I think you are talking about the attributes of an intelligent agent. Animals also experience and cause for example.

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. — AmadeusD

You've also made a claim. In rational discourse, propositions need the support of logical arguments. Why do you think you're exempt from this requirement?

probability distribution — Metaphysician Undercover

is not — AmadeusD

of probability — Metaphysician Undercover

a relation of probability — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are the calculated probabilities of possible values of a variable not part of a relation of probability of possible outcomes?

...everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly."

Since sensory processing by the brain at light speed is time-lagged only nanoseconds behind sensory stimulus, and thus it is negligible, you, like me, always wake up in the empirical present, it being noted you call it the past.

If this is true, as I judge it, based upon your words, then I see your temporal direction, like mine, is a passage through a never-ending, nanoseconds time-lagged sequence of pasts.

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is when the prediction of probability is taken as a prediction of necessity, which creates the illusion of continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy.

So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. However, when we assume the cause/effect relation to be one of necessity, and we assume therefore that the prediction is one of necessity rather than one of probability, this creates the illusion of continuity.

Therefore, the illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution itself, it is related to the assumption (belief) that the prediction which is based in probability is a prediction of necessity.

Where is the contradiction here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction.

Secondly, we know particles cover distances across durations of time. This is the issue you raised in your Planck time thought experiment: Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes.

Next you posited a theoretical half Planck length. Claiming no physics can occur at sub-Planck length, you speculated about info exchange at sub-Planck length independent of physics. You concluded immaterial info can do something causal independent of physics.

If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise,
we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it.

Inside the LHC two protons collide and the Higgs particle emerges. Researchers had predicted the emergence of the Higgs particle on the basis of one Higgs particle emergence for every 30 billion proton-to-proton collisions. Since the researchers, using statistical analysis, detected the Higgs particle, we see no continuity issue attached to a probability calculation of the Higgs particle emergence.

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

I really don't see how you apprehend contradiction here. The prediction is based in a relation of probability, not in a relation of necessity. However, when this relation (the cause effect relation) is taken to be a relation of necessity, the illusion of continuity is created. — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't what you wrote originally:

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover

The illusion of continuity $≠$... the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction $=$ prediction of probability $=$ therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity...

You've also made a claim. — ucarr

No. I've rejected your claim. It does seem, unfortunately, that you misunderstand basic tenets of exchange, reason and relation. It is making things difficult. We ran into this last year, and it seems MU is getting it now. Perhaps reflect on some of these criticisms with an open mind. It seems your entire mode is to simply push-back even when things you say aren't relevant.

Why are the calculated probabilities of possible values of a variable not part of a relation of probability of possible outcomes? — ucarr

a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. MU is trying to point out that the actual probability isn't relevant to his main thrust. The thrush is that your conception of continuity is nothing but close-nit probability giving hte illusion of same. Your comments in terms of the probability issue don't seem to actually address this. They appear to claim that, despite MU talking about two aspects separately, having different consequences to the argument, that they are contradictory. I told you they are not, as did MU.

I'm not sure more can be done.

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

Your claim is a refutation of my claim. It makes a declaration about the truth content of my claim, finding it to be zero.

Why do you think your refutation of my claim's truth content is not another claim that needs to be supported by a logical argument?

In a court of law, as you know, when one side says the other has made a contradictory statement, and then the side accused of making a contradictory statement says, "I did not make a contradictory statement." the judge then requires the side making the denial to prove their denial. In summary, we see that a claim of making a contradictory statement has been leveled against the other side, and then the other side denies it. The judge, hearing the denial, knows the denial is another claim, and thus demands the denier present an argument supporting the denial.

It does seem, unfortunately, that you misunderstand basic tenets of exchange, reason and relation. It is making things difficult. We ran into this last year, and it seems MU is getting it now. Perhaps reflect on some of these criticisms with an open mind. It seems your entire mode is to simply push-back even when things you say aren't relevant. — AmadeusD

Consider: As you see at the top of this post, I reposted MUs statements I find contradictory. I've edited out the extraneous details to clarify the parts of his statements I'm addressing.

This is evidence I present to support my claim of contradiction; I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. The point I'm making now isn't concerned with the correctness of my interpretation of MU's statements. I'm attempting to show I follow proper procedure when I participate in rational discourse. When I push-back on someone's claim because I believe it false, I always provide either evidence - as in this case - or a logical argument, or both.

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD

a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD

Consider: Two basketball players. Each player tries to hit the same jump shot from the same free throw line. A statistical analyst watches each player shoot the same shot twenty-five times. He calculates a probability distribution based on the twenty-five shots taken by each player. His conclusion says Player A has a fifty per cent chance of making shot #26, and Player B has a twenty-five per cent chance of making shot #26. Now we see Player A's chance of making the shot is twice that of Player B's chance of making the shot, according to the probability distribution.

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability?

In a court of law, as you know, when one side says the other has made a contradictory statement, and then the side accused of making a contradictory statement says, "I did not make a contradictory statement." the judge then requires the side making the denial to prove their denial. — ucarr

Absolutely not. BUt if this is how you feel things go, then I am not surprised. Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. In court, particularly important. Judges remind juries constantly that a defendant not providing any testimony or evidence does not indicate anything whatsoever. The entire point is that the prosecution prove their case, either on probability, or beyond reasonable doubt. At no stage, ever, does a judge require proof of denial. You're talking about disputed facts.

As you see at the top of this post, I reposted MUs statements I find contradictory. — ucarr

They clearly are not. I cannot say more.

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr

You're not asking close to the correct question to address the issue. The distribution and the relation are separate properties/elements. Obviously. So, yeah. Not much else to say

In a court of law, as you know, when one side says the other has made a contradictory statement, and then the side accused of making a contradictory statement says, "I did not make a contradictory statement." the judge then requires the side making the denial to prove their denial. — ucarr

Don't be mislead by the fact the prosecution must prove its case against the defendant, and not the other way around. Both the prosecution and the defense make claims of fact they must prove. So if a claim of innocence is based upon the defendant not being at the scene of the crime, in order to persuade a jury in their favor, they must prove their absence from the scene of the crime over and above the prosecution's proof they were present at the scene of the crime. Simple denial won't do. You can be confident this is correct because a prosecutor won't initiate a case lacking solid evidence proving the guilt of the defendant. Without being able to plausibly meet the burden of proof, the prosecution would be thwarted by simple denial.

If the defense could win their cases with simple denial, who would ever need a defense attorney?

Absolutely not. BUt if this is how you feel things go, then I am not surprised. Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. In court, particularly important. Judges remind juries constantly that a defendant not providing any testimony or evidence does not indicate anything whatsoever. The entire point is that the prosecution prove their case, either on probability, or beyond reasonable doubt. At no stage, ever, does a judge require proof of denial. You're talking about disputed facts. — AmadeusD

Your purist argument is true, but I don't believe one person in ten thousand would enter a courtroom as a mute defendant without a defense attorney. Moreover, with indigent defendants, the court assigns a public defender free of charge. No one but a purist thinks a mute defense is sound.

Regarding how all of this relates to your naysaying my claim of contradiction by MU, am I to suppose that in a debate, you'd make a denial without supporting it, and then stand mute while your opponent advances a cogent argument against it?

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr

You're not asking close to the correct question to address the issue. The distribution and the relation are separate properties/elements. — AmadeusD

Why do you think a distribution of differential probabilities is not interrelated? One of the points of the distribution is to compare levels of probability.

Why do you think a distribution of plotted trajectories has anything to do with the internal consistency and coherence of each trajectory? MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous. If he can establish this dis-continuity, then he can insert by conjecture possible non-physical agents of change and causation independent of physics.

MU wants to ride piggyback atop the dynamism of physics, then, at the critical moment of his conjectured dis-continuity of the trajectory of the particle, insert his immaterial agents, i.e., immaterial information doing an immaterial info exchange at the last lap of the trajectory, thus proving both the independence and causal power of immaterial info.

So far he doesn't answer the question why none of his independent, immaterial things can't do anything observable without the grounding of physics.

I want to point out, this is now quite off topic. It will become clear I see no reason to continue this, so take these responses and understand I wont be coming back to this. It's clogging the thread, and is a serious bore.

Your purist argument is true, but I don't believe one person in ten thousand would enter a courtroom as a mute defendant without a defense attorney. — ucarr

Then you do not know a whole lot about court cases.

If the defense could win their cases with simple denial, who would ever need a defense attorney? — ucarr

This is so disingenuous It's really hard to give you the time of day. I did not intimate this was the case. I did not intimate this was 'common'. I did not intimate that this was even relevant.

The answer to this clearly irrelevant question though is thus:
In almost any case that might eventually require a trial is preceded by several hearings. Probable cause, disputed facts, standing etc.. etc... all need sorting.
The Judge actually has to decide whether or not the prosecution even has a case, given the evidence they want to present at trial. If the evidence isn't good enough (depending on the type of charge, the burden of guilt (probable, reasonable doubt) etc.. etc..) the judge will simply throw out the case. A plain denial is a full response, and a vindication in those cases.
In a situation where it's somewhat marginal (i.e several circumstantial pieces of evidence) it is not entirely unusual for a defendant to simply allow the Jury to see the prosecution evidence, confident it doesn't prove the charge, and twiddle their thumbs while the prosecution makes their case. What you've asserted is that I must think that there are no cases in which the prosecution has a good case. That is not the case. I did not intimate that.

