I agree that h. sapiens evolved and that language also evolved but my argument is that we've crossed an evolutionary threshold which sets us apart from other animals. We are able, among many other things, to interrogate the nature of being through philosophy, or the size and age of the Universe, through science. — Wayfarer

All of that is just on account of symbolic language, and no one with half a brain would deny that we do those things that other animals don't. But I believe you want to infer from that a supernatural influence, and that is really the unspoken premise in your complaints about modern culture.

If you are not wanting to infer a supernatural influence, then we have nothing to disagree about. And note, I'm not outright denying the possibility of a supernatural influence, I'm just saying we have no valid warrant for such an inference, and that we have no way of making discursive sense of the idea.

So it really comes down to how you feel about it, it comes down to your intuitions or what "feels right" to you, and that is not a basis for argument at all, because it is a personal matter.

But I believe you want to infer from that a supernatural influence, and that is really the unspoken premise in your complaints about modern culture. — Janus

Where have I said that? :rage:

Where have I said that? — Wayfarer

You haven't. That is why I wrote "unspoken premise". It is also why I wrote that if you don't hold that unpsoken premise, then we have nothing to argue about. You don't seem to be a very close reader.

All that said, the impression I have had from years of reading your posts is that you do believe in a spiritual reality and even hierarchy (which would, if it were actual. amount to a supernatural influence).

He describes all the powers of living beings as potentials, capacities, the powers of self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you could make an essentialist argument that understanding is exactly the discontinuity between humans and other animals, even if understanding itself is a power among others like movement etc. One can find many features that is shared by all (not deficient) humans and absent in other animals and claim that as the discontinuity, no matter whether the feature chosen is important.

I quite like Aristotle though. I'm just pointing out that there are many lines that can drawn between us and animals.

there is a distinct discontinuity between living and inanimate — Metaphysician Undercover

Is there? What do you make of viruses? Specially something like a mimivirus.

I believe other animals are capable of reasoning and presymbolic language. The only difference I see is the advent of symbolic language with humans. I also think this is pretty much the standard view, so I'm not sure why you seem to think it isn't the standard view. — Janus

What does "presymbolic language" mean? Isn't all language by the meaning of "language", symbolic in some way? Adding "symbolic" to language, to say that human language is "symbolic language" is just redundancey.

"A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants", which I take to mean that, apart from external constraints, you are free to do whatever you want but you are not free to choose what it is that you want. — Janus

Why not? I see no problem with a man choosing ones wants. That's what we learn how to do in moral training, mastering our habits.

Well, you could make an essentialist argument that understanding is exactly the discontinuity between humans and other animals, even if understanding itself is a power among others like movement etc. One can find many features that is shared by all (not deficient) humans and absent in other animals and claim that as the discontinuity, no matter whether the feature chosen is important. — Lionino

I do not agree. I think its' very clear that other animals "understand". We had a dog which clearly understood that it ought not get on the table, and so it did not ... as long as someone was around. But as soon as we went to bed it would be on the table. To me, that's obviously a form of "understanding". Of course, you can tailor a definition of "understand" to suit your purpose, but what's the point in that?

I'm just pointing out that there are many lines that can drawn between us and animals. — Lionino

And I'm just pointing out that the vast majority of those lines are arbitrary. In a similar way, we could draw a line between child and adult, and say that only an adult is responsible for one's actions, because an adult understands. But such boundaries are arbitrary.

Is there? What do you make of viruses? Specially something like a mimivirus. — Lionino

I think viruses are quire clearly living. You should ask about something like cancer, or prions, and things like that.

Reasoned inference enables discoveries of facts impossible to obtain by observation alone. Science relies on it, not to mention everyday rational thought. — Wayfarer

Science confirms or disproves it through experimentation.

Those very means you call into question in your initial response. And here, you're verging on positivism. — Wayfarer

I call all means into question. Here, I was merely pointing out the self-contradiction of a particular hard-line position.

