I'm happy to drop either "fact" or "state of affairs," as long as it's clear that, whichever one we retain, it's the non-linguistic referent of a statement. — J

Yikes! But I don't think so. We need to make statements in order to talk about anything, certainly, but that doesn't mean that everything we talk about is also made of statements. — J

I didn't mean everything was "made of statements".. I'll lead you to something, but first let me take the route there..

Why do you think the Tractarian vision of "states of affairs" and "true propositions" pointing to the states of affairs as anything really profound rather than common sense? That is to say, this notion that the world exists, we talk about it with statements that pick out possibly true ones.

- Yes, @Banno began by claiming that talk of states of affairs is redundant and superfluous, and then went on to continue conflating states of affairs and statements in subtle and not so subtle ways. For example:

SO how does a state of affairs differ from that which a statement sets out? — Banno

A statement and what a statement sets out are not the same thing, and it is not redundant or superfluous to talk about what a statement sets out. Thus Banno is arguing for a different thesis here than his original one (i.e. equivocating). Even if we agree that a state of affairs does not differ from what a statement sets out, it does not follow that a state of affairs does not differ from a statement. A statement is a locution; a state of affairs is not.

---

- Good posts. :up:

Even if we agree that a state of affairs does not differ from what a statement sets out, it does not follow that a state of affairs does not differ from a statement. A statement is a locution; a state of affairs is not. — Leontiskos

How do you know? You are referring to something. Yet your reference is cognitively something. That doesn’t have to be a state of affairs.

Added more

Banno began by claiming that talk of states of affairs is redundant and superfluous, — Leontiskos

Well, no, I didn't, and the folk here are competent enough to understand the difference between "It's far from obvious that states of affairs are helpful" and "states of affairs is redundant and superfluous". Your misrepresentation of those with whom you disagree is by now well understood.

What we might do well is to avoid is inserting a third entity between the world and the statement. A state of affairs is not a something apart from how things are.

Folk are welcome to talk about states of affairs, but might do well to remember that they are a turn of phrase, not a piece of ontology.

Well, no, I didn't, — Banno

Well, yes, you did:

Have you ever noticed that when someone sets out a state of affairs, they do it by setting out a statement?

It's far from obvious that states of affairs are helpful, rather than just yet another thing to puzzle over. — Banno

Well, yes. What a statement sets out is a particular situation in the world. Do you then have three things, the true statement, the situation in the world and the fact? Or are we multiplying entities beyond necessity? — Banno

-

Folk are welcome to talk about states of affairs, but might do well to remember that they are a turn of phrase, not a piece of ontology. — Banno

I don't know what it would mean for state of affairs to be a "piece of ontology." In all likelihood you don't either.

This is a classic Analytic move of claiming that natural language has gone astray and "states of affairs" is unnecessary. In natural language "state of affairs" and "fact" do not mean the same thing. I'll stick with natural language rather than the artificial simplifications.

Thought it might have been him.

On the one hand, it's a ridiculous point because you can't *say* one word on top of another -- gotta say them in order. But on the other hand, spoken language is pretty much always accompanied by gestures, so you can imagine an accompanying gesture to convey the "on". On the third hand (the gripping hand), this won't work over a telephone. But on the fourth hand, language is spoken in person long long long before telephones, and pretty damn long before writing. And even writing has its own story, a little different from the story of speech.

A state of affairs is not a something apart from how things are.

Folk are welcome to talk about states of affairs, but might do well to remember that they are a turn of phrase, not a piece of ontology. — Banno

That’s why Tractatus is confusing. It posits an ontology but doesn’t want to remain there too long. Objects, state of affairs. Call them “real” or tokens, but they are something that he is “corresponding” with propositions. I hired they could be thoughts if one is to make an idealism from it.

Thought it might have been him. — Srap Tasmaner

We even had a long discussion about it 7 years ago.

The very idea that in language we represent the world, is probably a sort of illusion, or a myth. — Srap Tasmaner

This may be getting to the heart of it, especially if we push back, even gently, on the idea that "language" and "world" are easily separable and distinct. Language, or at least some parts of it, may in fact construct the world rather than represent it.

That’s why Tractatus is confusing. It posits an ontology but doesn’t want to remain there too long. Objects, state of affairs. Call them “real” or tokens, but they are something that he is “corresponding” with propositions. — schopenhauer1

That confusion was addressed in PI. But on that, as I recall, you disagree.

The SEP article that @frank introduced has arguments - section 1.2 - for the need to introduce states of affairs.

Hmm. Streetlight, of loving memory. Up until that thread I had refused to use "proposition", but Street convinced me of its utility.

:lol:

On the one hand, it's a ridiculous point because you can't *say* one word on top of another -- gotta say them in order. But on the other hand, spoken language is pretty much always accompanied by gestures, so you can imagine an accompanying gesture to convey the "on". On the third hand (the gripping hand), this won't work over a telephone. But on the fourth hand, language is spoken in person long long long before telephones, and pretty damn long before writing. And even writing has its own story, a little different from the story of speech. — Srap Tasmaner

Rombout has a nice section on linguistic differences, such as Frege's spatial notation. For example, the author she appeals to considers the difference between the Roman and Arabic numeral systems. I would say it's not ridiculous, because written language is not somehow limited to linear left-to-right symbols. Even spoken language can have similar things, such as tonal languages like Vietnamese where inflection becomes centrally important.

I'll lead you to something, but first let me take the route there..

