But what actually settles the issue in this case are the criteria you asked for, not the flower itself. — Manuel

But I asked you to bring me the flower itself. The criteria are only a means to an end.

If the flower I give you does not satisfy the conditions you have, then it does not match what you have in mind. The problem is not in the object, but our interpretation of it. — Manuel

"Have in mind" is a problematic phrase in this context. Let's say "it is not what you asked me to bring you." The blue flower that I bring you is not a problem in itself. But there is a problem with it in the context of your request to me. It's true that my interpretation of your request is a misinterpretation. Is that what you mean?

Yes, that's why I'm suggesting that scepticism/certainty is not the only issue in play in this text. BTW, I'm a bit puzzled by "all states of affairs" are objects. — Ludwig V

I agree but he is taking his time drawing out this side here first. And my recollection of TLP is shoddy but I was trying to draw the parallel of his, as you say Atomism there, and the “queer”-ness of the mechanism here.

I agree but he is taking his time drawing out this side here first. And my recollection of TLP is shoddy but I was trying to draw the parallel of his, as you say Atomism there, and the “queer”-ness of the mechanism here. — Antony Nickles

I don't quite understand the parallel. But perhaps it's better if I just wait and see how things develop. As you say, it's at a very early stage.

Yes, Descartes thought his way through to radical skepticism, but what we are dealing with here is the first part, which is wanting certainty (thinking of the whole world as objects we should be able to “see”, or know, as we do trees, etc.), which is the desire that starts the spinning. — Antony Nickles

Very much so - it is a big problem (certainty). And maybe phrasing it a bit harder that Wittgenstein (so far), certainty (100% no doubts at all) is impossible in the empirical world.

For me "mental image" is just pictorial stuff. The semantic stuff is not inherent in the image, but is the use we make of it. I don't think he denies that there are such things or that we might make use of them. But he does insist that this is only one way that we might find the red flower. — Ludwig V

Well, the most immediate example would be of a blind person asking for a red flower. But then since they can't see, it would be strange for them to ask for a red one, as opposed to just a "flower".

But I asked you to bring me the flower itself. The criteria are only a means to an end. — Ludwig V

And I did. But if I have poor vision, or confused red with pink then you are the one who needs to correct me, right? So, I give you the pink flower, you see the flower and judge it not to be red. It is your judgment of your perception triggered by the flower that corrects my mistake.

The flower is the stimulus, but without judgments ascertaining if what I gave you is correct, then the flower is quite useless.

"Have in mind" is a problematic phrase in this context. Let's say "it is not what you asked me to bring you." The blue flower that I bring you is not a problem in itself. But there is a problem with it in the context of your request to me. It's true that my interpretation of your request is a misinterpretation. Is that what you mean? — Ludwig V

To be clear I do believe in mental content and am a quite fanatical innatist and ardent believer in innate ideas. I am quite skeptical of "externalism" in most areas in philosophy.

I was somewhat surprised to be invited to discuss this, but it is welcome.

So, I don't find the phrase "have in mind" to be particularly problematic in the least.

You can interpret what you say in that manner if you wish, no problems at all from my part.

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

A substantive is some thing named:

We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.

(1)

What is at issue is a critique of the Tractarian metaphysics of mind. The logical necessity of the connection between names and the existence of corresponding objects, and, by extension, propositions and facts.

One difficulty which strikes us is that for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions; e.g. for such words as "one", "number", "not", etc.

(1)

This is followed immediately by the question:

Need the ostensive definition itself be understood?--Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood?

That “tove” can ostensibly mean pencil or round or wood might seem to be veering off on a tangent, but it raises a related question about the logical connection between language and the world. Language lacks the precision assumed in the Tractatus. That 'tove' means ‘this’ (pencil)and not ‘that’ (wood) is something that is clarified in practice by the activity of using language.

This activity may involve mental processes but is not reducible to them.

We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we don't quite understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could.

(3)

Why does the mind seem to be a queer kind of medium? This happens when the mind is taken to be a substantive, a thing with its own mechanism, but a mechanism that can bring about effects that no material mechanism could.

But here we are making two mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought
and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt
as a problem.

(5-6)

Consistent with the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains the distinction between philosophy and natural science.

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us.

(6)