Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey.

My question to you is this .... In this example, is 'sweetness' truly a static property of honey? It is true that we can measure the amount of fructose and glucose in a specific sample of honey, but can we discern the differences in quality of sweetness to the taster? Consider the same with the word 'beauty'. — Mapping the Medium

I think that since we just predicated the quality of sweetness to honey, we have to ask what the degree of separation the quality of sweetness has from objective, scientific markers of what makes something more or less sweet - if they exist. It does indeed seem that the sweetness of a sample of honey cannot be prescinded from the amount of fructose or glucose that exists in that sample of honey (science has shown us that those things directly cause a perception of sweetness), or what would be causing that perception of sweetness? A hallucination? Therefore, the synechistic layer resides in that the sweetness of honey must exist on a continuum that relates smoothly to a scientific measure. As such, I would say that sweetness is not a static property of honey because we can measure the changes in intensity.

I see sweetness and beauty, when used to describe something, as value judgements. Value judgements are analog; measures of fructose or glucose are specific and digital. Sometimes there is relevant correspondence between analog notation points and digital ones, and sometimes there isn't.

Sorry, to answer your question, in this example I don't think sweetness is a static property of honey.

I see sweetness and beauty, when used to describe something, as value judgements. Value judgements are analog; measures of fructose or glucose are specific and digital. Sometimes there is relevant correspondence between analog notation points and digital ones, and sometimes there isn't. — alleybear

So, do you think there is sufficient correspondence between fructose/glucose and perceived sweetness (value judgment)? It sounds like you must if you think sweetness is not a static property of honey. Or so it seems to me from the angle you're taking.

Let's add another example ...

Is hardness a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? ... Does a diamond possess hardness?

Is hardness a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? ... Does a diamond possess hardness? — Mapping the Medium

I would start by seeing if the language indicates that the quality of hardness can exist on a continuum and if such a thing can be measured. In the case of hardness, it does look like it can exist on a continuum, and if we can determine that diamonds exist at some point on this continuum (presumably all diamonds are of equal hardness) such that they measure up as being hard, we can then say that they possess the quality of hardness. How we measure hardness I'm not sure, but I do think this makes diamonds intrinsically, or at least statically, hard.

One more example, and then we'll just stick with these three and go from there. ...

The sun is bright. ... The sun has brightness.

Is brightness a static, intrinsic property of the sun?

But is 'hardness' a static, intrinsic property of a diamond?

But is 'hardness' a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? — Mapping the Medium

No, because hardness is a trait associated with a continuum implied by our language and abstraction of the term. So, what is defined as hard can change, even if diamonds are probably hard by most measures.

The sun is bright. ... The sun has brightness.

Is brightness a static, intrinsic property of the sun? — Mapping the Medium

Yes, I would say it is intrinsic. There is either light or no light, and so long as a light exists it has a brightness. Therefore, the sun must have brightness so long as it exists. This is to say that anything that exudes light must exist on the continuum of brightness and must therefore have brightness. This is only negated when the sun ceases to exist, at which point it no longer needs to have the quality of having brightness for it to have possessed brightness intrinsically; that the quality of this brightness depends upon the sun's existence, and would persist for its whole lifespan, means it is intrinsic to the sun.

Value judgements are analog; — alleybear

And in these examples, how would you reach those value judgements? How would you come to your conclusions?

Is brightness a static, intrinsic property of the sun? — Mapping the Medium

No. Brightness is a value judgement based on an organism's evaluation of the electromagnetic energies emanating from the sun. The emitting of energy is the intrinsic property of the sun. How that energy is interpreted depends on the interpreter.

I think he was just referring to the emission of light, which is directly related to the energy it emits. To take issue with the wording because it would require organisms to perceive that energy for it to technically qualify as "light" seems a little pedantic. But maybe he'll indicate what he meant.

Since another thread's topic is 'factual properties', I'll start off this thread with an example of what hypostatic abstraction is ... — Mapping the Medium

Yes, I'm the author of the 'factual properties' thread: Hello there. Thanks for your posts in that other Thread, they contributed much, and I found them highly intriguing, so I thought that I'd return the favor by stopping by this Thread that you started. Let me see if I can contribute something positive. I will have to quote your original post on multiple occasions, so please be charitable towards my persona.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey. — Mapping the Medium

I think I understand, and I think I agree with this. I'm not sure though, this is way above my current level of awareness as a person. It's very difficult for me to wrap my head around such abstract notions, that is the honest truth. Though that is a limitation of my personal intellect.

My question to you is this .... In this example, is 'sweetness' truly a static property of honey? It is true that we can measure the amount of fructose and glucose in a specific sample of honey, but can we discern the differences in quality of sweetness to the taster? Consider the same with the word 'beauty'. — Mapping the Medium

Is sweetness a static property of honey? Hmmm... I would say, yes. But I could be wrong, I'm just "shooting from the hip" here.