I think humans need to take responsibility for the fact of their difference to other species. — Wayfarer

What's that to do with the topic? The power of humans was never in question; the sentience of other species was.

we've crossed an evolutionary threshold which sets us apart from other animals. — Wayfarer

We did cross a threshold, but it wasn't an evolutionary one; it was a cultural one. Once humans turned into settled farmers, their attitude changed: land and water became commodities; herbivores became cattle or vermin; carnivores became rivals and enemies; insects became pests. Humans alienated themselves from other species.

I think its' very clear that other animals "understand". We had a dog which clearly understood that it ought not get on the table, and so it did not ... as long as someone was around. But as soon as we went to bed it would be on the table. — Metaphysician Undercover

A complete side-track. We had one of those. We had a fairly big table in the kitchen, off limit to animals. We hardly ever saw her on it, but when I put my key in the lock, there was a scramble and clicking of nails on tile, a big white dog coming to greet me, and a Pyrennees-shaped puddle of sand on the table. It was a perfectly rational thing for her to do: lying on the table enabled her to see out the windows in comfort.

Reasoned inference enables discoveries of facts impossible to obtain by observation alone. Science relies on it, not to mention everyday rational thought.
— Wayfarer
Science confirms or disproves it through experimentation. — Vera Mont

But you're missing the point. The claim I took issue with was this:

What information do you have to work with beyond the empirical? — Vera Mont

If by 'the empirical', you mean 'only what is available to sensory perception' (per John Locke and David Hume), then rational inference goes well beyond what is available to sensory perception. Through it, we have discovered endless things that you could never learn only by observation. These discoveries are then validated (or refuted) by observation and experiment, but conjecture plays a vital role, as do the paradigms within which results are interpreted, and neither of those are strictly or only empirical.

We did cross a threshold, but it wasn't an evolutionary one; it was a cultural one. — Vera Mont

And also an existential one, more to the point.

then rational inference goes well beyond what is available to sensory perception. Through it, we have discovered endless things that you could never learn only by observation. — Wayfarer

That's the 'point'. Conjecture, intuition, imagination, projection, gut feeling are all valuable starting points for the investigation of some phenomenon or the search for an answer to some question. They often point to where one should look for information; they do no themselves supply information.

And also an existential one, more to the point. — Wayfarer

What is an existential threshold? Apes exist; humans exist; humans are apes but apes are not human. Every speciation is a threshold of sorts, and so is every conception. What makes this branching off more special than all of the others?

That we’re related to, but significantly different from, simians, through higher intelligence, self awareness and other attributes. And that the difference is significant. Janus says that I am ‘appealing to the supernatural’ (although that term is implicitly pejorative.) What I will acknowledge is that I believe that elements of the religious account of mankind signify real differences. And that the accepted wisdom of humans being no different to animals is a cultural construct and one that is particularly suitable for the ‘sensate culture’ we live in.

As far as ‘what more is there than information’ there’s the whole question of interpretation, of what information means. I mean, I can fully accept the biological account of human origins without thereby accepting that we’re fully determined by biology.

And that the difference is significant. — Wayfarer

Of course it is. But the ways in which that difference is interpreted by humans is also significant.

What I will acknowledge is that I believe that elements of the religious account of mankind signify real differences. — Wayfarer

No; they exploit real differences.

As far as ‘what more is there than information’ there’s the whole question of interpretation, of what information means. — Wayfarer

‘what more is there than information’ Why is that in single quotes? It looks suspiciously like a disinterpretation of my asking what information is there in the extra-empirical?
Yes, interpretation is the sticking-point.

my asking what information is there in the extra-empirical? — Vera Mont

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. One for example does not perceive the concepts of "animal" or of "world" or of "number" but simply understands them - this when perceiving signs, for example - and any perception we might have of an animal or a world or a number (be it of the imagination or not) will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

No; they exploit real differences. — Vera Mont

That’s only one way of looking at it, but it will fit right in here

I think viruses are quire clearly living. — Metaphysician Undercover

So viruses are living?

