The recursive case is certainly an odd and rare kind of predication (and judgment). — Leontiskos

Rödl replies to this head-on in S-C & O. He says, of recursive, 1st person cases:

This may seem a limited failure of the force-content distinction. I think p cannot be a proposition because judgment is self-conscious. But this character of the act of judgment does not affect its object; that is a proposition all right. The force-content distinction is fine; it is just that we must not apply it to first-person thought of thought. There it breaks down on account of the peculiar character of thinking -- its self-conciousness. But this character of thinking leave untouched the nature of what is thought. — S-C & O, 20

Rödl goes on to argue that the problem can't be contained this way, that regardless of how "odd and rare" this sort of (attempted) predication is, it reveals problems that infect all attempts to apply the force-content distinction. That's a whole other topic, of course, but I just wanted to affirm that Rödl is well aware that one way out of this problem would be to mount a successful argument that there's something special about recursion.

I wouldn't be so quick to make that judgement. But I don't see what this has to do with whether or not there is a reincarnation of Hegel. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, but what folks are telling me about that, is that to discuss the topic of reincarnation is to go Off Topic in this Thread, since it's about Aristotle and something that Sebastian Rödl said about De Anima. In other words, if I or anyone else wants to talk about reincarnation, we need to do that in another Thread. And after careful consideration, I have arrived that the conclusion that such is indeed the case.

I guess this depends on what "be turned into" means. There is a break in the continuity of identity which is implied by that phrase. And there is a special term for such a break in the continuity of identity, it is generally known as a "transformation". "Reincarnation" also implies a type of transformation, as does "transubstantiation". The concept of "transformation" has been a great gift to creative philosophers. Now there must have been some jealousy from the mathematicians, because the concept "transformation", has now been adopted into mathematics and physics, enabling lofty sophistry. — Metaphysician Undercover

This, on the other hand, might have something to do with Aristotle. A transformation is just a change of form. The question would be, can an Aristotelian substance change its form and still be the same substance? That's a tricky thing to disentangle, you see. For several reasons. First of all, an Aristotelian substance is composed of matter and form. Arguably, it can change its matter and still be the same substance, but it can't change its form and still be the same substance, because its form is its essence. It helps to use a somewhat scholastic vocabulary here to interpret what Aristotle is meaning to say. But not only from the point of view of medieval realism, as exemplified by Thomas Aquinas, but also from the point of view of medieval nominalism, as exemplified by William of Ockham. I don't see how there can be middle ground between Aquinas and Ockham, as far as philosophy goes. Perhaps Peter Abelard, the medieval French scholastic, could be in some sense a middle ground between Aquinas and Ockham, but I've never actually seen the case spelled out in detail, I've only seen it mentioned or otherwise implied or suggested. So, back to the main point, I would say that an Aristotelian substance cannot change its form and still be the same substance, because the form of the substance is its essence, and if its essence changes, then its identity has changed: it is no longer the same substance, it is instead an entirely different substance. For example, a gold atom has 79 protons in its nucleus. That is the essence of gold, as far as I'm concerned, and it's a curious thing because that's what Kripke said, and I agree with him on that point (thought I don't agree with him on other points). If a gold atom loses just a single proton, it turns into a platinum atom. And if a gold atom gains just one proton, it turns into a mercury atom. At the level of ordinary objects, surely we can distinguish a solid gold bar from a puddle of liquid mercury. Why? Because they have different essences. Why? Because the essence of gold is to have 79 protons in every one of its atoms, and the essence of mercury is to have 80 protons in every one of of its atoms. When a gold atom turns into a mercury atom, what has happened is not the mere addition of a little bit of matter, but rather a change in essence, and consequently, a change in form (solid versus liquid), and consequently, a change in substance (gold is not the same chemical substance as mercury).

Rödl goes on to argue that the problem can't be contained this way — J

Well without those arguments I have no reason to assent to their conclusions.

Again, Rodl is giving a reductio, and I am pointing out that no one sees any problem with the so-called "absurdity."

You could phrase it this way, as a true/false question:

• Judging 'a is F' is different than judging 'I judge a is F'
  
  • True
  • False

Most people would answer, "true." So why believe Rodl when he says "false"? Again, what are needed are arguments for the implausible position. Recursive thought is odd and rare, not impossible.

