Here's a couple things to consider.

Logical possibility extends beyond physics into the realm of non-physics

Physical things, in order to emerge into existence in the present, must be pre-determined by
logical possibility as sufficient reason

Logical possibility causes physics — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "logical possibility".

The present tense of time is best represented as an area of parallel lines: — ucarr

I would not say it is best represented this way. That was just "the best" proposal I could think of at the time..

Although observation resolves the trajectory of an elementary particle into one measurable event, math can only calculate from super-position to a probability distribution of possible trajectories, so logic allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information — ucarr

As I explained, observation does not resolve "the trajectory" of an elementary particle. That's why it's commonly said that the particle takes every possible path. You are still talking about the particle as if it has a trajectory. It does not.

Logical possibility extends beyond physics into the realm of non-physics

Physical things, in order to emerge into existence in the present, must be pre-determined by
logical possibility as sufficient reason

Logical possibility causes physics — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "logical possibility". — Metaphysician Undercover

My use of "logical possibility" is based on your use of it in the quote immediately below:

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Although observation resolves the trajectory of an elementary particle into one measurable event, math can only calculate from super-position to a probability distribution of possible trajectories, so logic allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information — ucarr

As I explained, observation does not resolve "the trajectory" of an elementary particle. That's why it's commonly said that the particle takes every possible path. You are still talking about the particle as if it has a trajectory. It does not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's the link my quote is based on:

Measurement Problem

Did I omit any major parts of your theory from my summary?

My use of "logical possibility" is based on your use of it in the quote immediately below: — ucarr

There is a number of different senses of "possibility" recognized by philosophers, the principle distinction being between logical and ontological (metaphysical) possibility. In the first quote, in the context of contingent things, the sense is ontological possibility. In the second quote, in the sense of "possible paths", this is logical possibility. If you read them both as having the same meaning, that is an equivocal interpretation, not intended by me. I apologize for not being clear, but I expected that the difference did not need to be explained.

Logical possibility is basic to epistemology. If, for example, we say that X,Y, and Z, are all possibilities as to what happened, these are logical possibilities. We assume that one of these possibilities, or an unmentioned one, is what actually occurred. If, on the other hand, I say that a future event is contingent, or possible, this requires an ontological possibility. It is implied that there is something real, within the world, which accounts for this condition, that a specified future event may or may not occur. That is ontological possibility.



The important difference, in common usage, is that in relation to logical possibility we commonly assume that there is an actual "truth" to the matter. In relation to ontological possibility, contingent events, there is no truth or falsity, because the referent is a future event which may or may not occur. As Aristotle showed, we must allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle to provide for the reality of ontological possibility. There is neither truth nor falsity in relation to a future event which may or may not occur.

Here's the link my quote is based on: — ucarr

In QM, in the case of the possible paths, or trajectories, this is a construct of logical possibility. Therefore the "superposition" is a construct of logical possibility. However, there is incompatibility between logical possibility, and ontological possibility, (as described above) because one is derived from past observation, and the other describes future contingent events.

Simply put, the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. This is the "gap" referred to in your linked video, and what I called an "informational gap". The informational gap produces a false representation, "superposition". Ontological possibility is represented as logical possibility, with "superposition", and this is a false representation.

What I propose is that ontological possibility is better represented as nonphysical, because it violates the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) which apply to physical things.

...the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your statement makes a distinction between a representation of the recollected de facto past, which may or may not be true, and the contemplated de facto future, which, via poll sampling and statistical analysis, can be verified or falsified.

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the case of physical things, the arrow of time moves from ontological possibility (the future) towards logical possibility (the past) and from logical possibility towards realization of a definite and contingent outcome (the more distant past)? Moreover, the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) apply to this contingent outcome?

Simply put, the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

Logical possibility, being rooted in definitive identity and the binaries of noncontradiction and the excluded middle, cannot apply to the arrow of time from present to future because no true/false binary attaches to events that may or may not occur?