I would urge you, as I did several times last year, to carefully read posts prior to replying. You often say things that aren't easy to reply to, because they aren't sensible in the context.

Both the prosecution and the defense make claims of fact they must prove — ucarr

No. The defence will only do this if they feel the need to offer an 'alternative theory' to the prosecutions theory that they committed the crime. If there's decent evidence to support the prosecution theory, defense needs to get into gear. Otherwise, why bother? No jury would convict. A single judge might have thought the evidence was compelling. A jury may not.

they must prove their absence from the scene of the crime over and above the prosecution's proof they were present at the scene of the crime. — ucarr

This is a clear example of you misunderstanding the basic tenets I pointed out. No, They do not need to 'prove their absence'. If the prosecution has no evidence they were there, the prosecution has no case. End of. Defense need do nothing. It's in cases, such as above, where there is circumstantial evidence they may have been there that the defense will bother with an alibi. Even in those cases, It's entirely possible for the defendant to rely on "beyond reasonable doubt" and present nothing. Risky as fuck though, to be sure. Most attorneys/solicitors would not want to do this.

You can be confident this is correct because a prosecutor won't initiate a case lacking solid evidence proving the guilt of the defendant — ucarr

False. Cases are often thrown out because of this, or at least don't make it to trial. I would add, the types of cases you're talking about are almost always private prosecution. Those lawyers love money. That isn't the State v XXX its XX v YY. In those situations, its usually a he-said she-said. Your position would amount to every single prosecution being successful, prior to trial. Which is as ridiculous as the notion that no defense case requires evidence. Neither of us are actually pretending we think that, I'm sure.

Without being able to plausibly meet the burden of proof, the prosecution would be thwarted by simple denial. — ucarr

This is how you lose a case, as a prosecutor. Are you under the impression that all cases come with overwhelming evidence? Or that evidence of presence could somehow be rebutted once produced at trial? Neither of these things make sense, my friend. Cases require the prosecution to meet the burden of proof. Defense does not hold this burden as they are responding to a claim. They need prove nothing. While this is obviously not relevent the USA which may be where you're basing your claims, the quote from this link is telling:

"As a defendant, you are not required to present evidence (see section 25(d) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990). You are not required to prove that you are innocent; it is the prosecutor’s role to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty of committing the offence(s) you have been charged with."

No one but a purist thinks a mute defense is sound. — ucarr

False. You are pretending I have made a claim about all cases. Not so. And I wont take too seriously a bare assertion to the contrary. Go read some case law (this is rhetorical - you probably don't have data base access). As I said above, and you seem to have missed, Judges regularly instruct juries to make nothing of the defense producing no evidence or not testifying. This is not uncommon. This literally happens weekly, possibly daily, across various courts. Lawyers often instruct their clients not to testify because they risk saying something dumb, or revealing some secondary crime, or at the very least hurting their own credibility. If you simply don't believe me, that's fine, but you're wrong here.

Regarding how all of this relates to your naysaying my claim of contradiction by MU, am I to suppose that in a debate, you'd make a denial without supporting it, and then stand mute while your opponent advances a cogent argument against it? — ucarr

This is just as disingenuous as the previous part of your reply which was just so.

No. If you've made that of what i've said, that is a misinterpretation. One that seems, I am sorry to say, purposeful.
You made a claim. I denied it. That's the end of that, unless you want to provide support for your claim.
You failed to provide any support for your claim(on my view, to be sure). I am free to walk away denying it.
That's how it works. I am not required to answer to a claim which has not been supported. That is also how courts work, to the point that what's called "summary judgment" has been invented to cover this common circumstance. This is different to our situation though, which would be called a 'disputed facts hearing'. In this case, we would both provide evidence of hte 'facts'. The judge decides which is more likely, and from there it would perhaps be possibly to apply for a summary judgement if all facts fall on one side of the dispute. IN this case, all I need do is provide MU's statements and right-thinking person would clearly note there is no contradiction without interpolating. This is something you do with almost every post, so I am not particularly concerned there.

In this case, there is no judge. In my view, you failed to support your assertion. Therefore it was dismissed. Hitchens Razor.

These are all standard concepts. Your position is counter to them. Therefore, I am confident in leaving it here.

Why do you think a distribution of differential probabilities is not interrelated? One of the points of the distribution is to compare levels of probability. — ucarr

Once again asking the wrong question. This has nothing to do with what was disputed. THe dispute has to do with your erroneous claim of contradiction. It was erroneous. I do not need to clothe the Emperor.

MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous. — ucarr

No. That is not hte case, from any reading I can make (including several fairly pain-staked clarifications on MU's part. I fail to see how you are not understanding those). He is saying that probability (not a distribution there of) gives an illusion of continuity between T1 and T2 where in fact, there is a gap. There was no contradiction.

Your final two paragraphs are, in this context, incoherent to me. I leave htem be. Thanks for you time.

...they must prove their absence from the scene of the crime over and above the prosecution's proof they were present at the scene of the crime. — ucarr

This is a clear example of you misunderstanding the basic tenets I pointed out. No, They do not need to 'prove their absence'. If the prosecution has no evidence they were there, the prosecution has no case. — AmadeusD

You'll notice I've bolded the part of my statement that says an active defense is needed when the prosecution does have proof - I should've said "evidence" - since it might be interpreted as damning. Moreover, as you've needlessly pointed out, it's assumed that a case that goes to trial includes potent evidence against the defendant. Technically speaking, however, you're right, it's still true that the defendant need not speak nor engage council for a defense.

You can be confident this is correct because a prosecutor won't initiate a case lacking solid evidence proving the guilt of the defendant — ucarr

False. Cases are often thrown out because of this, or at least don't make it to trial. — AmadeusD

It's my understanding that the District Attorney is interested in viable cases, considering that his/her record impacts the outcome of the next election.

Without being able to plausibly meet the burden of proof, the prosecution would be thwarted by simple denial. — ucarr

Are you under the impression that all cases come with overwhelming evidence? Or that evidence of presence could somehow be rebutted once produced at trial? — AmadeusD

As I've been saying for some time now, both the prosecution and the defense need to exercise skillful judgment regarding the viability of a case. Even though it's a separate issue from the burden of proof being on the prosecution, the two issues are closely related within a complex relationship.

Don't be misled by the fact the prosecution must prove its case against the defendant, and not the other way around. Both the prosecution and the defense [are liable to] make claims of fact they must prove [in their own interest]. — ucarr

You note how defendants oftentimes refuse to testify. Usually this is because their defense attorney is presenting cogent rebuttals to the accusations. I don't suppose you're trying to suggest the defense has an advantage over the prosecution. Therefore, I think it reasonable to say, regarding any possible difference for the two sides going in, it's akin to the white pieces moving first in the game of chess.

No one but a purist thinks a mute defense is sound. — ucarr

As I said above, and you seem to have missed, Judges regularly instruct juries to make nothing of the defense producing no evidence or not testifying. This is not uncommon. This literally happens weekly, possibly daily, across various courts. Lawyers often instruct their clients not to testify... — AmadeusD

Yes, I see now that a mute witness and a mute defense are two different things. The presence of the defense attorney sets them widely apart.

Regarding how all of this relates to your naysaying my claim of contradiction by MU, am I to suppose that in a debate, you'd make a denial without supporting it, and then stand mute while your opponent advances a cogent argument against it? — ucarr

This is just as disingenuous as the previous part of your reply which was just so. — AmadeusD

No. If you've made that of what i've said, that is a misinterpretation. One that seems, I am sorry to say, purposeful. You made a claim. I denied it. That's the end of that, unless you want to provide support for your claim. You failed to provide any support for your claim (on my view, to be sure). I am free to walk away denying it. That's how it works. I am not required to answer to a claim which has not been supported. That is also how courts work, to the point that what's called "summary judgment" has been invented to cover this common circumstance. — AmadeusD

In this case, there is no judge. In my view, you failed to support your assertion. Therefore it was dismissed. Hitchens Razor.

These are all standard concepts. Your position is counter to them. Therefore, I am confident in leaving it here. — AmadeusD

In the long sequence below, I present MUs statement, provide my argument for deeming it contradictory, and then you make your denial of my argument. Since you quote me when I charge MU with being contradictory, the evidence suggests you've read my argument. Are you attempting to lie your way out of acknowledging you've read my argument?

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read your above quote, I get: The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

Compare, side-by-side, my two readings, which boil down your words to the gist of their meaning:

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

Haven't you been making an astute defense of the right to deny and then remain silent? The evidence is before us: you weighed in on a debate with a simple denial, and then defended your subsequent silence:

It's clear from your words [Metaphysician Undercover] that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. — AmadeusD

You did provide a supporting argument:

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD

...a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD

But I had to request it, and your tone in providing it suggested to me you felt you were doing me a favor.