Enter poliovirus:

A virus that is made of a simple RNA and an icosaedric capsid. If this is living for you, there is no reason why a simple RNA without capsid is not living. Being that RNA is a nucleid acid, a molecule, then other molecules must be living too, like proteins and lipids. And if those are living, other organic molecules must be living too, like ethanol and glycosis. Then it seems your line between alive and inanimate are just as arbitrary as humans and animals.

Sorry Lionino, I am not a biologist, and spoke hastily without understanding what I was saying. Google has told me that viruses are not alive, so I apologize for the misleading comment.

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. — javra

And still contain no information which is beyond observable reality.

One for example does not perceive the concepts of "animal" or of "world" or of "number" but simply understands them - this when perceiving signs, for example - and any perception we might have of an animal or a world or a number (be it of the imagination or not) — javra

Not sure what this means. One [person?] simply understands the concept of animal, world or number - okay. But before that one can understand the concept of something, at least one example of the original had to exist in either reality or imagination. One wouldn't have much use for a concept that corresponds to nothing in the universe. The ideal triangle would be quite meaningless without we can draw imperfect real ones.

will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

This, I understand not at all.

Google has told me that viruses are not alive — Metaphysician Undercover

Who are we to disagree then?

Despite what Google told you, there are many biologists that do defend viruses should be classified as life:

Raoult and Forterre (2008) even argue that we should reclassify all biological entities into two major groups: the ribosome-encoding organisms (archaea, bacteria, and eukaryotes), or REOs; and the capsid-encoding organisms (viruses), or CEOs (Figure 2).

I don't agree with them, but that is just a personal preference of mine.

But how would that amount to an ontological difference rather than just a different mode of consciousness?

I think people get to this in different ways, but I can think of a few examples. There is Sokolowski's "The Phenomenology of the Human Person," (excellent work blending Husserl, Aristotle, Aquinas, and modern science informed philosophy of perception). For Sokolowski, there is a very good reason (grounded in phenomenology, and perception) for positing that things have an "intelligibility." Intelligibilities are a potency in things. We do not actualize them simply by perceiving things (they are in Aristotlean second potentiality in perception). Words and other symbolic systems like mathematics are what actualize intelligibilities. An intelligibility might be thought of as "the sum total of true things that can be said of a thing."

We never fully grasp an intelligibility seen there are seemingly infinite contexts from which to approach any entity, but we can come to grasp them more or less. Grasping an intelligibility is in many ways a social project, something that occurs across the entire historical "human conversation," including the arts, sciences, etc.

We have good reason to believe in intelligibilities because it does not seem like they should spring up uncaused or be the sui generis results of a magical human power. We should believe in them particularly from a naturalist frame.

But then the grasp of thing's intelligibility involves understanding its species and genus (scholastic sense of the terms), its telos (at least for living things; the healthy adult versions of living beings are phenomenologicaly "present" to us even when observing the immature or diseases for ), and the universals involved with it. Animals may potential grasp intelligibilities in their own weak way (although Sokolowski denies this because for him language is essential for actualization), but they don't grasp essences and universals. But if these things have ontic reality, and there are good arguments that they do, than human beings, through being the "rational animal," very much live in a different world from animals. We have access to a higher ontic plane (in the sense of vertical reality one finds in Hegel and Plato, where what is more self-determining is in a way more real because it is not merely a bundle of effects of causes external to it).

In such a view, the relationship between knower and known is a very special relationship. It is the place where many of a things properties can be present at once, whereas in nature things only manifest a small number of their properties vis-á-vis their current context at any time. So things most "are what they are," in the mind of the knower, whose mind becomes like the things known.

The human attunement to universals makes it distinct then. Sokolowski doesn't look at the Transcendentals, but we could throw them in here too. For example, only the human mind seems to grasp the unity of being, the way in which the Many must also be One. This isn't just a graduation in experience of the world, but access to the depths of its ontic structure. Reason is ecstatic, transcedent, pushing people beyond current belief and desire — beyond themselves. Love, attuned to Beauty and Goodness, is like this too (will vs intellect). But reason seems to require words and syntax, and so, in the form that gives access to the Transcendentals, human reason is unique.