Simply put, the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

The future-to-past arrow of time is about ontological possibilities resolving down to: a) identity (A=A); b) non-contradiction (A $≠ ¬$A); c) excluded middle (A $∨¬A$) $¬$(A $∧$$¬$A)

...the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. This is the "gap" referred to in your linked video, and what I called an "informational gap". The informational gap produces a false representation, "superposition". Ontological possibility is represented as logical possibility, with "superposition", and this is a false representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the future-to-past arrow of time, QM uncertainty is ontological possibility? It is something real that accounts for a super-position event that may or may not occur? The Schrödinger equation calculates a math evaluation to a probability outcome, and this estimation introduces a gap between itself and the precise calculation that mathematically evaluates to a definitive outcome?

In relation to ontological possibility, contingent events, there is no truth or falsity, because the referent is a future event which may or may not occur. As Aristotle showed, we must allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle to provide for the reality of ontological possibility. There is neither truth nor falsity in relation to a future event which may or may not occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is why the future-to-past arrow of time allows the ontological possibility (causation) of free will to change things?

In the case of physical things, the arrow of time moves from ontological possibility (the future) towards logical possibility (the past) and from logical possibility towards realization of a definite and contingent outcome (the more distant past)? Moreover, the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) apply to this contingent outcome? — ucarr

I don't quite understand this. The arrow of time, in this representation, moves from ontological possibility (future) to ontological actuality (past). Logical possibility, in its basic form, is an epistemic principle, describing how we relate to past occurrences, actualities, when we are not sure exactly what actually occurred. But "logical possibility" gets more complicated when we look toward future events, predictions.

"Logical possibility" when applied to the past, recognizes that there must be "an actual", what actually occurred. When applying "logical possibility" to the future (ontological possibility), there is no such thing as "the actual", and this requires a different form of "logical possibility", known as modal logic. To mix these two senses of "logical possibility" is to equivocate, because one assumes an "actual", seeking to determine the actual, the other does not assume an actual, so it seeks to determine probabilities ony.

That's a gap between the two, which can only be bridged by applying some principles which are required as the criteria to determine the "actual". For example, in physics there is a need for "real time", and in cosmology "world line", to determine what is supposed to be the actual, when relativity principles are used.

Logical possibility, being rooted in definitive identity and the binaries of noncontradiction and the excluded middle, cannot apply to the arrow of time from present to future because no true/false binary attaches to events that may or may not occur? — ucarr

Yes, this may be adequately representative. There is "an actual" in the past, but no "actual" in the future. So if we draw a line of continuity from what has been determined as the actual, in the past, through the present, we have to account for this difference, that we cannot continue in this way, into the future, because there is no actual.

If we represent that boundary as a crossing from what is necessary (what actually happened), to what is probable (what most likely will happen), we need principles to account for this difference. If we cannot account for this difference, it means that we are lacking in information. Something happens at this boundary which manifests as a change between necessary and probable, and we do not have the information required to explain this change.

n the future-to-past arrow of time, QM uncertainty is ontological possibility? — ucarr

QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. That's the representation used by physics, the one which produces the need for entropy as a principle to account for the reality that time actively passes. There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation is not a true representation. It does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable.

Instead the mathematical principles employed produce an infinite regress at the approach to the boundary. The lack of information manifests as uncertainty. And this is a representation produced from approaching the boundary from the past side. Therefore it does not represent ontological possibility which is on the future side of the boundary.

This is why the future-to-past arrow of time allows the ontological possibility (causation) of free will to change things? — ucarr

The freewill acts within that informational gap, so it escapes the determinist understanding. By the determinist understanding, the continuity of past actuality, extends through the boundary of the present, into the future, so that there is no informational gap. Future events are apprehended as a necessary continuity of the past actuality, such that there is no possibility of a freewill act.

But if we maintain the boundary, then when we extend the past-present-future timeline through the present, we see that is passes from actual to probable. This provides for the lack of necessity, where the freewill acts. However, to be understood this lack of necessity, and the boundary itself, has to be accounted for by real principles. This may incline one to adopt the future-present-past representation, to incorporate the boundary into the representation. Then the possibility of an action is prior to the act itself, and the passing of time is itself an activity.