Why do you think a distribution of differential probabilities is not interrelated? One of the points of the distribution is to compare levels of probability. — ucarr

Once again asking the wrong question. This has nothing to do with what was disputed. THe dispute has to do with your erroneous claim of contradiction. It was erroneous. I do not need to clothe the Emperor. — AmadeusD

My question above is directly related to your argument supporting your denial of my charge of contradiction. I repost it below:

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD

...a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD

A clarifying example that helps the reader to understand my question, which I already posted to you yesterday, is reposted below.

Consider: Two basketball players. Each player tries to hit the same jump shot from the same free throw line. A statistical analyst watches each player shoot the same shot twenty-five times. He calculates a probability distribution based on the twenty-five shots taken by each player. His conclusion says Player A has a fifty per cent chance of making shot #26, and Player B has a twenty-five per cent chance of making shot #26. Now we see Player A's chance of making the shot is twice that of Player B's chance of making the shot, according to the probability distribution.

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr

You're ignoring my clarification. Why should I not think you're hiding behind your claim my question is irrelevant? Why should I not think you're hiding behind it because you cannot think of a sound refutation?

So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly."

Since sensory processing by the brain at light speed is time-lagged only nanoseconds behind sensory stimulus, and thus it is negligible, you, like me, always wake up in the empirical present, it being noted you call it the past.

If this is true, as I judge it, based upon your words, then I see your temporal direction, like mine, is a passage through a never-ending, nanoseconds time-lagged sequence of pasts. — ucarr

This is not true. I also recognized, and have explained, why we "wake up" in the non-empirical present, just as much as we "wake up" in the empirical present. The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. That is not a matter to be debated. We are just as much in the future as we are in the past.

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. I would argue that the future ought to be assigned priority, as we notice that a person's intention directs one's attention. And in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past.

Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy. — ucarr

Again, this is not true, uncertainty does indicate incomplete information. "Uncertainty" refers to the attitude of the knower, as a feature of the knowledge. When you say uncertainty is "...due to an existential limitation on measurement..." you are referring to the cause of this incomplete information, when you say "due to".

You may insist that this "uncertainty" is the result of an "existential limitation on measurement", and that is what I called the limitations of observability, but this is not a complete explanation. It does not explain how these limitations cause the knowledge which ought to consist only of certainties, to get contaminated with uncertainties.

I explained to you already how this uncertainty is due to a lack of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world. The "infinite series" of calculus, treats the limit as infinitely small, zero. The limitations of the observable world result in a boundary, or limit, which is non-zero, infinitesimal (as exemplified by Planck length). The uncertainty of the uncertainty principle is due to this lack of correspondence, which is an epistemic problem. This failure of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world, allows that the unknown, (which could be excluded from physics, and left as the non-physical part of reality which physics cannot explain), gets incorporated into the expression, the representation of the physical world, as the uncertainty of that representation.

Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction. — ucarr

OK, so my language was unclear, and you thought there was contradiction where there was not.

Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes. — ucarr

No it does not. That is the issue, with the uncertainty of the particle's location. We cannot say that the particle traverses that length because it's location in that extremely short duration of time when it is assumed to be moving, cannot be known. That is why physicists say that it takes every possible path from A to B. There is a discontinuity of information, such that we cannot really say that a particle even exists during this time. That's why its better to defer to the non-physical at this point, the circumstances are such that the principles of physics do not apply.

If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise,
we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it. — ucarr

This is utterly misleading. We cannot say that the supposed "particle" takes any "particular trajectory". Therefore we cannot say that it has "a trajectory", "a journey", or even that it exists in the meantime. There is a very clear lack of continuity of the supposed "particle", in this time period, Therefore we cannot talk about changes to the particle in this duration.

This isn't what you wrote originally: — ucarr

Of course it is not what I wrote earlier, I had to clarify what I had said, because you (wrongly) interpreted what I was saying as contradictory.

I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. — ucarr

This makes no sense. If I could see contradiction in my own words, I would not have said them. You need to explain to me in your words, why you think what I have said is contradictory. But you haven't. Each time you tried, you simply demonstrated that you misunderstood. Now you just take snippets of what I said, without any context, and wrongly claim that these snippets constitute contradiction.

MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous — ucarr

You continue to misunderstand. I've insisted that the discontinuity is a discontinuity of information. If we could say that possible trajectory #642 is necessarily the actual trajectory, then we have complete information, no discontinuity of information. If we cannot say necessarily, which trajectory is the actual trajectory, this implies a lack (gap) of information. Further, I argue that in the case of quantum "particles", the lack of information is due to a real, ontological, gap of existence of the physical "particle". This is an ontological discontinuity of the physical "particle" between t1 and t2. This ontological discontinuity is the cause of the lack of information, which produces the need to express the "particle's" location in terms of "probability" rather than expressing where the particle necessarily is.

MU wants to ride piggyback atop the dynamism of physics, then, at the critical moment of his conjectured dis-continuity of the trajectory of the particle, insert his immaterial agents, i.e., immaterial information doing an immaterial info exchange at the last lap of the trajectory, thus proving both the independence and causal power of immaterial info. — ucarr

This is a misrepresentation. There is a very real discontinuity of the "particle" as demonstrated by the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle is an expression of the obvious, common sense principle, that "the particle" cannot be moving and have a specific location at the same time. That's obvious to you, right? Zeno brought this to our attention. If a particle has momentum (movement), it cannot have a location ( a position), and if it has a position it cannot have movement (momentum). So we've assigned this sort of dichotomous scenario, either the particle has this or it has that. Simply put, either it has movement (momentum), or it has rest (location).

But this invites a fully valid philosophical question. If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite. So a philosopher might ask, what is happening, what type of change is this, when a thing's rate of acceleration is infinite.

So far he doesn't answer the question why none of his independent, immaterial things can't do anything observable without the grounding of physics. — ucarr

Oh, I missed this. I did answer this question already. The evidence of the nonphysical is the existence of activities which are contrary to, or cannot be grasped by physics. This includes free will acts. So the assumption of the nonphysical is not grounded in physics, it's grounded in the fact that physics cannot explain everything which is observable. And, my argument concerning time shows that it is highly probable that there are activities which physics will never be able to explain.

...everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly." — ucarr

The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

.

For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present?

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover

...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground.

Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy. — ucarr

You may insist that this "uncertainty" is the result of an "existential limitation on measurement", and that is what I called the limitations of observability, but this is not a complete explanation. It does not explain how these limitations cause the knowledge which ought to consist only of certainties, to get contaminated with uncertainties. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. So it's not an uncertainty. It's a design limitation. We might imagine there's more to be known, but our act of imagination doesn't dictate reality.

I explained to you already how this uncertainty is due to a lack of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

As the case with you lecturing me about "time passing with nothing happening," sometimes we have to make peace with a hard fact. This is - at least for the time being - a fundamental truth that can't be further broken down by analysis, nor can it be expanded by either interpolation or extrapolation.

The uncertainty of the uncertainty principle is due to this lack of correspondence, which is an epistemic problem. This failure of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world, allows that the unknown, (which could be excluded from physics, and left as the non-physical part of reality which physics cannot explain), gets incorporated into the expression, the representation of the physical world, as the uncertainty of that representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

If something is part of the observable world, even if that something is an abstract idea, then it can be measured for possible use. This is what semi-independent reality, apparently non-physical, should be amenable to. That’s abstract thought, isn’t it? I'm not seeing where you're able to show non-physical things in possession of causal powers whose effects can be measured for their usefulness. The top-down causation of mind doesn't count because mind is tied to brain. Also, so far, I’m not buying your arguments for concluding free will depends upon non-physical things.

Semi-independent reality posits abstract thought as quasi-non-physical.

Why must the reality of abstraction be independent of physical reality? What does it lose when it loses its independence?

You think things unexplainable in science inhabit a realm beyond its reach. If this realm is non-physical, then you need non-physical methodology to access and make use of these things. This is where you get stuck. You can’t name any non-physical methodologies. Mind is tied to brain, so it’s not what you’re looking for. This is the puzzle. Every attempt to find the non-physical terminates in physics. This is why we say mind is emergent from brain, but never becomes independent thereof.

There’s talk of granular sub-units of space being fundamental reality: moments in time occurring. Since these sub-units of space are separated, the question arises, “What lies between them?” Let’s suppose it’s time that lies between them. Does this not bring us right back to spacetime physics?

Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction. — ucarr

OK, so my language was unclear, and you thought there was contradiction where there was not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now my language is unclear. What I should've said is, "Your original language, in my opinion, expresses a contradiction."

Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes. — ucarr

No it does not. That is the issue, with the uncertainty of the particle's location. We cannot say that the particle traverses that length because it's location in that extremely short duration of time when it is assumed to be moving, cannot be known. That is why physicists say that it takes every possible path from A to B. There is a discontinuity of information, such that we cannot really say that a particle even exists during this time. That's why its better to defer to the non-physical at this point, the circumstances are such that the principles of physics do not apply. — Metaphysician Undercover

My counter-narrative to your above narrative stresses the non-equivalence of uncertainty and discontinuity. QM doesn't know precisely, but does know probabilistically, what path a particle occupies at a given moment of time. This uncertainty of knowledge has no impact whatsoever on the continuity of whatever path the particle actually takes. You make a leap of logic from uncertainty about which path the particle takes in a given moment to concluding the particle doesn't exist. That's an invalid conclusion from the evidence because, were it true, we'd be unable to verify the existence of the particle, whether it travels one Planck time or one millennium.