Except Hegel was never such a heart-throb. Gotta say, though, that for me the toughest sell so far in S-C&O is the connection to something genuinely Hegelian. — J

Now that I have decided to read the book, I will not be reading reviews of it. I will be looking for what I gleaned from Hegel.

Chief amongst them will be the connection to Self-Consciousness as a process of development as depicted in the Phenomenology of Geist. The movement from initial states of mind and the actions they motivated to the emergence of greater awareness. Hegel is making a statement about establishing a new method equal in spirit to Aristotle claiming that:

Now the reason why earlier thinkers did not arrive at this method of procedure was that in their time there was no notion of “essence” and no way of defining “being.” — Parts of Animals, 242a 20, translated by Peck and Forster

The issue here is that we reason discursively, and we do not (strictly speaking) ever simultaneously engage in more than one judgment. So when <I judge that I judge that a is F> there is at least a temporal distinction between the two instances of judgment, and in this case there is also a logical priority issue, i.e. one of the two judgments must be logically prior to the other.

So if Rodl wants to read that proposition as a non-temporal angelic intellection, it won't make any sense. That is, if we try to make both instances of 'judge' temporally and logically identical, it won't make any sense.

One way for Rodl to dispute true recursivity would be to say that the only way to interpret <I judge that I judge that a is F> in a non-vacuous way is to interpret it as <I judge that I have judged that a is F>.

Herewith Chapter 4 Objectivity and Self-Consciousness, 'A Science without Contrary', from which the passage in the OP was extracted.

I think you misunderstand. According to , Rodi is differentiating between the judgement of "a is f", and the judgement of "I judge a is f". The former is a proper predication. The latter, in which the subject would be a self-conscious being, and the predicate would be a belief, cannot be accurately characterized as a predication.

This is the issue I argued in another thread, we cannot represent an idea as the property of a human subject in the way of predication, because this would require that we violate the fundamental laws of logic. (Peirce does this with universals.) For example, when a person deliberates while making a choice, one holds both of two contrary ideas in one's mind at the very same time. If we predicate those ideas of the subject, there would be violation of the law of noncontradiction.

This points back to what I said about how we would represent "the soul", earlier in the thread.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/958098
First, we determine that we would reject the idea that the soul is like a physical object with parts. (This was accomplished by Plato's argument against the soul being a harmony.) However, Aristotle demonstrated that "the soul" is an actuality, a substantive form. So it appears like we could represent "the soul" as a primary substance, and proceed to describe its properties in the way of predication. But because this procedure would lead to absurd conclusions, we must reject the idea that "the soul" is like an object which we can represent with subject/predicate relations.

So, the soul has "properties" of a sort, represented by Aristotle as potentia, capacities, or powers, but we see now that these capacities cannot be described by proper predication, because this creates a situation in which the fundamental laws of logic would be violated. This is the issue Aristotle came across with the proposal of "matter", and "potential" in general. To properly understand these concepts, violation of the fundamental laws of logic was required. He proposed we adhere to the law of noncontradiction, but allow for violation of the law of excluded middle.

So, back to the main point, I would say that an Aristotelian substance cannot change its form and still be the same substance, because the form of the substance is its essence, and if its essence changes, then its identity has changed: it is no longer the same substance, it is instead an entirely different substance. — Arcane Sandwich

Aristotle's law of identity, allows that a material object has a changing form, yet maintains its identity as the same thing, through a temporal continuity assigned to the matter. A thing's identity may be its "essence", but its essence is ever changing, as form is "actual". This is why we can represent a thing as a subject for predication, and as time passes, contrary predications are true of the same subject. That is how Aristotle represented becoming, or change, as contrary predications to the same subject.

Aristotle's law of identity, allows that a material object has a changing form, yet maintains its identity as the same thing, through a temporal continuity assigned to the matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. What would be an example of that, so that I can get a clear picture of it? I would think of a caterpillar that turns into a butterfly. The caterpillar, arguably, does not have the same form as the butterfly that it turns into, but it still has the same essence, because it's the same individual creature, it just happens to have a different form. Is that what you're saying?

A thing's identity may be its "essence", but its essence is ever changing, as form is "actual". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I agree.