In the case of physical things, the arrow of time moves from ontological possibility (the future) towards logical possibility (the past) and from logical possibility towards realization of a definite and contingent outcome (the more distant past)? Moreover, the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) apply to this contingent outcome? — ucarr

I don't quite understand this. The arrow of time, in this representation, moves from ontological possibility (future) to ontological actuality (past). Logical possibility, in its basic form, is an epistemic principle, describing how we relate to past occurrences, actualities, when we are not sure exactly what actually occurred. But "logical possibility" gets more complicated when we look toward future events, predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

We know ontological possibility and logical possibility are linked. We know ontological possibility inhabits the future. We know that the free will by which the details of ontological possibility change is active in the future. We know free will is inactive in the past. We know logical possibility pertains to the past, so these things we know tell us, logically, that the arrow of time, from future to past, has free will changing ontological possibility as desired, and then ontological possibility created by free will shapes logical possibility because the two types of possibility must match for the sake of realization in the world. Finally, in the more distant past following logical possibility, realization of something real within the world occurs as a definite and contingent outcome.

We know ontological possibility and logical possibility are linked. — ucarr

The principal point of my last post was to demonstrate that these two are not linked. There is what I called a gap of information between them. This is due to "logical possibility" having been fundamentally designed to be compatible with observation (laws of noncontradiction etc.), which is of the past, and ontological possibility being of the future.

We know that the free will by which the details of ontological possibility change is active in the future. — ucarr

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. "the details of ontological possibility change".

We know logical possibility pertains to the past, so these things we know tell us, logically, that the arrow of time, from future to past, has free will changing ontological possibility as desired, and then ontological possibility created by free will shapes logical possibility because the two types of possibility must match for the sake of realization in the world. — ucarr

This appears very confused. Consider "ontological possibility" as possibility which exists independently from whether it is actualized, or even apprehended by a mind, in a way similar to the way we would say that actual things exist independently of being apprehended by a mind.

Now, ontological possibility provides the means by which free will may change the world. "Logical possibility" remains distinct as unable to apprehend ontological possibility due to the information gap. So creative forms of logic, such as modal logic, are produced in an attempt to bridge the gap.

QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. That's the representation used by physics, the one which produces the need for entropy as a principle to account for the reality that time actively passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

What happens to the principle of entropy within the future-to-past arrow of time?

There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation... does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can the anti-determinist representation be called the free will representation? If so, how does free will impact the boundary between the actual and the probable?

Instead the mathematical principles employed produce an infinite regress at the approach to the boundary. The lack of information manifests as uncertainty. And this is a representation produced from approaching the boundary from the past side. Therefore it does not represent ontological possibility which is on the future side of the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

The infinite regress is the math model of the approach of the past to the present? If the present has temporal extension, does the logical model show future and past overlap the expanding present as Venn diagrams? Do Venn diagrams of a timeline of overlapped future-present or present-past represent composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time?

In relation to ontological possibility, contingent events, there is no truth or falsity, because the referent is a future event which may or may not occur. As Aristotle showed, we must allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle to provide for the reality of ontological possibility. There is neither truth nor falsity in relation to a future event which may or may not occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is why the future-to-past arrow of time allows the ontological possibility (causation) of free will to change things? — ucarr

The freewill acts within that informational gap, so it escapes the determinist understanding. By the determinist understanding, the continuity of past actuality, extends through the boundary of the present, into the future, so that there is no informational gap. Future events are apprehended as a necessary continuity of the past actuality, such that there is no possibility of a freewill act. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please click the link below for a quick logical argument regarding the possibility of free will.

Logic and Free Will

There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation... does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover

The info gap is the boundary between the actual and probable which physics cannot cover because this boundary is occupied by non-physical reality?

Does the future-to-past arrow of time make the revelation QM uncertainty is a fiction?

But if we maintain the boundary, then when we extend the past-present-future timeline through the present, we see that is passes from actual to probable. This provides for the lack of necessity, where the freewill acts. However, to be understood this lack of necessity, and the boundary itself, has to be accounted for by real principles. This may incline one to adopt the future-present-past representation, to incorporate the boundary into the representation. Then the possibility of an action is prior to the act itself, and the passing of time is itself an activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The future is a non-physical dimension of time which, in turn, contains the dimension of free will?

If a dimension can be conceptualized as a type of set, then the set of free will has what type of members?

If passing time in the non-physical future causes ontological possibilities to change, where does free will play a role in making ontological possibilities change?