I know you want to set up a thought experiment that features a particle disappearing out of existence. This then allows you to usher in your non-physical info exchange as a conjectured example of non-physical causation that's useful. So far, your thought experiment is founded upon an invalid conclusion about the relationship between uncertainty and discontinuity. We know from the imaging of the LHC that particle paths do not suffer the type of QM discontinuity that would have them disappearing. Particles can decay, but that entails the emergence of constituent particles. If they did simply disappear, we couldn't design experiments to measure reactions from particle collisions. The first law of thermodynamics tells us that no mass is lost from the world overall.

If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise, we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it. — ucarr

This is utterly misleading. We cannot say that the supposed "particle" takes any "particular trajectory". Therefore we cannot say that it has "a trajectory", "a journey", or even that it exists in the meantime. There is a very clear lack of continuity of the supposed "particle", in this time period, Therefore we cannot talk about changes to the particle in this duration. — Metaphysician Undercover

The particle is not supposed. The particle is a photon. It has been established that a photon takes $5.39x10^-44s$ over the duration of one Planck length. You should notice something. Whenever you challenge me on a fact about physics, if I'm right about the fact, I can usually give you specific details establishing the fact. So far, you've only given me conjectures about what might be facts pertaining to the non-physical world, and your conjectures are usually short on details. In fact, most of your details are physics which you use to support your conjectures.

It now seems likely that, in general, non-physics cannot get started without using the measurements and methodologies of physics. This suggests to me non-physics is an emergent property of physics, i.e., it is abstract thought.

The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you can neither observe nor measure a thing, how do you know it exists? If you conceive a logical conjecture about something that might exist, can you count on finding it within the world? If it's physical yes. If it's non-physical no. If the non-physical world is independent, then it runs parallel to the physical world. What's the one example that seems to permit a connection between the non-physical and the physical? Abstract thought is the answer. The seeming transformation from non-physical to physical is not really a translation between parallel realms. Abstract thought emerges from the brain as it were as a timeless compression of multiple individual patterns grouped thematically into a conceptually timeless generalization. Of course this timeless generalization can be applied to individual patterns in the real world.

Since abstract thought is physical within the brain, then logic, also a product of the brain, also is physical. This tells us why you say,

I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe.

I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. — ucarr

If I could see contradiction in my own words, I would not have said them. You need to explain to me in your words, why you think what I have said is contradictory....Now you just take snippets of what I said, without any context, and wrongly claim that these snippets constitute contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you didn't see them in your own words, so you said them. I saw them in your own words, and here they are,

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read as: The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution which does not make a prediction of necessity.

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read as: The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity; it provides a relation of probability rather than a relation of necessity; it is not a true continuity.

Let's read them one after the other.

The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution... $→$ The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity...

MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous — ucarr

...I argue that in the case of quantum "particles", the lack of information is due to a real, ontological, gap of existence of the physical "particle". This is an ontological discontinuity of the physical "particle" between t1 and t2. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the gap in the existence of a particle - from one point in its trajectory to another point - is ontologically real, then, as I've said, that's your claim the trajectories of particles are incoherent. This conjectured discontinuity has nothing to do with not knowing before measurement, which possible trajectory will be the actual trajectory. Moreover, the measurement of the trajectory within the LHC will not show a discontinuity due to QM uncertainty. Instead, it will show discontinuity if the particle decays, or if something massive intervenes into its trajectory. Such discontinuity is something sought after by the design of the experiment. Physicists want to see particles interacting.

If a particle has momentum (movement), it cannot have a location ( a position), and if it has a position it cannot have movement (momentum). — Metaphysician Undercover

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not.

But this invites a fully valid philosophical question. If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite. So a philosopher might ask, what is happening, what type of change is this, when a thing's rate of acceleration is infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover

Something at rest has rest momentum as well motion momentum. Infinite acceleration violates relativity: there is no acceleration all the way to light speed.

The evidence of the nonphysical is the existence of activities which are contrary to, or cannot be grasped by physics. This includes free will acts. So the assumption of the nonphysical is not grounded in physics, it's grounded in the fact that physics cannot explain everything which is observable. And, my argument concerning time shows that it is highly probable that there are activities which physics will never be able to explain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood.

For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present? — ucarr

We already discussed this. The "now" of the present cannot be an extensionless point in time, for the reasons we discussed. Therefore it must be a duration. "Empirical present" is unacceptable because it implies that the entire duration of the present is in the past. We need to acknowledge that since "the present" refers to a duration, it consists of both past and future. To say that the present consists only of past is self-contradicting.

The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr

I see no reason for your so-called "common sense conclusion". The past cannot be altered, but the future holds the possibility of getting what you want. I don't understand why you would not prioritize the possibility of getting what you want, over that which is impossible to change.

If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. — ucarr

We discussed this already as well. The restriction is due to the limitations of "observability", and imposed by the need to observe in the science of physics. Therefore "that's all the info there is" is not implied at all. The lack of information available for the representation, is attributable to the restrictions of the scientific method of physics. The information we have is restricted due to the limitations of observability.

If something is part of the observable world, even if that something is an abstract idea, then it can be measured for possible use. This is what semi-independent reality, apparently non-physical, should be amenable to. — ucarr

Again, the problem is the limitations of observability. Yet you are restricting your knowledge of the world to "the observable world". That is the influence of your physicalist bias

You are only demonstrating that you are failing in your effort to understand. All observations are of things past. We have never, and simply cannot, observe the future. Since "the present" as what constitutes the reality of "what is", consists of both past and present, there is therefore a large aspect of the reality of "what is", which has never been observed, and simply cannot be observed.

Your attitude appears to be "if we just wait a Planck length or two, the future will become the past, and then it becomes observable, and measurable, so what's the difference?" The difference is that if we wait for it to become past, before acting on it, then we can never get what we want. In this case, what is wanted is a more complete understanding of reality. Therefore your proposal of "semi-independent reality" ought to be rejected as not having the capacity to be productive in relation to the goal of getting a more complete understanding.

Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe. — ucarr

Only from your perspective of physicalist bias, am I left with nothing but physics to explain what I believe. This is a restriction which your attitude imposes on me. You will only accept an explanation in physical terms. Therefore I have no choice but to demonstrate the deficiencies of physics, to get across the need for something else.

From the perspective of some mysticisms for example, within which the givenness of Newton's first law is rejected, and the assumption that the entire world is created anew at each moment of passing time is adopted, the constraints of "physics" are left behind, and we may speak freely in terms of willful creation. But such a discussion can only be meaningful if those physicalist assumptions are first rejected. That is why the reality of free will must be adopted as the primary, and self-evident, premise.

Let's read them one after the other.

The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution... →
→
The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity... — ucarr

Right, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. It is not in relation to the prediction, which is a prediction of probability. When a prediction of probability is falsely assumed to be a prediction of necessity, as in the case of a cause/effect prediction (the falsity demonstrated by Hume), this false "assumption of necessity" is consistent with the idea of continuity (which is an illusion of sense observation). There is a relation between the two "the assumption of necessity", and "the illusion of continuity", by means of which each one supports the other logically. So it is a sort of biconditional relationship of a vicious circle of falsity. Necessity (logical) implies continuity, and continuity (observational) implies necessity. The fact that the whole thing is based in probability rather than necessity, such that the whole vicious circle is actually irrelevant, is dropped right out of the picture.

Please explain how you apprehend contradiction.

If the gap in the existence of a particle - from one point in its trajectory to another point - is ontologically real, then, as I've said, that's your claim the trajectories of particles are incoherent. This conjectured discontinuity has nothing to do with not knowing before measurement, which possible trajectory will be the actual trajectory. Moreover, the measurement of the trajectory within the LHC will not show a discontinuity due to QM uncertainty. Instead, it will show discontinuity if the particle decays, or if something massive intervenes into its trajectory. Such discontinuity is something sought after by the design of the experiment. Physicists want to see particles interacting. — ucarr

Right, discontinuity is the reality, and that's what physics seeks to understand. Trajectories are fiction.

And QM uncertainty is a discontinuity, the discontinuity of information, which I explained. You are conflating the discontinuity of the supposed observed particle, (a discontinuity related to the limits of observability), and the discontinuity in the information about that situation, QM uncertainty. The point is that the latter does not correspond with the former, due to a lack of correspondence in the mathematical principles applied.

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr

Right, that I characterize as a gap (discontinuity) in information. If certainty is requested (as per normal epistemic standards), the uncertainty principle is reduced to either/or. Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other.

Something at rest has rest momentum as well motion momentum. Infinite acceleration violates relativity: there is no acceleration all the way to light speed. — ucarr

That's why the problem of acceleration remains an unresolved problem.

