmatic worth or need just as easily as their static rivals. However, they just happen to take a much more serious look at it and attempt to develop incommensurable terms when needed to better capture what they 'mean' as distinct from the former static meanings.

    3. When I was talking about space and time as substances, I meant it in the realist sense; so that is not a reification fallacy. I was speaking of what it would look like if one believes they are substances.Bob Ross
    Is that because you want them to be substances or is that only a lazy choice of language that talks about them in substantial manners? Clearly, that isn't the only language one can use unless you want to argue such a point nor would it have them remain true independent substances but something new language is required for (emergentism) or a completely new category with incommensurable language to accompany it.
  • Relativist
    2.8k
    Sorry, I don’t understand what you are saying then. You seem to keep flip-flopping. First you mentioned that everything exists necessarily such that there is no way they could have failed to existBob Ross
    No, I didn't. Here's what I said:
    Concrete example:suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions.Relativist
    You correctly noted that I should have said "causal determination", but my meaning is clear. I'm insisting on two things:

    • Contingency entails non-actual possibilities
    • IF there is contingency, it must have an ontological basis.

    Here’s what I am thinking you are attempting to convey, and correct me if I am wrong: saying that a thing could have failed to exist if its parts did not get so arranged (or did not exist) does not demonstrate that it could have failed to exist because it may be the case that there were no other causal possibilities such that it would not have existed. Is that right?Bob Ross
    That's part of it. Also: composition is identity, and contingency implies non-actual possibilities (metaphysically possible).

    Consider composed object X. I deny that there are "accidental" properties, so 100% of the properties (intrinsic+relational) are essential to being X. "X" refers to the unique thing that has that particular set of properties. So it's an identity.

    In my sense of the term, a table is contingent upon its parts;Bob Ross
    A table is composed of its parts. Contingency implies something that could have been different. What is it that could have been different?

    I think you can agree that that particular chair would not exist if its legs, the wood it is made out of, etc. did not existBob Ross
    The chair IS the arrangement of parts. So it's equivalent to saying "the chair would not exist if the chair did not exist".

    Metaphysical possibility is such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate the nature of things;Bob Ross
    I have no problem with this definition, because "the nature of things" means that it's consistent with whatever metaphysical framework is true; in practice, we treat our own metaphysical framework as true.

    But this is just definition; it's not an ACCOUNT of possibility: what is the ontological basis for a claim that a non-actual possibility was possible?

    It's easy to conceive of non-actual states of affairs, and mistakenly claim it to be contingent. Example: the outcome of a throw of dice seems contingent because we can conceive of a different outcome. But the outcome is actually the deterministic outcome of the physical factors. So, given those factors, the outcome was necessary, not contingent.

    contingency is the dependence of one thing on another for its existence; and necessity is the independence of a thing on any other things for its existence.Bob Ross
    Contingency implies something that could have been different. Suppose necessary object A deterministically causes B. B therefore exists necessarily. What is it that could have been different?


    Causality is traditionally and widely accepted as explanations of why a thing is the way it is. What you are probably thinking of is physical or material causality.Bob Ross
    The Aristotelean paradigm. The modern physics paradigm is more straightforward, and it omits nothing. Labelling an object's composition its "cause" makes the word "cause" less precise and more ambiguous.
    -------------------------

    Did you read the whole SEP Article on Divine Simplicity? The section The Question of Coherence brings up a point similar to mine. It references Alvin Plantinga's objection to Divine Simplicity, which is perfectly reasonable under Plantinga's "approach to ontology", but that "Plantinga-style objections will not appear decisive to those who reject his metaphysical framework. "

    The same principle applies to me: your argument depends on a metaphysical framework different from mine. You'll never be able to make it fit.
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