What is the role played by passing time with regard to the transition from non-physical future to physical present? Is passing time the function that makes the conversions between the three tenses of time? How does passing time go about making the conversions between the three tenses of time? How does passing time make the conversion between a non-physical time tense and a physical time tense?

In what particular ways does the physical present bring about the transition from future to past?

Do you agree these questions make it clear the issues being treated here inhabit the domain of science and not philosophy?

If a dimension can be conceptualized as a type of set, then the set of free will has what type of members?

As the set of a moving car has a person acting as a dynamo driving the car, the set of free will has what dynamo acting as its driver?

We know ontological possibility and logical possibility are linked. — ucarr

The principal point of my last post was to demonstrate that these two are not linked. There is what I called a gap of information between them. This is due to "logical possibility" having been fundamentally designed to be compatible with observation (laws of noncontradiction etc.), which is of the past, and ontological possibility being of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I understand your timeline of future-to-past, the linkage along the channel of possibility connecting ontological possibility and logical possibility is critically important because this is the continuity wherein free will can act to change contingent things. There are four necessary links in this chain of causation: ontological possibility (the future) → logical possibility (the overlapped present + past) → free will → desired changes in physical things.

As I understand your expositions concerning ontological versus logical possibilities, the distinction revolves around: Part 1: True or False: a) identity (A=A); b) non-contradiction (A $≠ ¬$A); c) excluded middle (A $∨¬A$) $¬$(A $∧$$¬$A), and Part 2: Probability: the event may or may not occur. Haven't we been examining the boundary between the actual and the probable? Isn't the future-to-past arrow of time the thing that links ontological possibilities with logical possibilities via free will en route to changes in physical things actualized? Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual?

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't you believe that if something is a necessary pre-condition for another thing, then that necessary pre-condition is logically prior to the contingent thing?

We know that the free will by which the details of ontological possibilities change becomes active in the future. — ucarr

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. "the details of ontological possibilities change". — Metaphysician Undercover

The desires of free will change ontological possibilities such that, for example, a girl exercises her free will to receive a green scarf for Christmas instead of a red one. Towards this end, she prays every night before bed to get the green scarf on the big day. Lo and behold, the ship from China comes in at the eleventh hour with green scarves to restock the depleted supply in time, and the girl just knows her prayers made this happen.

This appears very confused. Consider "ontological possibility" as possibility which exists independently from whether it is actualized, or even apprehended by a mind, in a way similar to the way we would say that actual things exist independently of being apprehended by a mind.

Ontological possibility, being independent of both mind and physical things, stands up as possibility real within the world?

Now, ontological possibility provides the means by which free will may change the world. "Logical possibility" remains distinct as unable to apprehend ontological possibility due to the information gap. So creative forms of logic, such as modal logic, are produced in an attempt to bridge the gap. — Metaphysician Undercover

Free will is the power acting upon ontological possibility so as to change its details along a timeline future-to-past?

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

By the above quote, do we know: logical possibility also inhabits the future-to-past arrow of time in the manner of: logical priority of possibility (future), being a necessary pre-condition of a contingent thing, also implies temporal ordering before a contingent thing?

Do we know that actual things were possible before becoming actual as, for example, the possibility of a building eventually standing upon a previously vacant lot? Conversely, do we know in advance that things logically impossible don't actualize as real in the world as, for example, a failed attempt to create a statue made of circular triangles?

What happens to the principle of entropy within the future-to-past arrow of time? — ucarr

I don't know. It's information not available to us by our current models of time. It's simply written off as a part of reality which is unintelligible. The idea is that by changing perspective it could become intelligible.

Can the anti-determinist representation be called the free will representation? If so, how does free will impact the boundary between the actual and the probable? — ucarr

It makes the boundary intelligible.

The infinite regress is the math model of the approach of the past to the present? If the present has temporal extension, does the logical model show future and past overlap the expanding present as Venn diagrams? Do Venn diagrams of a timeline of overlapped future-present or present-past represent composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time? — ucarr

Perhaps it could.

Please click the link below for a quick logical argument regarding the possibility of free will. — ucarr

Right, that is why the freewill approach is incompatible with the determinist approach.