So, what we are discussing is properties, qualities, and attributes. In Peirce's scientific method of synechistic inquiry, he explains that there is hypostatic abstraction and precisive abstraction. How do these pertain to the perception and understanding in thought, dialogue, and the written word? — Mapping the Medium

That is way more complicated than anything that I have ever had to deal with in my daily life, and in my professional life as a philosopher. I have no idea what to say here, honestly. This is far from being my area of expertise, even though I try to understand Peirce on occasion.

And when you ponder this, you should also consider the average person walking around out there in society without a clue as to what any of this means, haphazardly abstracting, ranting on social media, and teaching their children all of their haphazard habits. — Mapping the Medium

Mate, I don't know what any of this means, and I do philosophy for a living, I'm not some average person walking around out there in society without a clue, in that sense. But as to what you're actually talking about, in that sense, I've not a clue what it is you're saying. It's incredibly abstract, I'm afraid I don't understand it.

I imagine that different readers of this thread will gravitate towards one of the three examples over the others, but there is something that all three examples have in common. ... What they have in common is where we need to focus our investigation into the rewards and pitfalls of hypostatic abstraction.

What they have in common is where we need to focus our investigation into the rewards and pitfalls of hypostatic abstraction. — Mapping the Medium

That's a little vague.

I suppose you are referring to that we cannot rightly perform a hypostatic abstraction if the thing in question does not possess that trait intrinsically without some amount of subjective or linguistic value-assignment. Thus, I do think @alleybear is/was on to something.

edit: sorry for presuming you to be male.

edit 2: fixed the language I used.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". — Mapping the Medium

I have no access to what Peirce wrote about hypostatic abstraction, so I cannot comment about what he said.

Can "honey is sweet" be transformed into "honey has sweetness"?

As colour has different hues, sound has different pitches, there are different scales of pain, there are also different intensities of sweetness. For example, a mango can be very sweet, honey reasonably sweet and a watermelon slightly sweet.

In ordinary language we can say "this honey is sweet", meaning that this honey has one particular intensity of sweetness.

When we say "this honey has sweetness", we mean that this honey has a sweetness within the range very sweet to slightly sweet.

"Sweet" is a concrete concept, whilst "sweetness " is an abstract concept.

As the expressions "honey is sweet" and "honey has sweetness" have different meanings, one cannot be transformed into the other.

"Sweet" is a concrete concept, whilst "sweetness " is an abstract concept. — RussellA

I like where you are going with this...

What is it about the word 'sweet' that makes it a concrete concept?

Do you mean that we can measure 'sweet', but we cannot measure 'sweetness'?

Can we measure 'hard' in the case of the diamond? Or are we more likely to measure hardness?

See, it's trickier than it seems at first glance.

edit: sorry for presuming you to be male.

edit 2: fixed the language I used. — ToothyMaw

No worries, and no need to mention it. I am quite used to that happening when I engage in intellectual discussions that are not in person.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey. — Mapping the Medium

Here's how I might go about this from a formal point of view (again, I might be wrong about this, so, grain of salt and all of that sort of cautionary talk).

"Transforms a predicate into a relation". Using "honey", "sweet", and "sweetness" as the three basic terms, I would symbolize "honey" as an individual constant, "i", next I would symbolize "sweet" as a unary first-order predicate, "S", and finally I would (controversially) treat "sweetness" as an individual constant, not a predicate. Here is how that would work. There's two steps to it. The first step is this:

1) S(h). This means "honey, as an individual thing, has the property of being sweet."
2) S(hs). This means "honey, as an individual thing, and sweetness, as an individual thing, are related by the relation of "being sweet".

The problem here, however, is that you cannot say (1) and (2) at the same time. You cannot define "S" as a unary predicate and then attempt to use it as a two-place predicate. Either you use two different predicates, or you go about this in a completely different way.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey.
— Mapping the Medium

Here's how I might go about this from a formal point of view (again, I might be wrong about this, so, grain of salt and all of that sort of cautionary talk).

"Transforms a predicate into a relation". Using "honey", "sweet", and "sweetness" as the three basic terms, I would symbolize "honey" as an individual constant, "i", next I would symbolize "sweet" as a unary first-order predicate, "S", and finally I would (controversially) treat "sweetness" as an individual constant, not a predicate. Here is how that would work. There's two steps to it. The first step is this:

1) S(h). This means "honey, as an individual thing, has the property of being sweet."
2) S(hs). This means "honey, as an individual thing, and sweetness, as an individual thing, are related by the relation of "being sweet".

The problem here, however, is that you cannot say (1) and (2) at the same time. You cannot define "S" as a unary predicate and then attempt to use it as a two-place predicate. Either you use two different predicates, or you go about this in a completely different way. — Arcane Sandwich

Your logic looks correct to me. S(hs) just reflects that honey is not intrinsically sweet. We know it isn't because the relation of being sweet in S(hs) is based in that we know that there are observable qualities that make honey sweet, and we also know what makes something sweet in general. Since we cannot prescind the sweetness of honey from the existence of fructose/glucose, we conclude that to measure the fructose/glucose in a sample of honey is to measure its sweetness. Thus, sweetness is not a static property, but rather one that can more or less be measured, and, thus, to claim that honey possesses the property of being sweet is an abstract value judgment based on a measure of sweetness.

