kimchi — Leontiskos

Heh. I taught my phone "Kimhi" but it ignored me this time.

Heh. I taught my phone "Kimhi" but it ignored me this time. — Srap Tasmaner

@J might not object. "It doesn't taste good, but it is healthy!" :grin:

(A) "Dogs are nice"

and on the other

(B) "For all x, if x is a dog, then it is nice."

We just need a neutral word for the relation between (A) and (B), and, if you start with (A) and recast it as (B), we need a neutral word to describe what you're doing there. Maybe you believe you are "revealing (A)'s logical form," and maybe you don't. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, I don't think this Fregian move can plausibly present itself as something other than a schematization, so I agree with you in cases such as this one. But this is probably the weakest point of Frege's system. It's harder to tell if distinguishing force from content is artifice.

Again, for me it begins with the puzzle of the Meno. I want to say that if logic is artifice then knowledge is artificial. And of course some of what we involve ourselves in when we do logic is artifice, but that doesn't mean that there is nothing more than that involved.

Or we could put it this way: "Even if Frege's is not perfectly correct, it correctly points us in the direction of a real rational faculty that humans possess." To what extent can we speak about and explicate that faculty? And form and strengthen it? It's not altogether clear, but that it exists seems obvious.

Again, for me it begins with the puzzle of the Meno. I want to say that if logic is artifice then knowledge is artificial. And of course some of what we involve ourselves in when we do logic is artifice, but that doesn't mean that there is nothing more than that involved. — Leontiskos

This is good. I'll go look at the Meno (I think there's at least one thread on it here somewhere), and if I have anything to say, we can make a fresh start with that.

- Okay, and to be clear, Socrates proposes "recollection" and a form of reincarnation to respond to the dilemma. Aristotle proposes logic: that we can learn things that we did not know before, and that there is a manner in which this is done. I'm obviously thinking about Aristotle's answer rather than Socrates'. :smile:

Sure, sure. I, ahem, recollect the Meno and I know it weirds modern readers out. We'll do better than that. Unless I have nothing to say, then it's on you.

You know it's funny, but in what you might consider the early days of cognitive psychology, before there was much neuroscience, there was an enormous amount of research specifically on how children learn geometry. It was a core topic.

- That's pretty interesting. Plato would surely approve!

I'm not too sure what you want me to take from the stuff you quote. I went into some detail about extensionality - the topic of your quotes - earlier in this thread. It's central to Frege's account and so to this thread. So far as my previous posts on this page, I was making the point that we can talk about our utterances with greater lucidity that about our thoughts, simply because our utterances are public.

I agree with your two points. And yes, logic is useful even if it is not the foundation of our language. There are multiple logics, and we chose a logic to use in order to set out a coherent account.

It seems to me that we agree in rejecting logical monism.

I read musical notation (sheet music) only very slowly, but quickly master tabs. I choose the latter, rejecting musical monism for reasons of utility. I recognise that I would need to move to notation if if I moved to keys rather than strings. Much the same as for choices between predicate, propositional, free, or any of the various other logics. Depends what you are doing.

I'm not interested in a precise stipualtive definition. Such a thing is anathema to much of analytic philosophy, and certainly against the spirit of Philosophical Investigations. It's worth noting that those who are critical of analytic approaches usually begin by misunderstanding them. Again, I was making the point that we can talk about our utterances with greater lucidity that about our thoughts, simply because our utterances are public.

Yes, a convenient ambiguity. In the Begriffsschrift "⊢" is an explicit judgement of what follows is known. In the Grundgesetze this has changes significantly; ⊢ to something like "The following names the true". This is recounted in the SEP article on Frege's Logic. Subsequently truth was substantially replaced by satisfaction.

From what I understand, in the Begriffsschrift "⊢" is an explicit judgement; what follows is known, while — would prefix "a mere complex of ideas", un-affirmed (SEP). In the Grundgesetze this has changes significantly; ⊢ now says something like "The following names the true" (SEP). That's much closer to it's modern use, where ⊢ρ is "ρ is a theorem" and ψ⊢ρ says "ρ is derivable from ψ". Notice that in these more recent uses, truth is not mentioned. That's important. — Banno

One of the problems here is that focusing on Frege may give the false impression that his account remains paradigmatic for modern logic. It isn't.

So far as my previous posts on this page, I was making the point that we can talk about our utterances with greater lucidity that about our thoughts, simply because our utterances are public. — Banno

That may be true, but Frege was interested in thoughts. I think comparing and contrasting him to Wittgenstein would be a cool way to examine that.

One of the problems here is that focusing on Frege may give the false impression that his account remains paradigmatic for modern logic. It isn't. — Banno

That's fine. Frege remains fascinating. If I found a good article comparing and contrasting Frege and Witt on the issue of the world (...the world is all that is the case) would you be interested?

You'd have to add the problem of which Wittgenstein, and not just Tractatus vs Investigations, but the differing accounts of each. His early belief in a crystalline perfect language was pretty much in line with Frege, I supose. But that is rejected in the later, much messier account of meaning in terms of use.

I suspect that the difference of opinion between @Leontiskos and I is that he thinks of logic as an account of how we either do, or perhaps how we ought, to think. In contrast I don't see how such a view survives the multiplicity of divergent logics we now have available, and rather treat logic as a choice, a set of tools we can apply depending on what we are up to.

So Srap offered

(A) "Dogs are nice"
and on the other
(B) "For all x, if x is a dog, then it is nice." — Srap Tasmaner

But earlier Leontiskos offered an example that would have come out as

(C) There are things that are both dogs and nice

What this shows is how logic can be used to clarify the somewhat ambiguous English of "Dogs are nice" by making explicit the difference between a universal and existential quantification. Of course, we could have done the same thing in English by asking "Do you mean that all dogs are nice or that some dogs are nice?".

Not one logic, but many.

I suspect that the difference of opinion between Leontiskos and I is that he thinks of logic as an account of how we either do, or perhaps how we ought, to think. — Banno

With that guy, I'll note that

at time 1, he's opposed to x, while being as insulting as possible
at time 2, he's in favor of x, while being as insulting as possible.

There's no explanation for why he changed his mind. Something's up with dude.