But the Transcendentals and universals are natural. They are just transcend finite nature in a way, a "yes, and..." E.g., Plotinus' notion of the Good as the first principle of nature, but also as transcending it.

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. — javra

And still contain no information which is beyond observable reality. — Vera Mont

Humans throughout history have conceived of many different possible worlds. Not all these possible worlds which exist among humans as concepts are within the boundaries of observable reality. For one example of this, the monads of Leibniz’s monadology are non-observable. Yet the concept of monadology still holds (non-observable) information.

will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

This, I understand not at all. — Vera Mont

Perceptually focus on any exemplar of animal. Once this exemplar is visualized (or heard, smelled, touched, etc.) either via the imagination or otherwise, it will exclude all other possible exemplars of animal which the concept of “animal” by its very definition encompasses. For example, if the visualized exemplar of “animal” is a bird, this will exclude all dolphins, all insects, all reptiles, etc. Because of this, the concept of animal is itself non-observable, for it includes all individual exemplars of the concept that can be individually observed all at once. And such a thing cannot be seen, nor heard, nor smelled, etc.

----

EDIT: p.s., The same non-observability will apply to all concepts, even those that are far more specific. For example, the concept of a “red apple” will by its very delineation include all possible hews of red, all apple shapes and sizes, and all apple species (which can be in any way any shade of red) all at once—thereby making the concept of “red apple” non-observable when one gets into the nitty-gritty. And any given visualization of a red apple we might find ourselves holding will, then, necessarily exclude all the other possible exemplars of a red apple which the concept necessarily encompasses.

To emphasize: when I previously mentioned that we think and understand perceptions via concepts, but that concepts are in themselves extra-empirical (else non-observable), it is this analysis of concepts that I held in mind. Controversial though I know this can be.

Once this exemplar is visualized (or heard, smelled, touched, etc.) either via the imagination or otherwise, it will exclude all other possible exemplars of animal which the concept of “animal” by its very definition encompasses. — javra

No it doesn't! The concept encompasses the general as well as the particular; domains, classes, orders, families, genera, species, every member thereof as well as the specimen under observation. Concepts begin with the particular and expand up and out. Only the particular is real; the rest of whatever classifications apply are symbolic or imaginary.

The human awareness of other animals did not begin with an idea; it began with individual real entities. The human realized that every example of a certain kind of prey was like every other in some ways in which it was unlike another kind of prey. He then generalized that quarry as 'deer' - because whichever particular deer they killed, there would be enough meat for the clan. If, however, that stone age man went after a mammoth, his strategy would have to be different from the deer-hunting strategy, and this would hold true for all the very large creatures that had long curved tusks and a trunk. But the deer and mammoth had this in common with each other and with rabbits and wild pigs: unlike roots and berries, they resisted being killed, screamed and bled when they were. Kind of like other people....

the grasp of (a) thing's intelligibility involves understanding its species and genus (scholastic sense of the terms), its telos (at least for living things; the healthy adult versions of living beings are phenomenologicaly "present" to us even when observing the immature or diseases for ), and the universals involved with it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The human awareness of other animals did not begin with an idea; it began with individual real entities. The human realized that every example of a certain kind of prey was like every other in some ways in which it was unlike another kind of prey — Vera Mont

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in reality as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.

Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

And he has intuited all this about a mind of which he has not clue#1. Clever man!

when I previously mentioned that we think and understand perceptions via concepts, but that concepts are in themselves extra-empirical (else non-observable).... — javra

@Vera Mont- what Javra says here is similar to 'Kant's answer to Hume'. Kant's response to Hume addressed Hume's skepticism about the ability of human reason to understand the world beyond sensory experience. Hume - the textbook empiricist philosopher - argued that our knowledge is limited to what we can perceive through our senses. He was particularly critical of the notion of causality, claiming that our belief in cause and effect is merely a habit of thought formed by observing repeated associations between events.