I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood. — ucarr

This makes no sense. How are my "observations of physics" rooted in physics, when I am educated in philosophy, not physics? You only interpret them as rooted in physics because you cannot apprehend any other possibility due to the influence of your physicalist bias. I don't deny my dualist bias, but I deny that my "observations of physics" are rooted in physics, because my observational perspective is derived from an education in philosophy. This puts my observational perspective outside of physics.

For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present? — ucarr

We already discussed this. The "now" of the present cannot be an extensionless point in time, for the reasons we discussed. Therefore it must be a duration. "Empirical present" is unacceptable because it implies that the entire duration of the present is in the past. We need to acknowledge that since "the present" refers to a duration, it consists of both past and future. To say that the present consists only of past is self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover

The future is present in the now as an abstract thought. The mind understands that plans toward a goal are about the future, but this understanding is in the empirical present. Adding further difficulty to our understanding is the fact time is local and therefore relative. So the incidence of a stimulus impacts our perceptual system and, shortly thereafter, it renders a representation of the stimulus. It's now natural to think, therefore, by this example, the future precedes the past. However, at the moment of the stimulus, in its own frame of reference, its incidence is in the now, not in the future. This takes us back to our understanding that the future of the empirical present is an abstraction of the mind. We know this because, as we just observed, the incidence of the stimulus is in its own now, so it's the future only relative to a non-local frame of reference. In our own local frame of reference, the incidence of the stimulus is a past event, with us further in the past moving forward towards it. Even so, we're not moving towards the past, but instead moving forward within our own ongoing empirical present.

Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. This point is the limit of an infinite series, i.e., it's the limit of the ongoing now. You know you never wake up into the past, and you never wake up into the future. You only wake up into the empirical present. Relativity, because of its complexity, demands we understand we're always moving through the infinite series of the empirical present towards a dimensionless eternity as now.

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover

...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr

Directly above, I supply two of your comments. For my reaction to them, I repost your edited post of them. It's incomplete. Here's my entire quote:

I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground.
— ucarr

I see no reason for your so-called "common sense conclusion". The past cannot be altered, but the future holds the possibility of getting what you want. I don't understand why you would not prioritize the possibility of getting what you want, over that which is impossible to change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Instead of skipping over my argument in bold above, why don't you respond to it?

Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So your past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding.

If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. — ucarr

We discussed this already as well. The restriction is due to the limitations of "observability", and imposed by the need to observe in the science of physics. Therefore "that's all the info there is" is not implied at all. The lack of information available for the representation, is attributable to the restrictions of the scientific method of physics. The information we have is restricted due to the limitations of observability. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?"

Let's suppose simultaneity herein lies beyond the reach of physics. If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. Therefore, it cannot be used to establish the existence of a non-physical realm unless physics can see it also. The problem is that if physics can see it, it's physical not non-physical. This tells us that "non-physics" can only see what physics sees, and thus it too must be physics after all. Therefore, it cannot be used to establish a flaw in the methodology of physics since it cannot measure anything without using that same methodology. Finally, non-physics, being dependent on physics to observe nature, can only conjecture without knowing if its existence extends beyond the realm of the imagination.

Again, the problem is the limitations of observability. Yet you are restricting your knowledge of the world to "the observable world". That is the influence of your physicalist bias — Metaphysician Undercover

My scope of the observable includes abstract ideas. What does your scope of the observable include beyond physical things and abstract ideas? Bear in mind, abstract ideas include the contents of the imagination (free will), where I locate your non-physical world.

You are only demonstrating that you are failing in your effort to understand. All observations are of things past. We have never, and simply cannot, observe the future. Since "the present" as what constitutes the reality of "what is", consists of both past and present, there is therefore a large aspect of the reality of "what is", which has never been observed, and simply cannot be observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

The future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self.

If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting.

Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? If the info is time-lagged by only a few nano-seconds, and is thus negligible, then practically speaking, we're inhabiting the empirical present, which is a real present.

Your attitude appears to be "if we just wait a Planck length or two, the future will become the past, and then it becomes observable, and measurable, so what's the difference?" The difference is that if we wait for it to become past, before acting on it, then we can never get what we want. In this case, what is wanted is a more complete understanding of reality. Therefore your proposal of "semi-independent reality" ought to be rejected as not having the capacity to be productive in relation to the goal of getting a more complete understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time.

I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe. — ucarr

Only from your perspective of physicalist bias, am I left with nothing but physics to explain what I believe. This is a restriction which your attitude imposes on me. You will only accept an explanation in physical terms. Therefore I have no choice but to demonstrate the deficiencies of physics, to get across the need for something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. All you ever do is imagine non-physical activity that might be possible, with this act of imagination being totally dependent upon your observations of particular details of physics. Neither I nor any other physicalist impose this restriction upon you. You seem to be bound up in this restriction because, apparently, you are unable to liberate yourself from it by means of your non-physicality.

From the perspective of some mysticisms for example, within which the givenness of Newton's first law is rejected, and the assumption that the entire world is created anew at each moment of passing time is adopted, the constraints of "physics" are left behind, and we may speak freely in terms of willful creation. But such a discussion can only be meaningful if those physicalist assumptions are first rejected. That is why the reality of free will must be adopted as the primary, and self-evident, premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

You imagine yourself as one with all of existence. Furthermore, you imagine yourself the creator of all existence through exercise of free will. This empowers you to discard Newton, which you do. Now living beyond physics, you experience reality in terms of your free will and its creations.

Let's read them one after the other.

The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution... $→$ The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity...

Right, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. It is not in relation to the prediction, which is a prediction of probability. When a prediction of probability is falsely assumed to be a prediction of necessity, as in the case of a cause/effect prediction (the falsity demonstrated by Hume), this false "assumption of necessity" is consistent with the idea of continuity (which is an illusion of sense observation). There is a relation between the two "the assumption of necessity", and "the illusion of continuity", by means of which each one supports the other logically. So it is a sort of biconditional relationship of a vicious circle of falsity. Necessity (logical) implies continuity, and continuity (observational) implies necessity. The fact that the whole thing is based in probability rather than necessity, such that the whole vicious circle is actually irrelevant, is dropped right out of the picture.

Please explain how you apprehend contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is... in relation to the probability distribution... We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity...

The first line negates "probability distribution" in relation to "the illusion of continuity."

The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..."

QM uncertainty is a discontinuity, the discontinuity of information, — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you take this QM-Uncertainty caused discontinuity and put it into a thought experiment that shows when and where the discontinuity occurs and what effect it has on the trajectory of a photon?

You need to go into this level of physical detail in order to contradict: $5.39x10^-44s$.

This is a description of the trajectory of a photon traveling across the distance of one Planck length.

By inserting your info into this situation, you need to show how QM-Uncertainty destroys the claim the photon persisted intact across the Planck length.

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr

Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity?

If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite — Metaphysician Undercover

Zeno's paradox has been solved: there's a way to cross an infinite number of intervals so that they sum to a finite number. Acceleration is not involved.

I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood. — ucarr

This makes no sense. How are my "observations of physics" rooted in physics, when I am educated in philosophy, not physics? You only interpret them as rooted in physics because you cannot apprehend any other possibility due to the influence of your physicalist bias. I don't deny my dualist bias, but I deny that my "observations of physics" are rooted in physics, because my observational perspective is derived from an education in philosophy. This puts my observational perspective outside of physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your training in philosophy provided means to back your immaterial claims with evidence, no doubt you would use it. As you say, however, "...your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence.

The future is present in the now as an abstract thought. The mind understands that plans toward a goal are about the future, but this understanding is in the empirical present. — ucarr

I told you, the future is present to the mind as desire, anticipation, and such emotions which influence us in relation to the future. It is not present to the mind as "abstract thought". So you argue from a false premise.

The so-called "empirical present" is a 'present" which is purely past, as you admit. So you assume, when you say "understanding is in the empirical present", without any justification, that "understanding" is in the past. But this is clearly wrong because true "understanding" must involve the future just as much as the past, because the future is just as much a part of our reality as the past is.

Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. — ucarr

Sure representing the present in this way is "useful", that's what I've argued from the beginning. The problem is that it is not truthful. And because it is not truthful there are limitations to its usefulness. And attempting to apply it beyond the limitations of its usefulness will be misleading.

Instead of skipping over my argument in bold above, why don't you respond to it? — ucarr

I don't see an argument, just more false premises. An infant cries to fulfil its wants. Your claim that an infant has no capacity to fulfil its desires is unfounded and unsound.

Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So your past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding. — ucarr

Something with no physical evidence, time travel, and the capacity to change the past, cannot be offered as physics. Therefore I take it merely as a desire which you have. It serves as more evidence of the reality of my perspective, that in reality, desires are given priority over physical evidence.

Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?" — ucarr

This is evidence that "the present" as a point with zero dimension, though it is useful in many situations, reaches the limitations of its usefulness at QM.

If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. — ucarr

Another false premise. You keep insisting that the only way to the nonphysical is through observation of the physical, and I insist that this is false. Yet you keep insisting on it. We can derive information from ways other than observation. This is how a person comes to accept freewill as self-evident, through knowing one's inner self, and this is not a matter of observation.