The info gap is the boundary between the actual and probable which physics cannot cover because this boundary is occupied by non-physical reality? — ucarr

You do not have the causal relation correct here. The area of the boundary is called non-physical because physics cannot cover it, not vice versa. This is when observation is impossible, and physics relies on observation, so physics cannot cover it. Therefore it is non-physical.

Does the future-to-past arrow of time make the revelation QM uncertainty is a fiction? — ucarr

The uncertainty is not fiction, it is a real aspect of the physics.

The future is a non-physical dimension of time which, in turn, contains the dimension of free will? — ucarr

I would not say that it contains freewill, or else it woud not be free.

Do you agree these questions make it clear the issues being treated here inhabit the domain of science and not philosophy? — ucarr

No, I found those questions mostly incoherent, therefore impossible to answer. I can't say what that means other than that you probably don't understand.

As I understand your timeline of future-to-past, the linkage along the channel of possibility connecting ontological possibility and logical possibility is critically important because this is the continuity wherein free will can act to change contingent things. — ucarr

As I said, the two are not linked, there is a discontinuity, and this allows for the reality of freewill acts being concealed by the discontinuity.

Part 2: Probability: the event may or may not occur. Haven't we been examining the boundary between the actual and the probable? Isn't the future-to-past arrow of time the thing that links ontological possibilities with logical possibilities via free will en route to changes in physical things actualized? Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual? — ucarr

I think I see how you misunderstand now. Let's start with two categories, ontological possibilities and ontological actualities. These two constitute our assumed reality as future and past. The boundary between the two (which is really more like an overlap) is the present. We relate to these two through logical possibility, where the three fundamental laws apply to the possibilities for past actualities, and the logic of probabilities relates to the ontological possibilities of the future.

Probabilities are just an extension of the logic of past actualities, so probabilities do not accurately represent the true nature of ontological possibility. Therefore logical possibilities, and probabilities are not linked to ontological possibility. "Probability" which is the way we understand ontological possibility, is linked to logical possibility, which is linked to the actualities of the past. Freewill is the only principle we have which links to ontological possibility.

Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual? — ucarr

The ontological actual is linked to the ontological possible, by the present. The logic, by which we represent these two, does link the possible and the actual, but in a different way. The logic is based completely in the actual (past) without a true representation of the future, or present. Therefore the logical representation contains a gap or lack of information where the past is not properly reated to the present or future..

Don't you believe that if something is a necessary pre-condition for another thing, then that necessary pre-condition is logically prior to the contingent thing? — ucarr

Yes, that is why I conclude that the future (the possibility of the thing) is logically prior to the past (actuality of the contingent thing) . However we do not commonly represent things this way. Due to false premises, we represent the past (actuality) as prior to the future (possibility).

The desires of free will change ontological possibilities such that, for example, a girl exercises her free will to receive a green scarf for Christmas instead of a red one. Towards this end, she prays every night before bed to get the green scarf on the big day. Lo and behold, the ship from China comes in at the eleventh hour with green scarves to restock the depleted supply in time, and the girl just knows her prayers made this happen. — ucarr

Was there a point to this?

Free will is the power acting upon ontological possibility so as to change its details along a timeline future-to-past? — ucarr

Sure, something like that, but I still don't understand your terminology "change its details".

By the above quote, do we know: logical possibility also inhabits the future-to-past arrow of time in the manner of: logical priority of possibility (future), being a necessary pre-condition of a contingent thing, also implies temporal ordering before a contingent thing? — ucarr

I believe that we can conclude, that in order to understand the order of time logically, we need to order it in that way, as future prior to past. When we understand the order of time the other way, as past prior to future, there is an incompatibility between temporal priority and logical priority. Since the model of temporal priority commonly used is just a representation of time, then what needs to be changed in order to establish compatibility, is that representation.

Do we know that actual things were possible before becoming actual as, for example, the possibility of a building eventually standing upon a previously vacant lot? — ucarr

Yes we do know this. We know it through the way that we know the planning and construction of the building. Since we can plan for something, and produce it, we know that the possibility of the thing is there before the thing itself. Then as time passes, we act to ensure that all the required actualities (efficient causes) are produced from the possibilities as they emerge out of the future, during the passing of time, so that the project can be successful

Conversely, do we know in advance that things logically impossible don't actualize as real in the world as, for example, a failed attempt to create a statue made of circular triangles? — ucarr

I don't know how this is relevant.