This is why we can represent a thing as a subject for predication, and as time passes, contrary predications are true of the same subject. That is how Aristotle represented becoming, or change, as contrary predications to the same subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed.

Ok. What would be an example of that, so that I can get a clear picture of it? — Arcane Sandwich

The form of a material thing, in the strict sense of the word "form", in hylomorphism, includes all the accidental properties of that material thing. That's what gives the thing its unique "identity", as the particular thing which it is. However, the accidents are always changing, therefore the form of the material thing is always changing. Nevertheless we say that the thing maintains its identity as the same thing despite the scratches and dents that it receives.

We have to be careful with our use of "essence" because the "essence" of a particular, "what the thing is", as a unique particular, is different from "essence" as a type, "what type the thing is". This is the difference between primary and secondary substance, the unique individual being primary substance, the species being secondary substance..

Can you give me an example?

- Interesting, thanks Wayfarer. :up:

From the other thread:

I hate to say it, but a great deal of this comes down to how we want to use very ordinary words like "thought" and "accompany."

It's worth noting that for Aristotle thought is far broader than judgement. Judgement comes in two forms, one involving affirmation and negation and the other definition. "Knowledge" comes in many more forms than in most other thinkers (a good thing IMO, we use "know" in many different senses).

Thought is necessarily as broad as can be, since the mind is "potentially all things" (Aristotle draws the comparison to a blank slate upon which anything might be written in De Anima, although this cashes out in a way that is radically different from Locke's later invocation of the same image). Thought is, in this sense, a parallel of prime mater, although it is also, as determinate, the parallel of act/eidos.

Rödl's point on the self-awareness of assertion reminds me of Plotinus and co.'s interpretation and expansion of Aristotle. Except that for them this self-awareness only applies to knowledge, and really only to that knowledge that is most properly called "knowledge," which involves the co-identity of the intelligible and the intellect, as opposed to mere (informed, true) belief. All knowledge of this sort is, in a sense, self-knowledge, whether that be through the "undescended intellect" of Plotinus, or later attempts to put this capacity "within" embodied intellect. St. Augustine, for instance, has all (true) knowledge coming through a process of turning inward and upward. The mind is a "microcosm" of being (St. Bonaventure) and knowing is a sort of conformity, but also a sort of self-knowing; however, the microcosm is not a representation (which would open the Neoplatonists to all the charges of the Sextus and the other Empiricists).

I think Rödl is on much shakier ground though, because it's less obvious that this sort of self-reflection is either implied in all judgements, nor does it seem impossible in recursive judgements.

For one thing, in the broader English sense of "judge," we do things like judge where a line drive hit to us in baseball is going to land and run to catch it without any obvious self-reflection.

But more importantly, we often do seriously reason about our own judgements when it comes to practical reason. If we are continually courting lust, gluttony, and wrath, we might seriously question if we truly judge these to be bad. Do we really believe what we think we believe? We might affirm it with good justification, but do we know it, do we understand it, do we possess a noetic grasp of it?

Perhaps we do judge such vices to be bad, but perhaps we do not know this, or perhaps we only know it in a muddled in unclear way (consider here Plato's dual contentions that the person who truly knows Justice does not act unjustly, and that knowing Justice requires turning the "whole person" towards it in the first place).

As mentioned earlier, all knowledge is knowledge of eidos and of universals. If we predicated unique terms of unique sensations we could not be wrong, and no meaningful knowledge of an unbounded number of causes can be had but through a grasp of finite, unifying principles. But Aristotle tanks the idea of subsistent forms (and it's unclear if Plato even intended this, although he was certainly interpreted this way) and later commentators tank the idea of totally subsistent natures, leading to the idea that all knowledge is ultimately knowledge of the Logos/One/God. Or for Hegel, it is knowledge of the Absolute.

And self-knowledge is implied here. For Hegel Spirit is an essential moment, not contingent. However, it's also a moment that needs to be attained. You have to suffer read through PhS and the Logic to get to Absolute Knowing, which is itself historically situated. But it isn't a facet of every moment. It's decidedly absent from the moment of sense certainty where PhS begins.

Another way to look at the distinction is the difference between "first person declarative" and "informational" statements. Robert Sokolowski's very interesting phenomenology-centered approach to these same questions (also through the lens of St. Thomas and Aristotle) in "The Phenomenology of the Human Person," plumbs this distinction. In the former, our "I" statements involve us as thinking, agents of truth. However, we can also make merely informational statements about the world and ourselves without asserting ourselves as agents.

