Not so much. Reminds me a bit of General Semantics. — Banno

Yes, there are some things reminiscent of General Semantics, but General Semantics is more nominalistic. :wink:

Ah! I've solved it :rofl:

@Mapping the Medium, you think that nominalists are people who nominalise (or nominalize), in the grammatical sense which is, ironically and confusingly, precisely the process of creating a noun (a 'nominalisation') from a non-noun? But that (and the consequent expansion by one of the assumed ontological domain) is exactly what nominalists from Ockham to Goodman have generally abhorred.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalization?wprov=sfla1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism?wprov=sfla1

that (and the consequent expansion by one of the assumed ontological domain) is exactly what nominalists from Ockham to Goodman have generally abhorred. — bongo fury

No doubt. ... You have reached a midway point in the attempt to understand, but you still have some ways to go. You are approaching this from a nominalist position,.

I lived for a while in the mountains of North Carolina. There was a funny saying folks used to share if someone were to stop and ask for directions. .. "You can't get there from here."

Okay, this is how I see it:

If there are many propositions that could express that certain things are sweet, and sweetness is constructed from the properties of things being more or less sweet, then to turn the predicate "honey is sweet" into "honey has sweetness" seems valid, as it indicates a relation between one thing (honey) and a tangible property that corresponds to the original predicate being turned into a relation (that is to say the relation between things being more or less sweet and those things having the property of being sweet).

Therefore, it isn't really a category error, as this new "predicate of predicates" is derived from a physical reality: things are more or less sweet, and, thus, those things that qualify as being sweet are themselves more or less sweet depending upon a judgment. That is to say they possess sweetness - even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness.

So, my theory is that the "has" in "honey has sweetness" just represents a judgment that honey exists according to some measure of being sweet such that it possesses the more general property of sweetness by virtue of things being more or less sweet.

You are approaching this from a nominalist position,. — Mapping the Medium

I am? In what sense of nominalist position? That of someone disposed to nominalisation/reification/hypostatisation? Or that of someone opposed to it?

I am? In what sense of nominalist position? That of someone disposed to nominalisation/reification/hypostatisation? Or that of someone opposed to it? — bongo fury

That of someone whose thought has been influenced by it.

Influenced by which one?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalization?wprov=sfla1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism?wprov=sfla1

even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

I like where you're going with this. Are you now envisioning a fractal-like nature of sweetness that maintains that thread in the continuum?

It also helps to think about the commonly understood definition of 'a property'. Is a property a static characteristic?

Influenced by which one? — bongo fury

I am? In what sense of nominalist position? That of someone disposed to nominalisation/reification/hypostatisation? Or that of someone opposed to it? — bongo fury

That of someone whose thought has been influenced by nominalism, hence the binary categorization nature of your question.

It might be helpful for some readers to go back just a bit in this thread and review the interaction I had last night with Banno.

But has my thought been influenced by nominalism?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism?wprov=sfla1

Or has it been influenced by nominalisation?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalization?wprov=sfla1

How is this binary question not appropriate?

Again...... Haphazard' Hypostatic Abstraction... refers to the careless or uncritical process of reifying a quality, relation, or concept into a separate concrete entity or 'object' without sufficient consideration of its relational context, grounding or implications. This process often results in oversimplification or misrepresentation, where an abstracted concept is treated as if it possesses an independent, fixed existence, neglecting the dynamic interconnected nature of the phenomena being abstracted.

By framing hypostatization as something that exists as an isolated or universalized phenomenon, we risk oversimplifying a process that varies depending on context and intent.

We mustn't gloss over relational emergence, assuming that hypostatization inherently leads to error without exploring how it may reveal insights when applied thoughtfully (e.g., in Peirce's work).[/quote]

I like where you're going with this. Are you now envisioning a fractal-like nature of sweetness that maintains that thread in the continuum? — Mapping the Medium

I'll have to think about what you mean by that, unless you can expound a little?

even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

It also helps to think about the commonly understood definition of 'a property'. Is a property a static characteristic? — Mapping the Medium

I might be overreaching here, but this is what I think:

What you are getting at here is that we have abstract qualities like "sweetness" and "hardness" that gain meaning through relations determined by the process of hypostatic abstraction, and, thus, affixing the relevant quality to a subject requires human judgments. As such, certain relations humans might make seem to be rooted in mental phenomenon as any continuum or relation referenced by the process of hypostatic abstraction originates mentally. If that is the case, then the existence of sweetness, for example, only really exists as a cohesive whole in one's mind.