What happens to the principle of entropy within the future-to-past arrow of time? — ucarr

I don't know. It's information not available to us by our current models of time. It's simply written off as a part of reality which is unintelligible. The idea is that by changing perspective it could become intelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don’t know if the arrow of time and the arrow of entropy are connected?

There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation... does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover

It makes the boundary intelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does the function of free will, which is to observe, for example, "The input/output transformation function of free will applies to the future tense_present tense interface." transform the future tense, non-physical, into the present tense, physical? What is the common ground between future tense and present tense, and how does free will provide this common ground?

At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this description of the present, the two lines of dimensional extension are past and future. This shows that the present has no dimensional extension, and therefore it is a theoretical point with zero dimensions. What do you think?

Instead the mathematical principles employed produce an infinite regress at the approach to the boundary. The lack of information manifests as uncertainty. And this is a representation produced from approaching the boundary from the past side. Therefore it does not represent ontological possibility which is on the future side of the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

The infinite regress is the math model of the approach of the past to the present? If the present has temporal extension, does the logical model show future and past overlap the expanding present as Venn diagrams? Do Venn diagrams of a timeline of overlapped future-present or present-past represent composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time? — ucarr

Perhaps it could. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it follow logically that composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time, in the case of present + past, will contain moving things in super-position both temporally and spatially?

Does it follow logically that composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time, in the case of future + present, will contain moving things in super-position temporally, spatially and ontologically? Regarding temporal super-position here, this means time passing simultaneously physically and non-physically. Does it follow logically that this super-positioned passing time is both physical and non-physical?

Please click the link below for a quick logical argument regarding the possibility of free will. — ucarr

Right, that is why the freewill approach is incompatible with the determinist approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since the laws of nature involve conditional freedom of choice as a necessary choice, and we know that looking forward to the future from the present allows choices constrained no more than choices constrained by looking forward to the past from the future, can we conclude logically that, with respect to the direction of the arrow of time, conditional freedom of choice is symmetrical?

QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. That's the representation used by physics, the one which produces the need for entropy as a principle to account for the reality that time actively passes. There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation is not a true representation. It does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does the future-to-past arrow of time make the revelation QM uncertainty is a fiction? — ucarr

The uncertainty is not fiction, it is a real aspect of the physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

You say QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. How is it that QM uncertainty, the result of a false representation, avoids also being false?

The info gap is the boundary between the actual and probable which physics cannot cover because this boundary is occupied by non-physical reality? — ucarr

You do not have the causal relation correct here. The area of the boundary is called non-physical because physics cannot cover it, not vice versa. This is when observation is impossible, and physics relies on observation, so physics cannot cover it. Therefore it is non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where NP=non-physics; P=physics; O=observable, given NP=¬O, and P≠¬O, then NP≠P and P≠NP. What do you think?

The future is a non-physical dimension of time which, in turn, contains the dimension of free will? — ucarr

I would not say that it contains freewill, or else it woud not be free. — Metaphysician Undercover

If free will inhabits the world, where it is contained, then must we conclude, by your argument above, that free will does not exist?

Non-physical time passing causes non-physical free will to change?

If a dimension can be conceptualized as a type of set, then the set of free will has what type of members?
— ucarr

The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are the desires and anticipations of the future not a collection of things belonging to the set of the future?

If passing time in the non-physical future causes ontological possibilities to change, where does free will play a role in making ontological possibilities change?

In general, if passing time causes things to change, including non-physical things, then how is it free will, and not passing time, that causes ontological possibilities to change?

What is the role played by passing time with regard to the transition from non-physical future to physical present? Is passing time the function that makes the conversions between the three tenses of time? How does passing time go about making the conversions between the three tenses of time? How does passing time make the conversion between a non-physical time tense and a physical time tense?

Since passing time causes things to change, and future and present, one being non-physical, the other physical, connect, then how does non-physical future cause itself to become physical present?

How does non-physical future acquire the dynamism of the present?

