You misunderstand me: the concept of good refers to whatever 'good' means, not what or how one can predicate something to have it. Viz., the concept of value does not refer to what may be valuable. One must first understand, explicitly, what 'value' even means, not just as a word but as a concept, to determine what has it. — Bob Ross

You seem to be unaware of the fact that there are hundreds of different concepts of moral good depending on which theory you are looking at. Whatever definition you choose as your definition, it wouldn't be the only one, and definitely not the final one either.

I have given out the inferred definition from Aristotle's idea. It is clearly saying what moral good is, even if it sounds indirect and informal.

It wouldn't be right to force down a randomly selected concept of moral good to someone who is looking for a basic method to build the moral code.

The problem I was raising is that the OP is asking:

So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin? What question should I make?

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics.

Because the what goodness is is presupposed in what can be said to be good, so how can one accurately predicate goodness to something when they have not a clue what goodness is itself? That's blind metaethics, my friend....

Because the what goodness is is presupposed in what can be said to be good, so how can one accurately predicate goodness to something when they have not a clue what goodness is itself? That's blind metaethics, my friend.. — Bob Ross

OK, fine. What is goodness according to you?

We can talk about what we mean by "good" without worrying about moral realism

:chin:

What meaningfully is there to talk about other than whether goodness is objective; whether judgments about what are good are cognitive and some of them are true; and so forth? Sure, we can venture into metaethics without explicitly dealing with realism vs. anti-realism, but there core tenants of each are going to be addressed irregardless...

Dude. That's your answer?

The reason I am being so harsh with you, is because you obviously cherry-picked one sentence from my most recent post to someone else......

When I said that, I said:

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.


That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

Of which the phrase "what is good is good" clearly refers to the idea it is objective, and not that I am defining 'good' circularly.

It isn't productive to cherry-pick peoples' responses and address something utterly irrelevant to the conversation.

Yes...... :brow:

PS: I refer you back to this comment, because you never actually addressed it.

That doesn't matter for my point I was making: I was pointing out that the OP is asking where to start, and surely they must start with the concept of 'good' and not what can be said to be good. This is a basic distinction that shockingly no one else in this thread seems to cares about: everyone is just nudging @Matias Isoo in the direction of their metaethical and normative ethical commitments. I am not here to do that, because that's not what the OP is asking about. You don't start with someone else's robust ethical theory when starting ethics: you build your own way up.

That doesn't matter for my point I was making: I was pointing out that the OP is asking where to start, and surely they must start with the concept of 'good' and not what can be said to be good. This is a basic distinction that shockingly no one else in this thread seems to cares about: everyone is just nudging Matias Isoo in the direction of their metaethical and normative ethical commitments. I am not here to do that, because that's not what the OP is asking about. You don't start with someone else's robust ethical theory when starting ethics: you build your own way up. — Bob Ross

I think we each learn about goodness viscerally through experiences with grief, fear, and anger. But prove me wrong. What's your favored definition of goodness?

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter). — Bob Ross

Where did Moore say that? From my memory, Moore said it is impossible to define what good is, and one must start from what one ought to do from the knowledge of what morally good actions are, rather than asking what good is. (Ethics since 1900, by M. Warnock)

If it is from the actual reference from the original texts and academic commentaries on these points, you should indicate the source of the reference with your claims.

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics. — Bob Ross

I don't think I said to analyze happiness. I said what brings happiness to all parties involved is good. So it was an inferred definition of Good.

If you ever read any Ethics book, most of them start from the story of Socrates who asked, "How should we live?". He doesn't talk about what good is. No one really starts with what good is. Because like Moore said, and I agreed, good is not an entity. It is a property and quality. It is not possible to define what good is, according to Moore.

Of which the phrase "what is good is good" clearly refers to the idea it is objective, and not that I am defining 'good' circularly. — Bob Ross

I have responded to this as presented in several of your posts in this thread. Not the bare quote which I used to represent it. That bare quote would, one would think, cast you back to your entire position. It seems more likely you have someone disingenuous assumed that's all there was to respond to, in my mind which is not the case.

If your harshness is borne out of what's there in the full post i've quoted above, that is a misunderstanding on your part. I have adequately responded to your position. Your notion of 'objective good' is circular. I have made that much clear about my position, whether you agree with it or not. Unless you're actually obfuscating, in which case, maybe take a bit of time before replying (but i assume this is not hte case)

I should say, the two elements don't seem mutually exclusive - which is why i've been saying unhelpful rather htan unreasonable. It could be objective and circular, as Euthyphro shows is almost certainly the case, if an objective good were to obtain.

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting. At least, with respect to what I asked about, you haven’t shown that by which you understand what good is, yet you’ve presupposed goodness as a qualitative judgement of it.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.

Which immediately requires you to separate the empirical contingency of the one from the a priori necessity of the other.

Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates. — Mww

b-b-b-bingo.