If that is the case, then some properties are not static, while others are. I'm thinking that the properties related through hypostatic abstraction are not static unless the subject possesses the quality of "y-ness" referenced in the original predicate intrinsically. So, while sweetness could take as many arguments as propositions indicating something is sweet exist, whether or not something possesses sweetness statically relies upon the qualities of the relevant subject(s).

And Hypostatic Abstraction of the Haphazard kind is exacerbated by nominalists who hypocritically hypostatize the very process they like to oppose?

Could be, I suppose. That hardly explains why you would blame 'nominalism' rather than 'platonism' for the sorry state thus exacerbated.

I think you were confused by the terminology. Sorry.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalization?wprov=sfla1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism?wprov=sfla1

Could be, I suppose. That hardly explains why you would blame 'nominalism' rather than 'platonism' for the sorry state thus exacerbated. — bongo fury

You may have missed my statements about how I feel about Platonism. .... This is all fleshed out historically, by studying nominalism's conceptual early roots in the ancient world.

There is a book by Kojin Karatani titled 'Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy'. It is one of my favorite books. I highly recommend it.

Intrinsic Properties are characteristics that an object has in itself, independently of anything else. For example, the shape of an object is an intrinsic property.

Extrinsic Properties are characteristics that depend on an object's relationship with other things. For instance, being taller than another person is an extrinsic property.

Essential Properties are attributes that an object must have to be what it is. For example, being a mammal is an essential property of a human.

Accidental Properties are attributes that an object can have but are not essential to its identity. For example, having brown hair is an accidental property of a human.

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be.

Platonism takes this same idea and applies it to universal forms (but it is the same historically influenced idea!).

In Platonism, 'Forms' are abstract, perfect,unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world. According to Plato, the physical world is just a shadow or imitation of this realm of Forms.

Unlike nominalism, which treats properties as mere labels, Platonism asserts that these properties have an essential, independent existence in the world of Forms, but the issues with concretized identity are the same as in nominalism.

Platonism provides a framework where properties and identities have a deeper, more substantial existence beyond the physical realm, which SEEMS to contrast sharply with the nominalist view, but the premise is based on the same historical development of nominalistic thought. This has its origins in religious theology. As I explained before, the view was that God can only be omnipotent if able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint. Discrete, individual forms/objects is the foundational idea behind both nominalism and Platonism. Continuity is disrupted in both of them.

we have abstract qualities like "sweetness" and "hardness" that gain meaning through relations determined by the process of hypostatic abstraction, and, thus, affixing the relevant quality to a subject requires human judgments. As such, certain relations humans might make seem to be rooted in mental phenomenon as any continuum or relation referenced by the process of hypostatic abstraction originates mentally. If that is the case, then the existence of sweetness, for example, only really exists as a cohesive whole in one's mind. — ToothyMaw

If that is the case, then some properties are not static, while others are. I'm thinking that the properties related through hypostatic abstraction are not static unless the subject possesses the quality of "y-ness" referenced in the original predicate intrinsically. So, while sweetness could take as many arguments as propositions indicating something is sweet exist, whether or not something possesses sweetness statically relies upon the qualities of the relevant subject(s). — ToothyMaw

Therefore, it isn't really a category error, as this new "predicate of predicates" is derived from a physical reality: things are more or less sweet, and, thus, those things that qualify as being sweet are themselves more or less sweet depending upon a judgment. That is to say they possess sweetness - even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be. — Mapping the Medium

I think that this line of reasoning indicates the existence of the continuum is necessary if sweetness and properties like it exist so open-endedly in mental representation - even if those mental representations arise partially from physical observation or experience. People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated.

People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated. — ToothyMaw

:sparkle: Happy New Year!