My scope of the observable includes abstract ideas. What does your scope of the observable include beyond physical things and abstract ideas? Bear in mind, abstract ideas include the contents of the imagination (free will), where I locate your non-physical world. — ucarr

The future is present to us through feelings like desire and anticipation, it is not present to us as "abstract ideas". We have contact with the nonphysical through these emotions. This gaves rise to the abstract concept of "freewill", which is how we relate to our contact with the future.

he future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self. — ucarr

I don't understand what you mean by "future-as-past", and the rest of the paragraph makes no sense to me.

If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting. — ucarr

This is addressed above.

Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? — ucarr

Desire and anticipation.

Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time. — ucarr

I told you why relativity is unacceptable. So reference to it really does little here.

I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. — ucarr

I told you, freewill. You don't agree with me, therefore we have no platform from which to discuss details. The inverse is your claims about time travel. I don't agree with you, therefore we have no platform from which to discuss the details of time travel. The difference is that I do not ask you for details because I have absolutely no interest in your fantasy. You, on the other hand are somewhat interested in freewill, probably because it actually is a self-evident truth rather than a fantasy. Still, for some reason you refuse to accept it as a premise.

However, to address your complaint, I did discuss details concerning how the material world is created anew at each passing moment, and I described the type of model of time which is required for this. You told me mathematics and diagrams would help.

The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..." — ucarr

That line explicitly states "we have something... which produces the illusion of continuity". Why would you conclude that "something" refers to the probability distribution, when I've already stated that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not to the probability prediction? What is stated is that there is something there, which produces the illusion of continuity, and it also supports the assumption of necessity. I make no claims as to what that "something" is, but it is obviously not the probability distribution itself, because I've already explained how it is not that Your interpretation makes no sense. It's like you are intentionally making an obvious misinterpretation for the sake of claiming that I contradict myself.

Can you take this QM-Uncertainty caused discontinuity and put it into a thought experiment that shows when and where the discontinuity occurs and what effect it has on the trajectory of a photon? — ucarr

The photon has no trajectory. I've repeated this already, yet you keep talking as if it has a trajectory. You will never understand what I am saying until you drop this idea that the photon has a trajectory. Check this article (or any similar article), where it is stated "First, the photon has no space trajectory; it famously “follows all paths” like a wave." https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402621003983

The photon has a location at T-1, and a location at T-2. The two locations are not the same, and there is no trajectory which accounts for how the photon moved from position A to position B. Therefore we can conclude that there is discontinuity of information, relating to what happened to the photon between T-1 and T-2. The reality of the discontinuity of information is indicated by the fact that the photon's location is represented by a probability distribution rather than as having a specific, necessary trajectory. Furthermore, observable evidence of wave phenomena indicates that there is a discontinuity of the photon itself.

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity? — ucarr

Your example does not represent "uncertainty" in our context, which is a statement about what we can know. Suppose the greater certainty we have about whether child A is up or down, this implies that we have less certainty about whether child B is up or down. That is analogous. This is contrary to "if child A is up, child B is down", and indicates a discontinuity between the two, because knowledge of one does not translate to knowledge of the other.

I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence. — ucarr

That's a bad assumption. But you keep insisting on it even when I tell you not to.

...the future is present to the mind as desire, anticipation, and such emotions which influence us in relation to the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the future is present to the mind, then it's present in the mind in the present as the present. No amount of word-gaming will change this simple truth.

The so-called "empirical present" is a 'present" which is purely past, as you admit. So you assume, when you say "understanding is in the empirical present", without any justification, that "understanding" is in the past. But this is clearly wrong because true "understanding" must involve the future just as much as the past, because the future is just as much a part of our reality as the past is. — Metaphysician Undercover

The empirical past, as we experience it, resides within the local frame of reference of our now. It's only the past relative to the stimuli of our perceptions which have a different local frame of reference.

The local frame of reference of our now is the only experience of a temporal tense that has an absolute value for us mind, brain and body. The other two tenses: past and future, only have relative value for us as concepts within our minds. You can only experience past and future in your mind. You never experience them mind, brain and body. This is even true when we assume the possibility of time travel. When you time travel, and arrive in another time mind, brain and body, that time is now your empirical present. If we were sitting together in a room having this conversation, and I challenged you to travel mind, brain and body to either past or future absent a time machine, you could not do it. You would remain sitting next to me in the room, no matter how many word games you played.

Let's look at this again with another example: You're standing on the platform of a train station. An express train that doesn't stop at your station whizzes by with passengers aboard. You catch a glimpse of each other.

We know from relativity the passengers are in one local frame of reference; you are in another. Since their velocity, relative to you, is greater, their time, relative to you, passes more slowly. Conversely, your time, at the lower velocity, relative to them, passes more quickly. Relativity of time therefore tells us that in their glimpse of you, they're looking at the future; in your glimpse of them, you're looking at the past.

Since the two local frames of reference are different, Relativity tells us the passengers, within their own frame of reference, inhabit the empirical present; within your own frame of reference, you too inhabit the empirical present.

We only inhabit mind, brain and body the empirical present. Past and future are only experienced as concepts of the mind. Time measured in millennia had passed before the abstract mind attained to the relativity of time and its ramifications. This because the mind must climb a learning curve before it understands the empirical present and its relationship to past and future. We're not naturally aware of relativistic effects because we only experience them mentally.

Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. — ucarr

Sure representing the present in this way is "useful", that's what I've argued from the beginning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The QM approach to the literal now, as represented by an infinite series irrational, suggests something curious: the empirical now lies embedded within QM uncertainty. It looks similar to the hedging of superposition, but in effect at Newtonian scale.

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover

...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr

I don't see an argument, just more false premises. An infant cries to fulfil its wants. Your claim that an infant has no capacity to fulfil its desires is unfounded and unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

You misquote me (see my bold text above and compare it to your bold text immediately below): scant ability $≠$ no ability. So, again, as our past deepens, it enriches our intentions for the future.

Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So my past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding. — ucarr

Something with no physical evidence, time travel, and the capacity to change the past, cannot be offered as physics. Therefore I take it merely as a desire which you have. It serves as more evidence of the reality of my perspective, that in reality, desires are given priority over physical evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Those who are ignorant of the past are doomed to repeat it." When we intentionally make the present
different from the past, we can say we've learned how to contain it, which is changing it in the sense of erasing an influence (repetition) that otherwise would exist.

Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?" — ucarr

This is evidence that "the present" as a point with zero dimension, though it is useful in many situations, reaches the limitations of its usefulness at QM. — Metaphysician Undercover

Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty.

Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty. — ucarr

If you can't do that, then your inability is evidence Heisenberg Uncertainty is not a measurement problem; it's an existential limitation on possible measurement.

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr

Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity?

If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. — ucarr

Another false premise. You keep insisting that the only way to the nonphysical is through observation of the physical, and I insist that this is false. Yet you keep insisting on it. We can derive information from ways other than observation. This is how a person comes to accept freewill as self-evident, through knowing one's inner self, and this is not a matter of observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

(As a side note, I dispute your premise self-examination "...is not a matter of observation." Knowledge is always acquired by observation, whether through the senses, or through the mind. A priori knowledge is based upon the mind's observations of logical truth.)

But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act... Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your description above paints the picture of a thinker who uses physics to observe the natural world, and who then bolsters his observations with logic, and the two combined empower him to understand the natural world. This is a picture of you using your abstract mind emergent from your senses.

The future is present to us through feelings like desire and anticipation, it is not present to us as "abstract ideas". We have contact with the nonphysical through these emotions. This gaves rise to the abstract concept of "freewill", which is how we relate to our contact with the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we're sitting side-by-side on a bench in the park, and you start indulging your desires for the future: vehicle, home, large income and I, hearing tell of this from you, also start indulging my desires for the future with me in possession of similar things, do you believe the two of us have entered the future mind, brain and body?

The future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self. — ucarr

For a long time you've been telling me the future jumps to the past, skipping the present. Next the present and the past overlap and, somehow, the dimensional present includes the past.

If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting. — ucarr

This is addressed above. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know you've said our exercise of free will shapes a future that becomes the past overlapped with the present with our desires realized. This allows our present to move toward our desires realized in the future now become past. So, given the overlap of two different temporal tenses, I occupy two different times simultaneously. Maybe this is superposition that has me in two different temporal locations at once. Well, if I'm my own observer and resolve myself into a definite temporal location, then I've used free will to create myself according to desire, but since my observation sees only my past, then my present self remains a mystery. Under your plan, free will creates a version of me I observe as me-as-my-past-self. I still don't know myself now. The upshot: In spite of all of this complexity, I still need a dimensionless present I approach as an infinite series that narrows the time lag down to a differential so minute I can know my virtual self.

Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? — ucarr

Desire and anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non sequitur because these two would be looking toward the future, not toward the past, so they'd be looking at what they imagine, whereas they need to be looking at what is actually about to happen.

Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time. — ucarr

I told you why relativity is unacceptable. So reference to it really does little here. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present.

Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide.. — Metaphysician Undercover

All of this is theoretical physics. It won't modify relativity without experimental verification. Does it exist?