Why do you think the Tractarian vision of "states of affairs" and "true propositions" pointing to the states of affairs as anything really profound rather than common sense? That is to say, this notion that the world exists, we talk about it with statements that pick out possibly true ones. — schopenhauer1

Happy to go with you, but could you restate the question? Something off about the grammar.

Huh. Whaddya know.

tonal language — Leontiskos

Yeah that's nice, I forgot about tone. (I really should learn something about how it's used in such languages.)

The SEP article that frank introduced has arguments - section 1.2 - for the need to introduce states of affairs. — Banno

Continuing:
The basic idea seems to be that modal statements say something, and can be true, so there must be a something to which they correspond - and hence the need for "states of affairs" that can be what modal statements are about while not being how things are - not facts.

A state of affairs as how things might be.

But in most case we can keep track of what is modal and what is actual.

And drop the correspondence.

Not one logic, but many. — Banno

The foundational topic here relates to the Meno, which you are welcome to weigh in on:

Here's how I would start a thread about logic. I would post the dilemma of Meno 80b. I would basically say that if that dilemma can be overcome then logic exists, and if it can't then logic does not exist. Per Rombout, someone like Wittgenstein doesn't think logic exists. But the thread would not use the word "logic," for that word is an equivocal quagmire. — Leontiskos

You quote yourself more often than is healthy.

- If you managed to read my posts it wouldn't be necessary. You're a pro at talking past people.

Cheers, Leon.

That topic pretty much moved over to Logical Nihilism

The idea of a state of affairs comes from the Cartesian worldview. You can't demolish someone's worldview without giving them an acceptable alternative. They won't let you.

Perhaps.

In part it come back to the place of the "⊢"....
"We know that..."
"It might be that...."
"We believe that..."

Just trying to get back on task.

Know and believe are intensional operators. Is that where you were headed?

It's where I came in. "One might see this as setting aside the "assertoric" aspect of the sentence in order to deal with other aspects of its structure - what it is about." We can seperate the content from the intent.

I see.

Happy to go with you, but could you restate the question? Something off about the grammar. — J

So what I mean is, basically, as I see it, the Tractatus is simply a common sense point of view. X event happens in the world, we make statements that reflect these events. Actual events in the world (states of affairs) are reflected by accurate statements (true propositions). X state of affairs is reflected by Y true proposition (about/describing that state of affairs).

That confusion was addressed in PI. But on that, as I recall, you disagree. — Banno

I won't open that can of worms at this time.. Witt's theory of language in context/use and shift away from language as static correspondence, etc. However..

The SEP article that frank introduced has arguments - section 1.2 - for the need to introduce states of affairs. — Banno

In that article SOA are possibilities, where facts are what is the case from those possibilities. As far as I know, SOA that obtain are what Wittgenstein is saying is captured by true propositions.. Either way, whether modal possibilities of possible arrangements exist, versus the actual arrangements, he seemed to posit that there was a "something" that was being captured by true statement ("facts" or SOA that obtains).

To me, this is still a (barebones) metaphysics. It's a realist metaphysics that puts a lot of value on declarative statements are mapping "reality" in some veridically accurate way. The barebones aspect is that the "reality" is given short shrift in his koans referring to "objects" and states of affairs, and "facts", etc.

Yeah, and I think Wittgenstein would agree with you that it was a mistake. But for elsewhere.

And yeah, there is something of modality in the Tractatus "logical space".

So what I mean is, basically, as I see it, the Tractatus is simply a common sense point of view. X event happens in the world, we make statements that reflect these events. Actual events in the world (states of affairs) are reflected by accurate statements (true propositions). X state of affairs is reflected by Y true proposition (about/describing that state of affairs). — schopenhauer1

And so the question becomes interesting as to:
a) Why would our language/logic correspond to the world?
b) How do we know something is veridically accurate?

And thus this opens up interesting notions of information. Information theory seems to have some role to play for why "The grass is green" makes sense, AND then what it means to say, "It is true that grass is green". These are two different capabilities, possibly being conflated in this discussion, revolving around Frege. And Frege perhaps, did not have the tools to really go further with it. Modern ideas of information, linguistic evolution, and other forms, possibly outside of formal "logical systems", would help elucidate this. Yet this discussion becomes hermetically sealed to the dates of 1870-1950 when it is not opened up to these subjects which better tackle these confusions of the early analytics.

I'm not sure whether the Tractatus is quite as common-sense as you're describing it, but I'm no authority on matters Wittian. I agree that the propositions you stated as being Tractarian fit common-sense ideas about how language relates to the world.

Information theory seems to have some role to play for why "The grass is green" makes sense, AND then what it means to say, "It is true that grass is green". These are two different capabilities, possibly being conflated in this discussion, revolving around Frege. — schopenhauer1

Yes, two different capabilities. As we've seen, Kimhi wants to minimize or even eliminate what is different about them, in aid of unifying thinking and being. Glad to learn more about how information theory might apply, if you have some references.

One possible insight: The question about how language/logic corresponds to the world is rather unclear. Some philosophers seem to take "correspond" to mean "reveal formal commonalities" or even "make a picture of." Others are content with showing any kind of naming or symbolic relationship, and for them this is correspondence enough. What question are we examining here? I suggest it's about the latter kind of correspondence, since even if there is no formal or pictorial relationship between "The cat is on the mat" and 1) the idea of a cat on a mat, and/or 2) the fact of an actual cat on a mat, it's still puzzling, from a certain angle, why we can rely on language to make reliable connections of this sort.