Kant agreed that all our knowledge begins with experience, but he disagreed with Hume's conclusion that it therefore arises solely from experience. Kant introduced a critical distinction between the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of understanding (including but not limited to causation), which are necessary for us to interpret sensory information.

According to Kant, these categories are not derived from experience but rather are the preconditions that make experience intelligible in the first place. They are the innate structures of the mind that organize sensory data into coherent perceptions ('percepts'). For example, when we perceive one event following another, our understanding interprets this as causation, allowing us to see one event as causing the other, rather than just as two events occurring sequentially. Thus, Kant argued that Hume's reduction of knowledge to mere sensations and perceptions overlooks the active role of the mind's inherent structures, which underpin experience.

Generally speaking, your posts seem to exhibit a straightforwardly empiricist approach, hence are susceptible to this kind of critique.

:up: You're a fount of interesting book recommendations!

What does "presymbolic language" mean? Isn't all language by the meaning of "language", symbolic in some way? Adding "symbolic" to language, to say that human language is "symbolic language" is just redundancey. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the case of symbolic language symbols stand for something they don't physically resemble and they have no causal relationship with what they signify. A pictograph, for example, resembles what it stands for. Smoke indicates, is a sign for, fire. Animals may have language, that is they emit sounds or perform gestures that might be indicative of danger or an aggressive attitude or their desire to mate, and so on, but those sounds or gestures are signs, not symbols. It is with symbols that generalization and abstract thought becomes possible.

We have body language and musical language which are not symbolic. And in the visual language of painting, for example, the subjects do not symbolize what they resemble or evoke, but represent it.

We have good reason to believe in intelligibilities because it does not seem like they should spring up uncaused or be the sui generis results of a magical human power. We should believe in them particularly from a naturalist frame. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We know things are intelligible to us and to other animals. They need to be intelligible otherwise we and they could not survive. I see intelligibility as being primally and primarily dependent on pattern, on form. It's all about similarities and differences.

I agree that we should understand them from a naturalistic perspective, the whole notion of real, independent transcendent forms or essences is most plausibly a fantasy, I think.

Why not? I see no problem with a man choosing ones wants. That's what we learn how to do in moral training, mastering our habits. — Metaphysician Undercover

The first point is that what is significant to you, what is important to you, conditions your desires. We all have first order desires for pleasure, satisfaction, gratification, stimulation and so on. But in case those desires lead to habits that are unhealthy, they may be countermanded by stronger concerns like personal health, social harmony, or even simply by introjected moral prescriptions and proscriptions.

The second point is that what you desire in the first order sense; food, warmth, shelter, sex, and so on simply is what it is. You are thrown, so to speak, into the midst of these kinds of desires, and some people have stronger desires than others, or a different balance of desires. For example, food might be more important to you than sex. We are also thrown by our educations into the midst of our second order desires. We may be able to cultivate those desires and we each have different capacities for change, for re-inventing ourselves.

The third point is that each person's capacities just are that person's capacities—some are more capable than others at overcoming their compulsions or addictions. Some people simply don't and cannot, feel empathy, for example—they cannot force themselves to care for others, although is they are smart, they may at least be able to bring themselves to act as though they do.

To sum up we are free to act according to the dictates of our natures at any point in our lives, (and the dictates may change with or without our conscious intention) but we do not create ourselves, so the radical libertarian notion of free will and absolute moral responsibility is absurd.

According to Kant, these categories are not derived from experience but rather are the preconditions that make experience intelligible in the first place. — Wayfarer

Where is that "first place" supposed to reside? In the embryo? On the ovum? Surely not in the genes of apes that oh so recently could not philosophize at all? What is the origin of this mind that preconceives?

For example, when we perceive one event following another, our understanding interprets this as causation, — Wayfarer

We fist interpret it as a story. It is not until the same kind of event is followed by the same kind of event repeatedly that we begin to understand cause and effect. (For some people, it can happen with monotonous predictability and they still go on television to say "Nobody could have foreseen this!") Moreover, the intelligent among us observe, experiment and discover whether we ourselves can cause the same thing to happen. That's how we learned to control fire and ride logs down a river and build airplanes.