What Sokolowski gets right in the tradition is that demonstration is a means of grasping the intelligibility of things, of knowing, not what knowledge, much less thought, wholly consists in. For instance, science is a virtue, not a set of demonstrations. The idea that to "think p" is to judge p, and also to judge that one judges p, seems to court the reduction of thought to judgement (which does happen in many philosophies, there is a sort of Cartesian theater of sensation and imagination that the "buffered self" thinks about, which is more along the lines of what I think Kant is getting at).

It may be worth pointing out that this recent tangent on judgment comes not from the OP nor from Rodl's book, but from <an article that Rodl wrote in 2020> (linked here).

Thanks for this, very interesting. I especially appreciate:

I think Rödl is on much shakier ground though, because it's less obvious that this sort of self-reflection is either implied in all judgements, nor does it seem impossible in recursive judgements. — Count Timothy von Icarus

and

The idea that to "think p" is to judge p, and also to judge that one judges p, seems to court the reduction of thought to judgement — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm about to post something in the "p and I think p" thread that touches on the reduction of thought to judgment.

For example, judging that Obama lives in Chicago and judging that I correctly judge that Obama lives in Chicago are not two distinct judgments. This is just one act of judgment, which is at once a judgment that Obama lives in Chicago and a judgment that I correctly judge that Obama lives in Chicago. Often the adverb "correctly" (also "validly" or "rightly") drops out, and Rödl frames the self-consciousness of judgment as the idea that judging that p and judging that I judge that p are not distinct. For example, he says that "the act of the mind expressed by So it is is the same as the one expressed by I think it is so" (6). In any case, the thought is that one cannot pry apart the judgment that things are so and the judgment that I (correctly) judge that things are so. When I judge that Obama lives in Chicago, in that very act of judgment, I also judge that I (correctly) judge that Obama lives in Chicago.

Hmm, this is exactly what Sokolowski tries to disambiguate. For one, we can fail to be proper "agents of truth." We can live into our nature in this respect more or less well. We can side with Machiavelli over Cicero as respects the practicality of lying and deception. We can attempt to simply abdicate our role as agents of truth. Indeed we can do so self-consciously, essentially refusing to take on Rödel's notion here.

This is exactly what lands Pilate in Hell in my preferred reading of the Inferno (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/959841).

Now, in a certain sense, I feel like Rödel is simply getting at the "agent of truth," idea from a different angle, which isn't surprising because there is a confluence of historical influences here. The resemblance to Neoplatonic readings of Aristotle I mentioned does not seem off-base given: "We need to understand how judgment can be knowledge of what is in such a way that, precisely as knowledge of what is, it is nothing other than self‐knowledge of knowledge, or knowledge knowing itself. This is a formula of absolute idealism."

However, either this reviewer has missed the mark (which is possible, because I agree that Rödel writes confusingly) or Rödel seems to be collapsing knowing and judgement, while also assuming that all knowing reaches the status of Absolute Knowing (noesis). Maybe it's just the reviewer, but the mutable, contingent fact that "Obama lives in Chicago," is not the sort of thing that is really the proper object of noesis.

I always read PhS as sort of suggesting, like Aristotle, that Absolute Knowing is more a sort of a virtue—and I suppose it might make more sense if the recognition of the self-conscious nature of knowledge is an ideal we are removing road blocks to attain, as opposed to something clearly applying to all human thought.

I always read PhS as sort of suggesting, like Aristotle, that Absolute Knowing is more a sort of a virtue—and I suppose it might make more sense if the recognition of the self-conscious nature of knowledge is an ideal we are removing road blocks to attain, as opposed to something clearly applying to all human thought. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is how I read something that @Wayfarer said. But the funny thing is, I'm not convinced it's a virtue. Or perhaps it is, up to a point. I think the younger generation's fixation on self and self-consciousness perhaps pushes beyond the virtue into the vice, and so I'm a bit wary of these younger scholars pressing so hard into self-consciousness.

In an intellectual sense we see the same thing with excessively self-scrutinizing epistemologies, as if having perfectly clear knowledge of our act of knowing will justify our knowledge. When it is done in this way it has gone too far - a kind of intellectual incurvatus in se.