Your logic looks correct to me. — ToothyMaw

Thanks. But I think that there might even be a third option, which would be the three terms as individual constants, and then to use a three-place predicate whose only purpose is to be an application predicate, if that makes any sense. If not, allow me to formalize what I'm saying. Suppose:
1) That "h" is an individual constant that stands for "honey",
2) That "s" is an individual constant that stands for "sweet",
3) That "t" is an individual constant that stands for "sweetness, and
4) That "I" is a three-place predicate (i.e., a ternary relation).

If so, then:

I(h,s,t)

Which means "There is a relation between honey, the property of being sweet, and the property of having sweetness).

Does that make any sense?

Does that make any sense? — Arcane Sandwich

Not on its face, no. But I'll think about it.

edit: yes, that makes sense

Do you mean that we can measure 'sweet', but we cannot measure 'sweetness'? — Mapping the Medium

Taking wine as an example, the more residual sugar there is in a wine the sweeter it will be. For example, a dry wine could have 1 gms/litre of residual sugar whilst a sweet wine could have 45 gms/litre of residual sugar. The amount of residual sugar defines how sweet a wine is. ( www.wineinvestment.com).

We can measure how sweet a particular wine is. For example, a wine may have 20 gms/litre of residual sugar. This gives us a concrete fact.

We also know that the sweetness of wine varies between about 1 gms/litre and about 45 gms/litre of residual sugars. Any wine will lie within this range. This gives us another concrete fact.

Therefore, how sweet a wine is is a concrete concept, tangible in the same way that apples and chairs are concrete concepts.

The sweetness of wine is an abstract concept, in that it is not tangible as apples and chairs are.

However, both "sweet" and "sweetness" are measurable. "Sweet" is measurable as 20 gms/litre of residual sugar. "Sweetness" is measurable as lying between 1 and 45 gms/litre of residual sugar.

If any reader of this thread would like to explore Peirce's work, perhaps these links will help.

Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition

The Rule of Reason; The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce

I would have to buy them. Maybe this coming month when I get my check.

edit: didn't read the free account part

I would have to buy them. Maybe this coming month when I get my check. — ToothyMaw

They are free to explore on those links, but I know they can be difficult to read without blowing up. And if you're anything like me, you'd want to highlight passages and make notes on the pages.

Not on its face, no. But I'll think about it.

edit: yes, that makes sense — ToothyMaw

But it's somehow "unsatisfactory", innit. I mean, if that humble first-order formula is all that I can possible contribute to this conversation, then that makes me quite sad. I take that as a personal flaw about my own persona, though.

But it's somehow "unsatisfactory", innit. I mean, if that humble first-order formula is all that I can possible contribute to this conversation, then that makes me quite sad. I take that as a personal flaw about my own persona, though. — Arcane Sandwich

You definitely helped me think about it more rigorously. And as far as I can tell there is plenty of room for more conjecture, so don't be glum! :up:

edit: you introduced rigor to the conversation. I shouldn't have just framed that in terms of myself. Sorry.

This is the most rigorous representation I could come up with quickly of the current status of the example with the honey.  

The following argument can be made when someone tastes honey:

[[tastes]] = {(sweet: -> T), (like honey -> T)}

We also have another argument that seems necessary that says that:

[[tastes sweet]] = {possesses sweetness -> T}

This second argument is backed up by the fact that we know sweetness as a measure is entailed by the things that make something sweet and that “sweet” as a judgment occupies a region on some sort of sweetness continuum.

Therefore, the person in question could make the logically sound utterance after tasting the honey:

(a) This honey tastes sweet.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness.

This is, clearly, only valid from the viewpoint of the person making the value-judgment associated with the honey tasting sweet. That is to say that in this example we see that the hypostatic abstraction is only valid with a subjective judgment made by a human and even then it is still limited by that person’s experiences, as someone else might not believe that honey qualifies as sweet (hypothetically; of course everyone finds honey to be sweet).

Thus, objectively, we cannot say that honey possesses sweetness in a general sense, as we are measuring it according to an inherently subjective measure.

(a) This honey tastes sweet.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

Taking your idea as a sketch, let me see if I can add some color to it. I would say:

(a) This honey tastes sweet to a human being.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness in itself, if by "in itself" we mean an object-subject relation.
(c) Any object-subject relation can be reduced (abstracted away) to a something-something relation.
(d) And in a something-something relation, there are two individual variables, "x" and "y", such that something binds them, and that something is a relation.

However, that relation itself, can be treated either as a unary predicate, or as an individual variable "z", but then you would need a fourt element to play the role of the ternary, binding predicate.

Does that make any sense? I'm not sure that it does.

EDIT:

you introduced rigor to the conversation. I shouldn't have just framed that in terms of myself. Sorry. — ToothyMaw

Thanks mate, no need to apologize to me. You seem like a good person.