Generally speaking, your posts seem to exhibit a straightforwardly empiricist approach, hence are susceptible to this kind of critique. — Wayfarer

They're both dead enough not to trouble me overmuch, and they were both smart guys, yet disagreed, so it's possible that they were both wrong about some things that have since become easier to study, like neuroscience.

They're both dead enough not to trouble me overmuch — Vera Mont

Shows.

Just wanted to say I'm in agreement with what you've expressed. ...Including your accolades regarding @Count Timothy von Icarus's posts. :up:

Why thanks! I'm perusing that last title he mentioned even as we speak.

Where is that "first place" supposed to reside? In the embryo? On the ovum? Surely not in the genes of apes that oh so recently could not philosophize at all? What is the origin of this mind that preconceives? — Vera Mont

To even write your response, you're drawing on your innate capacities of reason and speech, which you must have to mount an argument in the first place.

That's what it means.

We first interpret it as a story. It is not until the same kind of event is followed by the same kind of event repeatedly that we begin to understand cause and effect — Vera Mont

It seems an obvious, common-sense answer, but the point is that a dumb animal, for instance, might be likewise 'exposed' to a series of events but never form any idea of a causal relationship, unless in terms of stimulus and response. Our ability to discern cause and effect goes beyond just observing repeated patterns and constructing stories. According to Kant, and an important point even though he might be a dead white male, the concept of causality is a fundamental 'category of the understanding' that we rely on to make sense of our experiences. This isn't merely a habit or a learned response from observing the world; it's a precondition for how we perceive and interact with the world. When we perceive one event following another, it's our mind's inherent structure that compels us to see this sequence as causal. This isn't simply a narrative we construct after the fact; it's an immediate and automatic application of our cognitive faculties. This means that our recognition of cause and effect is not just a result of experience but a lens through which we interpret all experiences, enabling us to engage with the world in a meaningful way.

Now, as per Jacques Maritain's quote, dogs and cats surely perceive some level of causal relations. After all they're highly intelligent species. But they lack the ability to abstract from that to understand general ideas (or ideas generally!) It is that abstractive and intellectual ability, easily taken-for-granted, that differentiates h. sapiens from other species.

I don't agree with them, but that is just a personal preference of mine. — Lionino

All this, I take as evidence that we do not know what "life" is. We seem to believe that there is something called "life", (and it's sort of odd that we name it as a thing, harkening back to "the soul"), but we really do not understand what it means to be alive.

Kant agreed that all our knowledge begins with experience, but he disagreed with Hume's conclusion that it therefore arises solely from experience. Kant introduced a critical distinction between the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of understanding (including but not limited to causation), which are necessary for us to interpret sensory information.

According to Kant, these categories are not derived from experience but rather are the preconditions that make experience intelligible in the first place. They are the innate structures of the mind that organize sensory data into coherent perceptions ('percepts'). For example, when we perceive one event following another, our understanding interprets this as causation, allowing us to see one event as causing the other, rather than just as two events occurring sequentially. Thus, Kant argued that Hume's reduction of knowledge to mere sensations and perceptions overlooks the active role of the mind's inherent structures, which underpin experience. — Wayfarer

I would think that since having these categories is actually having a form of knowledge, then we cannot truthfully say "Kant agreed that all our knowledge begins with experience". There is a bit of inconsistency here, whereby it is necessary to either break knowledge into two types, a priori and a posteriori (such as innate and learned), or else we need to provide different principles for understanding the a priori as something other than knowledge.

The latter, which appears to be the direction you've taken, is a very strenuous task. This course of explanation drives toward the resolution of Plato's "knowledge is recollection" problem. Without a proper separation between the potential for a specific form of knowledge, and actually holding that knowledge, the two become one and the same, with something separating them. So as Plato demonstrates, learning is nothing other than recollection. That produces the problem of infinite regress, and the conclusion that all knowledge has eternal existence.