I always read PhS as sort of suggesting, like Aristotle, that Absolute Knowing is more a sort of a virtue— — Count Timothy von Icarus

Consider from the Nichomachean Ethics:

if eudomonia consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation. — source

In all the axial-age philosophies, what is 'higher' is also more real and more virtuous. That is the axis of quality which has generally been occluded by modern philosophy.

I suppose it depends on how it is approached. But Rödl maintains the ultimate proper orientation of the individual towards the Good (at least in Wallace's treatment of him). Some of the quotes sound largely consistent with (if not necessarily suggestive of) a more Platonic/Patristic notion of knowledge as self-knowledge.

Not surprising, he's a Hegel guy and Hegel was deeply inspired by Meister Eckhart and Boheme, who were very influenced by the whole Augustinian tradition.

Anyhow, I tend to agree with Kierkegaard that the more common risk in Hegelianism (if not present for Hegel himself, properly understood) is not the elevation of the self and of human particularity/authenticity, but of washing it out and ignoring it.

Anyhow, I tend to agree with Kierkegaard that the more common risk in Hegelianism (if not present for Hegel himself, properly understood) is not the elevation of the self and of human particularity/authenticity, but of washing it out and ignoring it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, especially if Hegelianism is reduced (as it apparently was when Kierkegaard was writing) to a weird version of scientism, and a complete collapse of the subject/object distinction.

- Sounds good, those are reasonable counterpoints.

Can you give me an example? — Arcane Sandwich

A car gets dented, it still retains its identity as being the same thing, despite that change of form.

After spending a couple days, those linked papers/articles/essays give me a better understanding of Rödl’s general philosophy. I’m actually beginning to appreciate his neo-Kantianism in expression, if not so much in theory.

He leads us below the language barrier, re:….

“linguistic articulation” — Wayfarer

….whereas Kant had no choice but to put his speculative metaphysics to word. He expected the reader to understand the system as it’s articulated is not how the system works on its own, the only reason for its articulation is because it is not known.

Rödl attempts to show this, by saying we’re not being told anything we don’t “always already know”, but of course, we don’t always already know that, e.g., “I think” must accompany all my thoughts.

Rödl attempts to show this, by saying we’re not being told anything we don’t “always already know”, but of course, we don’t always already know that, e.g., “I think” must accompany all my thoughts — Mww

Yeah, I'm not happy with that either. But I don't like that move in general -- too gnostic for my tastes.

A car gets dented, it still retains its identity as being the same thing, despite that change of form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. It's like my example of the caterpillar that turns into a butterfly.

Yeah, other’s tastes as well. Still, there are those insisting we gain nothing by deleting epistemological gnostic mysticism in order to make room for pure logic, and gain even less by inserting (gasp) a transcendental qualifier.

Another thing: in the text, 9.3, he talks about principles as they relate to and condition judgement. It’s a worthy exposé, but very far from Kantian, insofar as he treats the primacy of first judgement as conditioned by principles derived from experience, or, as he calls it, “the power of knowledge”, when in fact, these belong to pure reason. You can get to empirical judgements related to science from principles of experience, but you can’t get to judgement itself, as such, from there.
(Caveat: I skimmed; but the gist is pretty close I think. Open to deeper consideration if you’ve got some)

I haven't gotten to 9.3 yet! (I read philosophy really slowly.). I'll try to remember to come back to your post when I have.

It's like my example of the caterpillar that turns into a butterfly. — Arcane Sandwich

The problem though, is your interpretation. You say "it still has the same essence". It doesn't have the same essence because the essence of an individual material object, as an individual material object , consists of all those accidentals which are changing. The object however, retains its identity despite changing. This implies that the identity of the object is associated with its matter rather than with its form. The matter is what persists through the change, as does the thing's identity.

The matter is what persists through the change, as does the thing's identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you solve the problem of the Ship of Theseus, then? Unlike an inorganic object, the identity of an organism arguably requires the spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal.

The name of the object "Ship of Theseus" is not the thing's identity, nor is anything we say about the object, "what it is". So the purported problem is not an issue of identity at all, that's a ruse. The thing's identity inheres within the thing itself.