People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated.
— ToothyMaw

:sparkle: Happy New Year! — Mapping the Medium

Yes, Happy New Year to you too. You doing anything special? I'm not.

edit: you don't have to answer that, lol. That kind of puts you on the spot. My bad.

You doing anything special? — ToothyMaw

I am spending the holiday with family, working, hiking, and enjoying some nature and sunshine. They are all special to me.

I'm going to open the next topic for the thread in my next post.

On to Precisive Abstraction ...

Unlike hypostatic abstraction, precisive abstraction involves isolating certain aspects of a concept while deliberately ignoring others for the sake of analysis or clarity. It’s a critical tool for philosophical inquiry, but like hypostatic abstraction, it can be misused or misunderstood. The challenge is in using precisive abstraction effectively without employing reductionism.

Taking into consideration what we've discussed so far about abstraction, how might we discover the rewards and avoid the reductionist pitfalls when using the tool of precisive abstraction?

Much has been written on the topic of precisive abstraction. And I am not an expert on that part of the literature as far as the work of Peirce goes. So it's impossible for me to give an answer to your question, to wit:

, how might we discover the rewards and avoid the reductionist pitfalls when using the tool of precisive abstraction? — Mapping the Medium

I can only suggest a sociological experiment to settle such an issue. I don't think that this is something that can be solved in any other way. But I could be wrong about that.

My first thought it that one might prescind qualities from a concept that don't require adherence to a category such that that concept does not possess that quality ambiguously (I'm thinking the result of an incorrect hypostatic abstraction). So, keeping up with the honey example, we could prescind sweetness from honey if it turns out through hypostatic abstraction that honey does indeed possess sweetness, and we can prescind sweetness from honey if it possesses that quality intrinsically or statically, but we cannot prescind sweetness from honey if there is ambiguity in if the honey truly possesses that trait intrinsically or statically in the absence of a valid hypostatic abstraction.

My second thought is that I'm not sure what I'm talking about at this point.

edit: that was mostly a joke. I understand what I'm saying even if the intention behind the creation of this thread is still not entirely clear yet.

In moving on to 'Precisive Abstraction', it will be helpful to stay aware of the differences in the ways that nominalism, Platonism, and Peirce approach abstraction.

Image link didn't work. I'll post it later on my site and then use that link to post it here. ... I'll be back. :wink:

By labeling, — Mapping the Medium

Again, nominalism isn't a tendency to proliferate labels. Nominalisation is closer to being that.

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. — Mapping the Medium

Nominalism agrees that nominalisation tends to reify (hypostatize) abstract properties, i.e. suggest they are real like concrete objects. Nominalism opposes that tendency.

Nominalism doesn't concretize properties because it doesn't reify them, and nominalisation doesn't necessarily concretize properties even when it reifies them. In reifying them it (nominalisation) might posit them as abstract properties (platonism). But if it posits or characterises them as concrete properties, then it's neither nominalist nor platonist.

You seem to suggest that concretizing amounts to monadising? (Maybe there's a better word for reducing relations to monadic properties.)

Being concrete is usually opposed to being abstract.

Being monadic (intrinsic if you like) is usually opposed to being relational.

The two distinctions are usually kept apart. Does Peirce associate them? Or could you flesh out how you think they correlate? I would be interested in that.

Nominalism (typically) respects the reality of concrete over abstract, but it has no preference at all for monadic over relational or vice versa.

Nominalisation may or may not concretize, but it also reifies relations just as readily as monadic properties. As the diagrams on the wiki page for hypostatisation make clear.

The two distinctions are usually kept apart. Does Peirce associate them? Or could you flesh out how you think they correlate? I would be interested in that. — bongo fury

Please see the image I just posted above. Trying to put Peirce in either nominalism or Platonism (label or categorize him) just doesn't work no matter how hard you might want to try.

Please see the image I just posted above. Trying to put Peirce in either nominalism or Platonism (label or categorize him) just doesn't work no matter how hard you might want to try. — Mapping the Medium

I agree with Nominalism, on those three points.

I agree with Nominalism, on those three points. — Arcane Sandwich

Thanks for stepping up and clarifying your position.