Well duh! The issue should not be whether animals have consciousness, but do we give a toss? But this is better than nothing i guess. Hasn't the scientific community got this far ages ago with fish? Jury is still out regarding Palestinians and Africans.

It might be overdue, and it might be obvious, but the fact that it's being said is significant in my view. My dear other has been reading a non-fiction book about settlers in our part of the world - Blue Mountains Australia - who used to mount hunting parties where they would shoot absolutely anything they could - platypus, koalas, native bird species of all kinds. They had no regard for animal cruelty at all.

Does anyone in the west think that animals are soulless automatons nowadays? From that whole discussion around Descartes that we had, it seemed that that wasn't close to a dominant view even centuries ago.

Is NYU running out of things to do?

Well, I thought it was meaningful. That’s why I posted it. I guess I must have misjudged the ambient cynicism.

People generally prefer to recognize difference over similarity. It feeds the ego and cultivates the superiority complex derived form the person's denial, or refusal to accept oneself as a very small part of a very large whole. Brute or savage, same difference.

I think it's significant they're taking insect consciousness seriously. I don't remember hearing anything about that when I was getting my degree thirty years ago.

Mind of a Bee is pretty cool.

:up:

Mind of a Bee is pretty cool. — Patterner

Dammit! Stop making me think that I need to read that book.

Which book? Do you mean
Mind of a Bee
Mind of a Bee
Mind of a Bee
Mind of a Bee
Mind of a Bee
?

:rage:

My bad.

Well, I thought it was meaningful. That’s why I posted it. I guess I must have misjudged the ambient cynicism. — Wayfarer

My first reaction was very similar to bert1's. But then I realized you're right: just knowing something, or considering it obvious isn't enough to convince people who prefer to deny it. For a very long time, the official stance of the scientific community, as well as the food industry, fur trade, sport hunting, etc., was that all other species exist for us to use in any way we like. That belief is not necessarily shared by people with no personal vested interest in experimentation, meat, fashion or cosmetics businesses - but we choose not to think about it when buying their products - like canned meat, booties and medicine for our pets... We are a species of supremely capable hypocrites and double-thinkers.

It's good to have an authoritative voice speak up for our suffering fellow creatures. Also, a public announcement means it will get some mass media attention. If it helps even a few people adjust their perspective even a little bit, then it helps.

Dammit! Stop making me think that I need to read that book. — wonderer1

Or, there is a very nice documentary
While you're in the library, pick up The Earth Dwellers

Or, there is a very nice documentary — Vera Mont

Unfortunately, Youtube says the video is unavailable.

Probably international copyright disputes again. It's a CBC production, can probably be seen on other venues. But never mind, You Tube has a whole bunch of goodies.

:up:

Beautiful cinematography.

Thank you very much for this information. I think that the attempt of these scientists is remarkable, especially because they compromise their seriousness by involving themselves in a field that is extremely important, but also very confused and exposed to criticism. I think it is an important sign of a cultural sensitivity that we are getting more and more in last decades.

I believe it would be useful to clarify the points that can cause confusion.

The core basis of the declaration is in the few lines paragraph that starts with “What is consciousness?”:

What is consciousness? The term has a variety of meanings. The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness focuses on one important meaning, sometimes called “phenomenal consciousness” or “sentience.” The question here is which animals can have subjective experiences. This can include sensory experiences (say, the experience of a particular touch, taste, sight, or smell) as well as experiences that feel good or bad (say, the experience of pleasure, pain, hope, or fear). This sense of the term “consciousness” is what Thomas Nagel had in mind when he famously asked “What is it like to be a bat?”.

Essentially they say that what consciousness is is completely unclear. Their ultimate reference point is Nagel’s famous article, which doesn’t clarify anything, remains ambiguous, so that, at the end, these scientists have no idea of what they are talking about in their declaration. I am saying this not to ridiculise these scientists, but, on the contrary, to point out their courage, as I said.

I think that the essential reference point in talking about consciousness is the dialectic relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. This is what is never clarified by Nagel, nor by these scientists, nor by anybody else, as far as I know in my quite limited bunch of information on the topic.

The paragraph I mentioned “What is consciousness?” is confused exactly because it mixes and messes up references to objectivity and subjectivity in trying to explain what consciousness is.

If consciousness is an objective phenomenon, it coincides with Chalmer’s “easy problem of consciousness”. As a consequence of this, suffering does not exist, since it is just a series of physical and chemical reactions happening in our body, that has been programmed by nature to favour our survival. This means, for example, that, when a human is tortured, nobody is suffering, what we have is just a series of objective, mechanical, material, measurable phenomenons, the same way when you hit a computer that has been programmed to show signs of suffering, actually nobody is really suffering, despite whatever that computer has been made able to show: it is just a “show”, there is not any actual “somebody” suffering inside that computer. This means that, even when I feel bad, I feel pain, I must interpret it the same way: I am just a theatre where a show happens. Any feelings, pain, suffering, desperation of mine, has to be considered by myself just as mechanical phenomenons. When I am suffering, actually nobody is suffering. This coincides with certain metaphysical constructions that we can find in spiritualities and religions, where everything is explained in terms of a system that works as a whole, despite its complex, diversified or even conflicting and opposing components.