Aristotle offered a resolution by portraying this as two distinct layers of potentiality. Kant's a priori can be understood as the capacity, or potential for learning. This potentiality underlies all a posteriori, or empirical knowledge, which is describe by Aristotle as the capacity, or potential to act. Notice the two distinct levels of potentialities. Knowledge proper, is the potential to act in a specific way. But in order to act in a specific way, we must first learn how to act in that way. Below this though, supporting it as a foundation, is the capacity, or potential to learn, which is a necessary requirement to learning. This, the lower level capacity to learn, appears to have all the characteristics of being a form of knowledge itself. Learning is a type of acting, so the capacity to learn is itself a capacity to act.

What separates these two forms of potential (two types of knowledge) is a form of activity. That type of activity is described by Aquinas as the creation of habits. This is how the one type of potential, the capacity to learn, becomes the other type of potential, as the capacity to act in a specific learned way. The former "capacity to learn" is the more general, and the latter is to focus the general potential in a more specific way. The importance of habits in the shaping and forming of living beings through evolution is what Lamarck focused on in his evolutionary speculations.

The first point is that what is significant to you, what is important to you, conditions your desires. We all have first order desires for pleasure, satisfaction, gratification, stimulation and so on. But in case those desires lead to habits that are unhealthy, they may be countermanded by stronger concerns like personal health, social harmony, or even simply by introjected moral prescriptions and proscriptions. — Janus

This seems to support my claim rather than yours. Since you name a multitude of types of desires, and the human being must prioritize one over the other in many situations, this seems to support what I said, that we can choose what we want. Please note, that having a general inclination in some way, is not the same as having a want. The want is for something specific an "object". So for example, I may have an emptiness in my stomach producing a general uneasy anxious feeling called "hunger", but this is completely different from the "want" of "I want a hamburger".

The second point is that what you desire in the first order sense; food, warmth, shelter, sex, and so on simply is what it is. — Janus

Notice, that all these so-called "desires" manifest simply as general uncomfortable, or even painful feelings. You only call them "desires" because you assume that there is an object involved. A desire is for something specific, this is the end, or object. The objects of all your mentioned desires, "food, warmth, shelter, sex," are very general. These generalities do not serve as objects at all, in reality. You just mention them as if they do, because it makes your argument. In reality, the desire is for a specific object, and since the person has the choice between many different objects, you can use the general terms, ""food, warmth, shelter, sex,".

Suppose for example, that you have the general feeling which we know as "hunger". This you seem to describe as "the desire for food". Hunger is clearly not the desire for food. It is a feeling within your body having an effect on your mind. The effect is not the general "desire for food", it is the desire to eat something. Then that desire to eat something is turned more specific by the conscious mind, toward the desire to eat a specific thing. The saying, "the desire for food" is simply a feature of the mode of description. Since we observe that the desire to eat something may be satisfied by many different food substances, we can simply call it "the desire for food". However, when hunger, the desire to eat something, actually manifests in the particular circumstances that it does, there is the opportunity for the hungry person to choose from many different food items, so that the feeling of hunger transforms to the want for a specific item, without ever actually being "the desire for food". That generalization is just the way that we describe the reality that the hungry person, the person with that feeling, has the freedom of choice to choose whatever object that one wants, to eat.

The third point is that each person's capacities just are that person's capacities—some are more capable than others at overcoming their compulsions or addictions. Some people simply don't and cannot, feel empathy, for example—they cannot force themselves to care for others, although is they are smart, they may at least be able to bring themselves to act as though they do. — Janus

This is simply a copout, the position of a determinist, fatalist, defeatist. As described in my reply to wayfarer above, a person's capacities are multilayered. And, through habit forming we are very able to shape and direct our capacities. This is because they are based in the most general, yet are actualized in the most particular, as in my description of hunger above. Because there are layers, and the opportunity of choice at each layer, and what is formed at the higher level is a further capacity, we very clearly have the ability to shape and form our own capacities. This for example is what we do when we grow up from childhood to being an adult, we shape our capacities in the directions that we choose, and eventually take on a career. And this ability to shape our capacities continues through our lives.