That doesn't solve the problem, though. Which of the two resulting ships is identical to the original one? The Mended ship, or the Reconstructed ship? Both? Neither?

Neither, because dividing a thing into parts creates distinct objects with distinct identities. That's why the problem is a ruse, it associates "identity" with the name for a thing, rather than with the thing itself. If we divide a thing, remove a part, and wish to maintain the same name for one of the parts rather than another, that's a matter of convention, not identity.

I don't think it's a ruse. It's a legitimate philosophical problem. And I think that the correct answer is that the Reconstructed ship is identical to the original ship. This solution, however, does not work for organisms though. In the case of a caterpillar that turns into a butterfly, you arguably need spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal.

Neither, because dividing a thing into parts creates distinct objects with distinct identities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Think of it this way. Imagine that you have a watch. Suppose that you disassemble it. Has the watch ceased to exist? Some metaphysicians say "yes": there is nothing there, other than the parts of a watch, which used to compose it, and now they compose nothing at all. Other metaphysicians say "no": the watch itself has not ceased to exist, it has merely ceased to be unified: it now exists as a scattered object.

No matter what position you take in that debate, in the example of the watch, the problem with the Ship of Theseus still stands: it is not self-evident that when you divide an object into parts, the original object ceases to exist, even if new objects with distinct identities are created in such a case.

No matter what position you take in that debate, in the example of the watch, the problem with the Ship of Theseus still stands: it is not self-evident that when you divide an object into parts, the original object ceases to exist, even if new objects with distinct identities are created in such a case. — Arcane Sandwich

That's why the correct answer is neither. The issue you sight is not a problem of metaphysical "identity", it's an issue of naming conventions.

That's why the correct answer is neither. The issue you sight is not a problem of metaphysical "identity", it's an issue of naming conventions. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you have a deflationary approach to metaphysics? Is that it?

So you have a deflationary approach to metaphysics? Is that it? — Arcane Sandwich

I don't think so, but I don\t know.

Is this what you believe, yes or no?

Yes it's what I believe. I also just noticed that I spelled "cite" wrong.

Yes it's what I believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok.

I also just noticed that I spelled "cite" wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one cares, except for Grammar Nazis. Your point was understood despite your grammatical mistake.