For some unexplained and inexplicable reason, we humans talk also about subjectivity, which coincides with Chalmer’s “hard problem of consciousness”. To the extent that it is exactly “subjectivity”, it cannot be explained and it has to be impossible to explain it. When we explain something, even when I explain something to myself, we can’t escape using shared concepts and reference points. To the extent that they are shared, they are not entirely subjective anymore. This means that, whenever we talk about subjectivity, we cannot escape turning it automatically into an objective concept made and expressed by objective and shared reference points, so that what we are talking about is not anymore the subjectivity we wanted to explain. This meets Wittgestein’s statement “What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”. According to Wittgestein and to what I said, we must give up any attempt to talk about subjectivity. I disagree with this, because language is not exclusively objective and shared, otherwise art wouldn’t exist, it wouldn’t make sense. Actually there are people who think that art can be entirely reduced to objective phenomenons. This coincides with people who answered Chalmers that a “hard problem of consciousness” does not exist. The same way it is not possible to give evidence of the existence of consciousness meant as subjectivity: if such evidence exists, as those scientists agree in the declaration, then it is not subjectivity anymore, it is objectivity.

I don’t think we can build any morality, as the declaration tries to do, basing on an objectivistic interpretation of consciousness. They wrote

“Third, when there is a realistic possibility of conscious experience in an animal, it is irresponsible to ignore that possibility in decisions affecting that animal”.

Why is it irresponsible? In a mentality that relies on objectivity, a stone that has been broken into small pieces is not something worse than when it was intact, just in one whole piece. The same way an animal, or a human, or a plant, that has been torn in pieces, it doesn’t matter how much “suffering” has been caused, is not something worse than a living being happily enjoying their life. At the end, this is what our cruel universe shows us, not caring at all if our minuscule planet Earth exists or not.

At the end, we can see that the declaration, by talking about “irresponsibility”, tries to create a scientific basis upon which to build some kind of morality, which is destined to failure, because morality, by definition, cannot be scientific.

Fortunately the declaration is confused, because it contains references to subjectivity as well. They just don’t realize that subjectivity cannot and mustn’t be proved. As I said, if we prove it, then it is not subjectivity.

I think that, if we want to include references to subjectivity in our minds, talks, discussions, mentalities, we need to stop with Wittgestein’s mentality and accept that language and philosophy have to accept and welcome their ability to refer to unprovable things and concepts. We need to welcome the methods and styles that are typical of art, poetry, music, and accept the fact that frequently, when somebody asks us to give evidence and clarity of what we are talking about, we cannot give it, they cannot claim evidence and clarity as something always essential, always required and necessary.

In other words, we need to integrate analytical philosophy, which wants clarity and objectivity, with continental philosophy, that accepts to venture into unprovable concepts.

Looks a fascinating read.

It's good to have an authoritative voice speak up for our suffering fellow creatures — Vera Mont

My thoughts too.

They just don’t realize that subjectivity cannot and mustn’t be proved. — Angelo Cannata

I take your point, but I think they kind of acknowledge that:

It would be inappropriate to talk about “proof,” “certainty,” or “conclusive evidence” in the search for animal consciousness, because the nature of consciousness is still hotly contested. However, it is entirely appropriate to interpret these remarkable displays of learning, memory, planning, problem-solving, self-awareness, and other such capacities as evidence of consciousness in cases where the same behavior, if found in a human or other mammal, would be well explained by conscious processing.

This means that, whenever we talk about subjectivity, we cannot escape turning it automatically into an objective concept made and expressed by objective and shared reference points, so that what we are talking about is not anymore the subjectivity we wanted to explain. — Angelo Cannata

Quite agree, and also agree that it is something that cannot be explained.

Quite agree, and also agree that it is something that cannot be explained. — Wayfarer

Do we need to explain or prove the value of life or freedom or happiness before we grant people the right to it? We don't all have one another's subjective experience and we have not required that to understand that we have these experiences in common. How do we know? Because we see ourselves in one another. We see ourselves in the actions and reactions of other species, too.

Do we need to explain or prove the value of life or freedom or happiness before we grant people the right to it? — Vera Mont

No, we don't. That is Angelo's point, as I understood it.

I guess I didn't understand it. I didn't discern confusion. I thought they simply resolved to put aside the controversy - that is, the conflict between acknowledging what our senses perceive and the convenient pretense of vested interests that treat other species as inanimate objects. We've been through all this with the characterization of non-Europeans, non-Christians, non-males, non-heterosexuals as "other" and therefore subject to abuse.