I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. — ucarr

I told you, freewill. You... are somewhat interested in freewill, probably because it actually is a self-evident truth... Still... you refuse to accept it as a premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Freewill expresses as desires and anticipations. These are thoughts of the mind linked to the neuronal activity of the brain. Even if we suppose thoughts are non-physical, supposing they're free is a big assumption. Neuroscience shows us that different parts of the brain control different types of thinking. When a part is damaged, or destroyed, the associated type of thinking changes, or stops. Sometimes the brain can adjust to offset loss of function due to injury. Certainly this partial correction is not non-physical. This shows that exercise of will has parameters. Take the impairment of speech due to stroke. I haven't seen where free will restores it to pristine condition.

However, to address your complaint, I did discuss details concerning how the material world is created anew at each passing moment, and I described the type of model of time which is required for this. You told me mathematics and diagrams would help. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not the case that the time proposed is bi-directional. What I propose is that physical things come into existence (are recreated) at each moment of passing time. Once it is created at the present it cannot be changed, but until that moment it is not determined. The second dimension of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past (receive material existence) prior to others, at the present. This means that the present is multidimensional because some types of objects are already in the past (fixed), while other types are just beginning to materialize. Empirical evidence indicates that massive objects are created and move into the past first, that is why they have inertia, obey basic determinist laws, and it is more difficult for freely willed acts to change them. Massless things are created last, having their moment of the present later, and this provides free will the greater capacity to use them for change.

So consider the premise that anything, any state of being, which comes into existence at the present. must be predetermined (principle of sufficient reason) by something. Now imagine a number of parallel horizontal lines, as arrows of time, in the same direction, arrows pointing left. At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. "The present" refers to when each type of object gains its physical existence. Notice that at any moment, massive objects already have physical existence before massless objects do. This allows that a slight change to a massive object, through a freely will act, is capable of producing a large effect on massless objects. This effect we observe as our capacity to change things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this a description of physical things, both massive and massless, coming into existence at each moment of passing time? After being created, these two types have a relationship to the present that determines when they can be changed? The free will of the thinking mind is the sufficient cause acting as the agent of creation of the two types of things? What are some important details of the physics of the continuous recreation of all things? How is passing time fueling this continuous recreation? How is it that passing time is non-physical? How does non-physical passing time become the dynamism of physical things changing? Is this transformation the continuous recreation of all things? Does your mind freely will the changes that are the events that populate your life? Does this mean nothing happens in your life that you don’t freely will into the
changes that are the events that populate your life?

The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..." — ucarr

That line explicitly states "we have something... which produces the illusion of continuity". Why would you conclude that "something" refers to the probability distribution, when I've already stated that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not to the probability prediction? What is stated is that there is something there, which produces the illusion of continuity, and it also supports the assumption of necessity. I make no claims as to what that "something" is, but it is obviously not the probability distribution itself, because I've already explained how it is not that Your interpretation makes no sense. It's like you are intentionally making an obvious misinterpretation for the sake of claiming that I contradict myself — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's look at your second unedited quote:

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your unedited quote, the relation of probability (probability distribution) is present, rather than a relation of necessity...

So, it (probability distribution) $=$ illusion of continuity.

Let's look at your first unedited quote:

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, it (probability distribution) $≠$ illusion of continuity.

The photon has no trajectory. I've repeated this already, yet you keep talking as if it has a trajectory. You will never understand what I am saying until you drop this idea that the photon has a trajectory. Check this article (or any similar article), where it is stated "First, the photon has no space trajectory; it famously “follows all paths” like a wave." https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402621003983

The photon has a location at T-1, and a location at T-2. The two locations are not the same, and there is no trajectory which accounts for how the photon moved from position A to position B. Therefore we can conclude that there is discontinuity of information, relating to what happened to the photon between T-1 and T-2. The reality of the discontinuity of information is indicated by the fact that the photon's location is represented by a probability distribution rather than as having a specific, necessary trajectory. Furthermore, observable evidence of wave phenomena indicates that there is a discontinuity of the photon itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

The photon has a random, uncertain direction that is constrained by a probability that keeps it nearly perpendicular to the axis. More importantly, the uncertain path of a photon gets resolved by observation into a definite and measurable path, as evidenced by: $5.39x10^-44s$. The photon duration of travel one Planck length, being observed and measured, was a certain and completed direction of travel without any fog of discontinuity.

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity? — ucarr

Your example does not represent "uncertainty" in our context, which is a statement about what we can know. Suppose the greater certainty we have about whether child A is up or down, this implies that we have less certainty about whether child B is up or down. That is analogous. This is contrary to "if child A is up, child B is down", and indicates a discontinuity between the two, because knowledge of one does not translate to knowledge of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no issue with either child having two possible positions on the seesaw at the same time. Likewise, there's no ambiguity about a vector having two types of measurement. Furthermore, QM uncertainty and precision of measurement are distinct. The Heisenberg equation, without uncertainty, gives us one measurement much more precise than the other, and vice versa. The either/or of the Heisenberg equation, like the up/down of the seesaw, has no fog hovering around it. The only implication linking the two measurements is that if one is of high precision, the other will be of low precision. Discontinuity has no application to this relationship.

The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your training in philosophy provided means to back your immaterial claims with evidence, no doubt you would use it. As you say, however, "...your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence.

That's a bad assumption. But you keep insisting on it even when I tell you not to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I keep insisting that free will, being dependent upon the brain, is not non-physical.

If the future is present to the mind, then it's present in the mind in the present as the present. No amount of word-gaming will change this simple truth. — ucarr

No word games on my part. As I said, both, past and future are present to the mind as "the present". That is the reason for the need for a two dimensional conception of "present". The present has two dimensions, past and future.

The other two tenses: past and future, only have relative value for us as concepts within our minds. — ucarr

That is what I dispute. That claim you make is conceptual only, and it is a conceptual feature necessitated by the idea that the present is a dimensionless point in time. The problems with this conception we've already discussed, and you seemed to agree with to an extent.

Since this "point in time" conception is faulty, then also its extension, that "past and future, only have relative value for us as concepts within our minds" also is faulty. Therefore the whole conceptual structure needs to be replaced with something more realistic. And most of the rest of your post is dismissed along with that faulty conception.

You misquote me (see my bold text above and compare it to your bold text immediately below): scant ability ≠
≠
no ability. So, again, as our past deepens, it enriches our intentions for the future. — ucarr

Well then, your objection to my point becomes irrelevant, because to make the point you desired, requires "no ability".

Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty. — ucarr

I suggest you go back and read all the posts from the beginning, and pay close attention. Heisenberg Uncertainty is the result of mathematical principles which do not correspond with observed physical reality. This brings unknown aspects of reality into our knowledge as "uncertainty", instead of leaving the unknown out of the knowledge as "the unknown". "The unknown" in this case, I argue, is the nonphysical. Application of the mathematics incorporates the nonphysical into the physical and this produces "uncertainty".

If you can't do that, then your inability is evidence Heisenberg Uncertainty is not a measurement problem; it's an existential limitation on possible measurement. — ucarr

I told you already, more than once, that this "uncertainty" is the product of mathematics which does not correspond with observed physics. The shortest possible duration of time, according to physical observations, is an infinitesimal length of time, we've been calling it Planck. The mathematics of "infinite series" treats this boundary as a zero length point in time. Therefore these two do not correspond. I explained this with reference to the difference between being at rest, and being in motion, and the problem of infinite acceleration.

You replied with some claim about there being no such thing as rest, in relativity. But this is false, because there is a rest frame, or inertial frame. And so there is a whole nest of problems here, starting with the difference between invariant mass and relativistic mass.

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity? — ucarr

I explained this. The seesaw example does not properly represent the uncertainty principle. Go back and read it please.

(As a side note, I dispute your premise self-examination "...is not a matter of observation." Knowledge is always acquired by observation, whether through the senses, or through the mind. A priori knowledge is based upon the mind's observations of logical truth.) — ucarr

Knowledge is not necessarily acquired through observation. We are born with knowledge so you ought not jump to such conclusions.

I think you are simply stretching the meaning of "observation" here, to suit your purpose. How would the mind "observe" if not through some sense apparatus? You simply claim that the mind can "observe" without the observational tool of sense because this appears to make a neat and tidy source of knowledge for you, "observation".

But it doesn't really solve any problems, because we're left with the problem of what could the mind observe without the use of senses, And the only answer is "itself". And if the mind can learn any sort of knowledge by observing itself, this implies that it is acting in a way which demonstrates that it already has knowledge. Otherwise it would be acting in a totally random way and self-observation would produce no knowledge. Therefore your proposal of stretching the meaning of "observation", to suit your purpose, actually gets you nowhere toward proving what you want to prove with it. We still cannot conclude that all knowledge is acquired through observation.

In fact, the logic proves that knowledge must precede observation. And of course this is very obvious to anyone who has given this subject any serious consideration. "Observation" is clearly an activity which requires some sort of skill, or at least the capacity to observe, and this must consist of a type of knowledge.