Tictoktictok???

As my ol’ buddy Billy Gibbons might say to Bob….got (you) under presssssuuurre….

Good isn't something decided by others. Good can be concerning groups or somebody alone, and their seeking of positive outcomes for their group or for the self.

I don't disagree with that: I think we learn about all concepts through experience; but that doesn't mean that we can skip steps and put the horse before the cart.

My answer of what the concept of good is, is found in this post:

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc. — Bob Ross

Where did Moore say that? From my memory, Moore said it is impossible to define what good is, and one must start from what one ought to do from the knowledge of what morally good actions are, rather than asking what good is. (Ethics since 1900, by M. Warnock)

My understanding of the Principia Ethica, when I read it a while ago, was that his whole critique was, first and foremost, that ethics hitherto had not even thought to question what the concept of good even is and, instead, skipped over it to a discussion of what can be predicated to have it. This is not to say that Moore, upon conducting (what he considered to be) the necessary investigation into the nature of goodness (as opposed to what The Good is—what can be said to be chiefly good), concluded that we can define it accurately. In fact, you are absolutely right that he considered it an absolutely simple and primitive concept; and I am inclined to agree with him on that point.

If it is from the actual reference from the original texts and academic commentaries on these points, you should indicate the source of the reference with your claims.

“Ethics since 1900” was not written by Moore. If you want to understand Moore, then you need to read The Principia Ethica:

But our question ‘What is good?’ may have still another meaning. We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how ‘good’ is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us first.

-- (Principia Ethica, Ch. 1, Section 5)

I said what brings happiness to all parties involved is good. So it was an inferred definition of Good.

Even if I grant your point, my point still stands:

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics. — Bob Ross

The OP is asking where to start to understand what is good, and I am merely pointing out that you are trying to have them start with Aristotelian ethics (at best); and starting with an already existing, robust theory is not the proper way to start. One needs to start by studying what the nature of goodness is: that is the beginning of metaethics.

It is not possible to define what good is, according to Moore.

That’s all fine: the OP is about where should a person start. Do you think they should just skip over asking themselves “is good definable?”? Do you just want them to skip that step?!?

I have responded to this as presented in several of your posts in this thread. Not the bare quote which I used to represent it. That bare quote would, one would think, cast you back to your entire position

No, one would not think that AmadeusD; because for anyone who actually read my posts, I took a Moorean position on the nature of goodness which is not circular. Again, you just quoted me out of context when I was talking about how goodness is objective.

Your notion of 'objective good' is circular. I have made that much clear about my position, whether you agree with it or not.

All you said was this:

This is tautological. This is unhelpful. This is not an answer to any of the questions. What's good is *insert definition* is the correct form of this statement. Everyone has their own. And that's absolutely fine. — AmadeusD

All you did is address that, when taken literally, “what is good is good” is tautological and doesn’t give a real definition. You absolutely did not address anything about my idea that goodness is objective. Now you are just trying to ad hoc rationalize your laziness.

AmadeusD, I try to be charitable; but on this one I can’t...it’s too painfully obvious what you did. You read a tiny snippet, which had nothing substantial to do with the post in which it was, that said “what is good is good” and assumed I was trying to define goodness as goodness.

It could be objective and circular, as Euthyphro shows is almost certainly the case, if an objective good were to obtain.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is about God and God’s relation to any objective goodness to demonstrate that God can’t really be the standard for it; and does not provide any reason to believe that an objective morality cannot exist.

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

Perhaps I misread, then: I thought you asked about what is good—no? Goodness is just the property of being good.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting

I am just advocating that a person who wants to begin understanding what is good must start with analyzing what they think the concept of good is; then what can be said to be good. That’s it. I don’t think the person in the OP should start with our understanding of what we think goodness refers to.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.
…
Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

Well, this just opened up a can of worms (;

Now we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism again haha. The question you raise, is an interesting, Kantian one—viz., if we cannot know how the things-in-themselves are, then how can we know what is in-itself good?

In short, I think this falls prey the same issue that transcendental idealism has with its in-itself vs. “for-us” distinction: by ‘in-itself’, I take Kant to really be meaning (whether he likes it or not) how a thing exists independently of any experience of it; and there’s another common meaning for ‘in-itself’, which is just the nature of a thing (and this can be based off of conditional knowledge of it). I find no reason to believe that I cannot have indirect knowledge of reality as it were in-itself in the second sense of that term.

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. All we need in order to grasp what is good (conditionally), is the intellect. That is, I guess, the “a priori sense of good itself”—although I am certainly not referring to exactly what you meant here (since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality). Or are you thinking that by concept of good, I am referring to an a priori concept of good?

EDIT:

It is also worth mentioning that moral non-naturalists will nod their approval your way on this one; and say that we do have some sort of extra sense for morality that allows us to sense the supersensible or that God gives us divine revelation.