Notice that the background statement acknowledges that definitions of consciousness are ‘hotly contested’. That is an allusion to the debate over ‘the problem of consciousness’, initiated by David Chalmers, who is also one of the signatories. The philosophical is that consciousness seems to escape or transcend any objective description or analysis. But that is strongly opposed by those like Daniel Dennett (whose obituary has just been published in the NY Times by the way.) According to him and his ilk, if something can’t be described or understood in scientific terms, then it ought not to be considered worthy of analysis.

Where I see this statement as being philosophically significant, is precisely because it acknowledges the capacity for experience as something inherently real and worthy of recognition. True, none of us act as if animals are machines, but the mechanistic metaphor still holds considerable sway over the scientific attitude.

Peter Wohleben, a career forester has a very well written, bestselling book called "The Hidden life of Trees: What they feel, How they communicate". In it he talks as if trees act with intention, and he describes how trees communicate with each other through electrical impulses that travel through mycelium which grow around their roots. The electrical impulses of trees have now been studied scientifically.

To communicate through the network, trees send chemical, hormonal and slow-pulsing electrical signals, which scientists are just beginning to decipher. Edward Farmer at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland has been studying the electrical pulses, and he has identified a voltage-based signaling system that appears strikingly similar to animal nervous systems (although he does not suggest that plants have neurons or brains). Alarm and distress appear to be the main topics of tree conversation, although Wohlleben wonders if that’s all they talk about. “What do trees say when there is no danger and they feel content? This I would love to know.” Monica Gagliano at the University of Western Australia has gathered evidence that some plants may also emit and detect sounds, and in particular, a crackling noise in the roots at a frequency of 220 hertz, inaudible to humans. — Smithonian

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-whispering-trees-180968084/

Wohleben now has a book called "The Inner Life of Animals: Love, Grief, and Compassion: Surprising Observations of a Hidden World". If it's as good as the tree one, it's well worth the read.

:up:

According to him and his ilk, if something can’t be described or understood in scientific terms, then it ought not to be considered worthy of analysis. — Wayfarer

Therefore, in his school of thought, all humans are also eligible for protein, slave labour, spare parts and experimentation without their consent?

Notice that the background statement acknowledges that definitions of consciousness are ‘hotly contested’. — Wayfarer

I get the contest between conscience and self-interest. I don't get the separate categorization of equally inexplicable consciousnesses.

Therefore, in his school of thought, all humans are also eligible for protein, slave labour, spare parts and experimentation without their consent? — Vera Mont

That would appear to be entailed by his philosophy, however despite arguing for it all throughout his career, he never actually behaved as if it were true. It is one of the many glaring contradictions in his writing. 'He was a Darwinian materialist in his cosmology and metaphysics while also strongly affirming human dignity as well as a progressive brand of liberalism in his ethics and politics. Herein lies the massive contradiction of his system of thought. He boldly proclaims that we live in an accidental universe without divine and natural support for the special dignity of man as a species or as individuals; yet he retains a sentimental attachment to liberal-democratic values that lead him to affirm a humane society that respects the rights of persons and protects the weak from exploitation by the strong and from other injustices. He also objects to B. F. Skinner and the sociobiologists for reducing man to the desires for pleasure, power, and procreation. And he condemned Social Darwinism as "an odious misapplication of Darwin's thinking" and expressed outrage at child abuse, the exploitation of women, and President George W Bush's attempt to rewrite the Geneva Convention's definition of torture as violations of personal dignity. In short, he was a conventional political liberal of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, type whose moral doctrine is a version of neo-Kantian liberalism that assumes the inherent worth and dignity of every human being. But none of this follows logically from his Darwinian materialism and it even contradicts it, which means Dennett's humane liberalism is a blind leap of faith that is just as dogmatic as the religious faith he deplored.'

There's a lovely lyric in the late, great David Crosby's last hit song, River Rise:

'and the wind has its own language
spoken by the trees.'

(Our personal 2023 Song of the Year.)

That would appear to be entailed by his philosophy, however despite arguing for it all throughout his career, he never actually behaved as if it were true. — Wayfarer

Why has anybody got any use for him? Seems like just another blowhard talking through his....hat.

True, none of us act as if animals are machines, but the mechanistic metaphor still holds considerable sway over the scientific attitude. — Wayfarer

As compared to what? The religious attitude?

Can you hear the bigotry in the phrase "the scientific attitude"? Do you not recognize scientists as individuals?

Can you hear the bigotry in the phrase "the scientific attitude"? — wonderer1

Yes, poor choice of words. I meant scientific worldview, although you might say there is no such thing - and I agree, as science is more a method than a worldview. But Daniel Dennett was one who truly did hold the 'the scientific worldview' as the only real philosophy.