If we're sitting side-by-side on a bench in the park, and you start indulging your desires for the future: vehicle, home, large income and I, hearing tell of this from you, also start indulging my desires for the future with me in possession of similar things, do you believe the two of us have entered the future mind, brain and body? — ucarr

Just having desires indicates that while being at the present, we are causally influenced by the future. Acting on such desires is even stronger evidence of this. This is no different from the fact that observing a moving object indicates that while being at the present we are causally influenced by the past. Put these two together, and we make predictions. If the moving object is coming toward your head, you duck. Living in the present is not a matter of simple observance (being in the past). And, it is not a simple matter of trying to get whatever desire moves you (being in the future). Nor is it a matter of being in between past and future, as the dimensionless point of division does not produce a concept which corresponds with reality. Therefore we are left with living in the present being a confluence of future and past.

For a long time you've been telling me the future jumps to the past, skipping the present. Next the present and the past overlap and, somehow, the dimensional present includes the past. — ucarr

This is misunderstanding, just like those charges of contradiction which you were making.

So, given the overlap of two different temporal tenses, I occupy two different times simultaneously. — ucarr

There is an easier way to state this. What you call "temporal tenses" are the dimensions of time. Therefore you can replace your confusing statement of "I occupy two different times simultaneously", with "the time of my being, i.e. the present, consists of two dimensions".

The upshot: In spite of all of this complexity, I still need a dimensionless present I approach as an infinite series that narrows the time lag down to a differential so minute I can know my virtual self. — ucarr

Why do you want to reintroduce the principle which we both agreed is faulty, the "dimensionless present". We had a long discussion about this when we first engaged, and my purpose was to get you to see, and agree with the faults in this representation, which you did at the time. This concept left "the present" as outside of time, nontemporal, such that no being which exists at the present could interact with temporal existence. Why do you now want to bring back this faulty principle when you know how bad it is?

Even if we suppose thoughts are non-physical, supposing they're free is a big assumption. — ucarr

I've told you already, it's not the thoughts themselves which are properly "nonphysical", its their cause which is. This is why its better to relate to the nonphysical through feelings, emotions like desire and anticipation, which demonstrate our participation in that dimension of time which is nonphysical, the future. In a similar way, we refer to memory to demonstrate our participation in the physical dimension of time

Is this a description of physical things, both massive and massless, coming into existence at each moment of passing time? — ucarr

Yes! Now you're catching on.

The free will of the thinking mind is the sufficient cause acting as the agent of creation of the two types of things? — ucarr

No, the human free will acts as an agent of change, not the agent of creation. So do the wills of other animals. But obviously none of us, nor all of us together for that matter, creates the world as we know it (in its independence from us) from one moment to the next.

What are some important details of the physics of the continuous recreation of all things? — ucarr

Spatial expansion to begin with. Remember, I explained the recreation as a mini big bang, at each moment of passing time, at each real point in space.

How is passing time fueling this continuous recreation? — ucarr

The passing of time is the succession of recreations, one after the other, at each moment as time passes.

How is it that passing time is non-physical? — ucarr

The passing of time is actually nonphysical, because it is completely left out of physics, as a real physical thing, to be dealt with. However, we could proceed to distinguish between the nonphysical and the immaterial here, and say that everything on the future dimension of time is immaterial, material existence being given at the present.

How does non-physical passing time become the dynamism of physical things changing? — ucarr

This is a feature of our observational apparatus. We observe across the moments of recreation, like watching a movie which really consists of a succession of still frames. Each moment has changes from the last, and we observe this as "the dynamism of physical things changing".

Does your mind freely will the changes that are the events that populate your life? Does this mean nothing happens in your life that you don’t freely will into the
changes that are the events that populate your life? — ucarr

I see that this is the part which is giving you problems. Suppose that each still frame in the succession of moments, is created at each passing moment, by some sort of behind the scene information (what some call Platonic Forms). This information (Platonic Forms) is the immaterial which is on the future side of each moment, determining what will be at that moment, as time passes. The freewill has the capacity to manipulate, change that information, to some degree. The laws of physics are based on our observational readings of patterns in the order of recreation, which dictates how the world (as independent from us) is recreated at each passing moment. Therefore the laws of physics which are designed to explain the independent world (as independent from us) do not account for how we interfere in the world.

So, it (probability distribution) =
=
illusion of continuity. — ucarr

No, you are still misunderstanding. There is probability, it is still mistakenly assumed by some to be necessity. Therefore there is something there which produces the illusion of continuity which induces the assumption of necessity.

I'm sorry if I was sloppy, and did not state things clearly. After explicitly stating in the first part, that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, I didn't think that I needed to restate "the assumption of necessity" in the second part, because I thought it was clearly implied. Obviously, it was not, you misunderstood and interpreted the second part as contradicting the first.

So, it (probability distribution) ≠
≠
illusion of continuity. — ucarr

Correct, the assumption of necessity is what is related to the illusion of continuity. I think the problem was caused because I was speaking about predictions based on probability, such as is the case with cause/effect predictions, and you introduced "probability distribution". I think this is what Amadeus pointed to.

Often, the cause/effect relation is assumed to be necessary. Remember we were talking about whether the cause/effect relation is biconditional. I explained how it is not biconditional because it is not a relation of necessity, but one of probability, as demonstrated by Hume. Further, I was explaining that when these probability predictions of cause/effect are taken to be necessary, this is related to the illusion of continuity. You replaced "probability predictions" with "probability distributions", and I didn't see any problem with this. However, when you did this, I think you lost sight of the assumption of necessity, thinking that no one would assume that predictions of probability distributions would be taken as predictions of necessity.

More importantly, the uncertain path of a photon gets resolved by observation into a definite and measurable path, as evidenced by: 5.39x10−44s
5.39

10
−
44

. — ucarr

This is not true. The photon can only be observed to have locations however far apart is determined by the measuring devices. And this is assumed to be limited by Planck length. The photon cannot be claimed to have "a path", or any specific trajectory in between, as evidenced by the fact that it is understood as probability.

The photon duration of travel one Planck length, being observed and measured, was a certain and completed direction of travel without any fog of discontinuity. — ucarr

Sorry ucarr, but this is simply not true. Read up on your quantum physics please. The photon is "observed and measured" at a particular location, and it cannot be shown to have a path of continuity between those points of measurement. That's what the basic double slit experiment shows.

This is exactly the problem with the assumption of necessity that I refer to above. The photon has a location at its points of measurement. Its existence between those points can only be described by the probability distribution. It has no necessary path between point A and point B. However, you are insisting that it does. Therefore you have fallen into that trap of falsity. That faulty assumption of necessity induces you to insist that the illusion of continuity is real.

The Heisenberg equation, without uncertainty, gives us one measurement much more precise than the other, and vice versa. — ucarr

That's why the seesaw analogy is no good. With the seesaw, you can infer the position of one from the position of the other. With the uncertainty principle, determining one renders the other as uncertain. That's why its consistent with discontinuity.

If your training in philosophy provided means to back your immaterial claims with evidence, no doubt you would use it. As you say, however, "...your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence. — ucarr

At least I'm honest with my definition of "observe". You fudge it around in an attempt to obscure the problems of physicalism. But as I demonstrated above your fudging of "observation" does not help you to avoid the inevitable conclusion of the reality of the nonphysical.

I keep insisting that free will, being dependent upon the brain, is not non-physical. — ucarr

That's contradictory. If it's physical, it's not free. So all you are doing now, is fudging "freewill". But just like in your fudging of "observation", it will not lead to anything productive.

.

.

Non-Physics: What I Learned

• Logical possibility extends beyond physics into the realm of non-physics

• Physical things, in order to emerge into existence in the present, must be pre-determined by
  logical possibility as sufficient reason

• Logical possibility causes physics

• Time, being non-physical, is logically prior to physics

• The three tenses of time: future/present/past, being time, are non-physical

• Physical things are fundamentally static

• Time passing causes events with physical things changing

• Time passing is a non-physical motion

• Time is not a dimension

• Time encompasses dimensions, and thus it is a set of dimensions*

• The present tense of time is not a theoretical point with zero dimensional extension

• The present tense of time is a two-dimensionally extended area, with the future tense of time and the past tense of time tucked inside of it

• The present tense of time is the junction where future meets past according to the arrow of time

• The present tense of time is best represented as an area of parallel lines:
• The first line represents massive objects, with the present entirely to the right

• The arrow of time, moving left, stays within the past
• The second line represents massless objects, with present entirely to the left
• The arrow of time, moving left, stays within the future

• Newton’s First Law (an object continues its physical momentum until changed by an opposing physical momentum) is incompatible with free will

• A slight change to the physical momentum of a massive object can be achieved through exercise of the non-physical momentum of free will

• Freely willed slight changes in massive objects produce large changes in massless objects

• The arrow of time, moving from future to the area of the present, where future traverses a complex, parallel bi-furcation of a massive-object timeline and a massless- object timeline, progresses from a discontinuity at the present into the past such that exercise of free will achieves changes in the moment-to-moment re-creation of the world

• Although observation resolves the trajectory of an elementary particle into one measurable event, math can only calculate from super-position to a probability distribution of possible trajectories, so logic allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information

• Although Heisenberg Uncertainty calculates precise position and imprecise momentum, or vice versa, the low precision of one or the other of the measurements allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information

* T → (P → (F,PST))
T=Time; P=Present; F=Future; PST=Past