As I understand your timeline of future-to-past, the linkage along the channel of possibility connecting ontological possibility and logical possibility is critically important because this is the continuity wherein free will can act to change contingent things. — ucarr

As I said, the two are not linked, there is a discontinuity, and this allows for the reality of freewill acts being concealed by the discontinuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you explain your above quote within the context of your below quote?

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

The principal point of my last post was to demonstrate that these two are not linked. There is what I called a gap of information between them. This is due to "logical possibility" having been fundamentally designed to be compatible with observation (laws of noncontradiction etc.), which is of the past, and ontological possibility being of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Part 2: Probability: the event may or may not occur. Haven't we been examining the boundary between the actual and the probable? Isn't the future-to-past arrow of time the thing that links ontological possibilities with logical possibilities via free will en route to changes in physical things actualized? Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual? — ucarr

I think I see how you misunderstand now. Let's start with two categories, ontological possibilities and ontological actualities. These two constitute our assumed reality as future and past. The boundary between the two (which is really more like an overlap) is the present. We relate to these two through logical possibility, where the three fundamental laws apply to the possibilities for past actualities, and the logic of probabilities relates to the ontological possibilities of the future.

Probabilities are just an extension of the logic of past actualities, so probabilities do not accurately represent the true nature of ontological possibility. Therefore logical possibilities, and probabilities are not linked to ontological possibility. "Probability" which is the way we understand ontological possibility, is linked to logical possibility, which is linked to the actualities of the past. Freewill is the only principle we have which links to ontological possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

If something is logically possible by a proposition not qualified in terms of time, this possibility persists in all temporal frames of reference? If something is logically probable by a proposition not qualified in terms of time , then this probability persists in all temporal frames of reference?

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

The ontological actual is linked to the ontological possible, by the present. The logic, by which we represent these two, does link the possible and the actual, but in a different way. The logic is based completely in the actual (past) without a true representation of the future, or present. Therefore the logical representation contains a gap or lack of information where the past is not properly reated to the present or future.. — Metaphysician Undercover

The logic of logical possibility is logical relations valid and true? The logic of probability is math relations mathematically valid and true? Correct evaluation of both types of statements are only constrained by time if their propositions are qualified in terms of time? Don't we see evidence of this in your above quote which has no comprehension restriction on contingent things and makes no reference to time?

Yes, that is why I conclude that the future (the possibility of the thing) is logically prior to the past (actuality of the contingent thing) . However we do not commonly represent things this way. Due to false premises, we represent the past (actuality) as prior to the future (possibility). — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you refute the following chain of reasoning: If the future is temporally and logically prior to the present and past, and if it has no necessary pre-condition, then it is a first cause and as such, free will is caused and contingent and not free. If the future is not temporally and logically prior to the present and past, and thus has a necessary pre-condition, then it inhabits the arrow of time establishing the past-present-future sequence.

The desires of free will change ontological possibilities such that, for example, a girl exercises her free will to receive a green scarf for Christmas instead of a red one. Towards this end, she prays every night before bed to get the green scarf on the big day. Lo and behold, the ship from China comes in at the eleventh hour with green scarves to restock the depleted supply in time, and the girl just knows her prayers made this happen. — ucarr

Was there a point to this? — Metaphysician Undercover

I find your claims about free will vague on the details and logic of its workings. My story is an attempt to apply your free will claims to a familiar situation in life. I wanted to see if you think it exemplifies what you've been claiming. Since you see no point to it, I conclude your examples demonstrating free will in action are very different.

...there is an incompatibility between temporal priority and logical priority. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think logical claims unqualified by time are tied exclusively to the past?

Do we know that actual things were possible before becoming actual as, for example, the possibility of a building eventually standing upon a previously vacant lot? — ucarr

Yes we do know this. We know it through the way that we know the planning and construction of the building. Since we can plan for something, and produce it, we know that the possibility of the thing is there before the thing itself. Then as time passes, we act to ensure that all the required actualities (efficient causes) are produced from the possibilities as they emerge out of the future, during the passing of time, so that the project can be successful — Metaphysician Undercover

When we start becoming active on Tuesday, we're emerging out of the future which was Monday?

Conversely, do we know in advance that things logically impossible don't actualize as real in the world as, for example, a failed attempt to create a statue made of circular triangles? — ucarr

I don't know how this is relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover